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This thesis seeks to demonstrate that a dialectical motif 
of power runs paradigmatically throughout Dietrich Bonhoeffer's 
theology, finding its ultimate expression in his theology of the 
cross. Power and weakness serve as a matrix through which 
Bonhoeffer approached life. Thus, what began as an implicit 
theological category for him gradually became an intentionally 
explicit motif, the terms of which gained their meaning increas­
ingly according to Luther's theologia crucis.
By examining how power and weakness manifest themselves 
dialectically in his understanding of God, humanity, and sin, one 
can see how Bonhoeffer offers a fresh understanding of divine and 
human power, and how these concepts gain renewed meaning 
methodologically and materially according to Luther's theologia 
crucis. Because of this sustained analysis of the meaning of 
power in Bonhoeffer's theology, we then examine his notion of the 
"arcane discipline" as a viable model for power in contemporary 
theology. Having ascertained the meaning associated with 
Bonhoeffer's dialectical concept of human and divine power, the 
ethical ramifications of his theological concept are discussed.
In so doing, Bonhoeffer's novel definition and model of power 
yield a new theological and ethical language from within its 
overa11 structure.
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. . . [B]ut God has chosen the foolish things of the
world to shame the wise, and God has chosen the weak 
things of the world to shame the things which are 




Living, or rather dying and being damned make a 
theologian, not understanding, reading or speculat­
ing. 1
Martin Luther's famous words in the Heidelberg Disputation 
of 1518 indicate his stand against the reigning scholastic 
theology of the day. Little did one Lutheran pastor and
theologian, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, four hundred years later, 
recognize the apposite nature such words would have for his own 
life. The theolocria crucis made a claim in both men's lives in 
ways that has set them apart within the Christian tradition.
In Luther's case, his momentous discovery of the 'righteous­
ness of God' (iustitia Dei) was a battlecry against the prevail­
ing theologians of the day. Underlying his fresh interpretation 
of God's righteousness lay a critique so radical that it was to 
separate him irreversibly from his theological contemporaries. 
Luther boldly took on the theologians of the via moderna. 
challenging the very essence and method of their enterprise with 
his opposing notion of a "theology of the cross."
He took aim at the prevailing theological method of the day 
which upheld the use of analogy in determining the meaning of 
theological concepts. His complaint was specifically targeted 
against the human concept of righteousness (iustitia) providing 
the definitive analogy for determining the nature and meaning of 
divine righteousness. His critique of the analogical method was
1 Martin Luther, Qperationes in Psalmos. (1519), Weimar 
Ausqabe. 5, 163, 28.
of such a thorough-going nature that it extended to analogous 
determination of all divine attributes. Hence, his opposition 
to the view that an essential underlying continuity remains 
between human and divine understandings of other divine attri­
butes such as "wisdom" (sapientia), "power" (virtus), etc.2
Luther opposed the methodology of analogy with the dialectic 
between opus alienum (God's alien work) and opus proprium (God's 
proper work)— God's works being hidden "under the form of their 
opposite" fabscondita sub contrario). For him, theological 
concepts gain their meaning in terms that are contrary to 
conventional human reason. This basic theological principle 
points to one source as authoritative for determining Christian 
discourse— the cross. Crux probat omnia! All theological 
language is subject to criticism on this basis. For Luther, the 
sufferings of Christ on the cross came to constitute the center 
and foundation of Christian theology. Thus, the father of 
Lutheranism pointed away from the principle of analogy toward the 
principle of hiddenness of God in his revelation, which is 
supremely expressed in the cross of Christ.
Luther believed human preconceptions about God are so 
confused and unreliable they must be shattered in order for a 
right understanding to occur. The cross stands between the gulf 
of human misconceived predispositions and the revealed God. 
There is no other locus by which one may rightly understand God. 
While this insight was initially linked to his early difficulties 
concerning the predication of human concepts of righteousness to 
God, his resolution of the dilemma was essentially method­
12
2 Alister E. McGrath, Luther's Theology of the Cross. 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993), pp. 153-161.
ological, and came to be extended to every divine attribute.3 
With his method of abscondita sub contrario. therefore, Luther 
came to speak of God's power revealed most clearly in weakness, 
God's wisdom manifest in terms humanity would deem foolish, and 
divine glory making its appearance in shame and suffering. 
Taking his cue from Paul in I Corinthians 1:18-31, the cross 
became his hermeneutical guide as well as theological content, 
as can be seen in the nomenclature assigned to his enterprise—  
the theology of the cross.
As a theologian of the cross, the existential dimension to 
this theological methodology manifest itself in Luther's personal 
life. A theologia crucis is not the type of theology which can 
be embraced or accepted in an academic sense only. It is an 
enterprise which takes hold in the life of the theologian. In 
Luther's case, his battle with a guilty conscience during his 
days in the monastery was an insufferable duel, the personal 
crisis, or force, which led to his theological breakthrough. In 
no uncertain terms, he described the nature of his personal 
struggle:
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Though I lived as a monk without reproach, I felt that 
I was a sinner before God with an extremely disturbed 
conscience. I could not believe that he was placated 
by my satisfaction. I did not love, yes, I hated the 
righteous God who punishes sinners, and secretly, if 
not blasphemously, certainly murmuring greatly, I was 
angry with God, and said, 'As if, indeed, it is not 
enough, that miserable sinners, eternally lost through 
original sin, are crushed by every kind of calamity by 
the law of the decalogue, without having God add pain 
to pain by the gospel and also by the gospel threaten­
ing us with a fierce and troubled conscience.'4
3 McGrath, ibid.. p. 160.
4 Lewis W. Spitz "Preface to the Complete Edition of 
Luther's Latin Writings," Luther's Works. Vol. 34, Career of the 
Reformer: I V . ed. and trans. by Lewis W. Spitz, (Philadelphia:
Fortunately for Luther, a fresh understanding of God's righteous­
ness as it is discussed in Romans paved the way for a transformed 
theological insight, and the Church has not been the same since.
Four hundred years later, Dietrich Bonhoeffer's life and 
theology evidenced him as a theologian of the cross as well. One 
can look to his theological works and immediately find tell-tale 
signs of a theologia crucis— for example, life under the cross 
as described in The Cost of Discipleship. and God's suffering and 
weakness in the world according to his Letters and Papers from 
Prison. However, Bonhoeffer, like Luther, had mitigating 
influences in his life which had a great deal to do with the 
terms of his theology and the way they developed throughout his 
lif e .
Living to see two world wars (1906-1945), Bonhoeffer 
observed and experienced first hand the military and political 
upheaval which characterized Germany at the time. He saw the 
rise of Hitler to power in 1933 and the consequent ramifications 
of his rule as chancellor over Germany. He witnessed the growing 
influence of extreme conservative right-wing politics and the 
eventual hunting, deportation, and extermination of Jews by the 
Nazis. He was a brilliant theologian with much promise and 
potential at Berlin University. He pastored in London, Spain, 
and Germany, and served as director of a clandestine seminary in 
Finkenwalde.
He studied abroad in the United States, traveled extensively 
during his involvement in the ecumenical movement, was a leader 
in the Church Struggle (Kirchenkampf), identifying himself with 
the Confessing Church. He is now well known for having joined
14
Muhlenberg Press, 1976), pp. 336ff.
with the political conspiracy against Hitler, a commitment for 
which he was imprisoned and eventually executed. Despite his 
premature death, Bonhoeffer's life was a full one, shaped by 
numerous influences, challenges, obstacles and opportunities, and 
all of these, needless to say, had a great deal to do with the 
way his theology was shaped and came to expression.
Another influence of a different order, however, affected 
Bonhoeffer's life and theology in a distinctive way. He 
struggled with power throughout his life, from his childhood days 
on. Eberhard Bethge, Bonhoeffer's best friend and biographer, 
related that Bonhoeffer's "whole life was a struggle to come to 
terms with his own power over others." The following is an 
excerpt of a recent interview with Bethge in which he recounts 
how Bonhoeffer struggled with power in his life:
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[Bonhoeffer's] whole life was a struggle to come to 
terms with his own power over others. And in the end 
he accepted it as a gift. . . . In a way, his return­
ing from America in 1939 solved, or was a great 
contribution to solving, that problem. In America he 
would have continued and continued his own power. He 
would have become a great theological teacher, a great 
friend of all of them there. But it would have been 
a continuation of his own growing power. So, his 
whole biography is from promising, highest claims and 
highest possibilities. He wrote his dissertation 
earlier than anyone else, he was always open to 
becoming a professor, full professor in Berlin— the 
main place of theology in Germany in those days. 
Everything was open to him. Then his biography is one 
of reducing and reducing, going back, into nothing. 
He became nothing, not a bishop, not a professor. He 
became nothing, nothing.
He would have become a professor, of course, as 
soon as possible, in 1939 in America if he would have 
stayed. But that would have aggravated his problem of 
power. So he came back. He decided to go back into 
that place where there was no prospect of a great 
career. But he gave his power in the service of 
others. In the form of his contribution to becoming 
a member of the conspiracy. Something which was, from 
his earlier point of view, absolutely impossible. The 
pacifist became a putschist. That is the background 
out of which he could say after coming back here, in
16
a letter he wrote to me, "No repetitions of trist- 
itia.11 From that point on, not only in his theology, 
but in his life, he had made a step of no return in 
the service of others, with others.
Indeed, in some very honest letters, Bonhoeffer related how 
as a child and a young adult he struggled with ambition and a 
self-centered egotism. This struggle with "power over others" 
was the cause of Bonhoeffer's occasional bouts with depression. 
The earthly right of the stronger was a theme he held fast to, 
yet struggled with throughout his life. This was his personal 
struggle, and it is interesting to see these same terms reflected 
paradigmatically in his theology.6
Power over others and the weakness of the overpowered— this 
theme manifest itself as a dialectical motif in Bonhoeffer's life 
as he struggled to come to terms with his strong personality. 
This self-acknowledged temptation toward ambition and a propensi­
ty to "step over" others plagued him even when the director of 
the seminary at Finkenwalde.7 Not until his decision the summer 
of 1939 to return from the States to Germany, and a most uncer­
tain future, did Bonhoeffer finally come to terms with it in his 
decision to give his "power" in the service of others. His
5 Interview with Eberhard Bethge conducted on Saturday, 
November 20, 1993, at his home in Wachtberg, Germany. See 
Appendix I. Bethge, to whom Bonhoeffer begueathed his theologi­
cal library, is 84 years old now. He retired after having served 
as a pastor in Germany for several years.
6 See Appendix I which elaborates on this point, esp. pp. 
308-11.
7 In his interview of 20 November, 1993, Bethge recounted 
how seminary students were drawn to Bonhoeffer and his strong 
persona, ceding him more authority and influence in the formation 
of their theological beliefs and ideals than he liked. It was 
a continued source of frustration for Bonhoeffer, which sometimes 
led to depression. He found he had to hold himself back from 
unduly influencing the young minds of those students who took to 
him. See Appendix I, p. 308.
collaboration with the political conspirators represents that 
selfless service.
The dialectical motif of power and weakness, thus, was an 
implicit category around which Bonhoeffer's theology came to 
expression manifesting itself explicitly throughout his life and 
theology, in parallel fashion. Further, as a dialectic, these 
terms increasingly gained their meaning and reached resolution 
in his theology of the cross.
Examination of the way Bonhoeffer utilized and understood 
the terms "power" and "weakness" throughout his theology yields 
new insight and meaning into basic categories of his thought. 
His personal struggle with power constantly gave way to a 
sacrificial service for others, indeed, "giv[ing] his power in 
the service of others," reflecting a life and theology whose 
contours clearly reflected Luther's theolooia crucis.
In some respects, Luther's personal struggle was the 
opposite of Bonhoeffer's. For Luther, his guilty conscience and 
ceaseless sense of never satisfying God drove him to Romans and 
a theological breakthrough which brought him peace. For 
Bonhoeffer, an overconfident ego and drive toward ambition and 
self-advancement caused occasional depression, driving him to 
learn from the Bible and those around him the fulfillment of 
service to others. Further, Bonhoeffer's personal struggle is 
not tied to a major theological "breakthrough" of Luther's 
proportion. Whereas the guilty conscience in Luther stands out 
as an intentional and explicit category in his theological 
agenda, the dialectic of power and weakness in Bonhoeffer began 
as an implicit theological category— stemming from a basic 
struggle in life— and gradually became more explicit as an
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intentional theological category as it came to take on meaning 
according to Luther's theologia crucis.
Despite these differences, both men are to be understood in 
relation to one another primarily as theologians of the cross. 
Like Luther before him, Bonhoeffer heralded a new kind of 
theological language, a turn toward a new understanding of 
theological concepts. It would be a "non-religious," or 
"secular" use of theological language. In his letters from 
prison he made it clear that a theology of the cross was the 
"starting point" for this new theological language. To many, 
scholar and layperson alike, this is as far as he got with his 
novel theological formulae. As a result of our examination into 
Bonhoeffer's life and theology, however, we shall see how his 
dialectical understanding of power and weakness came to yield a 
new language therein, whose terms and concepts gained meaning 
increasingly according to Luther's theologia crucis.
Given that both men's life and theologies as a whole point 
to a theologia crucis. what does one mean, specifically, by 
referring to Luther and Bonhoeffer as theologians of the cross? 
Five characteristics repeatedly come to the fore,8 distinguishing 
this kind of theology from others:
(1 ) the theologia crucis is a theology of revelation, 
which stands in sharp contrast to speculation. God has re­
vealed himself, and it is the task of the theologian to be 
concerned with God as he has chosen to reveal himself, 
instead of constructing preconceived notions of God which 
ultimately must be destroyed.
18
8 See Walther von Loewenich, Luther's Theology of the Cross, 
trans. Herbert J.A. Bouman, 5th ed. , (Minneapolis: Augsburg
Publishing House, 1982), pp. 17-24; Alister McGrath, op. cit. . 
PP. 148-152.
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(2) this revelation is indirect and concealed. A 
direct knowledge of God is not possible, we see only his 
"rearparts," the posteriori Dei.9
(3) this revelation is to be recognized in the suffer­
ings and the cross of Christ, rather than in human moral 
activity or the created order. For Luther, the cross of 
Christ and the cross of the Christian belong together.10
(4) this indirect knowledge of God which is concealed 
in the humility and shame of the cross is a matter of 
faith. For Luther, the "theologian of the cross" is one 
who, through faith, discerns the presence of the hidden God 
in his revelation in Christ and his passion and cross. 
Thus, the concept of the hidden God (deus absconditus) lies 
at the center of the theology of the cross.11
(5) God is particularly known through suffering. A 
fundamental contention of the theoloqia crucis is not 
merely that God is known through suffering, but that God 
makes himself known through suffering.
These are the interrelating themes of Luther's cross­
centered theology, the matrix out of which Luther and Bonhoeffer 
came to understand the theological enterprise.
9 McGrath rightly points out that this aspect of the 
theology of the cross is one of the most difficult to understand. 
In elucidating the concept he points to Thesis 20 of Luther's 
Heidelberg Disputations as the key: "although it is indeed God 
who is revealed in the passion and the cross of Christ, he is not 
immediately recognisable as God. Those who expect a direct 
revelation of the face of God are unable to discern him in his 
revelation, precisely because it is the posteriora Dei which are 
made visible in this revelation. In that it is God who is made 
known in the passion and cross of Christ, it is revelation; in 
that this revelation can only be discerned by the eye of faith, 
it is concealed. The 'friends of the cross' know that beneath 
the humility and shame of the cross lie concealed the power and 
glory of God— but to others, this insight is denied." McGrath, 
op. cit.. pp. 149-150.
10 Von Loewenich, op. cit. . p. 2 0 .
11 McGrath, o p . cit. . p. 150. John 14:8,9 in the New 
Testament serves as one of the two pericopes Luther referred to 
in order to illustrate this particular point: Phillip says, 
"Lord, show us the Father." And Jesus' reply, "...whoever has 
seen me has seen the Father."
Purpose and Structure of Thesis
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This thesis seeks to demonstrate that a dialectical motif 
of power runs paradigmatically throughout Bonhoeffer's theology, 
finding its ultimate expression in his theology of the cross. 
Although Bonhoeffer did not intend a programmatic definition of 
power in his theology, power and weakness serve as a crucial 
matrix through which he viewed life and the terms in which he 
understood it. What began as an implicit theological category 
for him, therefore, gradually became an intentionally explicit 
motif, the terms of which gained their meaning increasingly 
according to Luther's theologia crucis.
This study divides analysis of Bonhoeffer's thematic of 
power into four chapters. The first three chapters document the 
way he articulated his understanding of God, humanity, and sin 
dialectically in terms of power and weakness. While Chapter One 
shows how he increasingly understood and came to describe God in 
terms of weakness, suffering, and rejection, Chapter Two shows 
how his anthropology reached its full expression in terms of 
strength and autonomy. These two chapters, taken together, most 
fully reveal the way Bonhoeffer came to define divine and human 
power in terms of divine powerlessness. Chapter Three shows how 
Bonhoeffer went beyond Luther's systematic definition of sin by 
articulating its concrete, ethical contours in terms of the abuse 
or misuse of power over others.
By looking at the way power and weakness manifest themselves 
dialectically in his understanding of God, humanity, and sin, we 
are able to see how Bonhoeffer offers a fresh understanding of 
divine and human power, and how these concepts gain renewed 
meaning methodologically and materially according to Luther's
theolocri a crucis. Because of this sustained analysis of power's 
meaning in Bonhoeffer's theology in the first three chapters, we 
then examine his notion of the 'arcane discipline' as a viable 
model for power in contemporary theology in Chapter Four. 
Ascertaining the terms and meaning associated with Bonhoeffer's 
dialectical concept of human and divine power illuminates the 
ethical ramifications of his theological concept. In this way, 
Chapter Four shows how Bonhoeffer's novel definition and model 
of power yield a new theological and ethical language from within 
its overall structure.12
The State of Bonhoeffer Scholarship
In the last six years scholarship has focused on Bon­
hoeffer's late work. In 1988 at the Fifth International 
Bonhoeffer Society Conference in Amsterdam scholars took an in- 
depth look at Bonhoeffer's incomplete Ethics. pushing forward 
with novel methodological theories and fresh insight into his 
ethical agenda. The results of this conference have been 
published in the volume Bonhoeffer's Ethics: Old Europe and New
Frontiers.13 Four years later, the 1992 Sixth International 
Conference chose for its theme "Bonhoeffer's Legacy for the 
Future: Responsibility in a New World." Out of that conference,
21
12 This thesis restricts its focus to the most fundamental 
social aspect of power as it is discussed in Bonhoeffer's 
theology, i.e, the sociality of power between persons and within 
the Church. Because this study seeks to uncover the basic 
sociality underlying Bonhoeffer's understanding of power, it does 
not address the ramifications of Bonhoeffer's thoughts on civil 
or state power.
13 Guy Carter, Rene Van Eyden, H.D. Van Hoogstraten, and 
Jurjen Wiersma eds., Kampen, Netherlands: Kok Pharos Publishing
House, 1991.
one theme which repeatedly came to the fore was the significance 
of Bonhoeffer's theology of the cross in a world come of age. 
Scholars from nations all over the world, such as Latin America, 
Canada, Holland and America all highlighted the significance of 
Bonhoeffer's notion of the weak, powerless God in today's modern 
world and how the academy as well as the church must proceed if 
it is to determine the way God is present in the world today.
These conferences have led students, clergy, professors and 
lay-persons alike to explore some of the more provocative themes 
of Bonhoeffer's late thought. The powerlessness of God in the 
world is one of those themes, one which this study builds on and 
hopes to further dialogue. Three scholars in particular have 
pushed Bonhoeffer studies forward by demonstrating the concrete 
connection between his theology of the cross and the way "power" 
figures into his thought: Clifford J. Green, Larry Rasmussen and
Geffrey B. Kelly. Twenty years ago, Clifford Green decisively 
demonstrated human power as the specific soteriological problem 
in Bonhoeffer's early theology.14 Engaging in a theological 
analysis of power in Bonhoeffer's early theology, he argued that 
it must be understood as a "theology of sociality." By examining 
some recurrent passages, all having to do with the problem of 
power, Green demonstrated how Bonhoeffer's theological writings 
on the problem of power have an autobiographical dimension. 
Thanks to his work on Bonhoeffer's early thought, Green not only 
demonstrated conclusively the need to weigh Bonhoeffer's life and 
theology together, but he showed the legitimacy of "power" as a 
theological concept within the corpus. As Green performed in his
22
14 See Clifford Green, The Sociality of Christ and Humanity. 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Early Theology. 1927-1933. (Missoula 
Montana: Scholars Press, 1975), esp. pp. 145-177.
work, we shall demonstrate how Bonhoeffer's life illuminated his 
theology without it becoming a form of psychological reduction- 
ism.
Up until Green's work, Christology had long been thought 
central to Bonhoeffer's theology much to the exclusion of other 
theological categories. By demonstrating the close relationship 
between Bonhoeffer's theological anthropology and Christology, 
Green pointed to a new hermeneutical rubric by which to under­
stand the early theology. In this thesis we would like to carry 
Green's work one step further in two ways. First, we shall build 
on his notion of the sociality of Bonhoeffer's theological 
enterprise, by holding that the specific nature of this 
sociality lies in the way Luther's theology of the cross comes 
to expression throughout Bonhoeffer's theology. Secondly, while 
Green jump started Bonhoeffer studies by proving power as the 
specific soteriological problem in the early theology, we shall 
demonstrate how power as a controlling motif develops and gains 
its meaning dialectically, throughout the entire theological 
corpus. In this way, we will prove the inherent connection 
between Bonhoeffer's concept of power and his theology of the 
cross.
Larry Rasmussen, in his recent book Dietrich Bonhoeffer—  
His Significance for North Americans15 highlights the need for 
power analysis in theology and ethics, pointing to Bonhoeffer's 
theology of the cross as the authoritative guide for such an 
agenda. He has forwarded the agenda for theology and ethics with 
provocative questions which have guided his own inquiry:
23
15 Larry Rasmussen with Renate Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer—  
His Significance for North Americans. (Minneapolis: Fortress
Press, 1990) .
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It is not clear what the relationship of human and 
divine power in our time is. What does [the] sentence 
actually mean, theologically--"the ordering of all 
life is shifting in a sense from God to humanity"?16 
What does it mean in moral terms? What is the nature 
of God's presence now? Or, to respect the testimony 
of many, what is the nature of God's absence now? Is 
God's presence and/or absence different from ages in 
which human beings held less power and had less impact 
on the world of which they were a part? In short, 
what are we to make of divine and human power in our 
time, as "God-talk" and as "ethics-talk"?17
Rasmussen has done an excellent job introducing the multi-farious 
topic of divine and human power and weaving it together with 
Bonhoeffer's thoughts on the topic. The next step is to engage 
his analysis and see how we might forward the dialogue.
I agree with Rasmussen that what we need at the moment is 
not critique but "conceptual clarity and promising paths for this 
formidable subject [of power].18 Further, he is asking all the 
right questions when he asks:
How shall we think about these new powers? More 
to the point, how shall we think of them theological­
ly, up against the ancient confession that God is the 
source of all power and the one to whom we are ac­
countable for the powers we hold? Just what do we
understand to be the relationship of divine to human
power now, in our time?19
These are questions of content, of meaning which mandate a second 
look at the thoughts and practices which have been normatively
16 Rasmussen is quoting James Gustafson, Ethics from a
Theocentric Perspective. Vol. 2, (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1984), p. 281.
17 Rasmussen, ibid. . p. 11 2.
18 Rasmussen, ibid. . p. 113.
19 Rasmussen, ibid. . p 111.
assigned to divine and human power. We take up our inquiry, 
holding Rasmussen up as one who provides conceptual clarity and 
a promising path in the face of such pressing questions. With 
him, we look to the theoloqia crucis for answers, believing human 
power must be defined according to these terms.
Finally, in his excellent article "Revelation in Christ. 
A Study of Bonhoeffer's Theology of Revelation,"20 G.B. Kelly 
explicates the profound significance of the connection between 
the paradoxical weakness of the cross and power:
Luther's theoloqia crucis serves . . .  as the basis 
for Bonhoeffer's proposed reform of theological 
discourse and for an explanation of how God chooses to 
affirm the world and exert his salvific power in that 
world.21
Kelly advances the investigation into Bonhoeffer's theoloqia 
crucis one step further by delving into the paradoxical concept 
of God's "power in weakness." This notion lies at the heart of 
Bonhoeffer's later notion of a "secular" or "non-religious 
language." But it is also a fundamental concept that Bonhoeffer 
held throughout his life.22 This paradoxical notion merits much 
more attention than it has received among Bonhoeffer scholars. 
Thus, this study builds on Kelly's acute analysis, holding it up 
as a key concept to Bonhoeffer's overall theological enterprise.
20 Geffrey B. Kelly, "Revelation in Christ: A Study of 
Bonhoeffer's Theology of Revelation," Ephemerides Theoloqicae 
Lgvanienses. L.l (May 1974), pp. 39-74.
21 Kelly, ibid. . p. 64.
22 Eberhard Bethge highlighted this significant fact in his 
famous biography, "The belief in the power of weakness was one 
of Bonhoeffer's most basic insights, and he was to hold to it 
throughout his theological life." Eberhard Bethge, Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer: Man of Vision, Man of Courage. (London: Harper and
Row Publishers, 1985), p. 3 7 4.
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Eberhard Bethge remains the authoritative source for 
Bonhoeffer studies. In a recent interview, he confirmed that 
Bonhoeffer struggled with "power over others" in a fundamental 
way throughout his life and theology. However this struggle for 
power was always social in nature, between him and others. Thus, 
it was a dialectical kind of struggle between power and weakness, 
Macht und Ohnemacht. Bethge's reflections on Bonhoeffer sharpen 
the focus of this study, demonstrating in finer detail than would 
have been possible otherwise the significance of power as a 
social concept in Bonhoeffer's theology.
In his critique of John Milbank's recent book, Theology and 
Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason. Nicholas Lash pointed out
how narrowly Milbank defines "power" (as dominium) in diametric 
opposition to peace. Lash raises the crucial issue:
Rather than eschew all talk of 'power,' rather 
than deny that it is 'virtuous' to be peaceable, the 
theological task is better seen as taking good words 
up and purifying them of misuse by setting them in the 
context of a Christian understanding of God's out­
poured love. And, if we can do this for 'power' and 
'virtue' and 'peace' . . . then it should be possible 
to do it also for a politics which is 'not exactly' 
politics as we would otherwise understand and execute 
it.23
Lash captures how "power" needs to be released from its narrow 
definition. Whether one is presupposing "power" in the Niet- 
zschean sense of violence like Milbank does, the fact is that 
negative connotations commonly surround this concept. So often, 
power is thought of in material terms, as an object which can be 
possessed, captured or seized upon. It leads one to see power
26
23 •Nicholas Lash, "Not Exactly Politics or Power?" Modern 
Slieqlogy, vol. 8 , No. 4, (1992), p. 362 .
as a corrupting influence, one which must be checked, balanced 
and measured constantly, lest domination and aggression be 
carried out over those not possessing or holding it. Power 
becomes an object to be grabbed from the hands of others,24 
something to be renunciated, or, in its most positive light, a 
thing to be equitably shared among people. This reflects the 
materialist objectification which surrounds the whole concept of 
power, at least in the contemporary Western world.
With Lash, we believe "power" as a concept needs to be freed 
from its negative, restrictive connotations to a Christian one 
that offers promise and hope. With Rasmussen, we believe the 
present need for power analysis in the theological enterprise is 
acute. Bonhoeffer offers a new understanding, a new language by 
which we may understand power as it is defined at its root by the 
cross of Jesus Christ. Rather than making fragmentary and 
inchoate stabs at a non-religious language, he gave a solid start 
by showing consistently how "power" can be released from its 
objectivizing shackles to become a social, relational concept. 
We turn now to see just how "power" develops as a concept in 
Bonhoeffer's theology, and the way the theoloqia crucis impinges 
upon it.
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24 At least in the United States, it has become commonplace 
to describe the 1980's as the decade of greed. Two figures as 
diverse in American politics as Hillary Rodham Clinton and Lee 
Atwater said the same thing: "The 80's were about acquiring—
acquiring wealth, power, prestige,..." quoted from the article 
"Malaise" in The New Republic. May 31, 1993, p. 46. Such
reflects the objectified connotation of power which has taken 
hold in the American mindset.
[0 ]ur coining of age leads us to a true recognition of 
our situation before God. . . . God lets himself be
pushed out of the world on to the cross. He is weak 
and powerless in the world, and that is precisely the 
way, the only way, in which he is with us and helps 
us. . . . Christ helps us, not by virtue of his
omnipotence, but by virtue of his weakness and suffer­
ing. . . . The world's coming of age . . . has done
away with a false conception of God, [and] opens up a 
way of seeing the God of the Bible, who wins power and 
space in the world by his weakness.
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters & Papers from 
Prison. Letter of 16 July 1944, p. 360-61.
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CHAPTER ONE
BONHOEFFER'S DIALECTICAL UNDERSTANDING OF DIVINE 
POWER ACCORDING TO THE THEOLOGIA CRUCIS
Introduction
Bonhoeffer's early theology intimated what became real for 
him later in his life and theology— the dialectical notion of the 
power of God's weakness. The fact that he thought about God in 
terms of weakness is clear, particularly in the prison letters 
where he suggested only the weak God can help a humanity that has 
developed increasingly in terms of autonomy and secularity.1 
However, he always spoke of divine weakness in terms of its 
hidden power.2 The meaning associated with this duplex terminol­
ogy increasingly took on a paradoxical, if not dialectical tone, 
reaching resolution in terms of his theoloqia crucis.
Although evidencing some ambiguity and inconsistency in his 
early work (1927-1932), Bonhoeffer remained true to Luther's 
paradoxical notion, maintaining the hidden-yet-revealed God in 
the form of the crucified Christ as the starting point for any
1 "God lets himself be pushed out of the world on to the 
cross. He is weak and powerless in the world, and that is 
precisely the way, the only way, in which he is with us and helps 
us. Matt. 8.17 makes it quite clear that Christ helps us, not 
by virtue of his omnipotence, but by virtue of his weakness and 
suffering." Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, 
ed. Eberhard Bethge, (New York: Collier Books, 1972), pp. 360-61.
2 "The Bible directs man to God's powerlessness and suffer­
ing; only the suffering God can help. To that extent we may say 
that the development towards the world's coming of age outlined 
above, which has done away with a false conception of God, opens 
up a way of seeing the God of the Bible, who wins power and space 
in the world by his weakness." Ibid.. p. 361.
formulations about God. He eventually relinquished descriptions 
of God in terms of strength and omnipotence for ones charac­
terized by weakness, suffering, and vulnerability. God's 
hiddenness is not revealed in terms of absolute rule, in the form 
of an omnipotent sovereign, rather God is revealed in Jesus 
Christ through selfless sacrifice for the other. We begin by 
drawing out the way Bonhoeffer thought and based his theological 
statements about God in these terms. It soon becomes apparent 
as he clarified and developed his understanding of God from 1932 
onward, how divine hiddenness and divine strength receive their 
meaning from Luther's theologia crucis and the dialectical notion 
of God therein. A qualitatively different understanding of 
divine presence in terms of power results.
Following a brief introduction of Luther's notion of the 
hidden God, this chapter takes a look at Bonhoeffer's early 
understanding of God (1927-1932). Then a consideration of the 
year 1932 shows that a personal change in Bonhoeffer had far- 
reaching implications for his life and theology, particularly the 
concrete way he understood God. From that point on, (1933-1945) 
a steady progression away from omnipotent, glorious imagery for 
God to terms characterized by weakness, suffering, and hiddenness 
is apparent.3 The "hidden God" increasingly took on the charac­
teristics of Luther's theoloqia crucis. Such an understanding 
of God revolved around the hidden-yet-revealed Christ whose power 
was demonstrated axiomatically on the cross in death and 
suffering for others. In this way, we see the early Bonhoeffer
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3 We save our analysis of Bonhoeffer's statements on the 
Ethics for chapter two. Because he speaks dialectically about 
human autonomy and divine authority there, we reserve our 
analysis for a more extended examination and discussion than the 
purview of this chapter will allow.
(1927-1932) relinquishing ambiguous notions of God which belied 
a young theological voice for profound ones which embraced a 
hidden God whose power is defined in terms of the suffering and 
weakness of Christ on the cross.
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I. Luther's Notion of the Hidden God
Much debate has centered around the exact meaning of God's 
hiddenness and how to locate it with regard to other theological 
doctrines in Luther.4 Walther von Loewenich, once Professor of 
Church History at the University of Erlangen, was renowned for 
his influential work Luthers Theologia Crucis (1929), gaining 
attention in Europe in the early thirties and later in America 
in the seventies. Tracing the historical development of Luther's 
understanding of the hidden God from the early Heidelberg 
Disputation (1518), to the middle period in The Bondage of the 
Will (1525), to the late lectures on Genesis (period after 1525), 
von Loewenich ultimately characterized the idea of the hidden God 
as most intimately connected with Luther's theology of the cross, 
emphasizing the faith character of the knowledge of God.
Before him, Theodosius Harnack in Luthers Theologie (1927) 
emphasized the two-fold knowledge of God— knowledge apart from
4 Walther von Loewenich helpfully lists the multi-faceted 
questions which have been asked regarding how to interpret this 
doctrine in Luther: "What does it mean? Is the hidden God one
and the same as the revealed God, or is he to be associated with 
the absolute God of scholasticism? Is faith concerned with the 
thought of the hidden God, or is it a product of speculation? 
Is it a creation of the dilemma into which Luther fell because 
of his extreme and daring polemics, or is it intimately entwined 
with Luther's central thoughts? Above all, does the thought 
remain substantively the same in the course of Luther's theologi­
cal development?" See Walter von Loewenich, Luther's Theology of 
the Cross, trans. Herbert J.A. Bouman, (Minneapolis, Minnesota: 
Augsburg Publishing House, 5th ed. 1982), pp. 27, 28.
Christ (natural knowledge) and knowledge of God in Christ 
(revelation)— and coupled this notion with his own emphasis on 
the category of God the creator and God the redeemer. For him, 
this double relationship was the basic design along which 
Luther's theology follows. Yet still earlier, Albrecht Ritschl 
(1868, Geschichtliche Studien zur christlichen Lehre von Gott) 
believed the idea of the hidden God represented a relapse for 
Luther into nominalism, a purely arbitrary God bound by no law, 
conjured up polemically against Erasmus.
Von Loewenich found Harnack's distinction between creator 
God and redeemer God exaggerated and ultimately unsuitable as a 
basis for the doctrine of the hidden and revealed God.5 By 
passing over the contrast Luther made in the Heidelberg Disputa­
tion between God manifest in his works (the creator God) with the 
God hidden in suffering, Harnack subordinated the hidden God to 
his basic design of God the creator-redeemer, thus denying 
himself insight into the revelatory character of the hidden God .6 
Von Loewenich staked his claim upon the fact that the nexus 
between the hidden and revealed God is preserved when the faith 
character of knowledge is emphasized. He ultimately believed the
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5 It is worth noting that von Loewenich first wrote Luthers 
Theologia Crucis in Germany when Reinhold Seeburg was a Professor 
of Systematic Theology at Berlin University, the exact time he 
served as Dietrich Bonhoeffer's doctoral supervisor. Given the 
paucity of secondary literature on Seeburg, I would highlight von 
Loewenich's numerous references to him. He locates Seeburg as 
one who has incorporated Harnack's thesis in a somewhat modified 
form in his history of dogma. In von Loewenich's eyes, Seeburg 
so thoroughly subordinates the hidden God to Harnack's basic 
design of creator-God and redeemer-God that Seeburg demonstrates 
how the road from Harnack leads back to Ritschl again, denying 
himself insight into the revelatory character of the hidden God.
6 Cf. von Loewenich, Luther's Theology of the Cross, pp. 47,
hidden God is intimately connected with Luther's theologia 
crucis, with faith being a crucial element of such a theology.
Luther's warning that his concept of the hidden God could 
and would be misused prophetically pronounced its inherent 
theological vulnerability. However, whether he would have 
anticipated the ambiguity and misinterpretation which has 
surrounded an even larger aspect of this thought— the theologia 
crucis— is anyone's query. At the turn of the twentieth century 
in Germany, estimates varied as to the theological import and 
historical origin which should be assigned to this aspect of 
Luther's thought. Some maintained that the theologia crucis was 
as a pre-Reformation theology, influenced by Tauler's mysticism, 
characterized by monkish quietism, and not to be taken seriously 
as a pervasive aspect of his thought.7 Others virtually ignored 
the concept in Luther altogether.8 Others, however, like von 
Loewenich, pushed forward the thesis that "Luther's theology of 
the cross must not . . .  be regarded as a preliminary stage of 
Luther's theology, but rather that it constitutes an integrating 
aspect of Luther's entire theology."9
The five essential aspects of this theologia crucis are:
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7 Theologians following such a path include Hermann Hering, 
Die Mvstik Luthersf (1879); Otto Ritschl, Dogmengeschichte des 
Protestantismus r (1912); and Ernst Wolf, Staupitz und Luther. 
(1927) .
8 Reinhold Seeburg discusses Luther's early doctrinal views, 
but does not mention the concept of the theologia crucis. See 
Reinhold Seeburg, Die Lehre Luthers. (1917) reprinted in Dog- 
Dengeschichte IV, 1, trans. Charles E. Hay, Baker, 1954, Vol. II, 
Book III, Part I, Chap. 1. See also Julius Kostlin, Luthers 
Theologie, (1901) .
9 Von Loewenich, Luther's Theology of the Cross, p. 49.
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1) The theology of the cross as a theology of 
revelation, standing in sharp antithesis to 
speculation;
2) God's revelation as an indirect, concealed 
revelation;
3) God's revelation as recognized not in works 
but in suffering;
4) Knowledge of God who is hidden in his reve­
lation as a matter of faith; and
5) The manner in which God is known as reflect­
ed in the practical thought of suffering.10
The significance assigned to Luther's theology of the cross 
has crucial relevance for the way the German father's concept of 
the hidden God is appropriated theologically. That the doctrine 
of the hidden God is a disputed chapter in Luther's thought is 
borne out by the complexities surrounding his theological 
background, polemical skirmishes, and asystematic treatment of 
theological topics. Recent Lutheran scholarship has done much 
to forward the thesis that Luther's theology of the cross is a 
consistent, substantive theme throughout his theology, the 
paradigm out of which the hidden God is intimately developed and 
most accurately understood.11 As Alister McGrath has noted,
although the full implications of the existential 
character of faith and the hiddenness of God's self­
revelation in the cross have yet to be appreciated, it 
is evident that the characteristic die of Luther's 
theolocria crucis has already been cast by late 1515. 
It is for this reason that we regard Luther's discov-
10 Von Loewenich, ibid. . p. 2 2 .
11 See Alister McGrath, Luther's Theology of the Cross. 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993). McGrath not only makes an
eloquent argument for the hidden God as a cornerstone of Luther's 
theologja rrnnig, he provides detailed information regarding 
Luther's medieval background and training which invaluably guides 
one to a more accurate understanding of the nature of Luther's 
theological development. See McGrath, ibid.. pp. 148-75.
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ery of the 'righteousness of God' as being a catalyst 
for the development of the theoloqia crucis: Luther's
solution to his initial difficulties over the true 
meaning of institia Dei was not complete in itself, 
but was pregnant with potential conceptual elabora­
tion. That elaboration took place over the years 
1516-18, and led to the statement of that theology 
which is for ever associated with the name of Martin 
Luther— the 'theology of the cross.'12
For Luther, the concept of the hidden God is intricately 
bound to the duplex notion of the knowledge of God. Luther 
speaks of a general (generalise, natural knowledge of God which 
is implanted in the hearts of all persons and a particular, 
proper (propria) knowledge of God which is revealed in Christ.13 
Regarding such knowledge, one Luther interpreter says,
In the hands of the natural man, the natural knowledge 
of God gives rise, not to true religion, but to 'all 
idolatry, which without the knowledge of the Divinity, 
could never have come into the world.' The fault, of 
course, lies not with the knowledge, but with the man, 
who invariably misinterprets and misuses it, Luther 
maintains, in such a way that, without the 'proper' 
knowledge of God given in Christ, he can never avoid 
idolatry.14
When we proceed to inquire into the relationship of this duplex 
knowledge we discover that both types testify simultaneously to 
the same God. What, then, is the nature of their differences, 
given they have the same content and do not displace one another? 
The clue is found when we inquire into the more precise content 
of Luther's general knowledge of God.
12 McGrath, ibid. . pp. 160-61.
13 Martin Luther, Luther's Works. Jaroslav Pelikan & Helmut 
T - Lehmann, eds. (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1960), vol.
12/ pp. 310-11; vol. 31, pp. 37-70.
14 Philip s. Watson, Let God Be God ! . (London: Epworth Press, 
1947), p.  85.
Luther assigned great meaning and significance to omnipo­
tence as an attribute of God, both in terms of actuality and 
potentiality.15 Philip Watson, in his important work on Luther, 
Let God Be God!. concurs that sovereignty and righteousness are 
two attributes that can be regarded as of outstanding importance 
in Luther's view. Indeed, Luther believed God's supreme power 
was written on every person's heart.16 Power is understood in 
terms of God as omnipotent Creator. If this is a basic element 
of a natural knowledge of God, what, then, constitutes the proper 
knowledge?
When discussing the hidden God, we are at one and the same 
time referring to the revealed God. God's hiddenness and 
revelation are to be understood thus by the fact that God 
confronts us with his Word. Indeed, he "wraps" or "clothes" 
himself in his Word. If this were not so, God would "crush and 
annihilate us in his majesty, for his is a consuming fire."17 
Thus, Luther considered Christ as:
the best means of signifying what is in the speaker's 
heart. God's revelation of Himself in Christ, there­
fore, enables us to know 'what is going on in the 
Supreme Majesty' fwie es in suorema maiestate zuohet).
This is a far greater thing than if God had revealed 
how He created heaven and earth, for here He discloses 
His inmost self, His very essence or substance (suam 
substantiaird .18
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15 Luther's Works, o p . cit. . vol. 34, pp. 199-299.
16 '[T]hat God is omnipotent, not only in power but in 
action, and that if it were not so, He would be a ridiculous 
God'. Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will, trans. H. Cole, 
(London: Ed. H. Atherton, 1931) p. 244.
17 Von Loewenich, ibid. . p. 33.
18 See Watson, ibid. . p. 132.
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Luther goes on to describe the 'substance' of God as love.19 
Chief marks of this Divine love are described as a spontaneous 
love, a lost love, and above all, amor crucis--the love of the 
Cross.20 The cross is marked by the profound unconditional love 
Christ has for all. Of central importance is the fact that the 
cross, too, is the locus where Christ, as Incarnate love, proves 
invincible over the forces of lovelessness and selfishness.21
Although debates have occurred over which theory of 
atonement is operative in Luther, scholars have presumed the 
dramatic-dualistic theory, which places primacy upon the notion 
of Divine love, over against the penal theory which focuses on 
Divine justice.22 Whereas in the former, Christ's atoning work 
is seen as God's own work, directed toward persons in bringing 
them into a new relationship with God, the latter sees Christ's 
atoning work as directed toward God in order to change God's 
attitude about persons. The operative truth at the heart of the 
cross, then, in Luther, is the notion of Divine love.
19 Watson, ibid. . p. 146.
20 Luther describes God's spontaneous love as a quellende 
Liebe, "a love that wells up and flows forth out of the loving 
heart, quite independently of all external considerations . . . 
[s]uch love seeks not its own, but its neighbour's good . . ."
Luther's lost love (verlorene Liebe) is characterized by 
unconditional love to friend and enemies alike, regardless of 
whether it meets reception or rejection. Finally, as for the 
love of the Cross, Luther says, " [f]or sinners are lovely because 
they are loved; they are not loved because they are lovely. So 
man's love shuns sinners and evil men. But thus Christ: I came
not to call the righteous, but sinners. And this is the love of 
the Cross (amor crucis) born of the Cross, which betakes itself 
not where it finds a good to enjoy, but where it may confer good 
upon the evil and the needy. For it is more blessed to give than 
to receive, says the Apostle." See Watson, ibid. . p. 69, fn. 50; 
133-34.
21 See Watson, ibid. . p. 134.
22 See Watson, ibid.; Gustav Auleen, Christus Victor (London, 
1937); Anders Nygren Eros and Agape. A Study of the Christian 
¿ ^ - O U L p y e ,  (London, 1932, 1938-9).
Now the connection between the amor crucis as the essence 
of God's proper revelation and the omnipotent Creator is clear. 
The solution to how both the general knowledge and proper 
knowledge are a unity is reached in the following manner:
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Instead of the subordination of love to justice, on 
the one hand, or to arbitrary might on the other, 
which he found in Scholasticism, he seeks to represent 
both law and power as at the service of love. Indeed, 
it can be said that he finds precisely in the love, 
both the essential righteousness and the unassailable 
sovereignty of God. God's righteousness is no longer 
conceived in terms of distributive justice, but is 
identified with the grace by which He justifies the 
ungodly; and precisely this grace is the surest sign 
of His omnipotence, since He is a greater God, more 
really God, who can forgive and save sinners, than one 
who only knows how to punish and destroy.23
Omnipotence, therefore, is understood in terms of love, not as 
arbitrary power, nor primarily in terms of creation. The cross 
provides the defining point for God's power and omnipotence in 
the world. Spontaneity, unconditional love and especially love 
of the cross thus display the contours of divine power. They 
provide the signposts of how God's power is understood from the 
perspective of the theolocria crucis.
This connection between the Deus absconditus and the Deus 
revelatus— between general, natural knowledge and particular, 
proper knowledge of God— comes to a climax with the schema of 
Divine love, guintessentially expressed in the notion of amor 
crucis.24 Luther has effectively relocated the doctrine of God's 
omnipotence from an abstract doctrine, which is typically 
formulated primarily from the purview of the doctrine of cre­
ation, to subordinate it to the notion of divine love, love as
23 Watson, ibid. . p. 136.
24 Cf. McGrath, ibid. . p. 165.
it is defined according to the cross. When God's attributes, 
such as power and righteousness, are defined under the rubric of 
love, and this love is amor crucis. then a réévaluation of all 
values results from the cross.25 The "foolishness of God" is 
wiser than human wisdom, the "weakness of God" is stronger than 
human strength.
The connection between the two kinds of knowledge provide 
a critical theological linchpin. "There is no hiddenness of God 
for Luther other than the hidden form of his revelation."26 The 
cross figures in the center for making sense of the profound 
intricacies surrounding Luther's duplex knowledge of God. The 
pivotal character, then, of his theologia crucis takes on added 
dimensions when we look to the way Bonhoeffer understood and 
utilized concepts like the notion of the hidden God.
II. Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Life and Early Theology:
A Certain Ambiguity (1927-32)
Bonhoeffer pursued a lifelong quest to understand the way 
God is concretely present in the world. Although it was some 
time before he explicitly articulated his thoughts on God's 
hiddenness, his early theology intimated this interest. 
Bonhoeffer's use of certain key theological concepts and terms 
foreshadow the theologia crucis which increasingly came to mark 
his thoughts about God. The way he spoke of God in terms of 
power and weakness throughout his life bears this out. Certain­
ly, his later prison thoughts on the weak God who has been pushed
25 Von Loewenich, ibid.. pp. 11-1 2 .
26 McGrath, ibid.. p. 166 quoting H. Bandt, Luthers Lehr vom 
^erbprgenen Gottr (Berlin, 1958), p. 94.
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out of the world by humanity are well-known. Clifford Green 
paved the way for power analysis in Bonhoeffer by identifying 
'power' as a central motif in the German pastor's early theology. 
We seek to take Bonhoeffer scholarship one step further by 
identifying the way power and weakness together as dialectical 
motifs mark his overall theological thought. In this way, we 
shall see how this paradigm is a significant matrix out of which 
he developed some of his most basic statements about God.
A. Influences
Concerning Bonhoeffer's influences during this period of his 
academic training Bethge said:
At Berlin University he came to grips with the 
historical critical method, with primitive Christiani­
ty, Luther and Luther-anism, and the nineteenth 
century. In comparison he did not gain nearly so much 
from, or come to grips with anything like the same 
extent, the Old Testament, Calvin and his world— this 
he almost completely ignored— and the great medieval 
theologians. On the other hand, the new world of 
dialectical theology was completely his own discov­
ery .27
We begin by examining these influences by taking the last first—  
Karl Barth. Bonhoeffer's first exposure to Barth occurred 
between the summers of 1924 and 1925. Letters to his parents 
reveal the books Bonhoeffer was reading. In a letter dated 
9-8.1924 he revealed his preoccupation with philosophy, sociology 
and the history of religion. Max Weber's Sociology of Religion 
and Troeltsch's Social Theories of Christian Ethics topped his 
list of planned summer reading.
40
27 Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer. p. 62.
In May and June of 1925 the tone of his letters changed. 
Bonhoeffer began discussing Gogarten's The Religious Decision and 
it became apparent that a new interest had been discovered. He 
also possessed a copy of Barth's first volume of Das Wort Gottes 
und die Theologie (1924). During the winter of 1924-25 Bonhoef­
fer indulged himself in reading Barth's works. Further, through 
a relative who was attending the school of theology at Gottingen, 
Bonhoeffer received copies of notes from Barth's lectures 
"Instruction on the Christian Religion", I and II, the groundwork 
for what was eventually to be Barth's Prolegomena to Christian 
Dogmatics (1927). From these notes Bonhoeffer gained his first 
insight into the structure of the foundation for Barth's 
Roroerbrief ,28
The profound effect Barth was to have on this young 
theological student can be seen clearly in a seminar essay 
Bonhoeffer submitted to Seeburg in the summer of 1925. The title 
of the essay was 'Can a Distinction be drawn between a Historical 
and a Pneumatological Interpretation of the Scriptures, and What 
is the Attitude to this of Dogmatic Theology?' In this essay, 
Bonhoeffer basically refuted the very teachers for whom he had 
just written papers, Professors Harnack and Holl. In relegating 
the place of historical and textual criticism to the ash-heap29,
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28 •Bethge goes on to say that Bonhoeffer likely became aware
°f the journal Zwischen den Zeiten through his cousin at
Gottingen, but also through attending Harnack's seminar on the
apostolic fathers during the winter term of 1924-25. He must
have been aware of the controversy between Barth and Harnack as
epitomized in the 1923 issue of Christliche Welt. Cf. Bethge,
Dietrich Bonhoeffer. p. 51.
29 Bethge mentions that Bonhoeffer still maintained the 
necessary place of critical, historical work in Biblical studies, 
hut did not adequately reconcile this concession with his overall 
argument. cf. Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, p. 56.
Bonhoeffer proceeded to advocate the pneumatological exegesis 
advocated by Barth.30 Bethge quotes Bonhoeffer in this essay,
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The Christian religion stands or falls by belief 
in divine revelation that became historically real, 
tangible and visible--that is, to those who have eyes 
to see and ears to hear--and thus essentially implies 
the question that we are posing today about the 
relationship between history and spirit, or applied to 
the Bible, between letter and spirit, Scripture and 
revelation, man's word and God's....All attempted 
pneumatological interpretation is prayer, supplication 
to the Holy Spirit which alone gives it the hearing 
and understanding without which the most highly 
intellectual exegesis is nothing. Textual understand­
ing and interpretation, ministry, i.e., the realiza­
tion of God, is included in the prayer: Veni creator
spiritus .31
This seminar essay points to the beginning of Bonhoeffer's basic 
advocacy of Barth's theology of revelation and pneumatological 
exegesis which was to last, despite various theological points 
of disagreement between the two, throughout the rest of the 
German pastor's life.
A second major influence on Bonhoeffer was the renascence 
of Lutheran research and scholarship taking place in Germany, 
particularly in Berlin University during the early decades of the 
twentieth century. In 1925 he participated in two ecclesiastical 
history seminars under the guidance of Karl Holl (1866-1926), one 
of the premier modern interpreters of Luther in Germany. 
Bonhoeffer was deeply impressed with Holl's foray into the center 
of Luther's doctrine of justification. The young theological 
student was permanently convinced of the profundity of Luther's
30 Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer. p. 56.
31 Bethge, ibid. Interestingly, Bethge notes that Seeburg 
was so affected by the 'pneumatological exegesis' that he began 
to make reference to it in his seminar, and published a paper on 
it, R. Seeburg, 'Zur Frage nach dem Sinn und Recht einer 
pneumatischen Schriftauslegung', Zeitschrift für Systematische 
Ökologie, 1926, IV, pp. 3-59. Cf. Bethge, p. 57.
notion of cor curvum in s e . but he was disappointed with Holl's 
interpretation of Luther's faith as a religion of conscience32, 
thinking it did away with the extra me character of revelation, 
as well as with his weakly developed christology ,33
Holl's influence proved to be lasting in that while 
Bonhoeffer was in prison in Tegel in 1943, he had the professor's 
Kirchengeschichte sent to him. Largely through his exposure to 
Luther through Holl, he learned to claim and to challenge his 
Lutheran heritage on his own terms. While Bonhoeffer considered 
working with Holl on his licentiate thesis, he ended up studying 
with Reinhold Seeburg in his favorite area, systematic theology.
Given his exposure to renewed Lutheran scholarship, we can 
identify an aspect of Luther himself that was to make an
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32 Presenting Luther's faith as a "religion of conscience," 
Holl took his cue from Fichte's ontology of conscience and the 
Idealist tradition. With his "religion of conscience" Holl was 
able to make a proof for God's existence by stressing the 
experience of divine wrath in the conscience. By stressing this 
experience of wrath, he also brought out how, in Luther's 
theology, relief came in clinging to the divine Word of promise 
and the accompanying forgiveness that alone stills an accusing 
conscience. In God's wrath, Holl recognized a hidden, mysterious 
aspect of God— a hiddenness which turns out to be "the mask under 
which God hides himself." This is a part of God's essence, that 
he reveal Himself in His opposite. Thus, Holl's Luther resolved 
the tension between deus absconditus and deus revelatus. and 
trust in God's sole and complete causation of everything 
(Alleinwirksamkeit. literally, 'self-effectiveness') eliminated 
any ethical dilemma.
In Holl's view, God's omnipotence was for Luther behind the 
entire world. The nature of this God and His purposes were 
hidden, and trusting faith was necessary to resolve any moral 
tensions. Even though Holl recognized this hidden aspect of God, 
he strongly believed God's wrath was purposeful, necessary as a 
breaking up of the old and preparation for the new in God's 
creation. Indeed, such an understanding of God is ambiguous and 
ill-defined, with the ambiguities and contradictions of divine 
omnipotence reconciled on the sole basis of faith. See John 
Stroup, "Political Theology and Secularization Theory in Germany, 
1918-1939: Emanuel Hirsch as a Phenomenon of His Time," Lecture
Given to Faculty of Harvard Divinity School (January 9, 1986), 
PP. 17-18.
33 Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer. p. 46.
indelible impression on Bonhoeffer as is evidenced in his early 
works. Luther's ontological notion of coram Deo34, i.e., persons 
living in the presence of God, is the fundamental concept at work 
in Bonhoeffer's understanding of the Christian community's 
existence. Specifically, it forms the kernel of his argument 
against Idealist philosophy' s pneumatico-anthropological concept, 
which Bonhoeffer deemed inadequate as we shall see. But what is 
the meaning attached to Luther's concept of human life live coram 
Deo?
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First, it is important to note that according to Gerhard 
Ebeling, a preeminent German interpreter of Luther, that coram 
Deo is the key word to Luther's understanding of being.35 Luther 
is interested in investigating the nature of reality, the 
ontological situation of human existence. Basically, he believed 
that human life cannot be lived in an independent way, free of 
or from God. All of life is lived coram Deo, 'in the presence 
of God':
...the fundamental situation is that something is 
defined here not in itself, but in its outward rela­
tions with something else, or more properly, in terms
34 Gerhard Ebeling explains the exact meaning of the phrase 
coram Deo. See Gerhard Ebeling, Luther: An Introduction to His
Thoughtf trans. R.A. Wilson, (London: Collins, 1970), p. 193.
Ebeling says the precise meaning of the phrase is "before the 
face of," is "in the sight of." The fundamental significance of 
the Latin coram is the Old Testament understanding of reality at 
work.
Clifford Green, in his dissertation The Sociality of Christ 
and Humanity, argued that the "dynamic-voluntaristic" thought of 
Luther that took root in Bonhoeffer was nothing other than 
Bonhoeffer's own "theology of sociality." Clifford Green, The 
Sociality of Christ and Humanity: Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Early
Theology. 19 2 7 — 1933. (Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1975),
PP- 90, 91. While agreeing with Green as to the fundamental
nature of this basis in both Luther and Bonhoeffer, however, this 
study is restricted to this dynamic concept of reality as the 
£Qram relationship.
35 Ebeling, ibid. . 193.
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of the relationship of something else with it...the 
profundity of the situation that is implied by the 
preposition coram is not the way in which someone else 
is present before me, in my sight, but the way that 
I myself am before someone else and exist in the sight 
of someone else, so that my existential life is 
affected.36
For Luther, persons only truly exist in being recognized, living 
coram. Further, the coram relationship involves the expression 
of reality in the spoken word .37
Luther does not derive the coram thought merely from the 
phenomenon of our encounter with fellow human beings, even though 
he is concerned with the encounter between one person and another 
as well. The essential point of this coram relationship is 
presence in the strict sense. Hence, this fundamental situation 
of coram Deo, existence in the sight of God, in the presence of 
God, and in the word of God is the concept at work.38 As 
Bonhoeffer grappled with articulating the way persons understand 
themselves, it was the coram relationship which defined his 
thinking.39
At the same time, and from another direction, Bonhoeffer 
continually wanted to acknowledge the 'pro m e ' character of 
salvation. Bethge said it was this personal concern of Bon­
hoeffer 's which adumbrated his theological concern in Sanctorum 
Communio and Act and Being. And there can be no question that 
it was this concern that drove his notion of 'Christ existing as
36 Ibid. . pp. 195-96.
37 Ibid. . pp. 197-98. Ebeling goes on to say, "For Luther 
this has the concrete meaning that reality is only understood for 
what it is if the word of God, through which it has its being and 
which is what is truly real in it, is heard."
38 Ibid. . p. 199.
39 We see this in Act and Being, where Bonhoeffer quoted 
Luther at crucial points regarding the passive nature of human 
existence before God.
community.' This concern to discern the 'pro m e ' character of 
Christ's work reveals an important clue behind Bonhoeffer's 
desire to elucidate the concrete form of revelation. Until he 
was able to articulate clearly how it was that the Word of God 
was made concrete, and how this concrete, Incarnate presence 
continued on in time and history, in the form of the Church, then 
he remained unsatisfied that christological formulations remained 
formalistic claims. In this way, we shall see how Bonhoeffer's 
desire to articulate revelation's concreteness distinguishes him 
from Barth.40
One can see, especially in Act and Being. Bonhoeffer's 
concern that Barth, who believed the presence of the Holy Spirit 
determines whether a human word is concrete or an abstraction, 
nevertheless failed to describe in concrete terms the way in 
which the Spirit is present in the world, how revelation is a 
concrete reality in the world. In Act and Being Bonhoeffer 
criticized Barth as maintaining a formalistic understanding of
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40 James Burtness argues that the finitum capax infiniti must 
be understood as a key to Bonhoeffer's life and work. A very 
instructive part of the article, in which Burtness is quoting 
Paul Lehmann, points to the importance of this formula for both 
Barth and Bonhoeffer: "For Barth, the incapax protected the
concreteness of God in his revelation, as it were, on the giving 
end of the stick. For Bonhoeffer, the capax protected the 
concreteness of the revelation of God, as it were, on the 
receiving end of the stick, that is, in the reality of faith. 
For both, the major question of theology was the question of 
concreteness." James Burtness, "As Though God Were Not Given: 
Barth and Bonhoeffer, and the Finitum Capax Infiniti." (unpub­
lished manuscript on file at Bonhoeffer Archives, Union Theologi­
cal Seminary) p. 253.
Bonhoeffer was not content to leave the concreteness on the 
receiving end" as unformulated as Barth did. Both men were 
interested in the same thing— the concreteness of revelation. 
But both wanted to convince the other of where that emphasis 
should lay, hence their different Reformed and Lutheran convic­
tions played a large role in the way they approached God's 
revelation to humanity.
God's freedom. 41 Two years later, in 1932, he subdued his 
accusation, but revealed again his struggle with the Swiss 
theologian's manner of interpreting revelation:
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Barth admits without hesitation that he too is 
not 'assured against the sin' of making 'God an object 
of thought', and that his principles too are subject 
to the danger of being a 'last defence against God 
himself and his intervention in our life' . The 
characteristic feature of his theology is precisely 
that he believes that he cannot offer a sure defence 
against this danger, and yet thinks of it continually; 
his knowing that the ultimately concrete can be spoken 
only by the Holy Spirit and that every concrete human 
word remains an abstraction unless it is spoken by the 
Holy Spirit sets a limit to his theological work.42
B. Sanctorum Communio
During these formative years in Bonhoeffer's life, one 
cannot help but detect the vigor and drive with which he 
approached tasks. He was only 19 years old when he began work 
on his doctoral thesis in 1925. For his topic he chose to 
examine the sociological structure of the Church.43 Essentially, 
he was trying to reconcile the two influences that were seemingly 
irreconcilable at the time: Ernst Troeltsch and his critical
sociological agenda and Karl Barth with his revelational,
41 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Act and Being. (London: Collins, 
1962) p. go.
42 Quoted from Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer. p. 136. Also, 
found in the original German in Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Gesammelte 
Schriften vol. Ill, p. 156. Helpfully, in his own footnote, 
Bethge mentions that the quote above clarifies Bonhoeffer's 1944 
observation about 'revelatory positivism' which suggests Barth's 
notion of revelation ends up as an object of thought. This 
accusation will be examined later on in the study.
43 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio. reprinted in 
—jotrich Bonhoeffer Werke, vol. 1 (Munich: Christian Kaiser, 19867;
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unapologetic theology.44 In his thesis, Bonhoeffer developed his 
argument around the idea that Christ exists as the Church or 
Christian community (Christus als Gemeinde existierend) .45 
Targeting German idealism, Bonhoeffer accepted some of its 
philosophical tenets but rejected others and suggested ways for 
overcoming its deficiencies. For example, he criticized idealist 
philosophy for its lack of a voluntaristic concept of God, as 
well as its lack of a profound definition of sin. He argued for 
the innate sociality of persons, their sinful nature, and the 
transcendent nature of revelation. Regarding Idealism's flaw, 
Bonhoeffer said,
[w]e note the basic lack of a concrete concept of the 
person. The picture is everywhere the same. The
44Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer. pp. 57-60. Barth's appraisal 
of Sanctorum Communio was laudatory— he went so far as to call 
it a "theological miracle"; unfortunately, he did not know of the 
work or its significance until after Bonhoeffer had died in 
April, 1945. Barth said of Sanctorum Communio. "If there is one 
thing that justifies Reinhold Seeburg, it may lie in the fact 
that there emerged from his school this man and this thesis 
which, with its broad and deep vision, not only rouses the 
deepest respect when one looks back at the situation at the time, 
but also is to this very day more instructive, more stimulating, 
more enlightening and more truly 'edifying' to read than a great 
deal of the better known writing that has since been published 
on the problem of the Church . . .  I frankly admit that I find 
it difficult at least to maintain the level then reached by 
Bonhoeffer, and from my place and in my own language to say as 
much and not to express myself more weakly than that young man 
did then." See Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics. Vol. 4/2, p. 641. 
Also, see Peter Berger's essay "Sociology and Ecclesiology" in 
Martin Marty, ed., The Place of Bonhoeffer, (London: Billing and
Sons Limited, 1963), esp. pp. 55-57 where Bonhoeffer's place 
among the dialectical theologians of the day is clarified.
45 Bonhoeffer's usage of the term 'community' was influenced 
largely by two persons: Hegel and his understanding of community
as_the dwelling place of the Holy Spirit in the form of Absolute 
Spirit and Seeburg with his notion of community as the dwelling 
place of the Holy Spirit in the form of absolute will. Bon­
hoeffer wanted to refashion the whole christologically, believing 
he was overcoming Troeltsch and Barth's antithesis by attaining 
a third overriding position. Whenever the term "community" is 
used in reference to Bonhoeffer, the Christian community or 
church is implied.
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spirit is the one, is everlastingly identical, supra- 
personal and immanent in man. It destroys the con­
crete person and thus makes any concept of concrete 
community impossible, sacrificing this to the unity of 
immanent spirit.46
Through emphasizing such "defects," he went on to stress the 
Christian community in opposite terms. Here, Bonhoeffer spoke 
of God voluntarily revealing and joining himself to a human 
community of individuals— the church which is simul justus et 
peccatorum— in the form of the Holy Spirit.47
The Christian community is "weak" in that it is always simul 
peccator. Bonhoeffer emphasized this half of Luther's notion to 
make up for Idealism's excesses, but he had more specific things 
to say about the nature of Christ existing as community. He had 
a clear framework in mind regarding the purpose of the divine and 
human will with his notion of "Christ existing as community." 
He said:
In the community of God it [immediate community] 
clearly means, first, the absolute identity of purpose 
of the divine and the human will, within the relation 
of the creative to the created, that is, the obedient 
will. in other words, within the relation of ruling 
and serving . . . .  In religious language, certainly, 
this community is built upon immediate and mutual 
love; but because love rules when it serves we have 
the problem here of a pure association of authority 
(Herrschaftsverband): by limitless serving God rules
limitlessly over me n .48
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio. (London: 
Collins, 1963), p. 138.
47 Indeed, Bethge points out that this was Bonhoeffer's view: 
God's freedom confines itself within the limits of a weak human 
community of individuals. This had already been the view of the 
Bonhoeffer who wrote Act and Being . . . "  Bethge, Dietrich 
Bonhoefferr p. 37 4.
48 Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio. p. 41.
Within this vulnerable human community a certain order prevails 
having to do with the relation of ruling and serving. The social 
undercurrent is characterized by this hierarchically conceived 
relationship. However, Bonhoeffer points to a new understanding 
of this correlation by stressing the sociologically unique 
structure of the Christian community.
Whereas determining and pursuing God's will is traditionally 
perceived as the end toward which the community should strive, 
he suggests that in the mutual love of the saints, "communion" 
is in fact established as an end in itself. The paradox lay in 
the fact that love finds communion without seeking it, yet such 
communion is God's will for the Church:
But as it is precisely this communion of saints that 
the divine will purposes, the difficulty is resolved; 
the position therefore is not that this communion has 
a further aim outside itself . . . but that communion 
(in the broader sense) is in fact organized exclusive­
ly towards a specific end, namely, the achievement of 
God's will. But, as the community itself represents 
this realisation it is an end in itself.49
Thus, God's will is for communion, yet, paradoxically, the 
community must not attempt to achieve it on its own, for then it 
eludes realization. The paradox is revealed in the fact that 
God's ultimate rule within the community creates the love which 
enables persons to act in one another's behalf. God's rule is 
absolute and his authority binding, but such manner of ruling 
manifests itself not only in terms of obedient service on the 
part of men and women, but of persons in service to one another. 
In this way, God's rule is manifest in its paradoxical opposite—  
service. Clarifying his position Bonhoeffer said:
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Bonhoeffer, ibid.. pp. 125-26.49
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In order to understand [the Christian community's 
unique sociological structure] fully we must note 
further that the communion of saints knows that it is 
organized on the basis of authority. It is communion 
only by virtue of the rule of the divine will within 
it. The paradoxical nature of this relationship of 
authority between God and man in revelation has its 
basis in the fact that God rules by serving.50
Bonhoeffer's scheme of authority, while maintaining a conserva­
tive structure at its base— the hierarchical relation of absolute 
ruling and obedient service— provides a paradoxical interpreta­
tion that yields an entirely new understanding of these terms. 
It all turns on his notion of divine rule manifesting itself in 
service— its seeming opposite. Such a scheme for the Christian 
community is provocative, yet full of danger and promise.
There can be no doubt that Bonhoeffer's Systematics 
Professor, Reinhold Seeburg, had something to do with his 
student's schema. The professor affected Bonhoeffer's overall 
theological outlook with the notion of communities as communities 
of "will." This is the volitional aspect of Seeburg's theologi­
cal program which stayed with Bonhoeffer throughout his life.51 
Seeburg envisioned men and women as creatures who encounter one 
another, each possessing a will. It is inevitable that these 
wills confront each other and interact with one another. In the 
fallen world, and as "willing" creatures, one tries to force 
one's will upon another, making the "defeated" will submit to it.
Seeburg believed that only in the co-operation of wills 
("social synthesis" of wills) would their dissolution be
50 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . p. 126.
51 John P. Beal, "The Seeburg Connection: The Influence of
Reinhold Seeburg on the Early Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer," 
1976 (unpublished manuscript on file at Bonhoeffer Archives, 
Union Theological Seminary), pp. 14-16, 26-28.
achieved. In speaking of the sociality of the human spirit, 
Bonhoeffer took Seeburg's notion and applied it as well to the 
relation between God and humanity. It is community (Gemeinshaft) 
that results in this encounter between wills. Bonhoeffer 
expressed the thought of the community as a community of will:
To see the individual person as an ultimate unit, 
created by God's will, but as real only in sociality, 
is to see the relations of one with another, built 
upon difference, as also willed by God. This means 
that strife is the basic sociological law. Concretely 
this means that in every social relation there must be 
an element of partisanship. Only in the conflict of 
wills does genuine life arise, only in strife does 
power unfold. This insight is by no means new . . .
it does not mean that the other will is ignored or 
denied, but it is forced into one's own will and so 
overcome. Only in the co-operation of wills is their 
opposition dissolved. This is the 'social synthesis 
which triumphs over all antitheses of the will and of 
nature' . . . .52
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The danger of such a concept of sociality between persons lies 
in the fundamental coercion, strife, and antagonism between and 
over persons that adumbrates the sociological structure of the 
community. It suggests within its foundations an absolute
52 Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio. pp. 54-55. Bonhoeffer 
attributes the insight that "only in the conflict of wills does 
genuine life arise, only in strife does power unfold" to Seeburg 
in his Dogmatics. It is also worth noting that Bonhoeffer was 
reading Nietzsche during his doctoral studies. He refers to 
Hobbes as the first to express the purely social significance of 
strife and Paul Natorp with his notion that discord drives 
humanity forward.
Also Bonhoeffer referenced Seeburg regarding the notion of 
personal sociality, "[s]o far I can see, it was not until 
Reinhold Seeburg, in his Christliche Dogmatik . . .  in his 
teaching about man's innate spirituality, that the idea of 
sociality was suggested as belonging to man's original nature, 
thus restoring to dogmatics an important doctrine, without which 
the ideas of original sin and of the church cannot be fully 
understood." See Bonhoeffer, ibid. . p. 43. The thought of 
systematic sociologist Othmar Spann also heavily influenced 
Bonhoeffer in the notion of mutuality as the essence of personal 
spirituality. This thematic ended up constituting a cornerstone 
°f Bonhoeffer's enterprise in Sanctorum Communio.
tyranny that is incompatible with the notion of mutuality 
Bonhoeffer is suggesting. What kind of mutual service to the 
other is derived from an absolute rule which mandates such 
behavior? With such categories Bonhoeffer's model seems to fall 
into a dangerously conservative trap.
Yet the promise of Bonhoeffer's sociological model overcomes 
its dangers in the way divine rule is defined and discussed. 
Bonhoeffer clarified what lay at the root of this sociality— a 
life principle of vicarious action based on Christ's ultimate 
sacrifice on the cross for others:
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Not 'solidarity', which is never possible between 
Christ and man, but vicarious action, is the life- 
principle of the new mankind . . . .  Since now Christ 
bears within him the new life-principle of his church, 
he is at the same time established as the Lord of the 
church, that is, his relation to it is that with a 
'community' and that of a 'ruler' .53
The nature of Christ's rule is based on an ultimate act of 
sacrifice for others. Therein, power and authority are conferred 
on Christ. Bonhoeffer clarifies his concept of vicarious action 
even more:
The unique quality of the Christian idea of acting 
vicariously is that this action is strictly vicarious 
with regard to guilt and punishment. Jesus, being 
himself innocent, takes the others' guilt and punish­
ment upon himself, and as he dies a criminal, he is 
accursed, for he bears the sins of the world and is 
punished for them; but on the felon's cross, vicarious 
love triumphs; obedience to God triumphs over guilt, 
and thereby guilt is in fact punished and overcome. 
Such, briefly, is our way of seeing Christ's vicarious 
action.54
53 Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio, p. 107.
54 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . pp. 113-14.
Bonhoeffer goes on in Sanctorum Communio to delineate the 
concrete ramifications of the communion of saints. The social 
acts constituting the community of love clarify the structure and 
nature of the Church, specifically, the content of this mutuality 
among persons. Bonhoeffer summarizes such social acts as: 1)
God-appointed structural 'togetherness' (miteinander) of the 
church and its members; and 2 ) the principle of vicarious action- 
-that the members act for one another (füreinander)55
The crux of Bonhoeffer's ecclesiological model rests with 
this notion of social mutuality— defined according to Christ's 
vicarious action and demonstrated through action with and for 
others in Christian community. He points to Luther and the fact 
that such a principle for the community involves 'being trans­
formed into one another through love.' As Bonhoeffer put it:
Without in any way linking this with any mystical 
ideas about the vanishing of the frontiers between the 
concrete I and Thou, Luther is simply saying that now 
I no longer want anything but the Thou, and the one 
loving me does not want anything else but me; and that 
there is a reversal— as it were, a transformation— of 
the attitudes imposed by sin. In this event I am 
bound to reach the point where the want, infirmities 
and sins of my neighbor afflict me as if they were my 
own, just as Christ was afflicted by our sins.56
Bonhoeffer is able to talk about service and ruling in the same 
breath because of the new interpretation Christ brings to such 
seemingly contradictory motifs. The paradigm rests in the notion 
that the nature of God's rule, authority, and power centers in
54
55 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . pp. 126-27.
56 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . p. 127 (emphasis added) .
his sacrificial giving of himself on the cross for others.57 It 
is not a tyrannical rule based on domination and coercion of 
others toward a divine purpose. It is an absolute authority of 
a different order, the power of which is effected in a way 
contradictory to normative concepts of absolute authority.
Mutual self-giving within the Christian community is not 
experienced as a mandate wielded with duress, but as a natural 
inclination as a result of God's authoritative action within 
individual persons. Thus, the sinful tendency to dominate others 
and have one's way in the community is transformed into the 
gracious proclivity for selfless action for the sake of others.
Even in his early days as a doctoral student, Bonhoeffer 
thought about God's presence in the world in terms of power and 
weakness, ruling and serving, command and obedience. But we 
already see how he pointed to a fresh understanding of what 
divine authority looks like, and this having its genesis in 
Luther's emphasis on the transformative power of love and finding 
expression in the principle of vicarious action. These are just 
some of the terms Bonhoeffer used in his academic work, but they 
yield a theme, a prism through which the young man developed his 
lifelong theology. Moreover, they foreshadow a fundamental theme 
for which he became well-known in his prison letters— his 
statements about God in his weakness and powerlessness in the 
world, Jesus Christ as the 'man for others, ' and the autonomy and 
strength of a world come of age. Terms of strength and weakness 
which mark his late thought are intimated by the very categories 
Bonhoeffer used as early as 1925. Thus, his academic work
55
In this case, Bonhoeffer refers exclusively to the 
Christian community.
anticipates his later thought by an important paradigm through 
which he first developed his theological thought.
C. Act and Being
In writing his Habilitationschrift in 1929-30, Bonhoeffer 
continued with his unique line of interest in ecclesiology, 
specifically the idea of "Christus als Gemeinde existierend.11 
Whereas Sanctorum Communio had been a theological-sociological 
investigation into the concrete nature of the Church, Act and 
Being was a theological-epistemological study into the same 
topic.58 In the latter book, Bonhoeffer was attempting to 
resolve the debate between actualistic theology (Barth and 
Bultmann) and the new "theology of being" (Heidegger) . Bon­
hoeffer set out to reconcile the two different viewpoints by 
suggesting the epistemological dialectic of act and being is
better understood as the social dialectic between faith and the
church.59 In other words, he was wanting to preserve the
contingent and continuous nature of revelation in unity with his 
concept of the church as the concrete form of revelation. Before 
we see how Bonhoeffer expressed his motif of Christ existing as 
community, we shall look briefly at the ways he discussed
revelation in actualistic and ontological terms.
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58 Bethge, ibid. . p. 98.
59 Ibid. See also Wayne Floyd, "Christ, Concreteness and 
Creation in the Early Bonhoeffer," Union Seminary Quarterly 
S^kisw, vol. 39.1-2 (1984), p. 10. He described Bonhoeffer's
Project in Act and Being in the following manner: "Bonhoeffer
wished to do better than either what he understood to be the 
empty existentialism of Heidegger or Bultmann, or the positivity 
°f revelation which he feared of Barth."
Bonhoeffer shared with Karl Barth a fundamental belief in 
God's freedom to act among humanity in the event of revelation. 
However, the theological student continued to struggle, more 
explicitly than he did in Sanctorum Communio. with the ramifica­
tions of Barth's dialectical understanding of that freedom. 
Regarding Barth's understanding of God's freedom in revelation 
Bonhoeffer said:
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The Word of God is not bound and shall never be bound. 
Theological dialectic is a genuine theological dialec­
tic in so far as it is open to this thought, it is 
finally this and only this thought, and if it serves 
the freedom of the Word of God .60
While he wanted to maintain the transcendent nature of 
revelation along with Barth, Bonhoeffer could not advocate a 
dialectical understanding of God's freedom in the way that Barth 
did at that time. Holding true to the Lutheran dictum finitum 
capax infiniti. Bonhoeffer wanted to maintain an understanding 
of God's freedom that demonstrated the concreteness of revelation 
in the world.61 Bonhoeffer's conclusion was that unless God's 
freedom is understood in its concrete form in the world, one
60 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Akt und Sein. reprinted in Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer Werke. vol. 2 (Munich: Christian Kaiser, 1988), p. 
79 (author's translation).
61 Bonhoeffer's quest for the concrete expression of God's 
revelation in the world comes through in one of his addresses to 
the German-speaking congregation he served in Barcelona in 1928. 
Entitled, "What is a Christian Ethic?" he emphasizes the fact 
that ethics is concerned with persons' direct involvement in the 
concrete situations of the world. In so doing, "ethics does not 
become once again a way from man to God, but remains like 
everything that men who know themselves to be freed from the 
world by Christ can do...a demonstration which God can either 
accept or refuse . . ." Dietrich Bonhoeffer, No Rusty Swords:
fetters, Lectures and Notes. 1928-1936. vol. 1, trans. Edwin H. 
Robertson and John Bowden, (London: Collins, 1965), pp. 47-48.
results in making God an object of thought. That is why, then, 
later in Act and Being, he questioned the epistemological 
interpretation of transcendentalism in revelation and suggested 
instead a sociological framework. Such was the nature of 
Bonhoeffer's struggle to advocate an actualistic understanding 
of revelation.
Bonhoeffer believed that outside of faith there was such a 
thing as a being of revelation upon which persons' faith could 
rest. Although he was drawn to dialectical theology's appercep­
tion of the nature of existence, he could not fully accept it 
either. Bonhoeffer understood existence, from the perspective 
of dialectical theology, as "that which is not able to demon­
strate itself in truth, but it can only be understood in the 
decision for God . . . "62 The danger he saw in such an under­
standing was that of a concept of existence achieved outside 
revelation. Bonhoeffer was thinking specifically of Bultmann 
when he said, "Only from the sinful condition is one able to 
interpret one's historicity, and not the other way around."63
Bonhoeffer was strongly affected by the appearance of Martin 
Heidegger's Being and Time.64 Specifically, it was his notion 
of Dasein that influenced Bonhoeffer's understanding of exis­
tence. Dasein may be translated as the entity which exists, 
namely, man [sic] himself.65 This notion was the key in helping
62 Ibid. . p. 91. (author's translation)
63 Ibid. , p. 92. (author's translation)
64 Martin Heidegger, Sein und Seit. 1927.
65 Bonhoeffer, Act and Being, p. 59. This is Bonhoeffer's 
translation of the word. He speaks of it in more detail as
nan's understanding in history, in the given temporal context 
°f the decisions he has taken." Bonhoeffer, ibid., p. 63. 
Apparently, it was Heidegger's revolutionary perspective in 
Phenomenology— to consider existence in temporal, historical
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Bonhoeffer conceive of being in personal, finite terms, not
impersonal, infinite ones. Heidegger's concept of Dasein was 
able to articulate the continuous basis of human existence that 
Bonhoeffer was looking to express in theological terms. 
Ultimately, however, he had to reject Heidegger's notion of 
Dasein because it had no room for revelation; it was a self- 
contained understanding of human existence. However, Bonhoeffe- 
r's critigue of Heidegger was even more pointed than that.
Bonhoeffer was in direct opposition to the notion of
"possibility" or "potentiality" that laid behind Heidegger's 
concept of being. Whereas Heidegger's system allowed, even 
invited one to think of existence in terms of possibility, 
Bonhoeffer rejected this outright. For him, such notions, when 
applied to theology called into guestion God's freedom in 
revelation. Giving voice to his displeasure, he said,
Existence is thought in relation to revelation as 
it is affected by revelation. Here there is no more 
potential of being affected . . . .  Existence is
either genuinely affected or it is not; indeed, as the 
concrete spiritual-physical unity is a 'boundary'
which passes no longer through man or can be drawn by 
him, it is Christ himself.66
Bonhoeffer could not accept an understanding of existence which 
carried with it an understanding of potentiality of being. To 
him, persons live an either-or existence, in a concretely 
determined existence which has been created by God and revealed 
to us in revelation. This brings us to Bonhoeffer's conception
59
categories, rather than in timeless ones, (i.e., Husserl)— that 
caught Bonhoeffer's attention.
66 Bonhoeffer, Akt und Sein. op. cit. . pp. 75-76 (author's
translation).
of existence and how he was able to overcome Heidegger's 
definition.
Bonhoeffer, referring back to Luther's concept of passive 
existence, advocated an understanding of existence as an 
"existence which undergoes." So for him, the solution to the 
existentialist notion was to be found in the Church. There we 
can understand the continuity of the person, both as sinful and 
saved. Bonhoeffer articulated the continuous nature of person- 
hood with his anthropological categories of "being in Christ" and 
"being in Adam."67 Such a schema provided for the determined 
existential situation of persons; there is no possibility or 
impossibility of being in existence. There is only the concrete, 
fixed reality of persons as sinner and saved, communio sanctorum 
et peccatorum. Obviously, Bonhoeffer's understanding of the 
human existential situation applied to the Christian community 
only. Later he would expand his christology to expand and 
include the whole world. Here, he is trying to solve the problem 
of act and being by focusing on the simultaneous anthropological 
reality in the church.
Two contextual factors must be highlighted in order to 
appreciate the theological formulations that were asserted in Act 
and Being. First, Bonhoeffer was struggling with the influence 
of the theological faculty at Berlin. No less than the liberal
67 Cf. Act and Being, pp. 153-184; Akt und Sein, pp. 135-185. 
Bonhoeffer mentions the Catholic philosopher-theologian Przywara 
and the Thomist principle of "analogia entis" (analogy of being) 
(P* 6S, Act and Beinq  ̂♦ Despite his success in "opening the 
concept of being to transcendence" with his thorough ontological 
treatment, Przywara's schema is ultimately rejected by Bonhoeffer 
for the reason that "[a]ny attempt to establish an ontological 
Principle by fastening the idea of the creature to "Adam" must 
lead to...a pure metaphysics of being." (p. 157, Act and Being) 
Bonhoeffer is basically disturbed by the analooia entis' lack of 
an ontological acknowledgement of the sinful character of the 
uman creature in its doctrine of Adam.
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questions of the nineteenth century interested him. Yet, he was 
indelibly changed by Barth's revelational theology and its basic 
tenets. How was he to reconcile the two?68 The key for Bon- 
hoeffer was to assert that persons cannot understand their 
existence from their own perspective. The nature of our 
existence is not independent, but an existence which "undergoes,” 
a passive existence. Here, we see again the second major 
influence on Bonhoeffer's anthropological stance— Luther and his 
notion of human existence as coram.
With Luther, Bonhoeffer denied that persons can ever 
understand themselves from a self-referential point of view. 
Such an attempt is doomed from the beginning because the nature
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68 John Godsey argues that it was the way in which Barth and 
Bonhoeffer nineteenth-century liberal theology and the way in 
which it was to be overcome which was the basic difference 
between them. Godsey points to the 180-degree turn from liberal 
theology's anthropological starting point as the key indicator 
of Barth's reluctance to deal with experientially-oriented 
questions of the modern world. Bonhoeffer, on the other hand, 
still wanted to address these anthropological questions. Hence, 
a socio-existential side of Bonhoeffer that Barth chose not to 
take up. See John Godsey, "Barth and Bonhoeffer: The Basic
Difference," Presidential Address, American Theological Society, 
April 1986, unpublished manuscript on file at Bonhoeffer Ar­
chives, Union Theological Seminary, pp. 24-27.
We concur with Godsey's appraisal of the difference between 
Barth and Bonhoeffer, especially with reference to both of their 
early theologies. Although he did not agree with liberal 
theology's way of dealing with its basic anthropological 
questions, Bonhoeffer provided a way of answering those questions 
without falling prey to the presuppositions of that same era. 
Barth, in his book, The Humanity of God, said with reference to 
the Erlangen school of theology, "But insofar as Hoffman's 
theology was intended to be a theology of Christian self- 
understanding and not a theology of the Holy Spirit, it could not 
break through the general trend of the century. This is true in 
spite of the significance which this theology has for us even 
today. The basic concern of evangelical theology could not find 
a genuine expression in these terms. If only the need for an 
approach from below had been genuine and had grown out of a new 
examination of the authentic concerns of theology!" Karl Barth, 
She_Humanity of Go d . (London: Collins, 1961), p. 25. We contend
that Bonhoeffer did have such a genuine approach from below, 
teexamining anthropology from the authentic concerns of theology.
of existence is such that persons exist before God whether they 
like it or not and know it or not. It is this Lutheran under­
standing of the passive nature of human existence which formed 
the backbone of Bonhoeffer's argument against liberal theology's 
anthropological schema. Men and women are able to gain accurate 
self-understanding only through faith, from an existence which 
lies outside of them and informs them. This is the manner in 
which Bonhoeffer presented the categories of persons— "being in 
Christ" and "being in Adam"; living as judged and forgiven 
persons before God in the church.
Bonhoeffer was able to discuss the way God's revelation is 
both act and being, contingent and continual in nature, by 
pointing to the dialectic at work between faith and the church. 
We have just seen how he asserted the priority of justification 
in any anthropological quest for human self-understanding. The 
Church is the necessary counterpart of the dialectic in that it 
is only in the Christian community that an accurate understanding 
of self is possible. It is only in the Church, through the gift 
of faith, that one understands herself/himself as both condemned 
and justified.
We can certainly see in Act and Being a continual progres­
sion toward a concrete description of how one is to recognize the 
Word and the Spirit in the Church. Without such concretization, 
Bonhoeffer would be guilty of his own critique against idealistic 
philosophy, leaving theological concepts in metaphysical terms. 
We have seen how crucial it was for Bonhoeffer to understand 
human existence as an existence coram. Whereas we clearly see 
his Lutheran notion of existence at work in Act and Being, we 
shall see more concretely how Bonhoeffer understood the 'pro m e ' 
character of Christ's person and work in the Christology
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lectures. But first, we pause to examine a theological ambiguity 
which marked Bonhoeffer's life and theology in the late twenties.
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D. Bonhoeffer's Ambiguous Understanding of God
A basic dynamic in Bonhoeffer's personal life yields a 
deeper dimension into his way of thinking: his personal struggle 
throughout his life with a tendency to have power over others.69 
A gifted, intelligent, and assiduous person, Bonhoeffer was 
nonetheless well aware of this tendency from early on. Utilizing 
a social structure like that of absolute rule and obedient 
service in one's theology can lead to dangerous conclusions. And 
in fact, an ambiguity and incongruence marked Bonhoeffer's young 
life in similar dialectical terms of power.
Serving as assistant pastor in a German-speaking parish in 
Barcelona in 1928, Bonhoeffer delivered several sermons and 
lectures. One of these lectures, "Basic Questions of a Christian 
Ethic," demonstrates his loyalty at that time to the ancient 
earthly principle of the right of the stronger:
Voelker are like men. They are immature and need 
leadership; they grow to the bloom of youth, to 
manhood, and they die. In this there is nothing which 
is either good or evil in itself. Yet profound
69 Clifford Green identified "power as dominance" to be the 
problem in Bonhoeffer's personal life and in society as well at 
that time. in fact, Green went on to argue that precisely by 
dealing with dominating power in his theological and personal 
pilgrimage Bonhoeffer was able to celebrate human strength and 
maturity in his later theology.
Green documents the soteriological problem in Bonhoeffer's 
theology by focusing on the power of the ego. He identifies 
seven passages which together demonstrate the soteriological 
problem of power in the early theology. For more on the power 
°f the ego as the specific problem in Bonhoeffer's early 
soteriology see Green, The Sociality of Christ and Humanity: 
a^ £ i c h _ Bonhoeffer's Early Theology. 1927-1933. pp. 150-157.
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questions are involved here, for growth requires 
expansion, and the increase of power involves pushing 
the other aside. This is the same in personal life 
and in the life of a Volk. But every Volk has a call 
of God in itself to make history, to enter into the 
contest of the life of Voelker. It is valid to hear 
this call out of the growing and becoming of the Volk 
as it occurs in the sight of God. God calls the Volk 
to manliness, to battle, and to victory. The strength 
and the power and the victory is from God who creates 
youth in man and Volk. God loves youth, for God 
himself is eternally young and strong and victorious. 
Anxiety and weakness should be defeated by courage and 
strength. Should not a Volk which has experienced the 
call of God to its own life, to its own youth and its 
own strength, should not such a Volk follow this call, 
even if this means treating as unimportant the life of 
other Voelker? God is the Lord of history. If a Volk 
humbly bows before this holy will which guides histo­
ry, then in its youth and strength it can, with God, 
overcome the weak and the cowardly; for God will be 
with it .70
This surprising extract reveals a young Bonhoeffer espousing 
patent Lebensraum philosophy and a titanic ethics. It does not 
sound like the voice of the academic in Sanctorum Communio much 
less the one who was to espouse pacifism later. Indeed, Eberhard 
Bethge classified these statements as "dreadful" phrases which 
evidenced a young theologian who was not yet "talking his own 
language."71 But one must remember the context in Germany at the 
time. As Bethge emphasized:
Such propositions were soon to become articles of 
faith among German nationalists in the Evangelical 
Church but, before they were interpreted anti-Semitic- 
ally and chauvinistically and became the hall-mark of
70 I have used the translation offered by Clifford Green. 
See Clifford Green, Bonhoeffer: The Sociality of Christ and
HManity, pp. c jt.r pp. 161-62.; Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer Werkp Vol. 10, (Munich: Christian Kaiser Verlag,
1991)' PP. 339-40.
71 Bethge, op. cit. . p. 85-86.
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right-wing extremism, they were also used by democrats 
and members of StresemanlVi Volkspartei ,72
Indeed, Bonhoeffer shows himself a product of his culture, 
thinking in terms and categories which prevailed in German 
culture and philosophy.73 One key way, then, the ambiguity of 
this early period manifests itself has to do with the way 
Bonhoeffer dealt in this old earthly theme of the right of the 
stronger over the weak. In Sanctorum Communio he articulated a 
scheme in which "stepping over" the other person reflects a 
sinful sociality at work in community whereas God's transforming 
love involves a community ruled by selfless service in mutual 
relation with the other. The lecture from Barcelona— in the name 
of national loyalty— however, maintains the opposite, advocating, 
even legitimating "pushing the other aside."
Certainly a disparity is apparent, and it revolves around 
the category of strength and weakness, power and defeat. At this 
point in his life (1927-1931/32) theology was an academic 
enterprise. But in 1931-32, a change occurred in his life which 
not only had far-reaching consequences for his attitude toward 
theology and the church as a whole, but it had everything to do 
with the way Bonhoeffer resolved such inconsistent views. 
Similar statements were never again to surface in his sermons or 
letters. As Bethge has noted, "[bjarely two years later he felt 
very uncomfortable at having expressed himself in this way about
72 Bethge, ibid. . p. 8 6 .
73 • •The idea of the struggle for life as the natural basis of 
human existence came from Friedrich Naumann, on whom Bonhoeffer 
specifically relied in this address. The same motif is found in 
Max Weber. Cf. Bethge, p. 86 citing Friedrich Naumann, Briefe 
^B^E-Religion. (7th ed. 1917) pp. 61 ff.
burning ethical questions . . . .  The theoloqia crucis and a 
wider view did their work ."74
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Ill. "From Phraseology to Reality" (1931-32)
Bonhoeffer never considered himself one who went through 
many changes in his life, that is, momentous departures from one 
way of life or thinking to another— except for one. He said,
There are people who change, and others who can hardly 
change at all. I don't think I've ever changed very 
much, except perhaps at the time of my first impres­
sions abroad and under the first conscious influence 
of father's personality. It was then that I turned 
from phraseology to reality . . . .  Neither of us has 
really had a break in our lives. Of course, we have 
deliberately broken with a good deal, but that again 
is something quite different . . . .  I sometimes used 
to long for something of the kind, but today I think 
differently about it.75
The change Bonhoeffer describes occurred when he was beginning 
to teach at Berlin University and work in the church and in the 
ecumenical movement. He openly referred to this change in a 
letter to a former girl-friend:
I plunged into my work in a very unchristian way. An 
• . . ambition that many noticed in me made my life
difficult . . . .  Then something happened, something 
that has changed and transformed my life to the 
present day. For the first time I discovered the 
Bible . . .  I had often preached, I had seen a great 
deal of the Church, and talked and preached about it—  
but I had not yet become a Christian . . .  I knew that 
at that time I turned the doctrine of Jesus Christ 
into something of personal advantage for myself . . . 
I pray to God that will never happen again. Also I
74 Bethge, op. cit. . p. 87.
75 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison. Letter of 
APril 22, 1944, p. 277.
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had never prayed, or prayed only very little. For all 
my loneliness, I was quite pleased with myself. Then 
the Bible, and in particular the Sermon on the Mount, 
freed me from that. Since then everything has 
changed. I have felt this plainly, and so have other 
people about me. It was a great liberation. It 
became clear to me that the life of a servant of Jesus 
Christ must belong to the Church, and step by step it 
became plainer to me how far that must go. Then came 
the crisis of 1933. This strengthened me in it. . .
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Ambition and self-advancement had been motivating forces in 
Bonhoeffer's life and theology up until this point. Then, in 
1932, Christianity became real to him in a dynamic and living 
way.77 Experiences he had had the previous two years contributed 
toward this change— particularly his year of study in the United 
States at Union Theological Seminary78 and his work with the 
ecumenical movement. Bonhoeffer commented in his letter that he 
experienced "a great liberation." A significant aspect of what 
he was 'liberated from' was this basic struggle with his own 
power over others. Eberhard Bethge made it clear that Bon­
hoeffer's whole life was a struggle to come to terms with his own
76 Letter from Finkenwalde, January 27, 1936. Quoted from 
Bethge, op. cit.. pp. 154, 155.
77 One Bonhoeffer scholar refers to this change reflecting 
the fact that he was in the process of becoming a theologian of 
the cross. For him, "Theology was no longer discourse designed 
to show his academic acumen; it was a matter of faith and witness 
to the reality of God become man for him and the world." John 
W. DeGruchy, Bonhoeffer and South Africa: Theology in Dialogue.
(Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company,
1984) , pp. 22, 23.
78 Bonhoeffer's relationship with Frank Fisher proved to be 
especially meaningful, one that yielded new vistas of life. 
Fisher introduced Bonhoeffer to the poor neighborhoods of Harlem, 
and through their friendship, Bonhoeffer regularly attended 
Abyssinian Baptist Church and taught Sunday School there. The 
experience had a profound effect on the young student; it was his 
first exposure to black culture, the socio-economic problems 
which were a part of that part of New York City, but most impor­
tantly, the vigor and life with which that congregation wor­
shipped and lived together.
power in relation to others.79 Although he was to continue 
struggling with his natural influence and strong personality and
how it affected those he was around, his anxiety was partially
salved.
That 1931-32 was a significant year for Bonhoeffer personal­
ly, and with far-reaching ramifications, is not a novel discov­
ery. However, the evidence presents itself that a basic 
ambiguity which characterized Bonhoeffer's life and thought up 
until that point was partly resolved as a result of this 
'change. ' This discovery of Christianity in a way he had not 
known before marks a significant event in which his predilection 
for aggressive ambition and self-advancement was transformed at 
a root level. He was freed in his own life to focus on the
church and his responsibility in it in a way which simply had not
existed up until then. In Lutheran terms it was an example of 
being affected by God from the outside— the extra me nature of 
revelation— and relinquished from personal ambition and inward 
motivation.
68
79 • •Interview with Eberhard Bethge, Saturday, November 20, 
1993. See Appendix I.
One Bonhoeffer scholar highlighted the terms of Bonhoeffer's 
struggle as was seen in his 1932 lecture, "Thy Kingdom Come": " 
• • . the religion of the weak who would escape from the pains 
and pressures, the lies and catastrophes of the world into an 
eternal realm; and the religion of the strong, who would fight 
for God's cause; for religion and the church, for social and 
moral reconstruction, against the powers of the world and so 
build the kingdom of God. There are subtle ironies in both these 
forms. The yearning of the weak for eternal security is a 
religious attempt to prescribe to God just what human problems 
he shall solve and what comfort he shall offer. The striving of 
the strong to subdue the world for God is, as religious, not 
Properly secular but secularist. It builds a kingdom with human 
power, but it does not allow God whom the Scriptures reveal to 
be lord of the world." Charles C. West, "Barth, Bonhoeffer and 
the Secularists on Human Religion: A Dialogue with Ernst Feil,"
unpublished paper presented at the Sixth International Bonhoeffer 
ociety Conference, Union Theological Seminary, New York City, 
August, 1992, p. 8 .
This change is apparent and paralleled in the way Bonhoeffer 
spoke of God in terms of power and weakness from 1932 on. 
Alluding to it in Sanctorum Communio. Bonhoeffer's paradigmatic 
way of thinking and approaching life— in terms of strength and 
weakness— came to be shaped more and more according to Luther's 
theologia crucis.80 Rather than relinquish the paradigm out of 
which he had struggled and articulated an important part of his 
theological thought, it began to take on fresh meaning and 
relevance in his life and work, particularly in the way he 
understood God and God's presence in the world.
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IV. The Christoloqy Lectures (1933)
A. The Nature of Leadership and It's Authority: 
the Concept of Fiihrer
Bonhoeffer's Christology lectures81 provide us with the most 
complete picture of his Christological program between the years 
1927-1933 . It represents not only the high point of his academic 
career, but its end. As Bethge recalls,
Christology, which he had once regarded as having been 
so remarkably neglected in Holl's seminars on Luther, 
in the last resort lay behind the 'change' which he 
had referred to already in his 1931 lecture. It had
80 • •Bethge confirms this observation in his statement, noted
earlier, regarding the retractable nature of Bonhoeffer's titanic
statements made in Barcelona. "Barely two years later he felt
very uncomfortable at having expressed himself" as he did in
Barcelona. As Bethge put it, "[t]he theolooia crucis and a wider
view did their work." Bethge, op. cit. . p. 87. "Barely two
Years later" would be the time of this "change."
81 The Christology lectures are not based on Bonhoeffer's 
Manuscript (which is lost) , but are a reconstruction of students' 
notes from the seminar, delivered the summer of 1933. Bethge 
served as compiler and editor.
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been the magnetic or even the explosive center of 'The 
Nature of the Church' of 1932; and it was to be the 
basis for ethics and serve as a defence against misuse 
of the concept of 'orders of creation' . . . .  When 
the gales of 1933 swept over the universities, Bon- 
hoeffer stuck to his post, unaffected by the line of 
the so-called "Springtime" in Germany. In autumn of 
1933 Bonhoeffer gave up his post in anger and shame, 
determined to remain a theologian only in the service 
of the opposing Confessing Church. This most certain­
ly meant the end of his academic career.82
Before Bonhoeffer left the university as jftrivatdozent. he had 
voiced his disapproval of the rising political power by radio 
address several months earlier. On February 1, 1933— the day
after Hitler came to power as chancellor of Germany— Bonhoeffer 
broadcast a message entitled, "The Younger Generation's Changed 
View of the Concept of Führer." In the talk he analyzed the 
development of the concept of Führer, especially since the post­
war Youth Movement.83 Eberhard Bethge reminds us that,
It would be a misinterpretation . . . were we to
pretend that his argument against the leadership cult 
was based on liberal, democratic ideas; it derived 
rather from a conservative notion of order, and this 
in spite of the idea simultaneously evolved of the 
breaking up of the 'penultimate' orders as opposed to 
the 'ultimate'. Bonhoeffer was concerned with the 
correct structuring of authority . . . .84
In the radio address Bonhoeffer warned his listeners in his final 
sentences, that should the leader:
82 Bethge, op. cit.. p. 164; Bethge, "Turning Points in 
Bonhoeffer's Life and Thought," 23 Union Seminary Quarterly 
Btyiew, (1967) pp. 7-8.
83 Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer. p. 193.
84 Bethge, ibid. . p. 194.
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allow himself to succumb to the wishes of those he 
leads, who will always seek to turn him into their
idol, then the image of the leader will gradually
become the image of the 'misleader' . . . This is the
leader who makes an idol of himself and his office,
and who thus mocks God .85
These last statements however were not communicated over the air 
waves because Bonhoeffer's microphone had been switched off.86 
As can be seen from the overall gist of the text, he did not shy 
away from expressing his political opinion from a theological 
perspective; further, he and his family had maintained a 
cautious, critical eye of Hitler and the Nazis from the begin­
ning.
B. Christ as Mediator, Center, and Boundary
Six months after the radio address Bonhoeffer delivered his 
Christology lectures. This was an arduous task for him insofar 
as it required a synthesis of important themes and emphases which 
had marked his theology up until that time. He opened up the 
lectures stressing a theme in the form of a question which came 
to mark his life— "Who is Jesus Christ?"87 For him this was the
85 Bethge, ibid. .
86 The exact reason for this has never been confirmed. 
Although it could have been due to an overrunning of his time, 
the script shows the syllables had been carefully counted and 
worked out. Whether the station had fallen under Hitler's 
control in two days is uncertain. But, what does remain is the 
fact that Bonhoeffer's most damning statements against Hitler 
were silenced and his talk cut short. Cf. Bethge, Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer f p. 1 9 4 .
87 Bonhoeffer's first theological letter from prison on 30 
April 1944 reflects this lifelong quest, "What is bothering me 
incessantly is the question what Christianity really is, or 
indeed who Christ really is, for us today." See Dietrich 
onhoeffer, Letters & Papers from Prison. Letter of 30 April 
944 / p. 279. Although his theology began to take on a new
correct question for Christology, the question of faith and 
reason.88 He went on to discuss a central theme during his 
early years— the pro me structure of Christ's existence. Due to 
the personal structure of Christ's presence in the church, only 
the "who" question could begin to comprehend the "pro me" 
structure of Christ's existence.89
Bonhoeffer discussed the person and place of Christ in 
triadic terms: Christ as Word, Sacrament and Community, not only
incorporating the third concept into his thought, but making it 
the focus of his social understanding of revelation.90 He 
enumerated the place of Christ as the center of human existence,
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dimension at this point in the letters from prison, the christol- 
ogical focus remained with him throughout his life.
88 See Bonhoeffer, Christolocrv. (London: Collins, 1966) , p.
31; see also Dietrich Bonhoeffer, "Christologie. Vorlesung," 
Gesammelte Schriften. vol. Ill, ed. Eberhard Bethge (Munich: 
Christian Kaiser Verlag, 1960), p. 170.
89 Clifford Green points out that the pro me structure of 
Bonhoeffer's christology not only is the personal structure of 
Christ's being, and the controlling motif in the various sections 
of his lectures, but it was Bonhoeffer's attempt at a reformula­
tion of christology by interpreting traditional ontological 
concepts in terms of sociality, not in terms of self-understand­
ing, as with Bultmann. Clifford Green, "Sociality and Church in 
Bonhoeffer's 1933 Christology," The Scottish Journal of Theology. 
Vol. 21, No. 4, (December 1968), p. 422. We shall see examine 
the consequences of this difference between the two theologians 
in chapter two.
90 Bonhoeffer's thoughts on the relationship of the Word to 
the community show how he adopted as his own Karl Barth's 
conclusion that things can be known only by their like: "What
does it mean that Christ as Word is also community? It means 
that the Logos of God has extension in space and time in and as 
the community. Christ, the Word, is spiritually and physically 
present. The Logos is not only the weak word of human teaching, 
¿22trina; he is also the powerful Word of creation. He speaks, 
and thus creates the form of the community. The community is 
therefore not only the receiver of the Word of revelation; it is 
itself revelation and Word of God. Only in so far as it is 
itself the Word of God can it understand the Word of God. 
Revelation can be understood only on the basis of revelation." 
onhoeffer, Christoloqy. p. 60; Gesammelte Schriften. p. 193. 
(emphasis original) .
the center of history and as the mediator between God and nature. 
In this way, Bonhoeffer developed the theme of "barrier" which 
he had raised in Sanctorum Communio through the concept of 
Christ's place in the center and boundary of human history, 
relationship and existence.
In his notion of Christ existing as community, he called the 
church back to recognize the transcendent truth upon which it is 
based and which it can recognize only through the gift of faith. 
The community is not to be understood as a religious group, 
striving after God with its best intentions and efforts. Rather 
the opposite, Bonhoeffer reestablished the revelatory nature of 
the church, the divine truth upon which it has its existence.
Bonhoeffer accepted the church, not in "religious" terms as 
nineteenth century liberalism had done, but in accord with 
dialectical theology's tenet that revelation can be recognized 
only by revelation. Certainly, the difference between Barth and 
Bonhoeffer would be the former's rejection of the finitum capax 
infiniti and the latter's acceptance of it. It is important to 
note that Bonhoeffer showed a definite break with the liberal 
theology of Berlin and his advocacy of the revelatory theology 
advocated by Barth and the other dialectical theologians of the 
1920's in his notion of Christ existing as community.
Christ as mediator— as center and boundary— increasingly 
became a signal motif in his theology, not only in the tradition­
al Christological sense, i.e., the person and place of Christ, 
but in relation to his unfolding theologia crucis.91 Such terms
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91 •One may understand the versatility of this concept in 
Bonhoeffer's work by looking to the way he utilized the schema 
°f Christ the mediator, the center and boundary of human 
e*istence in Creation and Fall. We will examine these related 
motifs in depth in Chapter Three.
are wrapped up in his understanding of divine power and weakness, 
as is explicitly articulated in the Christology lectures.
In the lectures Bonhoeffer described various heresies which 
have occurred throughout church history. Before launching into 
the nature of positive Christology, he emphasized the role of 
critical Christology in relation to heretical notions about Jesus 
Christ. He said:
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Critical christology is concerned with defining and 
guarding against a false Jesus Christ. Boundaries 
must be drawn to guard against both false theological 
content and inappropriate thought-forms. Any sen­
tences which make statements about Jesus Christ with 
unequivocal directness are to be designated as having 
a false theological content.92
In this way, Bonhoeffer affirmed the Chalcedonian Definition as 
the highest form of christological expression. In it "the direct 
statement about Jesus Christ is superseded and split into two 
expressions which stand over against each other in contradic­
tion."93 Bonhoeffer believed strongly in preserving the mystery 
of the Incarnation in theology so that it would not fall victim 
to theological reductionism and caricature. The way he opened 
his course for the summer reflects how strongly he believed in 
preserving the indirect nature of the topic:
Teaching about Christ begins in silence . . . This has 
nothing to do with mystical silence . . . The church's 
silence is silence before the Word. In proclaiming 
the Word, the church must fall silent before the 
inexpressible: Let what cannot be spoken be wor­
shipped in silence (Cyril of Alexandria). The spoken 
Word is the inexpressible: that which cannot be
spoken is the Word . . .  To speak of Christ means to
92 Bonhoeffer, Christoloqy. p. 104.
93 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . p. 106.
75
keep silent; to be silent about Christ means to speak. 
Proper speech of the Church is proclamation of Christ 
from a proper silence. . . .  We must study christology 
in the humble silence of the worshipping community.94
Bonhoeffer's critical method lent itself naturally to his final 
emphasis in the lectures— positive Christology. His accent on 
silence and paradox intimated the kenotic terms he used to 
describe the christological enterprise.
C. Kenotic Christology: Christ the Scandalon
Bonhoeffer advanced Luther's humiliation-exaltation 
christological formula in his final pages.95 It is with this 
scheme that we once again see the familiar terms of God's 
weakness and God's hiddenness raised as paradigmatic for 
understanding the Incarnate One. He defines who Jesus Christ is 
and how one may correctly speak of Him:
So if we speak of Jesus Christ as God, we may not 
speak of him as the representative of an idea of God 
who possesses the properties of omniscience and 
omnipotence (there is no such thing as this abstract 
divine nature!) ; we must speak of his weakness, of the 
cradle and the cross; and this man is no abstract 
God.96
94 Bonhoeffer, ibid.. p. 27; Bonhoeffer, Gesammelte Schrift- 
ffi/ vol, III, p.  167. The underlined portion of the quotation 
is the author's translation.
95 The summer term ended before Bonhoeffer had completed his 
topic on Positive Christology. According to his notes, he was 
to include a section entitled "The Eternal Christ." Bonhoeffer,
p. 118.
96 Bonhoeffer, ibid.. pp. 108-09; Bonhoeffer, Gesammelte
^ £ Ü t e n ,  vol. Ill, p. 233.
Bonhoeffer echoes Luther before him by pointing to the mundane, 
human image of Jesus as the signpost of God's presence in the 
world. He is the weak man among sinners.
Bonhoeffer comes to the heart of the matter by pointing out 
how the historical ambiguity of Jesus Christ is ultimately a 
stumbling block for people. For Bonhoeffer, the authority Jesus 
assumes is the essence of the scandal. In forgiving others' 
sins, Jesus makes a claim to be the Son of God. As Bonhoeffer 
put it,
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Had he done the signs which were demanded of him for 
proof, men would probably have believed in him. But 
just when it came to the point of signs and wonders, 
he retreated into his incognito and refused to give 
any visible attestation. In this wav he causes the 
offence. Had he answered the question put to him 
about his authority with a miracle, then it would not 
be true that he was wholly man as we are. At the 
decisive moment, in the question about Christ, the 
exception would have been made. So the nearer the 
revelation, the thicker the concealment must be; the 
more urgent the question about Christ, the more 
impenetrable the incognito.97
Whereas Bonhoeffer had just finished emphasizing the paradox of 
the incarnation by affirming the Chalcedonian definition, he 
paused to clarify the nature of God's hiddenness. Christ enters 
the world as the humiliated God-man. The humiliation resides in 
the entire Incarnate One, not the humanity of Christ. He enters 
the world incognito, and this hiddenness manifests itself in the 
fact that:
97 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . p. 114; Bonhoeffer, Gesammelte 
^iHdJLten, vol., Ill, p. 238. The underlined portion of the 
quotation is the author's translation. John Bowden's translation 
ln £hjristoloqy reads, "In this way he makes a stumbling block." 
The original German reads, "So schafft er das Ärgernis."
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He was really made sin for us, and crucified as the 
peccator pessimus. Luther says that he is himself 
robber, murderer and adulterer as we are, for he bears 
our sin, and in so doing describes the ultimate 
foundation of all christological statements. As the 
one who bears our sin, and no one else, he is sinless, 
holy, eternal, the Lord, the Son of the Father.98
Bonhoeffer uses classical Lutheran language here, marked by 
paradox, centering around God's incognito. It is nothing other 
than a kenotic christology. The vicarious principle surfaces 
again as a foundational motif, this time with regard to christo­
logy. The social concept of Christ bearing persons' sins and 
carrying them as if they were his own is the bedrock upon which 
Bonhoeffer built his Lutheran christology.
Of interest to us is the fact that the scandalous nature of 
Christ is paradoxical. Underneath the weakness, suffering and 
sacrifice of Christ's passion is the power and strength of the 
One who alone forgives sin. On the surface, a beaten man dies 
a meaningless death, having made far-fetched claims about 
himself. Underneath is the reality that the Son of God took upon 
himself all human stain, providing new life for the very ones who 
deserve death. While such a paradigm might seem far from novel 
and a mere continuation of Luther's christological model, one 
roust not forget the paradigm that was central for Bonhoeffer 
himself. As he put it,
"[w]e cannot get [ajround the scandal by means of the 
resurrection. We have the Exalted One only as the 
Crucified, the Sinless One only as the one laden with 
guilt, the Risen One only as the Humiliated One. . .
Even the resurrection is not a penetration of the 
incognito. Even the resurrection is ambiguous. It is
98 Bonhoeffer, ibid.. pp. 112-13; Bonhoeffer, Gesammelte
Schriften, p. 237.
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only believed in where the stumbling block of Jesus
has not been removed."99
The German pastor now spoke unqualifiably of Christ in terms 
of weakness, paradox, and scandal. Christ was the man for 
others, intimately involved in the lives of others, demonstrating 
his power in this paradigmatic way. Omnipotence is characterized 
by Bonhoeffer as an abstract concept. Divine authority takes the 
form of Christ's self-giving of himself for others. We already 
know the social concept of vicarious action serves as the 
cornerstone for Bonhoeffer's christology as a whole. Now we 
begin to see the vicarious principle as an indication of God's 
hidden authority and power in the world. It is expressed in 
classically paradoxical Lutheran terms, following the lines of 
a theology of the cross. Whereas Bonhoeffer expressed his 
christology in these traditional terms in 1933, it settled as a 
thematic which was to unfold in more depth in the years ahead. 
He had moved beyond a theological and personal ambiguity, more 
certain of the serious consequences such an understanding of God 
in the world could have in his own context.
V* The Cost of Discipleship (1937)
The theology of the cross is a theological legacy having its 
roots in Luther and Kierkegaard, extending generally from a 
Pauline tradition. In The Cost of Discipleship this lineage 
shines forth in clear expression. We see the main characteris­
tics of Bonhoeffer's theoloqia crucis converge in a way which
Bonhoeffer. ibid., p. 116; Bonhoeffer. Gesammelte
S s h r i f t e n ,  P . 2 4 0 . --------------
demonstrates his loyalty to Luther as well as his creativity in 
working out of such a scheme. Part of that creativity involves 
the way divine power and weakness function as controlling motifs 
in Bonhoeffer's cross-centered theology.
Before we examine the way the theoloqia crucis reaches 
expression in The Cost of Discipleship. we shall list once again 
the five essential aspects of a theology of the cross:
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1) The theology of the cross as a theology of 
revelation, standing in sharp antithesis to 
speculation;
2) God's revelation as an indirect, concealed 
revelation;
3) God's revelation as recognized not in works 
but in suffering;
4) Knowledge of God who is hidden in his reve­
lation as a matter of faith; and
5) The manner in which God is known as reflect­
ed in the practical thought of suffering.100
100 • • •Von Loewenich, ibid.. p. 22. Alister McGrath lists the
same five characteristics, drawing from von Loewenich and
providing much greater annotation. See Alister McGrath, Luther's
Theology of the Cross, pp. 149-51. Larry Rasmussen offers a
somewhat different, more politically sensitive, enumeration.
According to Rasmussen, the essential elements of the theoloqia
£Lucig are: (l) God does not want to be known by that which is
invisible, but only by what God has disclosed; (2) The knowledge
of God, veiled in revelation, is a matter of faith. What is
known is God's humanity and weakness revealed through the cross;
(3) As revealed, God is, at the same time, hidden. The revealed
God is hidden under suffering and the cross; (4) This means that
the revelation of God is apprehended in suffering and the cross,
understood as Christ's passion and at the same time as the
Christian's suffering and cross. The suffering of Christ and of
the Christian belong together; (5 ) This way of knowing God shows
the necessity of suffering and excludes all works-righteousness.
Suffering is most precious while works-righteousness is useless
and deceptive; God accepts only those who are lowly and despised.
ee Larry Rasmussen with Renate Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer— His
--A3nifj.cance for North Americans. (Minneapolis: Fortress Press,
199°), p. 151.
Bonhoeffer dealt with these aspects of Luther's theology of the 
cross over a five year period. Although The Cost of Discipleship 
appeared in print in late 1937, they reflect thought from as 
early as 1932. Thus, his time as director of a clandestine 
seminary at Zingst and Finkenwalde and the communal life he 
experienced there provide the context out of which he developed 
these motifs. Also, the church struggle (Kirchenkampf) going on 
at the time is an essential ingredient to the contextual 
background against which Bonhoeffer wrote. We turn now to see 
how these elements impinged on Bonhoeffer's theology during this 
middle period of his thought.
If one were to ask "Who is Jesus Christ for us in The Cost 
of Discipleship? 11 the answer would be: a strong, commanding
Christ who calls for obedience. Indeed, the Christ of The Cost 
of Discipleship stands as a militant figure in seeming contradic­
tion to the christological image of the "man for others" 
Bonhoeffer had described in 1933. However, the context of the 
times yields crucial insight and understanding into Bonhoeffer's 
use of such christological imagery.
The Cost of Discipleship was written over a period of years, 
1932-1937, in the midst of the church struggle (Kirchenkampf) 
when the Confessing Church was struggling to iron out its 
position. The force of Bonhoeffer's themes in The Cost of 
Blscipleship are due to the tumultuous year 1933 . However, their 
conception dates back to 1932. Eberhard Bethge recounts the 
appearance of certain themes during that year: "obedience as
action," the idea of "cheap grace." Also, the impact of 
Bonhoeffer's year at Union Theological Seminary (1930-31) is to
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be noted, where he struggled with the traditional Lutheran 
interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount.101
Bonhoeffer was writing The Cost of Discipleship at a time 
when he felt the Church in Germany was giving in to a "cheap" 
understanding of God's grace, thereby extricating itself from the 
costly obedience he believed was demanded under Hitler's 
threat.102 This partly explains the militant Christ he held up 
at this point in his writings. The theologia crucis is strong 
in Letters and Papers from Prison as well as in The Cost of 
Discipleship; whereas both differ in their terminology and 
picture of Jesus, they depict the same theology of the cross. 
We turn to see how such a diverse theological paradigm is 
possible.
A. The Call
Bonhoeffer did not write The Cost of Discipleship with a 
view to it becoming a book. It began in the form of lectures he 
delivered on the theme of discipleship and the Sermon on the 
Mount. Eberhard Bethge recounts how the German pastor began his 
lectures to the seminarians at Zingst by investigating the nature 
of 'the call' rather than with what now constitutes the opening
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101 See Eberhard Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer. pp. 375-377. 
See also Bonhoeffer's letter to Edwin Sutz dated 28 April, 1934. 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. I, pp. 39-41.
102 Indeed, Bonhoeffer spoke of the need for the Confessing 
Church to be converted rather than Hitler. See Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer, Gesammelte Schriften. (Munich: Christian Kaiser,
1958), ed. Eberhard Bethge, vol. I, pp. 42-43. See also Ernst
oil,The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer. trans. Martin Rumschei- 
0/ (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), p. 77.
pages of The Cost of Discipleship. the concept of 'costly 
grace.'103 This is how he spoke of Christian discipleship, in 
the first instance, in terms of 'the call.' The call from God 
to persons is best designated as a social paradigm for under­
standing Christian discipleship.
For Bonhoeffer, the call can be defined both positively and 
negatively. In the positive sense, we are called to follow 
Christ. We are summoned to an exclusive attachment to his 
person.104 Discipleship is nothing less than a personal rela­
tionship between the living Christ and the obedient disciple, and 
Bonhoeffer repeatedly lays the emphasis on the fact that 
discipleship is a Christological fact, not an anthropological 
one.105 Delimiting the call negatively, the call is not an
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103 It is worthy to note that the German phrase teure Gnade 
has a connotation that extends beyond the pithy phrase tradition­
ally associated with it, 'costly grace.' It literally means
grace sold on the market like cheap-jack's wares.' See Bethge, 
Blgtrich Bonhoeffer. p. 369.
104 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Discipleship. (New York:
Macmillan, 1963), p. 63.
105 "Discipleship means adherence to Jesus Christ alone, and
inunediately." Bonhoeffer, ibid. . p. 136.
abstraction,106 neither is it voluntarism107 nor a facere quod 
in se est108.
In his section entitled "The Call to Discipleship" the call 
to follow Jesus Christ takes on the form of a commandment. Jesus 
takes up his claim to divine authority and pronounces the last 
word.109 While Christ is in perfect union with God, the disciple 
is commanded to enter into perfect fellowship or communion with 
Christ. That is "the sum of the commandments— to live in 
fellowship with Christ."110
While Bonhoeffer's image of Christ is a harsh one, it is 
crucial to recognize the sociality underlying the relationship 
between Christ and the disciple. In his exegesis of Matthew 
19:16-22, the story of the rich young man, Bonhoeffer stresses 
the fact that the man is encountering an inescapable relationship 
between the Lord and the would-be disciple. The point, for 
Bonhoeffer, is not to focus on the call or command to obey, nor 
the actual following of the disciple, but the fact that it is
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106 "Christianity without the living Christ is inevitably 
Christianity without discipleship, and Christianity without 
discipleship is always Christianity without Christ. It remains 
an abstract idea, a myth which has a place for the Fatherhood of 
God, but omits Christ as the living Son." Bonhoeffer, ibid.. p. 
64.
107 "No man can choose such a life for himself. No man can 
call himself to such a destiny, says Jesus . . . [t]he gulf
between a voluntary offer to follow and genuine discipleship is 
clear." Bonhoeffer goes on to say that insisting on one's own 
terms in discipleship is to reduce discipleship to the level of 
human understanding. This cannot be so because it is only a 
gracious mandate which comes exclusively from Christ. Bonhoeff­
er, ibid., pp. 65-66.
108 "Obedience to the call of Jesus never lies within our own 
power . . . [t]he step into the situation where faith is possible 
is not an offer which we can make to Jesus, but always his 
gracious offer to us." Bonhoeffer, ibid. pp. 93-94.
109 Bonhoeffer, ibid.. p. 82.
110 Bonhoeffer, ibid.
Christ who calls the disciple to obey him. The disciple stands 
face to face with the living Lord; it is the ultimate encoun­
ter.111
The harsh image of the commanding Christ is complemented by 
the subjective side of discipleship— Christian obedience. For 
Bonhoeffer, the nature of Christian discipleship is a following 
at best.112 The dynamic nature of following Christ lay in the 
fact that it cannot be reduced to an intelligible program, goal 
or ideal to strive after. Indeed, following Jesus Christ is void 
of all content.113 This can only be described as a dynamically 
social, incarnational definition of Christian obedience. 
Bonhoeffer remained consistently christological in his descrip­
tion of the human aspect of discipleship by focusing on the extra 
nos nature of any Christian action.114
Thus, we have a christological scheme in The Cost of 
Discipleship where Jesus Christ issues a call to obedience, in 
the form of a command, to persons who are to obey spontaneously.
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111 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . p.73-84.
112 "Because the Son of God became Man, because he is the 
Mediator, for that reason alone the only true relation we can 
have with him is to follow him. Bonhoeffer, ibid.. p. 64.
113 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . p. 62.
114 It is part of Bonhoeffer's theological genius to be able 
to emphasize the subjective side of discipleship (Christian 
obedience, or following) in general while simultaneously 
highlighting the objective side (Christ's merit) in particular. 
That he was under the influence of the 'Word of God' theology is 
clear here.
Karl Barth so agreed with the way Bonhoeffer explicated the 
nature of Christian discipleship that he gave high praise to the 
German pastor in his Church Dogmatics saying " . . .  I cannot 
hope to say anything better on the subject than what is said here 
by a man who, having written on discipleship, was ready to 
achieve it in his own life, and did in his own way achieve it 
even to the point of death." See Karl Barth, "The Call to 
Discipleship," Church Dogmatics. IV/2, (Edinburgh: T&T Clark,
1985) , pp. 533-34.
Such a concept of discipleship, regardless of its dynamic 
sociality, can connote a tyrannical overtone such that it might 
not seem viable for its overly strict, conservative concept of 
ordered relationship between Christ and follower. However, if 
we leave our examination of Bonhoeffer's christology in The Cost 
of Discipleship there, it remains a fragmented caricature of a 
christological authority which is much more diverse and profound 
in character.
B. The Extra Nos Character of Faith
For the German pastor, the extra nos character of faith is 
key. Faith is never a human response to God's grace which is 
offered to us in the person of Jesus Christ. Faith itself is a 
work which is created in us by the present Christ. It is always 
a work which lies outside our cognitive grasp, always an actus 
directus. The extra nos character of faith in Christ the 
Mediator are key christological terms for Bonhoeffer.115 With 
the notion of Christ the Mediator and the extra nos character of 
faith we have hit upon a pivotal aspect of Bonhoeffer's theology 
i-n The Cost of Discipleship. Indeed, this concept is a turning 
point and key indicator of his theoloaia crucis.
Bonhoeffer spoke of the barrier Christ represents between 
the world and persons. He said,
By calling us he has cut us off from all immediacy 
with the things of this world. He wants to be the 
center, through him alone all things shall come to 
pass. He stands between us and God, and for that very
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115 Bonhoeffer's section "Discipleship and the Individual" 
discusses this pivotal theme, Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Disciple- 
SiiiE, pp. 105-11.
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reason he stands between us and all other men and 
things. He is the Mediator, not only between God and 
man, but between man and man, between man and reali­
ty.116
In the call to discipleship it is not a duty to which one is 
called, but a strict adherence to the person of Christ. As the 
Mediator, Christ divides by standing in the center between 
individuals and God and between persons themselves. "Since his 
coining man has no immediate relationship of his own any more to 
anything, neither to God nor to the world."117 Such an emphasis 
on the lack of immediacy, particularly between God and the world, 
has caused many to interpret Bonhoeffer's statements in The Cost 
of Discipleship as other-worldly. The Christian community 
appears as an isolated, inward-looking institution that has no 
connection with the world.118 However, the deceptive nature of 
the language in The Cost of Discipleship is most apparent here.
One of the chief characteristics of a theology of the cross 
is the use of paradoxical language. Bonhoeffer was not working 
on a dualistic notion of God and world, with the church as a 
community to be separated in a social sense from the world. He 
was after something altogether different. For him, there are two 
reasons why direct relationships between persons are impossible. 
First, the nature of reality is such that individuals only have 
real contact with one another through the Mediator of all
116 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . p. 106 (Emphasis added) .
1 1 7 Bonhoeffer, ibid.. p. 106-07.
118 "There can be no real attachment to the given creation, 
no genuine responsibility in the world, unless we recognize the 
breach which already separates us from it." Bonhoeffer, ibid.. 
P- 110.
relationships, Jesus Christ. Social reality is bound by a 
Christological cohesion which holds it together.
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Since the coming of Christ, his followers have no more 
immediate realities of their own, not in their family 
relationships nor in the ties with their nation nor in 
the relationships formed in the process of living. 
Between father and son, husband and wife, the individ­
ual and the nation, stands Christ the Mediator, 
whether they are able to recognize him or not.119
The second reason direct relationship is impossible is the 
fact that each person bears an "incognito":
However loving and sympathetic we try to be, however 
sound our psychology, however frank and open our 
behavior, we cannot penetrate the incognito of the 
other man, for there are no direct relationships, not 
even between soul and soul.120
In the end, each of us faces a breach with all our immediate 
relationships. It may take the form of an external breach (as 
with family and nation) or it may be a hidden and a secret 
one,121 but either way, the only relationship characterized by 
immediacy exists between God and his Son, and between the same 
Christ, the individual and the Christian community. Once this 
fundamental barrier is acknowledged, we are then in a position 
to establish right relation between ourselves, God and the 
world.122
11Q Bonhoeffer, ibid.. p. 108.
120 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . p. 110.
121 Bonhoeffer, ibid.
122 "There can be no genuine thanksgiving for the blessings 
°f nation, family, history and nature without that heart-felt 
Penitence which gives the glory to Christ alone above all else. 
There can be no real attachment to the given creation, no genuine
C. The Paradoxical Use of Language
8 8
Bonhoeffer advances several theological concepts in The Cost 
of Discioleship that are deceptive and susceptible to misinter­
pretation unless one acknowledges two very important factors 
motivating them. The first reason is contextual. While it 
sounds like he is rejecting the world and earth,123 he is rather 
suggesting the church must be a counter-cultural symbol against 
Nazi culture. He felt the Nazi state had interfered in the life 
of the church and church members failed to oppose this incursion. 
As a result, Christians had accommodated and come to live like 
the "the rest of the world."124 Now, he was rallying them to 
recognize the fundamental breach that existed between Hitler's
responsibility in the world, unless we recognize the breach which 
already separates us from it. There can be no genuine love of 
the world except the love wherewith God loved it in Jesus 
Christ." Bonhoeffer, ibid.. p. 110.
123 "The call of Jesus Christ teaches us that our relation to 
the world has been built on an illusion. All the time we thought 
we had enjoyed a direct relation with men and things. . . . Now 
we learn that in the most intimate relationships of life . . .
direct relationships are impossible." Bonhoeffer, ibid.. p. 108.
124 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . p. 46. "The antithesis between 
Christian life and the life of the bourgeois respectability is 
at an end. The Christian life comes to mean nothing more than 
living in the world and as the world in being no different from 
the world, in fact, in being prohibited from being different from 
the world for the sake of grace. The upshot of it all is that 
ray only duty as a Christian is to leave the world for an hour or 
so on a Sunday morning and to go to church to be assured that all 
ray sins are forgiven. I need no longer try to follow Christ, for 
cheap grace, the bitterest foe of discipleship, which true 
discipleship must loathe and detest, has freed me from that." 
Bonhoeffer, ibid. . pp. 54-55. This point is emphasized and 
discussed in Patricia A. Schoelles, Discipleship and Social 
Ethics: A Christian View of Social Ethics in the Light of the 
~S£k_of Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Jueraen Moltmann and Johannes B. 
aitz, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Notre Dame, Department 
°f Theology, Notre Dame, Indiana, May, 1984, p. 80 (unpublished 
manuscript on file at Bonhoeffer Archive, Union Theological 
Seminary) .
program for the church and their own allegiance to one Lord, one 
leader— Jesus Christ. Thus, the separatist language which marks 
Bonhoeffer's discussion about the relationship between the God, 
the church, and the world.
The second reason for Bonhoeffer's deceptive use of language 
in The Cost of Discipleship is a more strictly theological one. 
He is speaking the language of a theoloqia crucis by using 
several theological terms and concepts in the paradoxical way he 
discusses the hiddenness existing between God, persons, and the 
world. The "incognito" that exists between persons so that 
social immediacy is impossible bears this out. He stresses the 
hidden sociality which marks every relationship, a boundary or 
limit which persons constantly try to breach in order to gain 
direct access to God or another. Bonhoeffer unqualifiably 
refutes such an idea at its base with his notion of Christ the 
Mediator— the sole source of accession between God and the world 
and between persons.
Throughout his life Bonhoeffer held to this Lutheran 
theological maxim— that the finite bears or carries the infinite. 
God is in the facts himself. Bonhoeffer's language reflects this 
in several ways in The Cost of Discipleship. In his description 
of Levi leaving his fishing nets to follow Jesus, we see this 
concept as work. His ethical notion of transcendence— finding 
God in the neighbor at hand— reflects this paradoxical motif. 
Bonhoeffer was looking for a way to describe exactly how one is 
to have both feet planted firmly on the ground in order to 
experience God's presence.
The paradox lay in the fact that once this ultimate breach 
or barrier is acknowledged, persons are freed to enter into the 
bind of relationship God makes possible through his Son Jesus
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Christ. Rather than retreat into a corner, the church is to 
enter into full relationship with the world in which it finds 
itself. Further, this Mediator stands in the center between my 
neighbor and myself. He divides, but he also unites.125 The 
principle underlying this profound, hidden aspect of sociality 
is the finitum capax infiniti.
Hidden behind the Christ who is a barrier between God and 
persons and between persons themselves, stands the Mediator who 
steps toward persons, calling them to follow and enter into a 
profound relationship between God and one another. This paradox 
is none other than the theoloqia crucis. The finitum capax 
infiniti reaches its expression in the notion of Christ the 
Mediator. But the paradoxical Christological expression goes 
much further. Bonhoeffer had much more to say about what this 
Mediator looked like in the world.
Just as discipleship involves following Jesus, suffering 
involves the same passive element at the heart of Christian 
activity. Suffering is a passio passiva— it has already been 
performed by Christ for us. We have only to follow in the 
footsteps of the cross.126 Bonhoeffer acknowledges a passio 
activaf or voluntary suffering, in the Christian life as well. 
This refers to asceticism and imitations of the suffering of
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1?S •Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Discipleship, p. 112.
126 "The disciple community does not shake off sorrow as 
though it were no concern of its own, but willingly bears it. 
And in this way they show how close are the bonds which bind them 
to the rest of humanity. But at the same time they do not go out 
°f their way to look for suffering, or try to contract out of it 
by adopting an attitude of contempt and disdain. They simply 
bear the suffering which comes their way as they try to follow 
Jesus Christ, and bear it for his sake." Bonhoeffer, ibid.. p. 
122. Further, he notes that the Christian is not worn down by 
sorrow because it is borne in the strength of Christ who bears 
him or her up.
Christ. He identifies the danger in assigning too much signifi­
cance to this type of Christian obedience.127
Discipleship involves adherence to the suffering Christ. 
Bonhoeffer said, "Discipleship means adherence to the person of 
Jesus, and therefore submission to the law of Christ which is the 
law of the cross."128 A theology of the cross incorporates the 
notion of Christ's suffering, as well as that of the Christian, 
as one of its signposts. Bonhoeffer discusses suffering129 in 
terms of taking on the sins of others as one's own and forgiving 
them. This kind of suffering is reminiscent of Luther's 
tropological interpretation of Christ's atoning act on the cross. 
Bonhoeffer goes beyond Luther in stating that Christians are 
called upon to suffer the sins of others and to forgive them. 
This is his rendition of Luther's "being a Christ" to another. 
We see here a fascinating explication of what bearing another's 
sins as suffering means:
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127 "There is always the danger that in our asceticism we 
shall be tempted to imitate the sufferings of Christ. This is 
a pious but godless ambition, for beneath it there always lurks 
the notion that it is possible for us to step into Christ's shoes 
and suffer as he did and kill the old Adam . . . [t]he motive of 
asceticism was more limited— to equip us for better service and 
deeper humiliation. But it can only do that so long as it takes 
the suffering of Christ as its basis; if not, it degenerates into 
a dreadful parody of the Lord's own passion." Bonhoeffer, ibid.. 
pp. 190-91.
128 •Further, "Jesus must therefore make it clear beyond all
doubt that the 'must' of suffering applies to his disciples no 
less than to himself. Just as Christ is Christ only in virtue 
°f his suffering and rejection, so the disciple is a disciple 
°nly in so far as he shares his Lord's suffering and rejection 
and crucifixion . . . .  Suffering, then, is the badge of true 
discipleship." Bonhoeffer, ibid.. pp. 96, 100.
129 •He delimits suffering into two categories: (1) the
Christian's dying to the attachments of this world, and (2) 
suffering others' sins and forgiving them. We shall examine thesecond.
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While it is true that only the sufferings of Christ 
are a means of atonement, yet since he has suffered 
for and borne the sins of the whole world and shares 
with his disciples the fruits of his passion, the 
Christian also has to undergo temptation, he too has 
to bear the sins of others . . . [a]s Christ bears our 
burdens, so ought we to bear the burdens of our 
fellow-men . . . [m]y brother's burden which I must
bear is not only his outward lot, his natural charac­
teristics and gifts, but quite literally his sin. And 
the only way to bear that sin is by forgiving it in 
the power of the cross of Christ in which I now share 
. . . [f ]orgiveness is the Christlike suffering which 
it is the Christian's duty to bear.130
Two exceptional things stand out in this notion of bearing 
another's sins and forgiveness as suffering. Forgiveness is 
transformed from being understood as a cheap, individualistic 
commodity to a costly, relational reality. Secondly, suffering 
is an extra nos concept. Suffering, in terms of forgiveness, is 
considered by reference to the other person rather than oneself. 
This is yet another way Bonhoeffer shows the extra nos character 
of human existence. In this notion of suffering, we are 
determined by a presence outside ourselves. It is interesting 
to note that suffering, while being characterized as a "spiritu­
al" reality (forgiveness of sin), is still discussed in concrete 
terms.131
Christian suffering is a suffering under the cross. It is 
a cross that waits for everyone and which is destined and 
appointed by God .132 Suffering stands at the heart of the cross- 
-"Suffering and rejection sum up the whole cross of Jesus. To
i  -a a Bonhoeffer, ibid.. p. 10 0.
131 "My brother's burden which I must bear is not only his 
outward lot, his natural characteristics and gifts, but quite 
literally his sin." Bonhoeffer, ibid., p. 100.
132 "Only a man thus totally committed in discipleship can
experience the meaning of the cross." Bonhoeffer, ibid.. p. 98.
die on the cross means to die despised and rejected of me n ."133 
The cross carries specific meaning, and it is here that the 
radical reversal of human assumptions occurs.134 This is a 
fundamental aspect of a cross-centered theology.
In Bonhoeffer's understanding of suffering under the cross 
we see a reversal. Suffering was described in extra nos termi­
nology. He rejected suffering as a self-centered reality, 
focusing on the claim the other person places on the life of the 
Christian. Further, rather than highlight the sorrow and pain 
involved in the notion of suffering, Bonhoeffer's leitmotif was 
the bearing of others' sins and forgiveness. Theological 
concepts, like forgiveness and suffering, which easily tend to 
be interpreted in an individualistic, inward-looking way, are 
turned outward, and interpreted from the perspective of the other 
person with whom we stand in relation. This is just one aspect 
of the reversal of assumptions that occurs as a result of 
Bonhoeffer's theology formulated on the basis of the cross. No 
other Christian symbol offers such thorough-going critique and 
re-evaluation, and it is here that Bonhoeffer's theology gains 
an added measure of credibility for late twentieth century 
Western theology.
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133 Bonhoeffer makes an interesting distinction here between 
suffering and rejection. He says, "Had he only suffered, Jesus 
might still have been applauded as the Messiah. All the sympathy 
and admiration of the world might have been focused on his 
passion. it could have been viewed as a tragedy with its own 
intrinsic value, dignity and honor. But in the passion Jesus is 
a rejected Messiah. His rejection robs the passion of its halo 
°f glory. it must be a passion without honor. CD, pp. 95, 96. 
Here, Bonhoeffer clearly demonstrates that his is a theology of 
the cross, against any form of a theoloqia qloriae. just as 
Luther before him.
134 "[A] re-evaluation of all values results from the cross." 
von Loewenich, op. cit.. p. 1 2 .
Perhaps the most significant element of the paradoxical 
nature of theology conditioned by the cross is the hidden-yet 
revealed nature of revelation. That the notion of the hidden God 
is fundamental for Luther is a given fact. Bonhoeffer follows 
in Luther's footsteps in The Cost of Discipleship. even though 
it is not until the Letters and Papers from Prison that we see 
a more categorical, explicit theme of the hidden God unfold. As 
a theme, however, hiddenness prevails in Bonhoeffer's thought in 
a way that was not true for Luther. It extends to more catego­
ries than theology proper and the nature of faith— that is, 
Luther's earlier eschatalogical definition of faith. Given his 
perennial search for the concrete nature of revelation and faith, 
it is inevitable that visibility and empirical reality are 
complementary themes in Bonhoeffer. These complementary themes 
yield insight into a fresh, provocative dimension to Bonhoeffer's 
theology of the cross. But first we must look to the way he 
understands the motif of hiddenness in The Cost of Discipleship.
Hiddenness is discussed in several contexts in The Cost of 
Discipleship. Bonhoeffer designates three chapters to this 
theme: "The Hidden Righteousness", "The Hiddenness of Prayer",
and "The Hiddenness of the Devout Life." In these sections of 
the book, hiddenness is crucial to the fabric of Bonhoeffer's 
theologja crucis. For example, in "The Hidden Righteousness" 
Bonhoeffer talks about a "voluntary blindness" in which the 
follower's discipleship is visible to others but is hidden from 
the follower.135 Hiddenness from self, not the world, shows the
135 "Christ's virtue, the virtue of discipleship, can only be 
accomplished so long as you are entirely unconscious of what you 
are doing. The genuine work of love is always a hidden work. 
This voluntary blindness in the Christian (which is really sight 
illuminated by Christ) is his certainty, and the fact that his 
life is hidden from his sight is the ground of his assurance.
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selflessness at the heart of Bonhoeffer's schema. Whereas self- 
denial represents the negative side of the equation, christo- 
logical awareness and openness to others positively states the 
hidden character of righteousness.
In addition to these three explicit sections on hiddenness, 
this theme is discussed in other contexts. We have already 
described the hiddenness of the other person— the incognito of 
the other and the indirect sociality between persons— as well as 
the hiddenness of suffering,136 particularly as Bonhoeffer draws 
such a concept within the purview of the hiddenness of the cross 
itself.137
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What is the perisson? It is the love of Jesus Christ 
himself, who went patiently and obediently to the 
cross— it is in fact the cross itself. The cross is 
the differential of the Christian religion, the power 
which enables the Christian to transcend the world and 
to win the victory. The passio in the love of the 
Crucified is the supreme expression of the 'extraor­
dinary' quality of the Christian life.138
The visible and the invisible aspects of the life of discipleship 
are combined because both are defined as the cross of Christ 
beneath which the disciples stand. The cross is at once the
Thus hiddenness has its counterpart in manifestation." Bon­
hoeffer, ibid.. p. 177; see also, ibid., p. 97.
136 To restate in brief, this hiddenness has to do with the 
fact that while from the outside, on the face of it, bearing the 
suffering of the cross might appear too heavy, in reality it is 
light because it is Christ's cross and his bearing which supplies 
our strength. The paradox lay also in the fact that our "small" 
human burdens, which might appear so light in comparison to 
Christ's demands, actually are an unceasing burden which we 
cannot cast off on our own.
137 •The hiddenness yet visibility of the cross is discussed 
in most concentrated form in the section "The Enemy— The 
Extraordinary'." Bonhoeffer, ibid.. pp. 162-71.
138 Bonhoeffer, ibid.. pp. 170; see also ibid.. p. 171.
necessary, the hidden, and the visible.139 As such a paradoxical 
reality, the cross is characterized by yet a more specific 
paradox— its power and weakness. It is this more exact, telling 
contrast that we examine now and which reveals a secret at the 
heart of Bonhoeffer's theology of the cross.
Power, as a topic, occurs explicitly throughout The Cost of 
Discipleship. Bonhoeffer discusses theological power in an 
exegetical section entitled "The Apostles."140 In other parts 
of the book, the powers of Satan are identified,141 yet Bon­
hoeffer confidently speaks of the sovereignty of God's power.142 
This sovereignty is discussed often in characteristic Lutheran 
terms, referring to civil power under the authority of God. 
Finally, the power of the world and the power of the church are 
teleologically contrasted.143
Bonhoeffer spoke of power as ruling in a negative fashion 
in The Cost of Discipleship. Listing whoredom as the first sin 
against God— idolatry— he saw it as the resurgence of "the old 
Adam," the desire to be as God, to be the creator of life, to 
rule rather than to serve.144 In this way, Bonhoeffer took 
Luther's notion of sin as cor curvatus in se and gave it an
139 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . p. 176.
140 The distinction between Christ's power and that of the 
devil is made clear here. See Bonhoeffer, ibid.. pp. 226-27.
141 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . pp. 232, 329.
142 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . pp. 293, 295.
143 See Bonhoeffer, ibid. . p. 121.
144 —I i • •Bonhoeffer, ibid., pp. 318-320. Bonhoeffer's connection 
between whoremongering and covetousness is profound: "With
whoredom covetousness is closely associated . . . [t]he whore­
monger desires to possess another person, the covetous man 
material things. The covetous man seeks dominion and power, but 
°nly to become a slave of the world on which he has set his 
heart." Bonhoeffer, ibid.. p. 319.
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ethical interpretation. Power appears a negative category for 
the German pastor until we see how he understood God's power 
hidden in the weak Word.
For Bonhoeffer, divine power and weakness are theological 
concepts which must be considered together in order to understand 
them aright. The power and the weakness of the Word of God are 
simultaneous.145
If they [the disciples] do not realize this weakness 
of the Word, they have failed to perceive the mystery 
of the divine humility. The same weak Word which is 
content to endure the gainsaying of sinners is also 
the mighty Word of mercy which can convert the hearts 
of sinners. Its strength is veiled in weakness; if it 
came in power that would mean that the day of judgment 
has arrived.146
He finds meaning for both power and weakness in the theolocria 
crucis. defining them in relation to one another. As Eberhard 
Bethge stated, "[t]he belief in the power of weakness was one of 
Bonhoeffer's most basic insights, and he was to hold to it 
throughout his theological life."147 We have already seen how 
as early as Sanctorum Communio Bonhoeffer worked from the 
theological presupposition that "God's freedom confines itself 
within the limits of a weak human community of individuals."148 
Now we see how weakness expands as a theological motif in The 
Cost of Discioleship. this time with reference to the Word of 
God. We also see how God's power begins to take on new meaning 
in terms of the weak Word.
145 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . p. 234; see also ibid. . p. 264.
146 Bonhoeffer, ibid. , p. 207.




Bonhoeffer contrasts the ¿^eak Word with the power of 
ideology:
The Word recognizes opposition when it meets it, and 
it is prepared to suffer it. It is a hard lesson, but 
a true one, that the gospel, unlike an ideology, 
reckons with impossibilities. The Word is weaker than 
any ideology, and this means that with only the gospel 
at their command the witnesses are weaker than the 
propagandists of an opinion. But although they are 
weak, they are ready to suffer with the Word and so 
are free from that morbid restlessness which is so 
characteristic of fanaticism.149
He succeeds in making the point that the Word's power cannot be 
measured because it is not a quantifiable entity or program. Its 
power resides in the content of the Word itself, not the extent 
to which this Word comes to be accepted, or even coerced, on 
others as an idea or ideology must be in order to be effective. 
The weakness of the Gospel lies in the very fact that persons may 
choose to reject it. Its power is defined in terms of its 
message and Person who alone has the ability to enter the lives 
and hearts of people and transform them.
Regarding Bonhoeffer's distinction between the Word and 
ideology, Bethge said:
The Word of Christ must not be mistaken for trium­
phant, all-pervasive conviction, for it can also 
respect the impossible, take into account the barriers 
which it encounters; it esteems the individual— the 
more so when that individual disagrees. The idea, on 
the other hand, invades the individual, and nothing is 
impossible to a programme. But the Word incarnate is 
content to be despised and rejected . . . [i]n the
interpretation of the weak Word we are close to the 
profoundest thought ever expressed by Bonhoeffer:
149 Bonhoeffer, ibid., p. 207.
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discipleship as participation in Christ's sufferings
for others, as communion with the Crucified.150
By such a strong adherence to the vulnerability of the Word in 
the hands of the world, Bonhoeffer shows signs of his profound 
understanding of power in terms of weakness— the power of 
weakness. Such power can be none other than the power of the 
cross because it takes into account rejection at its base. Once 
again, we are reminded of the hiddenness of the cross. 
Bonhoeffer says, "The cross is the only power in the world which 
proves that suffering love can avenge and vanquish evil."151 
Suffering love conquers by asking how to serve and not how it can 
be served.152
Bonhoeffer's social understanding of discipleship proves to 
be a hermeneutical key to this new definition of power, because 
we see a fundamental change of position being posited. In The 
Cost of Discipleship. he addresses the person as a responsible 
individual who is fundamentally determined by the existence of 
the other. Power is not a motif having to do with self-determi­
nation, but refers to the extra nos character of God's Word. The 
vicarious principle which Bonhoeffer spoke of as early as 
Sanctorum Communio is an operative principle here.153 But it is
150 Bethge, op. cit. . p. 3 74.
151 Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Discipleship. p. 161.
152 •Bonhoeffer, ibid.. p. 166. Bonhoeffer is clearly 
discussing pacifism in these words about suffering love. 
However, we are pointing to the larger theological reality which 
underlies these thoughts and is the adumbrating context in which 
his pacifism, at that time, must be understood.
153 •"Jesus offers his disciples a simple rule of thumb which 
will enable even the least sophisticated of them to tell whether 
his intercourse with others is on the right lines or not. All 
he need do is to say 'I' instead of 'Thou,' and put himself in 
the other man's place . . . the disciple will look upon other men
not enough to point to the social character of Bonhoeffer's 
understanding of power as the "power of weakness." The German 
pastor is suggesting a theological understanding of power as a 
conquering which is hidden in selfless love and action. God's 
rule and authority in the church, among disciples, takes 
paradigmatic form in the suffering love which occurred at the 
cross. Thus, Bonhoeffer makes militant christological claims 
based on the hidden definition of power which he understands to 
be operative at the heart of the cross. Such reveals the 
dialectical terms which unfold in his theoloqia crucis.
In conclusion, the Cost of Discipleship. which eventually 
caused Bonhoeffer's thought to become well known both inside and 
outside of Germany, demonstrates how ideas from as early as 1932 
took shape to find their eventual expression in published form 
by 1937. In this way, the continuous nature of Bonhoeffer's 
theology is apparent, even though a significant portion of the 
force of his thought was formulated in relation to the church 
struggle going on at that time.
In plotting the progression of the way Bonhoeffer formulated 
his theological thought in terms of divine power and weakness 
from his early work to his late prison theology, The Cost of 
Discipleship clearly demonstrates the centrality of the theoloqia 
crucis during his middle period. In his early period a certain 
ambiguity with the notion of divine power and weakness was 
reflected in his life and thought. Then came the change in 1932. 
His Christology lectures reflected a much more consistent 
Paradigm, holding up Luther's kenotic christological model as a 
critical, instructive paradigm for Germany at that time.
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as forgiven sinners who owe their lives to the love of God."
Bonhoeffer, ibid.. p. 209.
In The Cost of Discipleship. Bonhoeffer incorporates 
explicit statements on the hiddenness of God in terms of power 
and weakness— particularly with the notion of the weak Word—  
moving closer to resolving such terms in a full-blown manner, as 
he does in the letters from prison. During this middle period 
in his life, God's power and weakness in the world, as a motif, 
receives specific meaning from the theoloqia crucis. Divine 
power incorporates rejection into its definition— the weak Word 
is vulnerable in the world. Such a characteristic reflects the 
same kind of weakness Christ suffered on the cross— rejection by 
humanity.
At the same time, the weakness of the Word is a weakness 
which conceals. Its "power" does not reside in a programmatic 
message that can be guaranteed success, popularity or appeal 
among others. Its power is actually void of content for 
Bonhoeffer because the power is the relationship persons have 
through Jesus Christ and his death on the cross pro nobis. It 
is a social understanding of divine power characterized by a 
relationship of mutual self-giving: God giving himself freely
for others in the Incarnate one on the cross; Jesus Christ 
experiencing suffering, rejection, and death for the sake of 
others; Christians giving of themselves freely with an attitude 
"outward" toward others because of the presence of Christ among 
them.
This is the social definition of divine power he came to 
articulate more and more, but it might be missed if his paradoxi­
cal use of language, particularly with reference to divine power 
and weakness, is overlooked. Power, as a motif, cannot be 
separated from weakness, for when they are both examined from the 
Perspective of the cross, not only do they inform each other's
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meaning, they reveal the "re-evaluation of values" which is 
implicit in such a meaning. As such, Bonhoeffer comes to 
understand and use this concept dialectically. Paradox suggests 
an ultimate contradiction residing between two motifs, for 
example, the Chalcedonian Definition. But Bonhoeffer comes to 
redefine divine power and weakness rather than leave them as 
mysterious concepts ultimately inexpressible. Bonhoeffer did not 
intend a programmatic definition or redefinition of power or 
weakness per s e . It is, however, a result of the way he 
approached life and the theological enterprise as both came to 
be conditioned more and more by Luther's kind of theology— the 
theology of the cross. By looking to his late theology, we see 
how the paradigmatic terms of divine power and weakness received 
their most mature, full expression there, ultimately finding 
resolution in his full-blown theology of the cross.
VI. Letters and Papers from Prison (1943-45)
A. God's Providence in a Situation of Human Powerlessness
One of the aspects of a theology of the cross is that God 
is particularly known through suffering. This means that the 
Christian also experiences the cross of Christ in a profound, 
concrete way. This was the case for Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Until 
now, we have shown how the theoloqia crucis increasingly began 
to take shape in Bonhoeffer's life and theology in terms of power 
and weakness. Further, we have argued that a dialectic charac­
terized these terms, increasingly according to Luther's theologi­
cal paradigm. Now, as never before, Bonhoeffer's personal life 
reflected this paradigm.
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For two years, Bonhoeffer knew the confined and isolated 
existence of the jail cell. Arrested on April 5, 1943 he was
placed in Tegel prison in Berlin. During his two years of 
confinement he was moved to different incarceration units in 
Germany. From the Gestapo cellars in the Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse 
to Buchenwald concentration camp; from there to Regensburg to his 
eventual place of death at Flossenburg. Under summary court 
martial, he was executed by hanging on April 9, 1945. These two 
years were the only time in his life that Bonhoeffer had all 
vestiges of power and influence taken from him. He came to know 
the meaning of powerlessness and weakness in proportions that 
only added a new dimension of credibility and sharpness to his 
previous theological thought.154
As Bonhoeffer came to know first hand what personal 
suffering meant, he incorporated themes relating God's power to 
his present situation of powerlessness in a profound way. At 
this time in his life the German pastor was forced to "wait." 
It became a "dominant feature of [the] present condition."155 
During this time of waiting, Bonhoeffer spoke of divine power 
with his numerous references to God's providence. At several 
points during his prison experience he spoke of a new feeling of 
"being in God's hands" while his own hands, for all intent 
purposes, were effectively tied and rendered useless:
154 Bethge mentions the significance of KristaEnacht in 
November 1938 as a turning point for Bonhoeffer in which he 
decided action must be taken against Hitler, not just words. 
This decision, which manifest itself in an explicit way when 
Bonhoeffer returned from the U.S. in June 1939, showed the way 
in which he "reduced" his own power, fully aware of the conse­
quences involved. See Appendix I, pp. 310-11, 318 to understand 
the way in which weakness found powerful expression in Bon- 
noeffer's own life.
155 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison. Letter of 7 
August 1943, p. 8 9 . "
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As long as we ourselves are trying to help shape 
someone else's destiny, we are never quite free of the 
question whether what we're doing is really for the 
other person's benefit— at least in any matter of 
great importance. But when all possibility of co­
operating in anything is suddenly cut off, then behind 
any anxiety about him there is the consciousness that 
his life has now been placed wholly in better and 
stronger hands. For you, and for us, the greatest 
task during the coming weeks, and perhaps months, may 
be to entrust each other to those hands.156
The imagery of being, ultimately, in God's hands and not human 
ones, brought Bonhoeffer comfort and strength.157 Rather than 
giving in to a morbid fatalism,158 he firmly believed in a 
boundary between resistance and submission in the face of fate 
and using prudent discretion in exercising both.159 Eschatology 
went hand in hand with God's providence: only God can somehow
156 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . Letter of 23 January 1944, pp. 190-91.
157 See Bonhoeffer, ibid. , Letter of 22 December 1943, p. 
174; 24 December 1943, p. 177.
158 "Of course, not everything that happens is simply 'God's 
will'; yet in the last resort nothing happens 'without God's 
will' (Matthew 10:29), i.e. through every event, however 
untoward, there is access to God." Bonhoeffer, ibid.. Letter of 
18 December 1943, p. 167.
159 "I think we must rise to the great demands that are made 
on us personally, and yet at the same time fulfil the commonplace 
and necessary tasks of daily life. We must confront fate . . . 
as resolutely as we submit to it at the right time. One can 
speak of 'guidance' only on the other side of that twofold 
process, with God meeting us no longer as 'Thou', but also 
'disguised' in the 'It'; so in the last resort my question is how 
we are to find the 'Thou' in this 'It' (i.e. fate), or, in other 
words, how does 'fate' really become 'guidance'? It's therefore 
impossible to define the boundary between resistance and 
submission on abstract principles; but both of them must exist, 
and both must be practised. Faith demands this elasticity of 
behavior. Only so can we stand our ground in each situation as 
!t arises, and turn it to gain." Bonhoeffer, ibid. . Letter of 21 
February 1944, pp. 217-1 8 .
bring good out of evil, providing certain hope amidst what 
appears meaningless chaos.160
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B. The Place and Meaning of Suffering in the Christian 
Life
Bonhoeffer wrote a letter on 21 July 1944, the day after von 
Stauffenberg's attempt on Hitler's life failed, knowing his 
destiny was most likely sealed at that point. Having already 
talked about the "elasticity" faith requires in a letter five 
months earlier, he went on to draw the lines of such faith more 
clearly in words which have since become renowned:
I discovered later, and I'm still discovering right up 
to this moment, that it is only by living completely 
in this world that one learns to have faith. One must 
completely abandon any attempt to make something of 
oneself . . . .  By this-worldliness I mean living 
unreservedly in life's duties, problems, successes and 
failures, experiences and perplexities. In so doing 
we throw ourselves completely into the arms of God in 
the world— watching with Christ in Gethsemane. That, 
I think, is faith; that is metanoia; and that is how 
one becomes a man and a Christian (cf. Jer. 45!). How 
can success make us arrogant, or failure lead us 
astray, when we share in God's sufferings through a 
life of this kind?161
Sharing in God's sufferings in the world— one could not be 
closer to a cross-centered way of thinking than Bonhoeffer here. 
Bonhoeffer came to recognize the place of suffering in the 
Christian life in such a way that this theme indelibly marks the 
pages of his prison letters. He believed in living life to the 
full, which necessarily meant embracing its pain and sorrows
160 See Bonhoeffer, ibid. . p. 11, Letter of 9 March 1944, pp. 
2 .
161 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . Letter of 21 July 1944, pp. 369-70.
honestly.162 He felt sharing someone's distress much more valu­
able than trying to explain it.163
Bonhoeffer saw a danger in talking about suffering so 
explicitly. For him, suffering as an abstract principle is 
wrong:
106
Now, is it right to set the Old Testament blessing 
against the cross? That is what Kierkegaard did. 
That makes the cross, or at least suffering, an 
abstract principle; and that is just what gives rise 
to an unhealthy methodism, which deprives suffering of 
its element of contingency as a divine ordinance . .
. To turn to a different point: not only action, but
also suffering is a way to freedom. In suffering, the 
deliverance consists in our being allowed to put the 
matter out of our own hands into God's hands. In this 
sense death is the crowning of human freedom. Whether 
the human deed is a matter of faith or not depends on 
whether we understand our suffering as an extension of 
our action and a completion of freedom. I think that 
is very important and comforting.164
Bonhoeffer was able to talk about suffering and deliverance at 
the same time, having found a new dimension to this aspect of the 
cross. The comfort it brought him could not have been better 
expressed than in his memorable poem "Stations on the Way to 
Freedom." There he describes suffering as one of the inevitable 
stops on the journey to ultimate freedom in Christ.165
162 See Bonhoeffer, ibid. . Letter of 23 January 1944, p. 191,
Letter of 18 December 1943, pp. 167-68; Letter of 24 December
1943, pp. 176-77.
163 See Bonhoeffer, ibid. . Letter of 1 February 1944, p. 203.
1M Bonhoeffer, ibid.. Letter of 28 July 1944, pp.374-75. 
(Emphasis added).
165 "A change has come indeed. Your hands, so strong and 
active, are bound; in helplessness now you see your action is 
ended; you sigh in relief, your cause committing to stronger
hands; so now you may rest contented. Only for one blissful
moment could you draw near to touch freedom; then, that it might 
he perfected in glory, you gave it to God." Bonhoeffer, ibid.. 
P* 371. it is worth noting the imagery of the strength of God's
Lest one think Bonhoeffer waxed poetic about suffering, he 
maintained until his death quite a strong, sometimes humorously 
unremitting view on the topic. His vivid recounting of an 
experience with a fellow prisoner demonstrates this unambiguous 
attitude.166 In keeping with his intolerance for others' self­
described suffering, he refused to characterize his own situation 
in these terms:
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When people suggest in their letters . . . that I'm
suffering here, I reject the thought. It seems to me 
a profanation. These things mustn't be dramatized. 
I doubt very much whether I'm 'suffering' any more 
than you, or most people, are suffering today. Of 
course, a great deal here is horrible, but where isn't 
it? Perhaps we've made too much of this question of 
suffering, and been too solemn about it . . . .  I be­
lieve, for instance, that physical sufferings, actual 
pain and so on, are certainly to be classed as 'suffe­
ring. ' We so like to stress spiritual suffering; and 
yet that is just what Christ is supposed to have taken 
from us, and I can find nothing about it in the New 
Testament, or in the acts of the early martyrs. After
hands taking over that of human hands in suffering— a beautiful 
way Bonhoeffer spoke poetically of God's power in the midst of 
human weakness.
166 »My present companion, whom I have mentioned several 
times in my letters, gets more and more pitiable. He has two 
colleagues here, one of whom spends the whole day moaning, and 
the other literally messes his trousers whenever the alert goes, 
and last night even when the first warning was sounded! When he 
told me about it yesterday— still moaning— I laughed outright and 
told him off, whereupon he would have me know that one mustn't 
laugh at anyone in distress or condemn him. I felt that that was 
really going too far, and I told him in no uncertain terms what 
I thought of people who can be very hard on others and talk big 
about a dangerous life and so on, and then collapse under the 
slightest test of endurance. I told him it was a downright 
disgrace, that I had no sympathy at all with anyone like that, 
that I would throw any such specimens out of the party for making 
rt look ridiculous, and so on. He was very surprised, and I dare 
say he thinks me a very doubtful Christian . . . There are 17 and 
18-year-olds here in much more dangerous places during the raids 
who behave splendidly, while these . . .  go round whimpering .
• • • ITlhere is a kind of weakness that Christianity does not 
¿Old with, hnt which people insist on claiming as Christian, and 
£hen_slina mud at. So we must take care that the contours do not 
5§i-blurred.11 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . Letter of 2 February 1944, pp. 
204-05 (Emphasis added).
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all, whether 'the church suffers' is not at all the 
same as whether one of its servants has to put up with 
this or that. I think we need a good deal of correc­
tion on this point; indeed, I must admit candidly that 
I sometimes feel almost ashamed of how often we've 
talked about our own sufferings. No, suffering must 
be something quite different, and have a quite differ­
ent dimension, from what I've so far experienced.167
It would be wrong for us to formulate a normative concept 
of suffering for the Christian life in general based on Bonhoef­
fer's views, not only because the German pastor himself discour­
aged general notions on the topic as "abstract," but because he 
was writing with particular, concrete examples of suffering in 
mind— for example, Jews being arrested, placed in camps, and 
killed. However, he does offer a basic guideline by which we may 
understand the critical dimensions of suffering according to 
Christ's cross. The first quote shows his thoughts about the 
meaning of God's suffering, the second describes that of the 
Christian:
God lets himself be pushed out of the world on to the 
cross. He is weak and powerless in the world, and 
that is precisely the way, the only way, in which he 
is with us and helps us. Matthew 8:17 makes it quite 
clear that Christ helps us, not by virtue of his 
omnipotence, but by virtue of his weakness and suffer­
ing . . . .  Man's religiosity makes him look in his 
distress to the power of God in the world: God is the
deus ex machina. The Bible directs man to God's 
powerlessness and suffering; only the suffering God 
can help. . . .168
To be a Christian does not mean to be religious in a 
particular way, to make something of oneself . . .  on 
the basis of some method or other, but to be a man—  
not a type of man, but the man that Christ creates in 
us. it is not the religious act that makes the
167 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . Letter of 9 March 1944, pp. 231-32.
168 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . Letter of 16 July 1944, pp. 360-61.
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Christian, but participation in the sufferings of God 
in the secular life. That is metanoia: not in the
first place thinking about one's own needs, problems, 
sins, and fears, but allowing oneself to be caught up 
into the way of Jesus Christ, into the messianic 
event. . . .169
These words capture in crystallized expression an essential 
aspect of Bonhoeffer's theologia crucis: what suffering under
the cross of Jesus Christ looks like in the world. Thus, 
Bonhoeffer offered a fresh interpretation of this aspect of 
Luther's cross-centered theology by laying out the contours of 
God's suffering in the world in contemporary terms.
In his letter of 18 July 1944 Bonhoeffer went on to describe 
a variety of forms the messianic sufferings of God in Jesus 
Christ take in the New Testament.170 He then followed up with 
the question, "But what does this life look like, this participa­
tion in the powerlessness of God in the world?" Bonhoeffer spoke 
of God's sufferings in the world repeatedly in the terms which 
marked his theology from early on— in terms of weakness. But 
these terms have taken on an added meaning— they are the 
signposts of God's presence in the world, who God is for us 
today. As we shall see, Bonhoeffer held that this is where God's 
very strength and omnipotence are to be found. This is Luther's 
theology of the cross brought to new heights, finding dynamic and 
provocative expression.
God's strength and weakness, power and powerlessness are the 
terms in Letters and Papers from Prison which release Bonhoeff- 
er's theology of the cross into their full-blown expression. 
This Lutheran strand of thinking is the bedrock upon which
169 Bonhoeffer, ibid.. Letter of 18 July 1944, pp. 361-62.
170 Bonhoeffer, ibid.. Letter of 18 July 1944, p. 362.
concomitant statements about the world-come-of-age and human 
autonomy are to be understood.171 We have seen how Bonhoeffer 
understood strength and weakness together in a dialectical 
fashion. Doing so here again, yet as never before, he resolves 
this paradigm in terms of God's power and weakness, informed by 
the cross. A re-evaluation of values results. Bonhoeffer goes 
beyond Luther in this way. Not only does he point to the paradox 
involved in God's hidden power at the cross, he follows up by 
pointing to the dialectical contours of the new definition which 
is yielded up as a result of the transformation. This is just 
one way Bonhoeffer remains relevant for theology today.
C. Winning Power and Space in the World by Weakness
As Luther's theology of the cross describes God in terms of 
hiddenness, Bonhoeffer follows in the same tradition by saying 
God is not as we imagine.172 What may be surprising is the 
extent to which he discusses God's hiddenness in terms of 
weakness and powerlessness, and the way omnipotence figures into 
the theological equation:
He [God] is weak and powerless in the world, and that 
is precisely the way, the only way, in which he is 
with us and helps us. Matthew 8:17 makes it quite 
clear that Christ helps us, not by virtue of his 
omnipotence, but by virtue of his weakness and suffer­
ing.173
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171 As we shall demonstrate in Chapter Two.
172 "The God of Jesus Christ has nothing to do with what God, 
as We imagine him, could do and ought to do." Bonhoeffer, ibid.. 
Letter of 21 August 1944, p. 391.
170 Bonhoeffer, ibid.. Letter of 16 July 1944, pp. 360-61.
And further,
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Who is God? Not in the first place an abstract belief 
in God, in his omnipotence etc. That is not a genuine 
experience of God, but a partial extension of the 
world . . . [h]is [Christ's] 'being there for others'
is the experience of transcendence. It is only this 
'being there for others', maintained till death, that 
is the ground of his omnipotence, omniscience, and 
omnipresence.174
It is worth noting that Bonhoeffer does not reject the notion of 
God as omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent. Rather, he 
asserts the right basis for a belief in God's all-pervasive 
attributes— in terms of Christ's "being there for others." The 
vicarious principle, which has been present in the German 
pastor's theology from early on, takes on added significance.175 
It is the theological cornerstone for understanding God's true 
power in the world.
With reference once again to the letter of 16 July 1944, we 
see Bonhoeffer's understanding of God reach its clearest 
expression in his discussion of humanity's coming-of-age.176 The
174 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . p. 381.
175 The vicarious principle of action takes its' cue, of 
course, from Jesus Christ, who Bonhoeffer described as "the Man 
for others." Indeed, this christological identification stayed 
with Bonhoeffer throughout his life. As G.B. Kelly pointed out, 
"This distinctively Bonhoefferian title does, in fact, sum up the 
various aspects which form, almost mosaic-like, the figure of 
Jesus Christ which emerges from Bonhoeffer's theology. Several 
Christological themes are interwoven here. If Bonhoeffer can 
describe Christ as "the man for others" (der Mensch fur Andere), 
it is because his basic notion of God-in-Christ is of one who 
exists pro m e . as man's representative (Stellvertreter) and in 
the most total act of his self-donation, the humiliation of the 
cross. Kelly, "Revelation in Christ: A Study of Bonhoeffer's 
Theology of Revelation," p. 66.
176 The world-come-of-age concept will be treated more fully 
ln chapter two. However, it is appropriate at this time to 
acknowledge Bonhoeffer's agreement with Feuerbach that God as a 
working hypothesis had been surmounted and eschewed. He notes
quotation is lengthy, however, unless it is examined as it 
appears below, it is possible to miss the crucial theological 
link Bonhoeffer makes between God's power and weakness in the 
world and what it means. That he speaks of God paradigmatically 
in such terms is striking:
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And we cannot be honest unless we recognize that we 
have to live in the world etsi deus non daretur ['even 
if there were no God']. And this is just what we do 
recognize— before Godl God himself compels us to 
recognize it. So our coming of age leads us to a true 
recognition of our situation before God. God would 
have us know that we must live as men who manage our 
lives without him. The God who is with us is the God 
who forsakes us (Mark 15.34). The God who lets us 
live in the world without the working hypothesis of 
God is the God before whom we stand continually. 
Before God and with God we live without God. God lets 
himself be pushed out of the world on to the cross. 
He is weak and powerless in the world, and that is 
precisely the way, the only way, in which he is with 
us, and helps us. Matthew 8.17 makes it quite clear 
that Christ helps us, not by virtue of his omnipo­
tence, but by virtue of his weakness and suffering.
. . . . Man's religiosity makes him look in his
distress to the power of God in the world: God is the
deus ex machina. The Bible directs man to God's 
powerlessness and suffering; only the suffering God 
can help. To that extent we may say that the develop­
ment towards the world's coming of age outlined above, 
which has done away with a false conception of God, 
opens up a way of seeing the God of the Bible, who 
wins power and space in the world by his weakness. 
This will probably be the starting-point for our 
'secular interpretation'.177
that philosophers from Descartes (deism) to Spinoza (pantheism) 
have all indicated the movement of modern philosophy, in its 
various representations, towards the notion of human and worldly 
autonomy. As a result of reading about nineteenth century 
Germany, he decided that a new historical epoch was in the 
making. The deus ex machina would be discarded while human 
autonomy and responsibility would take on new status. He tried 
to express this with the concept of a world-come-of-age. 
Further, with his belief in the entrance of this new 
secularization came the corresponding notion that the religious 
conscience is not a God-shaped void in humans. It is a construct 
°f history and society.
177 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . Letter of 16 July 1944, pp. 360-61.
Bonhoeffer's use of paradoxical language is striking throughout 
this passage. The Scottish theologian Ronald Gregor Smith never 
tired of stressing the dialectic involved in Bonhoeffer's 
description of God in this way. In order to combat Bonhoeffer's 
would-be interpreters from reducing the tension of the paradox, 
Smith emphasized the paradoxical aspects of Bonhoeffer's 
statements.178
Power and weakness mark Bonhoeffer's discussion of who God 
is in a way that is paradigmatic.179 He clearly is pitting two 
notions of God against each other here. He speaks of a false God 
in terms of religiosity180 who is characterized by power. He 
also refers to the 'God of the Bible,' characterized by power­
lessness, suffering, and weakness. Not only are two very
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178 He said, "It is this hidden presence, this presence in 
absence and absence in presence, which is the reality of Christ's 
being. It is not possible to weaken the tension, or to simplify 
the consequent dialectic, by suggesting . . . that the God
'without' whom we live 'before God and with God' is merely the 
false God, the God who has been turned into a principle and made 
an object of thought and of religious aspirations. On the con­
trary, it is the one God before whom and with whom we live who 
is at the same time the God we are without." Ronald Gregor 
Smith, ed. , World Come of Age. A Symposium on Dietrich Bon­
hoeffer . (London: Collins, 1967), p. 19. Cf. Clements, op. cit. .
p. 179.
179 While Larry Rasmussen suggests that Bonhoeffer came to 
the subject of power in the last year of his life (Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer— His Significance for North Americans, p. 112) he 
seems to be referring specifically to the concept of state power. 
This is certainly true as a result of his involvement with the 
Political conspirators. However, the power of the state and the 
citizen's responsibility represents an important development in 
Bonhoeffer's long quest to understand and articulate divine and 
human power. Bonhoeffer had a great deal to say about power at 
the most basic social level— between God and person, and between 
one person and another. This basic sociality underlies his later 
thoughts and actions having to do with concepts of responsibility 
and power in relation to the state in Ethics and Letters and 
Papers from Prison.
180 Barth's critique of religion had a lasting effect on
Bonhoeffer as is evidenced here, as elsewhere, in Letters and
Eapers from Prison.
different notions of God delimited here, but two very opposing 
notions of potence and impotence implicated in such images.
At first glance, it would seem that 'power' is a negative 
word in Bonhoeffer's theological dictionary when used to describe 
God in the world, whereas 'powerlessness' is definitive. When 
one looks more closely to the way he employs these terms, it 
becomes clear that he is making use of paradoxical language. 
Bonhoeffer does not let his theological notion of God's power—  
powerlessness tread in unresolved paradox. This would mean the 
lack of an intelligible, concrete theological solution. Rather,
at work in his description of the god of religion and the
powerlessness of the God of the Bible is a redefinition of what 
powerful and powerless mean with reference to God.
This redefining of concepts is at the heart of the theology 
of the cross, for it is in the very nature of such a paradigm to 
describe God as hidden rather than omnipotent. Bonhoeffer 
maintains the paradox involved with Luther's notion of God's 
power being hidden in the weakness of the cross. However, he is 
not content to leave such terms there. He moves on for expres­
sion of the "re-evaluation of values" that occurs in this
specific instance. He moves in search of the hidden concrete
meaning of God's presence as these terms are dictated by the 
cross. a  dialectic then, not paradox, comes to characterize 
God's presence in the world, and he demonstrates the concrete 
nature of this transformed concept by way of a christological
guideline.
The key to Dietrich Bonhoeffer's dialectical understanding 
°f God is expressed most concisely and consistently in his 
christological notion of "being there for others." The cross 
reveals the nature of God's simultaneous power and powerlessness
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in the world. On the one hand, the imago Dei suggests nothing 
more than the crucified figure of Christ, powerless in the hands 
of humanity, suffering a cruel death for the sake of all. But 
such an image recasts the notion of God's power in terms of 
atonement, not omnipotence.
Hidden behind God's powerlessness on the cross, then, is the 
real meaning of divine power. The nature of this power is in 
serving and giving to the other. It is 'being there for others' 
as Bonhoeffer liked to say in his prison letters. We recall his 
words, "It is only this 'being there for others', maintained till 
death, that is the ground of his omnipotence, omniscience, and 
omnipresence."181 Divine omnipotence receives its meaning from 
the lowly figure of Christ on the cross, where the nature of
divine power is in Christ's giving of himself for sinful
humanity. Bonhoeffer follows in the tradition of Luther's 
theology of the cross by asserting divine power in incarnational 
and cross-centered terms. He draws from the event of God's 
atonement, rather than postulating omnipotence in more tradition­
ally orthodox terms which emphasize God's unquestioned control 
of human affairs. With a theology of the cross, power is under­
stood christologically and socially in terms of service.
Bonhoeffer was glad to see the advances of secularity into 
the modern age, largely because of its doing away with the notion 
°f a deus ex machina. Abstract notions of God— such as the 
omnipotent One— could finally make way for concrete ones. The
crucified Christ, who suffered and died on the cross, rejected
by humanity then and now— this is the way God is present in the
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101 Bonhoeffer, ibid.. "Outline for a Book," p. 381.
world. Bonhoeffer could not have presented more contrasting 
images of God to an increasingly autonomous Western society.
In his christology lectures of 1933 he did not hold up the 
Son of God as the locus for understanding who God is, he pointed 
to the humiliated Son of God.182 It was a thoroughly kenotic 
Christology. Hence, Luther's approach to theology is bound up 
with the notion of an "emptying" of divine power and authority 
as is demonstrated in the Suffering Servant. Similarly here, 
Bonhoeffer rejects the notion of an all-powerful God whose rule 
depends upon human weakness, guilt and dependency. This is why 
Feuerbach and Nietzsche were his allies on this point.183 He 
rejected the idea of God as it tends to prevail in traditional 
terms, like omnipotence, because for such an idea to take hold 
presumes an exploitation of human weakness and dependency. It 
requires a "sickness of soul" for which God is the cure.
Bonhoeffer unambiguously held up the suffering, rejected 
Christ on the cross as the locus of God's presence among humanity 
in the twentieth century. However, in doing so, he pointed to 
the hidden nature of God's power in the midst of a seemingly 
pathetic display of divine revelation in the world. Bonhoeffer 
went beyond the paradox of traditional Lutheran thought, pointing 
out a divine power of an entirely different order.
In rejecting the deus ex machina. Bonhoeffer was rejecting 
the notion of divine power which exploited human weakness. 
Further, God's power in terms of omnipotence— the precise terms
182 "If Jesus Christ is to be described as God, then we may 
not speak of this divine essence, of his omnipotence and his 
omniscience, but we must speak of this weak man among sinners, 
of his cradle and his cross. When we consider the Godhead of 
¿osus. then above all we must speak of his weakness. Bonhoeffer, 
SfeHistqJLggy, p. 108.
1 1 b
Feuerbach and Nietzsche are discussed in Chapter Two.183
Bonhoeffer rejected— assumes a dominating kind of rule; one which 
not only connotes a strict hierarchy with God above the world and 
absolute control of human affairs, but one which suggests power 
as a possession which God owns, distributes and wields according 
to his will regardless of those upon whom such power is to 
effect.
Bonhoeffer, on the other hand, holds up the suffering Christ 
of the cross as the locus of divine power— suggesting thereby an 
entirely new paradigm through which to view God's concealed 
power. For him, Christ's "omnipotence" or power is grounded in 
a social reality, not a reified one. Power is not a divine 
essence or "thing" which God possesses. Divine power is manifest 
in His Son's giving of himself in the most profound relationship 
for others, having taken upon himself all human sin. The 
profound intimacy of relationship in such a concept is striking, 
as against that of an omnipotent God.
That Christ followed the path of the cross, suffered there 
and died in the place of others offering forgiveness is the full 
demonstration of God's power revealed in the world. Such an 
understanding of divine revelation remains concealed and hidden 
to many because it goes against common definitions of what God's 
power should look like according to our expectations. This is 
the way Bonhoeffer goes beyond Luther in his theology of the 
cross. He takes up the hiddenness of God's power and looks at 
what that power means in the light of the cross for the world 
today.
The christological notion of 'being there for others' is the 
theological guideline Bonhoeffer offers a world which has 
gradually come to understand itself increasingly in terms of 
Power, self-determination, and autonomy. As such, it stands as
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a provocative, permanent critique against other definitions of 
power. Holding up divine power as a fundamentally social,
relational concept which revolves around the motif of vicarious 
living and acting with and for others, Bonhoeffer suggested this 
as a model for the church's form of power in the world. In his 
"Outline for a Book," in words which parallel the words he had
just written about God's power in the world as 'being there for
others,' he said:
The church is the church only when it exists for
others . . . The church must share in the secular
problems of ordinary human life, not dominating, but 
helping and serving. It must tell men of every 
calling what it means to live in Christ, to exist for 
others. . . .184
Serving, rather than dominating, stands at the heart of this 
christological notion of divine power. In this way, Bonhoeffer 
concretely discusses a crucial parameter of what the cross of 
Jesus Christ looks like in the world as well as that of the 
Christian. Further, he lays out a critical theological guideline 
by which divine power as well as human power are to be weighed 
and measured.
Conclusions
Eberhard Bethge said Bonhoeffer's whole life was a struggle 
to come to terms with his own power over others. We have seen 
the same kind of struggle in his theology. His early academic 
theology revealed an ambiguity with regard to the way God is
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184 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison. "Outline for 
a Book, " pp. 382-83.
present in the world. While weakness as an explicit 
ecclesiological and implicit christological theme was brought out 
as early as Sanctorum Communio. Bonhoeffer still had not come to 
terms with his titanic notion of God. Yet his relentless desire 
to determine the concrete nature of God's revelation in the 
world, particularly in Lutheran terms like the existential coram 
Deo motif and the christological 'pro nobis' theme, all portend 
the sociality which undergirded his developing theological 
enterprise.
Then came the change in 1932 when Christianity became real 
to him, and theology became more than an academic enterprise. His 
tendency toward ambition and dominating others was salved in a 
fundamental way, and this was reflected in his theology. The 
Christology lectures revealed a thoroughly Lutheran kenotic 
christology which held up the scandal of Christ's passion as the 
definitive example of God's hidden power in Christ. From 1933 
on, we noted Bonhoeffer's increasingly consistent description of 
God and God's presence in the world in terms of power and 
weakness. His crucial decision in June 1939, to return to 
Germany and the fate awaiting him there signals the way he 
personally traded certain security and influence in America, 
using his power instead in sacrificial service for those 
suffering in his homeland. In this way, we saw how he ultimately 
resolved the paradox between power and weakness dialectically in 
his own life and theology according to Luther's theoloqia crucis.
When one accepts the thesis that Bonhoeffer approached his 
life and the theological enterprise in this way, important 
questions that linger around certain aspects of his theology are 
reso lved .  The commanding figure of Christ in The Cost of 
SlfLcipleship no longer is seen as a digression between his early
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and late work— the nature of such authority gaining its meaning 
from the cross.185
We understand Bonhoeffer's later statements about human 
autonomy, strength, and power dialectically, in terms of his 
statements about God's weakness in the world. He had said the 
God of the Bible who wins power and space in the world by his 
weakness would be the starting point for his non-religious 
interpretation of Biblical concepts.186 In this way, we see how 
the categories of power and weakness run throughout his theology 
in a consistent, provocative manner, yielding new dimensions to 
well-known categories of thought. As Bethge has noted, there is 
an astonishingly broad continuity in Bonhoeffer between the 
Berlin beginnings and the Tegel period. "Bonhoeffer had 
preserved this Christology for fifteen years, continually making 
it more profound, in order to ground the present power of Christ 
even more clearly in the weakness of the human sufferings of 
Jesus. "187
Bonhoeffer's understanding of God stands in the sharpest 
contrast to traditional notions of God's omnipotence specifically 
because of the terms of power traditionally assigned to God. 
Bonhoeffer mentioned several times his belief that the omnipotent 
God was an abstract concept, falsely carried over from past 
periods of history. He praised the work of Feuerbach in so far 
us it did away with a childish working hypothesis and made way
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185 Of course, not to mention the fact that Bonhoeffer was 
contrasting the ultimate nature of Christ's authority in the 
church against that of Hitler.
186 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison. Letter of 16 July, i944 , p> 351>
187 •Bethge, op. cit., p. 793 (Emphasis added).
for intellectual freedom. "God as a working hypothesis in
morals, politics, or science, has been surmounted and abolished; 
and the same thing has happened in philosophy and religion 
(Feuerbach!) "188
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Anxious souls will ask what room there is left for God 
now; and as they know of no answer to the question, 
they condemn the whole development that has brought 
them to such straits . . .  I wrote to you before about 
the various emergency exits that have been contrived;
. There is no such way— at any rate not if it 
means deliberately abandoning our mental integrity; 
the only way is that of Matt. 18.3, i.e., through
repentance, through ultimate honesty . . . Man's
religiosity makes him look in his distress to the 
power of God in the world: God is the deus ex machi­
na . The Bible directs man to God's powerlessness and 
suffering . . . To that extent we may say that the
development towards the world's coming of age outlined 
above, which has done away with a false conception of 
God, opens up a wav of seeing the God of the Bible, 
who wins power and space in the world by his weak­
ness .189
Thus, Bonhoeffer hailed a new period in history, but this 
during the midst of war in Germany in the mid-forties, at a time 
when hope was all but quashed for the Germans. He held up an 
understanding of God which stemmed from the notion of God's 
weakness and powerlessness in the world. It was a hidden God, 
but one whose power was manifest in such weakness. It was a 
different kind of power altogether from what anyone could 
imagine. Because Bonhoeffer drew out the implications of the 
living God who is hidden in weakness according to the cross and 
UL_terms of atonement, theology as a discipline has been left
100 ,Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, Letter of 16 
July 1944, p. 360.
189 •Bonhoeffer, ibid.. pp. 360-61 (Emphasis added).
with a critical christological guideline against which theologi­
cal claims may be measured.
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Man's religiosity makes him look in his distress 
to the power of God in the world . . . [t]he Bible
directs man to God's powerlessness and suffering . .
. [t]o that extent we may say that the development 
towards the world's coming of age . . . opens up a way 
of seeing the God of the Bible, who wins power and 
space in the world by his weakness. This will proba­
bly be the starting-point for our 'secular inter­
pretation' .
Bonhoeffer, Letter of 16 July, 1944, 
Letters and Papers from Prison, p. 361.
CHAPTER TWO
HUMAN AUTONOMY AND THE THEOLOGIA CRUCIS:
TOWARD A DIALECTICAL UNDERSTANDING OF HUMAN POWER
Introduction
As the theologia crucis ultimately provides the ground for 
Bonhoeffer's understanding of God, the same is true for his 
anthropology. Whereas Chapter One documented the reversal of 
terms and redefinition involved in Bonhoeffer's concept of God 
in terms of power and weakness., Chapter Two does so again here, 
with respect to his theological anthropology and the meaning 
assigned to human power. In accordance with the method and terms 
of Luther's theology of the cross, Bonhoeffer demonstrates the 
way human power, or 'autonomy,' is understood in relation to 
God's hidden power, or weakness. The dialectical relationship 
between these terms shines forth clearly in the late theology, 
particularly in his Ethics and Letters and Papers from Prison.
This chapter examines the christological and anthropological 
terms of power that surface in Bonhoeffer's late works of Ethics 
and Letters and Papers from Prison (1940-1945). First, we
examine the positive meaning he assigns to human power in the 
Ethics, particularly with his concepts of reality and respon­
sibility. By pointing out how the cross informs such meaning, 
Bonhoeffer identifies the dangers inherent within an increasingly 
autonomous, powerful humanity. In this way, we show how 
Bonhoeffer discusses the positive and negative terms of an 
autonomous humanity in terms of power.
Then, we look to the Letters and Papers from Prison where 
Bonhoeffer spoke the most clearly in terms of a theology of the 
cross. With his critique of religion came an affirmation of the 
modern period in history in which humanity becomes increasingly 
autonomous, making less recourse to "God" in questions of 
importance.1 By demonstrating how the terms of his religious 
critique are bound up in the concept of power, we see more 
clearly how notions like a "world come of age" and a "non-reli­
gious interpretation of theological concepts" gain their meaning 
accordingly. Divine and human power are discussed exclusively 
in christological terms— the vicarious principle of "being there 
for others." This represents the pinnacle of Bonhoeffer's 
theology of the cross— where language describing God and humanity 
in terms of power parallel one another, taking shape according 
to the cross. We turn now, however, to see how Bonhoeffer's 
Ethics is conditioned by two motifs in particular— conformation 
and command— and the way in which power and weakness figure into 
his schema, this time in his conservative social construct 
"superiority and inferiority."
The Ethics was to be Bonhoeffer's magnum opus. and he 
expressed from prison that he felt it was the only thing left for 
him to finish.2 The purpose of this chapter, then, is to 
highlight two ethical motifs— conformation and command— in the 
Ethics which are determinative for some key ethical concepts 
(responsibility, deputyship, obedience, freedom); concomitantly,
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1 Cf. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison. 
Letter of 8 June 1944, pp. 325-29.
"I sometimes feel as if my life were more or less over, 
ar>d as if all I had to do now were to finish my Ethics." 
onhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison. Letter of 15 December19« ,  p. 163.
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we shall then demonstrate how such ethical terms inform key 
anthropological terms (world come of age, non-religious inter­
pretation of theological concepts) in the Letters and Papers from 
Prison. In this way, we will ultimately show that Bonhoeffer not 
only had a great deal to say about human power in his late 
theology, but how such power gains its meaning exclusively in 
christological terms, according to the theologia crucis. Before 
we begin our investigation into his two later works, a brief word 
regarding the Ethics is necessary, due largely to the unfinished 
nature of the project.
Six years ago in 1988, Bonhoeffer scholars focused attention 
on the Ethics at the Fifth International Bonhoeffer Society 
Conference in Amsterdam. One very important result of the 
conference was a panel discussion on "New Studies in Bonhoeffer's 
Ethics." In this chapter we shall be building on the findings 
of two scholars whose research was presented at this conference. 
First, Clifford Green's proposed chronological reordering of the 
ethics fragments into five phases serves as the organizational 
paradigm for our anthropological analysis.3 Secondly, in his
3 Rather than maintain four different ethical approaches and 
their corresponding chronological order as Eberhard Bethge has 
in previous editions, Green proposed five different phases that 
involve a reorganization of concepts in the new Ethics volume of 
the critical edition of the Dietrich Bonhoeffer Werke. See 
Appendix II for the differences between the two sequences.
It is important to note that whereas Bethge organized 
Bonhoeffer's Ethics into four different ethical "approaches" 
('Ansatz'), Green proposed that the manuscripts be arranged in 
three 'blocks.' He said, "By choosing the term 'block' I meant 
to indicate 'a chapter or group of chapters which Bonhoeffer 
intended to belong together in developing a set of ethical 
ideas.' Hence, 'block' for me was 'a more neutral word which 
does not imply that a particular block is necessarily a "new 
approach" or that it is governed by a particular theological 
theme which is different from other blocks; but nor does it 
exclude that possibility." Clifford Green, "Textual Research for 
the New Edition of Bonhoeffer's Ethics" Panel Discussion, in 
-Snhoeffer's Ethics: Old Europe and New Frontiers. Guy Carter,
René van Eyden, Hans-Dirk van Hoogstraten, Jurjen Wiersma, eds.
partial summary of the chapter "A Question of Method," Larry 
Rasmussen contends that there are two different methodological 
motifs explicitly discussed in the Ethics: "conformation" and
"command."4 By focusing on the christological basis of these 
methodological motifs, i.e., the commanding Christ and the 
crucified Christ, according to whose shape we conform, Chapter 
Two emphasizes the christological basis of these two ethical 
concepts, not their status as ethical categories per s e .
The discussion on his unfinished Ethics begins with his 
concept of reality, examining how conformation plays a central 
role there and is further clarified by a controlling motif during 
his second phase: the penultimate and the ultimate. Finally, in 
his last period, the fifth phase, consideration is given to 
Bonhoeffer's concept of the commanding Christ who rules by 
mandate and command. With the discovery in 1982 of correspon­
dence between Bonhoeffer and Karl Barth, we now know that 
Bonhoeffer, in May 1942, read the section of Barth's Church 
Dogmatics (II/2) , "The Command of God." This means that the work 
represented during the fifth phase, in which he deals with the 
"The Ethical and the Christian as a Theme" and "The Concrete 
Command and the Divine Mandates,"5 is heavily dependent on 
Bonhoeffer's reading of the galley-proofs of Church Dogmatics
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(Kampen, Netherlands: Kok Pharos Publishing House, 1991), pp.
32, 33, 38.
4 Larry Rasmussen, 'A Question of Method,' in "New Studies 
in Bonhoeffer's Ethics." Bonhoeffer's Ethics. Old Europe and New 
EE°ntiers, (Guy Carter, Réne van Eyden, Hans-Dirk van Hoog- 
straten, and Jurjen Wiersma, eds.) (Kampen, Netherlands: Kok
Pharos Publishing House, 1991), p. 43-44. See also Rasmussen, 
Bietrich Bonhoeffer--His Significance for North Americans, op. 
pp. 91-110.
5 The period from the end of 1942 to 5 April 1943.
II/2, even though there is no mention of this either by Bon­
hoeffer, Barth or Bethge.6
In both periods of his writing, the first phase and the 
fifth phase, the two methodological themes Rasmussen identified 
are clearly apparent: conformation and command. While we
examine both categories, we pause to take a closer look at the 
ethical theme of command, and the christological description of 
Christ as the one who issues the mandate or command. Such an 
analysis is necessary for the very important reason that 
Bonhoeffer, in various phases of writing Ethics. uses conserva­
tively ordered relationships to describe his ethical notions. 
For example, in his last phase of writing, which gleans heavily 
from Barth and his "theology of the Word," Bonhoeffer describes 
God's commandment in terms of a defined order of superiority and 
inferiority. As we have seen throughout his theology, Bonhoeffer 
uses the poles of power and weakness to express his thought— this 
time, in Ethics in terms of superiority and inferiority. In the 
first phase, with his concept of reality, the mandates and a 
structured "order" are present in a significant way. At the same 
time, in both phases of his writing, he points to the crucified 
Christ as the one in whom all dominion rests and in whom all 
reality is bound. How does he reconcile these two seemingly 
contrary notions?
Rather than subordinate the theme of Christ as commander in 
the Ethics r as Larry Rasmussen does, and rather than fault 
Bonhoeffer for utilizing such conservatively ordered concepts as
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6 Larry Rasmussen, 'A Question of Method,' in Bonhoeffer's 
-Lilies. Old Europe and New Frontiers, p. 43.
inevitably oppressive and restrictively binding in his thought,7 
Chapter Two argues that Bonhoeffer has something surprising to 
say about such a socially ordered understanding. However, unless 
one examines his hierarchical notions closely and at length, it 
is easy to misconstrue Bonhoeffer's intention, and thus de- 
emphasize or prematurely negate such thinking before its meaning 
has been fully ascertained.
Finally, in the third and fourth phases of his writing the 
Ethics. in which he describes the structure and unity of 
responsibility, Bonhoeffer provides a clear and fresh under­
standing of the ordered relationship between God and world and 
between one person and another. Thus, despite the fragmentary 
nature of Bonhoeffer's project, the need to weigh each phase or 
section of his thought in relation to the others becomes para­
mount. Such careful examination of Bonhoeffer's various themes 
and how they impinge on one another demonstrates a continuity in 
his multi-faceted ethical project. The continuity we emphasize 
in this chapter is the way power and weakness surface once again 
in his late theology and how this informs his understanding of 
Christian anthropology.
The Ethics: Human Autonomy Defined in Relation to the
Crucified and Commanding Christ
Nowhere does Bonhoeffer have more to say about the nature 
of human autonomy than in his Ethics and Letters and Papers from
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7 As Stephen Plant does in his paper, "'A Suggestion of 
North German Patriarchalism': A Materialist Duologue with the
Ethics of Dietrich Bonhoeffer," (Unpublished paper presented at 
the Sixth International Bonhoeffer Society Conference, New York, 
Union Theological Seminary on 8 August 1992) . On file at 
Bonhoeffer Archives, Union Theological Seminary.
Prison. Whereas he clearly spoke of a new time in human history 
characterized by autonomy, strength, and increased power with 
explicit motifs such as "world come of age" and a "non-religious 
interpretation of theological concepts" in the prison letters, 
such ideas were gaining expression at the time of his writing the 
Ethics (1940-43). This is evident time and time again: (1) in
his discussion of the inheritance of the Western world and two 
kinds of godlessness— a hopeless godlessness and a godlessness 
full of promise— foretelling his notion of a religionless Chris­
tianity8; (2) with his clear definition of the difference between 
the natural and the creaturely, the "natural" implying an element 
of independence and self-development that parallels the notion 
of humanity's maturity and adulthood; and (3) in the concepts 
which go together to mark the structure of responsibility, i.e., 
freedom and deputyship.
It is well known that the Ethics is an unfinished attempt 
at a book9, containing within it several different ethical points 
of departure. The question arises, then, why examine more 
closely his christological terms in the Ethics? The answer is 
in the foundation upon which his Ethics is built:
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The point of departure for Christian ethics is 
not the reality of one's own self, or the reality of 
the world; nor is it the reality of standards and 
values. It is the reality of God as He reveals 
Himself in Jesus Christ. It is fair to begin by 
demanding assent to this proposition of anyone who 
wishes to concern himself with the problem of a 
Christian ethic.10
Cf. Bonhoeffer, Ethics. pp. 98-108.
9 The day Bonhoeffer was placed under house arrest, 5 April
!943, drafts of the fifth phase were lying on his desk and were 
confiscated by the Gestapo.
10 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . pp. 189-90.
In this first phase of writing, Bonhoeffer summarized the nature 
of his ethical approach in incarnational terms. Christian ethics 
is ultimately a christologically-based enterprise. Fundamental 
questions such as, "What is 'good' and 'evil' in the world?", and 
"How does one discern between them?" receive their answer in the 
living Jesus Christ who embraces all of reality.11 Bonhoeffer 
was attempting to offer a unified understanding of God, doing 
away with traditional two sphere thinking in Christian ethics.12 
Thus, he proposes to hold God and the world together with his 
concept of reality. Accordingly, it is appropriate for us to 
briefly examine this christo-centric understanding of ethics 
before turning to Bonhoeffer's notion of human autonomy.
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11 "The will of God, which became manifest and was fulfilled 
in Jesus Christ embraces the whole of reality. One can gain 
access to this whole, without being torn asunder by its manifold 
variety, only in faith in Jesus Christ, 'in whom dwelleth all the 
fulness of the Godhead bodily (Col. 2.9 and 1.19), 'by whom all 
things are reconciled, whether they be things in earth or things 
in heaven' (Col. 1.20), and whose body, the Church, is 'the 
fulness of him that filleth all in all' (Eph. 1.23). Faith in 
this Jesus Christ is the sole fountain-head of all good." 
Bonhoeffer, ibid.. p. 213.
12 Bonhoeffer identified this as a "colossal obstacle" which 
began after New Testament times, became dominant in the Middle 
Ages and again after the Reformation, prevailing in the field 
even in his time. With such thinking "the main underlying 
conception in ethical thought, and the one which consciously or 
unconsciously has determined its whole course, has been the 
conception of a juxtaposition and conflict of two spheres, the 
one divine, holy, supernatural and Christian, and the other 
worldly, profane, natural and un-Christian." The problem for him 
with such dualistic structures is that Christ becomes a "partial 
and provincial matter within the limits of reality. [Thus,] [i]t 
is assumed that there are realities which lie outside the reality 
that is in Christ." Bonhoeffer, ibid. , p. 196. Hence, the 
sizable undertaking of Bonhoeffer's ethical project as a whole 
and the profound significance of his unified concept of reality 
in particular.
A. An Ethic of Reality: Conformation to the Crucified
Christ
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For Bonhoeffer, ethics involves a concrete, all-encompassing 
christology at its base. It is concrete, not abstract in 
character, applying to all of humanity, not a portion of it.13 
Despite the universal nature of its claim, it does not aim at 
"developing a program for shaping or formation of the western 
world."14 It is concerned with the way Christ takes form in the 
world, and Bonhoeffer discusses this in terms of reality:
The form of Christ is one and the same at all 
times and in all places. And the Church of Christ is 
also one and the same throughout all generations. And 
yet Christ is not a principle in accordance with which 
the whole world must be shaped. Christ is not the 
proclaimer of a system of what would be good today, 
here and at all times . . . [He] was not essentially
a teacher and a legislator, but a man, a real man like 
ourselves. And it is not therefore His will that we 
should in our time be the adherents, exponents and 
advocates of a definite doctrine, but that we should 
be men, real men before God . . . For indeed it is not 
written that God became an idea, a principle, a 
programme, a universally valid proposition or a law, 
but that God became man. This means that though the 
form of Christ certainly is and remains one and the 
same, yet it is willing to take form in the real man, 
that is to say, in quite different guises . . . What
Christ does is precisely to give effect to reality. 
He affirms reality. And indeed He is Himself the real 
man and consequently the foundation of all human 
reality. And so formation in conformity with Christ 
has this double implication. The form of Christ 
remains one and the same, not as a general idea but in 
its own unique character as the incarnate, crucified 
and risen God. And precisely for the sake of Christ's 
form the form of the real man is preserved, and in 
this way the real man receives the form of Christ.15
13 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . pp. 85-86.
14 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . p. 87.
15 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . pp. 84-85.
The christological foundation for this ethical approach is 
abundantly clear.
This unified concept of reality, which gains its meaning in 
Jesus Christ, is not self-evident. Just at the point where
Bonhoeffer discusses the knowledge of reality, how it is 
obtained, and how easily it can be misperceived, christology is 
again the key. He points to the achievements and attitudes of 
a noble humanity— reason, moral fanaticism, conscience, duty, 
free responsibility and silent virtue— and demonstrates how each 
of these is unable to honestly and consistently perceive the 
nature of reality.16 With a preconceived program of interpreta­
tion operating in one's ethical system, reality then becomes 
something against which theory may be applied and judged. 
Bonhoeffer said:
It is not by astuteness, by knowing the tricks, 
but only by simple steadfastness in the truth of God, 
by training the eye upon this truth until it is simple 
and wise, that there comes the experience and the 
knowledge of the ethical reality.
Thus, Bonhoeffer points to a depth, a profundity in the nature 
of reality with which an ethical system ultimately cannot reckon. 
Without "pouring scorn" on the noble achievements of earlier 
generations in their attempts to determine the knowledge of 
ethical reality, Bonhoeffer attempts to "replace rusty swords 
with new ones."17
He points away from ethical principles as a guide to 
reality, and instead toward "simplicity and wisdom"— toward the
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16 Cf. Bonhoeffer, ibid. . pp. 65-68.
17 Bonhoeffer, ibid. , p. 68.
person of Jesus Christ— to make reality clear and perceptible. 
Writing in 1940, at a time when "all concepts [were] being 
confused, distorted and turned upside-down"18 Bonhoeffer believed 
his generation was beset and oppressed by a "superabounding 
reality of concrete ethical problems," while the moral theorists 
were blinded and deceived by evil appearing in the form of 
light.19
Bonhoeffer proposed, then, a concept, an ethic of reality 
which is void of programmatic content, gaining expression and 
meaning in social terms— in the person of Jesus Christ.20 
Reality is not only christologically determined, it is profound 
in nature, so much so that it requires both "simplicity" and 
"wisdom" to perceive it:
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To be simple is to fix one's eye solely on the 
simple truth of God at a time when all concepts are 
being confused, distorted and turned upside-down. . .
. Not fettered by principles, but bound by love for 
God, he has been set free from the problems and 
conflicts of ethical decision . . .  It is precisely 
because he looks only to God, without any sidelong 
glance at the world, that he is able to look at the 
reality of the world freely and without prejudice. 
And that is how simplicity becomes wisdom. The wise 
man is the one who sees reality as it is, and who sees 
into the depth of things. That is why only that man 
is wise who sees reality in God. To understand reality 
is not the same as to know about outward events. It 
is to perceive the essential nature of things.21
18 Bonhoeffer, ibid.
19 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . pp. 64-65.
20 •Such a specifically christological motif echoes the way
he described Jesus' call to discipleship in The Cost of Disciple- 
p. 62. Cf. René de Visme Williamson, Politics and Protes- 
Lâfltjrheoloqv. An Interpretation of Tillich, Barth. Bonhoeffer. 
hQd-_Brunner. (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State UniversityP« S S, 1976, , p. 69.
21 Bonhoeffer, Ethics. pp. 68-69. (Emphasis added).
By pointing to "simplicity" and "wisdom," Bonhoeffer points to 
the hidden nature of reality. Reality, ethically speaking, is 
not self-evident. It can easily be misperceived and miscon­
strued, and may only be understood by looking to God's revelation 
in Christ in order to correctly perceive it. Thus, according to 
Bonhoeffer's portrayal of it in this first phase of his Ethics. 
reality is held together christologically, and is hidden in 
nature.
One last factor must be considered regarding Bonhoeffer's 
christological foundation for reality. In the section immediate­
ly following his explanation of the nature of reality, "Ecce 
homo! ." he identifies the image of the crucified and rejected 
Christ at the center of history. The suffering, rejected Christ 
stands at the crossroads between God and the world. Upon hearing 
his words in this brief section, one cannot help but think of the 
context in which he was writing:
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Ecce homo! Behold the man! In Him the world was 
reconciled with God. It is not by its overthrowing 
but by its reconciliation that the world is subdued. 
It is not by ideals and programmes or by conscience, 
duty, responsibility and virtue that reality can be 
confronted and overcome, but simply and solely by the 
perfect love of God. Here again it is not by a 
general idea of love that this is achieved, but by the 
really lived love of God in Jesus Christ. This love 
of God does not withdraw from reality into noble souls 
secluded from the world. It experiences and suffers 
the reality of the world in all its hardness. The 
world exhausts its fury against the body of Christ. 
But, tormented, He forgives the world its sin. That 
is how the reconciliation is accomplished. Ecce 
homo!22
Bonhoeffer said the figure of the Reconciler comes between God 
and the world, filling the center of all history. Further, He
22 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . p. 70.
follows a path of humiliation and atonement, taking on undeserved 
guilt along the way.23 Bonhoeffer then goes on in the next three 
sections to show how confused ethical values become when they are 
not grounded in the humiliated Christ. First, he juxtaposes the 
One who was despised by men with "the despiser of men." His 
contrast between the person of Christ and Hitler is clear. He 
says,
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The news that God has become man strikes at the 
very heart of an age in which both the good and the 
wicked regard either scorn for man or the idolization 
of man as the highest attainable wisdom. . . .  At such 
a time as this it is easy for the tyrannical despiser 
of men to exploit the baseness of the human heart, 
nurturing it and calling it by other names. Fear he 
calls responsibility. Desire he calls keenness. 
Irresolution becomes solidarity. Brutality becomes 
masterfulness. . . . For the tyrannical despiser of
men popularity is the token of the highest love of 
mankind.24
In the next section, "The Successful Man," Bonhoeffer 
juxtaposes the guilt, shame, and death of Christ with the 
successful man who "strides forward from one deed to the next, 
conquering the future and securing the irrevocability of what has 
been done."25 Against this person, characterized by a false 
standard of success stands the crucified Christ who demonstrates 
success' true meaning.26 Without explicitly stating his points
23 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . pp. 70-71.
24 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . pp. 72-73.
25 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . p. 76.
26 "The figure of the Crucified invalidates all thought which 
takes success for its standard . . . He is not concerned with
success or failure but with the willing acceptance of God's 
judgement. Only in this judgement is there reconciliation with
°d and among men. Christ confronts all thinking in terms of 
success and failure with the man who is under God's sentence, no 
Matter whether he is successful or unsuccessful. It is out of
of contrast, Bonhoeffer showed how mixed up ethical values had 
become under the reign of Hitler, and how only the humiliated 
Christ could point the way to a clear vision of a restored 
reality.
In his third section, Bonhoeffer pointed to a disastrous 
confusion between life and death that occurs when one's view of 
reality becomes skewed.27 Christ's resurrection stands as the 
miraculous event that makes nonsense of what he termed "the 
idolization of death" that was prevalent at that time in 
Germany.28 In all three of these brief sections, Bonhoeffer 
delineated how a confusion of basic values occurs, and how only 
Christ can provide a way back. He points to the re-evaluation 
of values which occurs through Christ. Further, he asserts that, 
"[i]t was precisely the cross of Christ, the failure of Christ 
in the world, which led to His success in history . . . "29 To
a world that measures and justifies itself in terms of success, 
the figure of the sentenced and crucified Christ will remain a 
stranger, or at best, an object of pity.30
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pure love that God is willing to let man stand before Him, and 
that is why He sentences man. It is a sentence of mercy that God 
pronounces on mankind in Christ." Bonhoeffer, ibid.. p. 77.
27 "There is no clearer indication of the idolization of 
death than when a period claims to be building for eternity and 
Yet life has no value in this period, or when big words are 
spoken of a new man, of a new world and of a new society which 
is to be ushered in, and yet all that is new is the destruction 
°f life as we have it. The drastic acceptance or rejection of 
earthly life reveals that only death has any value here. To 
clutch at everything or to cast away everything is the reaction 
°f one who believes fanaticallv in death." Bonhoeffer. ibid., pp. 78-79. -----
28 Bonhoeffer, ibid.. p. 78.
29 Bonhoeffer, ibid.
30 Bonhoeffer, ibid.. p. 75.
In such christological words we see the humiliated, 
crucified Christ who was rejected by humanity. Thus, Bonhoeffer 
employs the terms of the theology of the cross in three ways: 
(1) the explicit focus on the crucified Christ as the only way 
to perceive reality truthfully, (2) the re-evaluation of values 
that occurs when one holds up conventional values against that 
of the cross, and (3) the hidden nature of Christ's revelation 
in the world— people don't perceive it because it stands in 
contrast with what otherwise seems normative. Thus, we see 
Bonhoeffer holding up a theology of the cross as the specific 
guide post for ethics in this context.
Finally, we would be incomplete in our portrayal of 
Bonhoeffer's christological vision as it is articulated in this 
first phase of his writing if we did not mention the way he 
discussed how Christ takes shape in the world, in reality. The 
notion of "conformation" is ingredient to Bonhoeffer's overall 
ethical thought, particularly his ethic of reality, for this is 
the way he concretely discusses the "social content" of his 
ethic, since it is singly informed by the person Jesus Christ. 
Bonhoeffer spells out what he means by the form of Christ taking 
shape in the world:
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The word 'formation' arouses our suspicion. We 
are sick and tired of Christian programmes . . . The
word 'formation', therefore, must be taken in quite a 
different sense from that to which we are accustomed.
• . . Their primary concern is not with the forming of 
a world by means of plans and programmes. Whenever 
they speak of forming they are concerned only with the 
one form which has overcome the world, the form of 
Jesus Christ. Formation can only come from this form. 
But here again it is not a question of applying 
directly to the world the teaching of Christ or what 
are referred to as Christian principles, so that the 
world might be formed in accordance with these. On 
the contrary, formation comes only by being drawn into 
the form of Jesus Christ. It comes only as formation
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in His likeness, as conformation with the unique form 
of Him who was made man, was crucified, and rose 
again.31
Several things are to be noted in Bonhoeffer's notion of 
conformation to Christ. First, he cannot emphasize enough the 
social nature of this ethical concept— that it cannot boil down 
to a program or plan which may be executed with human initiative 
and insight. Bonhoeffer points only to Christ, emphasizing the 
fact that He is the one who does the "molding." Secondly, as an 
ethical theme, Christian activity is grounded in a passivity at 
its base.32 Bonhoeffer ingeniously weds a christological empha­
sis with an ethical motif here.33 Thirdly, we conform to the
31 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . p. 80.
32 "This [conformation] is not achieved by dint of efforts 
'to become like Jesus', which is the way in which we usually 
interpret it. It is achieved only when the form of Jesus Christ 
itself works upon us in such a manner that it moulds our form in 
its own likeness. (Gal. 4:19)." Bonhoeffer, ibid.. p. 80. See 
also Clifford Green, "Textual Research for the New Edition," Old 
Europe and New Frontiers, p. 36.
33 For the sake of maintaining the focus of this chapter, we 
shall only briefly mention Bonhoeffer's important concept of the 
'ultimate' and the 'penultimate', which he articulated during his 
second phase of writing the Ethics (November 1940-February 1941). 
We draw attention to this category because it was here that 
Bonhoeffer articulated a way in which a world come of age may 
exhibit its autonomy in a responsible way.
He argued that during the last two hundred years the 
spiritual situation of western Christendom has called the 
ultimate, (the last things, i.e., God's grace) into question at 
an increasing rate, imperiling the stability of the penultimate 
(the next to last things, i.e., proclaiming the grace of God). 
In other words, humanity and goodness should not acquire a value 
°f their own, but they should be claimed for Jesus Christ.
For Bonhoeffer, the point in drawing out these complementary 
realities is to establish personhood as a penultimate to 
]ustification by faith. See Bonhoeffer, Ethics. p. 134. Hence, 
the ethical behavior of autonomous persons for another person can 
never be more than a testimony to the ultimate gift of God's 
justification of humanity. Rather than discredit the role of 
human endeavor in the world, then, Bonhoeffer attempts to show 
the necessity for such moral action in the name of a greater 
reality, God's grace. As Larry Rasmussen pointed out in his 1990 
onhoeffer seminar at Union Theological Seminary, this is
image of the Incarnate, the Crucified and the Resurrected One. 
Bonhoeffer warns against establishing a separate theology or 
ethic on the basis of only one.34
Whereas Bonhoeffer gave exclusive emphasis to the crucified 
Christ in earlier sections ("Ecce Homo!", "The Despiser of Men," 
"The Successful Man," and "The Idolization of Death") the context 
of his remarks clarify such a highlight. However, given the 
contextual emphasis on the crucified Christ, this does not take 
away from the fact that Bonhoeffer's christological emphasis is 
fully in line with a theologia crucis. Such an emphasis provided 
the critical vantage point by which Bonhoeffer judged the ethical 
standards reigning under Hitler's rule askew, and giving him the 
clarity of vision to call for a "re-ordering of values" in light 
of the crucified Christ. While we see the unity in Bonhoeffer's 
christological ethic of reality and notion of conformation, his 
emphasis on the crucified Christ suggests the kind of christology 
guiding this ethical vision and the critique which lay therein.
But what does this christological basis have to do with his 
notion of human autonomy? The way Bonhoeffer articulates this 
ethic of reality with his theme of conformation, God's concrete 
commands and human obedience to them occur as indicative ethical
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Bonhoeffer's ingenious way of suggesting ethics, not as a 
precondition of grace (as Luther would have it) , but as a 
foreteller, a proclaimer of grace. Further, it serves as a key 
for maintaining the difference between God and persons. For, 
while the notion of autonomous persons in a new age might seem 
to risk eclipsing the notion of God, Bonhoeffer's ethics-escha- 
tology distinction augurs well the distinction.
14 He discusses this in his section on 'The Ultimate and the 
Penultimate' where he says, "It is quite wrong to establish a 
Separate theology of the incarnation, a theology of the cross, 
or a theology of the resurrection, each in opposition to the 
others, by a misconceived absolutization of one of these parts; 
it is equally wrong to apply the same procedure to a consider- 
ation of the Christian life. . . . Only in the unity is the
conflict resolved." Bonhoeffer, Ethics, p. 131.
acts, not ones that are imperatively assigned. God's authority 
in the world is discussed in terms of formation, an indicative 
motif, more so than mandate, an imperative one. The human person 
is placed into the reality of the world, acting responsibly in 
it as a result of christological formation, which shapes the 
attitudes and actions of the individual. 'Ethics as command' is 
not prevalent in this portion of his Ethics. but it is a theme 
much discussed by Bonhoeffer in the last stage of his writing. 
By determining these twin christological emphases in his Ethics. 
we come away with a much clearer picture of the contours and 
content of human autonomy.
B. Bonhoeffer's Conservative Social Structure of Authority: 
Superiority and Inferiority in his Ethic of Command
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1. A Conservative Social Structure as Warrant for 
Ethical Discourse
We turn now to Bonhoeffer's last phase of writing Ethics. 
which occurred between the end of 1942 and 5 April 1943. As was 
mentioned earlier, Larry Rasmussen has documented the fact that 
Bonhoeffer read the galley-proofs of Barth's Church Dogmatics 
II/2, "The Command of God," in May of 1942, and relied on them 
heavily in his discussion of "ethics as command," even though he 
does not explicitly mention Barth.35 Rasmussen has carefully 
depicted the extent to which Bonhoeffer relied on his mentor and 
deviated from him.36 He concludes that whereas the emphasis for
35 See Rasmussen, Dietrich Bonhoeffer— His Significance for 
HQ£th_Americans r op. cit. . pp. 98-110, esp. pp. 98-101.
36 Rasmussen points out the classically Bonhoefferian themes 
°f obedience, christocentricity of the command, the full 
embracing of life by the command and the conferring of freedom
Barth is a constant accountability before God, Bonhoeffer's is, 
rather, of God's permission for persons to live fully, as more 
than takers of ethical decisions.37 In this portion of this 
study, we shall investigate another kind of difference between 
Barth and Bonhoeffer, one which suggests a conservatism in 
Bonhoeffer's understanding of God's command that is altogether 
absent in Barth's. What we find of interest is that the 
"superiority-inferiority" motif runs strong in this fifth phase 
of writing. We know this emphasis does not come from Barth 
because he expressed discontent with Bonhoeffer's strong reliance 
on this kind of social ordering in his Church Dogmatics III/4.38 
We shall explore the ramifications of Bonhoeffer's employment of 
this conservative social structure not only to determine the 
reasoning behind such a surprising motif, but to aid in our 
determination of the relationship between his ethic of command 
and formation.
It has been suggested by some that Bonhoeffer utilized a 
conservative, even oppressive, order of social structure. 
Recently, at the 1992 Sixth International Bonhoeffer Society 
Conference in New York City, Union Theological Seminary, one 
Bonhoeffer scholar, Stephen Plant, presented a paper, taking up 
Barth's concern. Plant wondered whether Bonhoeffer's mandates 
theology "does not seek to re-establish a tolerant authoritarian­
ism which, whilst providing safeguards for the inferior,
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which predate Bonhoeffer's reading of Church Dogmatics 2/2, as 
well as the fact that there are changes in, and additions to, the 
material used from 2/2 to clarify Bonhoeffer's distinction from 
Barth in this instance. Rasmussen, op. cit.. pp. 101-103.
37 Ibid. . p. 102.
38 • •See p. 147 infra, for Barth's estimation of Bonhoeffer's 
use of the superiority-inferiority category.
legitimates the retention by the superior of control and 
power."39 Is Bonhoeffer trapped within the confines of a German 
patriarchalism? And what are the ramifications of this social 
structure for Bonhoeffer's understanding of human autonomy?
Bonhoeffer opens his section on "The 'Ethical' and the 
'Christian'" by determining the warrant for ethical discourse. 
For Bonhoeffer, the concrete warrant and authorization for 
ethical discourse is just as important as the actual content of 
an ethical assertion.40 For Bonhoeffer, the warrant is not 
something persons can assign to themselves. Rather, it is an 
imparted authorization, assigned not primarily on the basis of 
subjective accomplishments and merit, but on the basis of an 
objective position in the world.41 Thus, Bonhoeffer says 
authorization for ethical discourse is conferred upon the old man 
and not upon the young one, upon the father and not the child, 
the master and not the servant.42 This is where he brings in the 
category of the superior and the inferior:
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What finds expression here is that disparity 
which is so extremely offensive to modern sensibili­
ties but which is inherent and essential in the 
ethical, namely, the disparity between the superior 
and the inferior. Without this objective subordi­
nation of the lower to the higher, and without that 
courage to accept superiority which modern man has so 
completely lost, ethical discourse is dissipated in
39 Stephen Plant, "'A Suggestion of North German Patriarch­
alism' : a Materialist Duologue with the Ethics of Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer," Unpublished paper delivered at the Sixth Interna­
tional Bonhoeffer Conference, New York City, Union Theological 
Seminary, 17 August 1992, p. 8. (On file at Bonhoeffer Archive, 
Union Theological Seminary).
40 Bonhoeffer, Ethics. p. 271.
41 Bonhoeffer, ibid.
42 Bonhoeffer, ibid.
generalities, it lacks an object and its essential 
character is destroyed.43
Thus, for Bonhoeffer, the ethical implies certain definite 
sociological relations in which authority and subordination are 
cast and delegated as separate realities. Paramount to Bon­
hoeffer in this scheme is the fact that such a social order is 
a concrete relation between the giver and receiver of commands, 
not a formal rational principle.44 Bonhoeffer then makes some 
important qualifications for what he knows can be an easily 
misunderstood schema.
He affirms the legacy of the Enlightenment in which this 
social order came to expression, reminding the reader of the 
social order which preceded it:
In its polemical context the Enlightenment must 
still be allowed to have been right to oppose a system 
under which society was divided into privileged and 
unprivileged sections. The ethical is in actual fact 
connected with the universally and humanly rational; 
and in actual fact the inherent tendency of the 
ethical, in its subordination of the inferior to the 
superior, does not in any way imply a sanctioning of 
privileges.45
The Enlightenment went wrong when it made a formal abstract 
principle of human reason, according to Bonhoeffer. However, he 
still sees it offering a corrective to any attempt to misuse the 
ethical as a sanction for privilege.46 Trying to clear the path
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43 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . pp. 271-72
44 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . p. 273.
45 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . p. 273.
46 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . p. 274.
for this social structure as a legitimate one for ethics, he
defines exactly what he means by such an order.
First, he says what superiority does not mean. "Superiority 
does not consist in the subjective value of the superior man, but 
derives its legitimation from a concrete objective commission."47 
The warrant goes with the office, not with the person. 
Bonhoeffer argues that ethical chaos results if this relation is 
tampered with, as can be seen in the father who derives his 
authority from his children's confidence in him and the govern­
ment which derives its authority from its popularity.48 The 
authorization for ethical discourse is conferred upon those who 
hold authority by the nature of their office, and Bonhoeffer
lists some of these: the old man, not the young; the father, not
the child; the master, not the servant; the teacher, not the 
student, etc.
Before he goes on to discuss how God's command differs from 
the ethical, Bonhoeffer rejects a particular ethical approach, 
and in so doing, clarifies his understanding of the superior and 
inferior social structure. He denounces the positivisitic 
approach to ethics49 because it finds the warrant for ethical 
discourse in reality as it is given, without any further attempt 
at explanation. To him, it contained no criteria beyond the 
reality which is given at any particular time and which can 
always change.50 When the positivistic approach succeeds, actual
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47 Bonhoeffer, ibid.
48 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . p. 275.
49 As from the tradition of the nineteenth century conserva­
tive romanticist J. Stahl, and in the twentieth century by the 
Catholic, Max Scheler.
50 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . p. 275.
power comes to be regarded as the sole criterion for the warrant. 
Bonhoeffer contends that there are other criteria beyond the 
positive data for the classification of authorities and of their 
warrants, specifically, the warrant coming by divine appointment. 
Determination of the meaning bound up in such a divinely ordered 
warrant, then, becomes paramount. Bonhoeffer turns to that issue 
next.
2. The Object Lying Beyond the Ethical: 'The Com­
mandment of God'
In discussing the commandment of God, we come to the heart 
of Bonhoeffer's statements about the divinely ordered social 
structure of superiority and inferiority. God's commandment is 
described as something different from the ethical. It is 
unconditional, total, embracing the whole of life. While it 
forbids and commands it also permits; not only does it bind, but 
it sets free by binding.51 In short, it is an absolute and 
concrete claim laid to persons by God in Jesus Christ.52 One of 
its chief aspects is that it "establishes on earth an inviolable 
superiority and inferiority which are independent of the factual 
relations of power and weakness."53 Bonhoeffer does not elabo­
rate on what he means by "the factual relations of power and 
weakness," but he seems to be alluding to a positivistic 
connotation, meaning the relations of power and weakness as they 
occur in reality. This would suggest that he is emphasizing a
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51 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . p. 277.
52 Bonhoeffer, ibid.
53 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . p. 279.
disparity between human social expressions of power and weakness 
and the way God intends for such a category to be understood.
God's command confronts the world in the four mandates: 
church, marriage and family, culture, and government. In 
defining exactly what he means by mandate, Bonhoeffer states:
It is the legitimation and warrant for the 
execution of a definite divine commandment, the 
conferment of divine authority on an earthly agent.
The term 'mandate' must also be taken to imply the 
claiming, the seizure and the formation of a definite 
earthly domain by the divine commandment.54
Once again, we find Bonhoeffer emphasizing the social structure 
of superiority-inferiority in relation to the divine mandate. 
Bearers of the mandate do not receive their commission from 
below— they are "deputies and representatives of God." As such, 
the sphere of the mandate is established in an unalterable 
relation of superiority and inferiority.55 Bonhoeffer, yet 
again, qualifies what he means by these terms in three ways
saying that (1) it is not identical with an earthly relation of
superior and inferior power;56 (2) that the mandate establishes 
inferiority as well as superiority; and (3) that they represent 
a relation of persons, not of concepts or things.
For Bonhoeffer, this conservative social structure is
essential to his overall ethical enterprise.57 Indeed, it
54 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . p. 287.
55 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . p. 289.
56 Indeed, "On the contrary . . . the divine mandate . . .
corrects and regulates the earthly relations of superior and
inferior power in its own way." Bonhoeffer, ibid.. p. 289.
57 "The genuine order of superior and inferior draws its life 
from belief in the commission from 'above', belief in the 'Lord 
°f lords'. This belief alone can exorcize the demonic forces
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virtually hinges on such a category. A clearly differentiated 
relation of superiority and inferiority is obtained when the word 
of God's revelation in Jesus Christ is proclaimed in church.58
In the church the word is proclaimed as one commandment—  
God's revelation in Jesus Christ--and Bonhoeffer points out two 
important factors therein which reveal his attitude toward an 
autonomous humanity. First, the cross of atonement sets one free 
for life before God in the midst of a godless world. It sets one 
free for life in genuine worldliness. Thus, Bonhoeffer speaks 
of a positive "worldliness" (as we see again in the letters from 
prison) and how the cross unleashes one in freedom to participate 
in it. Secondly, the commandment of Jesus Christ rules over the 
Church, family, culture and government, but it does so, simulta­
neously setting each of these mandates free for the fulfillment 
of its allotted function. In the same way, Jesus Christ as Lord 
emancipates the four mandated areas to realize their essential 
character, which is grounded in Christ. In this way, Bonhoeffer 
overcomes heteronomy (godless humanity seeking its own deifica­
tion, displacing God) and autonomy (humanity that is detached 
from God's commandments) with Christonomv— Jesus Christ's ruling 
over the world, thereby, setting it free, free for others, pro 
aliis. Freedom, then, operates at the heart of Bonhoeffer's 
notion of God's rule in Jesus Christ.59
Further, Bonhoeffer's understanding of superiority and 
inferiority does not provide the basis for any kind of domina-
which emerge from below. The collapse of this belief means the 
total collapse and destruction of the whole structure and order 
which is established in the world from above." Bonhoeffer, 
fifchics, pp. 290-91.
58 Bonhoeffer, ibid.. p. 293.
59 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . pp. 297-99.
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tion.60 The irony surrounding Bonhoeffer's tenacious affirmation 
of this ordered concept comes to the fore: while he obviously
saw the danger in using such a category because of the way it 
could be exploited and lead to domination, he stubbornly held 
onto it, arguing not only the collapse of an entire ethical 
system with its dismissal, but its clear distinction as freedom, 
apart from twisted human understandings of superiority and 
inferiority.
Upon such evidence of Bonhoeffer's understanding of the 
superior-inferior social construct, one must ask along with 
Barth:
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Is it enough to say that these particular rela­
tionships of rank and degree occur with a certain 
regularity in the Bible, and that they can be more or 
less clearly related to Christ as the Lord of the 
world? Again, does the relationship always have to be 
one of superiority and inferiority? In Bonhoeffer's 
doctrine of the mandates, is there not just a sugges­
tion of North German Patriarchalism? Is the notion of 
authority of some over others really more characteris­
tic of the ethical event than that of the freedom of 
even the very lowest before the very highest?61
Is Barth right, that Bonhoeffer is bound by a certain 
"patriarchal" frame of thinking? And is Stephen Plant correct, 
that Bonhoeffer's ethic does not allow for liberation from below, 
that it seeks to "re-establish a tolerant authoritarianism which, 
whilst providing safeguards for the inferior, legitimates the 
retention by the superior of control and power?"62 Before we
60 Ibid. . p. 298.
61 See Plant, op. cit. . p. 8; Church Dogmatics III/4, p. 22.
62 Plant, op. cit. . p. 8.
offer up our own conclusions, Bonhoeffer offers his own response 
and addresses the matter.
During his third phase of writing Ethics (March to October 
1941) Bonhoeffer articulated the notion of an "ethic of responsi­
bility." We already saw in his fifth writing phase how he came 
to articulate God's commandment in terms of freedom— God's 
command which is a setting free. Here, during his third phase, 
he takes up the issue directly in such a way that clarifies his 
own estimation of the superior-inferior social paradigm. What 
he has to say about the relationship between free responsibility 
and obedience yields insight into his separation of the social 
order into superior and inferior, the strong and the weak. The 
quotation is lengthy, but necessary to show Bonhoeffer's thought 
about the social order:
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It must seem at first sight as though everything 
we have said about free responsibility is applicable 
in practice only when a man finds himself in what we 
call a 'responsible position' in life, in other words 
when he has to take independent decisions on the very 
largest scale. What connexion can there be between 
responsibility and the monotonous daily work of the 
labourer, the factory worker, the clerk, the private 
soldier, the apprentice or the schoolboy? It is a 
different matter already with the owner-farmer, the 
industrial contractor, the politician or statesman, 
the general, the master craftsman, the teacher and the 
judge. But in their lives, too, how much there is of 
technique and duty and how little of really free deci­
sion! And so it seems that everything we have said 
about responsibility can in the end apply only to a 
very small group of men, and even to these only in a 
few moments of their lives; and consequently it seems 
as though for the great majority of men one must speak 
not of responsibility but of obedience and duty. This 
implies one ethic for the great and the strong, for 
the rulers, and another for the small and the weak, 
the subordinates: on the one hand responsibility and 
on the other obedience, on the one hand freedom and on 
the other subservience. And indeed there can be no 
doubt that in our modern social order, and especially 
in the German one, the life of the individual is so 
exactly defined and regulated, and is at the same time 
assured of such complete security, that it is granted
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to only very few men to breathe the free air of the 
wide open spaces of great decisions and to experience 
the hazard of responsible action which is entirely 
their own. In consequence of the compulsory regula­
tion of life in accordance with a definite course of 
training and vocational activity, our lives have come 
to be relatively free from ethical dangers; the 
individual who from his childhood on has had to take 
his assigned place in accordance with this principle 
is ethically emasculated; he has been robbed of the 
creative moral power, freedom. In this we see a deep 
seated fault in the essential development of our 
modern social order, a fault which can be countered 
only with a clear exposition of the fundamental 
concept of responsibility . . . Yet it would be an
error if we were to continue to look at the problem 
from this point of view. There is. in fact, no single 
life which cannot experience the situation of respon­
sibility; every life can experience this situation in 
its most characteristic form, that is to say, in the 
encounter with other people. Even when free responsi­
bility is more or less excluded from a man's vocation­
al and public life, he nevertheless always stands in 
a responsible relation to other men.63
The quotation is telling— Bonhoeffer identified a "deep-seated 
fault" in the essential development of the modern social order. 
That fault has to do with a regimented social order which divides 
persons into great and small, strong and weak, rulers and 
subordinates. Further, he identified the fact that such a 
regulated division in social structure seriously inhibits the 
ethical development of persons.
Bonhoeffer said the only way to counter this huge social 
developmental error is with a clear understanding of the concept 
of responsibility. He then went on to affirm that responsibility 
is not a category reserved for a certain type of person; every 
individual can experience the situation of responsibility. 
Wherever a person meets another person— there arises genuine
63 Bonhoeffer, Ethics. pp. 250-51. (Emphasis added).
responsibility, and these responsible relationships cannot be 
supplanted by any general regulation or routine.64
But Bonhoeffer said we should go one step further: responsi­
bility not only stands side by side with relationships of 
obedience, it also has its place within these relationships.65 
Hence, "obedience and responsibility are interlinked in such a 
way that one cannot say that responsibility begins only where 
obedience leaves off, but rather that obedience is rendered in 
responsibility."66 Bonhoeffer effectively reassigns obedience 
and responsibility as a unified idea, applicable to everyone, 
whereas before in his context in Germany, obedience was seen as 
the appropriate response for the weak and responsibility was 
reserved for the strong. By bringing the motifs of obedience and 
responsibility together, Bonhoeffer gives expression to an 
ethical concept that is inclusive and liberating for all. 
Ultimately responsibility implies a tension between obedience and 
freedom so that the responsible person delivers up one's self and 
one's deed to God.67
In light of Bonhoeffer's statements about the structure of 
responsibility, what is one to make of his understanding of the 
social order, particularly in terms of superiority and inferiori­
ty? Is this a legitimate social structure for him after all? 
Do his statements on responsibility in his third phase of writing 
contradict his later statements about God's command and the 
'inviolability' of the superior-inferior social structure
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64 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . p. 251.
65 Bonhoeffer, ibid.
66 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . p. 252.
67 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . p. 253.
inherent within it? And lastly, is Bonhoeffer inextricably 
trapped within a patriarchal way of thinking, as Barth suggested?
3. Conclusions Regarding the Terms of Bonhoeffer's 
Social Structure of Authority
Several comments are in order regarding Bonhoeffer's notion 
of and regard for the social ordering of persons in superior and 
inferior terms. First, we must remember that superiority and 
inferiority had more to do, for him, with the issue of determin­
ing the warrant and authorization in ethical discourse than with 
the ethical content of the category and how it "plays out" in 
society. At least this was true in his section on God's command­
ment. In his third writing phase, in the section on responsibil­
ity, however, Bonhoeffer explicitly acknowledges that much damage 
has been done as this social order has developed and taken hold 
in German society.
We also note there, however, that while he comes up with a 
solution (the structure of responsibility) he does not negate the 
social order in and of itself. He does provide a clear concept 
and structure of responsibility to inform that order. Even so, 
while Bonhoeffer does not explicitly reject the superior-inferior 
social category, his focus moves away from defending such an 
order, as we see him do in his section on the divine mandates, 
to pointing the way to a new understanding of responsibility that 
ls applicable to everyone. The fact that in the Letters and 
£§£ots from Prison he never again speaks in terms of superiority 
and inferiority, but does continue the themes he raised with his 
notion of responsibility—  deputyship, freedom— suggests the more 
enduring aspect of Bonhoeffer's overall emphasis.
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One might say that the superiority-inferiority category was 
an essential and unnegotiable aspect of his understanding of that 
which lay beyond the ethical--the command of God--while it became 
a questionable category for his ethics, insofar as it had been 
exploited as an ethical concept in German modern society. At the 
risk of sounding inconsistent in drawing such a conclusion, one 
must remember that Bonhoeffer acknowledged very clearly that the 
superior-inferior structure was a divinely ordered relationship 
whose meaning is gathered in terms of God's command, not "factual 
relations of power and weakness."
That brings us to Karl Barth's conclusion— that Bonhoeffer 
evidences a "North German Patriarchalism." Whereas Bonhoeffer 
does show evidence for this in his relentless advocacy of this 
category in his concept of God's command, he is not irrevocably 
trapped by it either, as his notion of responsibility demon­
strates. Further, in a letter from prison dated 23 January 1944, 
Bonhoeffer explores the notion of 'friendship,' finding it 
difficult to classify sociologically. He concludes that it is 
a category sui generis, belonging "not to the sphere of obedi­
ence, but to the broad area of freedom, which surrounds all three 
spheres of the divine mandates."68 That Bonhoeffer is aware of 
his conservative tendency toward order, structure and classifica­
tion is apparent in the prison letter.69 His candid thoughts on 
this topic indicate that Bonhoeffer readily subjected his own 
structure of authority to critique, revising it accordingly
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68 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, pp. 192, 193. 
Please refer to Appendix III for a full transcription of Bon­
hoeffer's discussion of friendship as well as his poem on the 
subject in honor of Eberhard Bethge.
69 Please refer to Appendix III to indicate Bonhoeffer's 
Self“conscious critique.
whenever convinced of its shortcomings. We saw this in his move 
from the order of 'preservation'70 to the mandates; we saw it in 
his candid questioning of the viability of the superior-inferior 
social order; and we see it now with his open thoughts on the 
sociological status of friendship. More than being guilty of a 
North German patriarchalism, Bonhoeffer proves himself a humble 
revisionist, constantly restructuring his understanding of 
authority due to sociality underlying his theology.71
Perhaps Bonhoeffer's greatest weakness in holding up the 
paradigm of superiority and inferiority is the way such a scheme 
contradicts the essence of his critique of religion. Bonhoeffer 
believed the character of "religion" was that of "privilege" and 
"tutelage." Not only did he fight against the dangerously 
privileged character of the Christian religion throughout his 
life, but he saw closely connected the role it plays as the 
"guardian" of "immature" persons, who have not come of age. As 
Bethge elaborated:
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'Religious interpretation' is an interpretation of the 
Gospel of the powerlessness of Christ that establishes 
priests (as the givers of life) or theologians (as the 
custodians of truth) as the guardians and the rulers 
of the people of the Church, creating and perpetuating 
a situation of dependence. Nothing will be as diffi­
cult as overcoming the monarchial and patriarchal 
structures of hierarchies, theologies and, indeed,
70 In 1932 Bonhoeffer had juxtaposed the notion of 'order of 
preservation' to avoid the dangerous connotation being propounded 
by right wing theological interpretations of 'order of creation'. 
Now, based on his assessment of the person's relation to the 
w°rld, he replaced "'the sphere of the reqnum Christi' with the 
less static idea of 'mandate'. Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer. pp. 
621, 622.
71 Cf. Charles West, 'Ground Under our Feet,' in "New Studies 
in Bonhoeffer's Ethics" . Guy Carter, Rene van Eyden et a l . , eds., 
Sgnhoeffer's Ethics. Old Europe and New Frontiers. (Kampen: Kok
haros Publishing House, 1991), p. 41.
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dogmas, for coming of age has an element about it that 
is alarmingly unreassuring.72
Further, he lacks Biblical evidence to support it in the ultimate 
way that he does. Further, an inconsistency arises between the 
way Bonhoeffer understands the relationship of superiority- 
inferiority in his description of God's command (it is objec­
tively tied to the office, not the person) and the structure of 
responsibility (it applies to every person, regardless of their 
"station.")
Finally, we come to Plant's concern--that Bonhoeffer seeks 
to provide safeguards for the inferior while legitimating the 
retention of control and power by the superior. If Plant's 
conclusion is correct, then he is surely right that such an ethic 
does not allow for liberation from below. We respond to such a 
conclusion by stating that Bonhoeffer's choice of social order 
leaves itself open to be interpreted as an ethic which houses 
a tolerant authoritarianism at its base. That Bonhoeffer 
actually sought to "re-establish" a tolerant authoritarianism, 
as Plant suggests, is, however, another matter, and it is an 
enterprise he did not attempt.
Again, one must remember whose authority Bonhoeffer was 
trying to "seal" with the superior-inferior structure. His 
concern was with the ethical as a mandate coming from God to 
humanity, not as an ethical structure in itself. However, this 
is not to take away from the fact that Bonhoeffer did not reject 
a basic division between the strong, powerful, and superior, and 
the weak, subordinate, and inferior. We say "did not reject" 
because Bonhoeffer seemed to move away from this category as a
72 Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer. pp. 78 0-81.
social construct with his notion of responsibility, and he never 
referred to it again in his prison letters.
Further, we deny that Bonhoeffer legitimates the retention 
of control and power by the superior in his mandates theology, 
as Plant concludes. This is so because Bonhoeffer fundamentally 
weds superiority to the concept of responsibility in his 
discussion on God's command. Plant assumes that superiority 
connotes a retention of power and control in Bonhoeffer, whereas 
the latter discusses the motif in terms of responsibility in the 
fifth phase of writing73 and, indeed, seems to move away from it 
with his notion of responsibility and its structure in his third 
section. Once one looks very closely at the definition Bon­
hoeffer attaches to the "superior" and the way in which he is 
suggesting it, it becomes evident that it fundamentally cannot 
legitimate privilege, exploitation, or domination over others 
because Bonhoeffer discusses it fundamentally in terms of 
responsibility and obedience.
Unfortunately, the terms "superiority" and "inferiority" 
carry so much baggage with them today, this is the greatest 
obstacle for their reception among scholars and followers of 
Bonhoeffer, not to mention their overall viability as social 
constructs. These terms have become politically loaded, carrying 
negative connotations. Interestingly, Bonhoeffer himself seemed 
to back off from such a socially-ordered concept once he
73 Indeed, Bonhoeffer several times tries to allay the fear 
that by affirming "superiority" domination in any form may be 
suggested. While Plant does not seem to be suggesting that 
Bonhoeffer's understanding of the mandates legitimates domination 
(a negative term) neither is Bonhoeffer's intent to legitimate 
detention of power and control, (positive and negative terms.) 
“e is seeking to legitimate the responsible use of power more 
than insure who has that power, even though, admittedly, the 
social structure he uses can lend itself to such an interpreta­tion.
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recognized its negative affect in modern German culture. 
However, we would be amiss to reject this notion in Bonhoeffer 
out of hand because it becomes clear that he was trying to say 
something different with this order. In the end, he ended up 
dropping it, as the letters from prison show. There, he builds 
on notions like deputyship and autonomy--ideas which have unique 
import for how we may understand the language of command and 
obedience anew.
Although some may not like to admit it, Bonhoeffer did show 
the way to a new understanding of terms like "command" and 
"superior-inferior" in the Ethics. In the process, he began 
pointing to a new language, a non-religious one that would make 
more sense to a "mature" generation. By looking at his Ethics 
we saw how two christological emphases came forth, informing 
ethical action. Addressing his ethical thought to an increasing­
ly "godless world" characterized by an independence and autonomy 
heretofore unknown, Bonhoeffer held up the images of the 
crucified Christ to whom we conform and the commanding Christ to 
whom we respond to inform a grown up age as to the nature of its 
power. Conformation to the shape of Christ as well as freely 
chosen response to God's command set the terms for how a world 
come of age can exercise its autonomy and be true to its form.
4. Conclusions Regarding Bonhoeffer's Christological 
Ethics in Terms of Conformation and Command
We have examined the two motifs of conformation and command 
which run throughout Bonhoeffer's Ethics. Rather than conclude 
that his thematic of command is subordinate to his notion of
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conformation, however, as Larry Rasmussen does74 we conclude that 
both thematics are resolved in a unified way with Bonhoeffer's 
concept of responsibility as it is delineated in the Ethics and 
with his understanding of the hiddenness of God's power as 
weakness in Letters and Papers from Prison. By laying out the 
structure of the responsible life in terms of deputyship, 
correspondence with reality, acceptance of guilt, and freedom, 
the vicissitudes and disparities that ultimately separate those 
whom the world would deem the weak from the strong, Bonhoeffer 
overcomes such divisions with an inclusive motif. Already we 
have seen in his notion of freedom how the relationship between 
responsibility and obedience, as he defined it, does away with 
any privileged understandings for whom freely chosen ethical 
action is possible. Bonhoeffer focuses on the relationship 
between persons as a whole, leaving behind class distinctions and 
divisions. Further, as we have seen in chapter one, Bonhoeffer 
spoke of the true nature of God's power or rule in the world in 
terms of the christological vicarious principle, 'being there for 
others.' God's command takes the form of selfless service for 
others on the cross. In this way, command and conformation to 
Christ intersect, modifying each other dialectically so that 
there is no choice between two methods.
Before leaving the Ethics, we pause to take a brief look at 
one of his other ethical notions which stems from his theologia 
SEucis and which informs his understanding of human autonomy— the 
notion of deputyship. With this, Bonhoeffer shows us with
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74 Both in the summary of his chapter 'A Question of Method, ' 
in "New Studies in Bonhoeffer's Ethics," Old Europe and New 
Trailers, p. 43 and in his book Dietrich Bonhoeffer: His
—i3Sjf.icance for North Americans, o p . cit. . pp. 105-110.
another motif the contours by which an autonomous humanity may 
understand itself.
Responsibility characterizes the picture of persons living 
in an increasingly secularized, modernized world. Bonhoeffer 
indicated that responsibility is fundamentally a matter of 
"deputyship" :
Deputyship, and therefore responsibility, lies
only in the complete surrender of one's own life to
the other man. Only the selfless man lives responsi­
bly, and this means that only the selfless man lives 
. . . Jesus, life, our life, lived in deputyship for
us as the incarnate Son of God, and that is why 
through Him all life is in essence a life of deputy­
ship . . . [i]n this real deputyship which constitutes 
His human existence He is the responsible person par 
excellence ,75
The connection between responsibility as deputyship and the 
nature of human autonomy is evident in the way Bonhoeffer 
describes Christ as the responsible person par excellence. The 
responsible person will act selflessly, as a deputy in behalf of 
the other. Bonhoeffer spoke of such action as "selfless self- 
assertion .1,76
In the theoloqia crucis. humility plays an important role, 
and it is present in Bonhoeffer in a way which is not true for 
Luther. While Luther certainly asserts humility as a fundamental 
condition of the disciple following the way of the cross, the
prevailing connotation is that of resignation, lowliness, or
nothingness.77 For Luther, humility is perfected self-knowledge,
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75 Bonhoeffer, Ethics. p. 2 24.
76 Bonhoeffer, ibid. , p. 222 .
77 Walter von Loewenich, Luther's Theology of the Cross, p.
and its boundary is love to the neighbor. Indeed, the way of 
humility is from the inside out, not from the outside in.78
Bonhoeffer takes Luther's idea and releases it from its 
introverted nature, arguing that there is a way to embody 
humility externally in "selfless self-assertion" toward one's 
neighbor. Whereas humility for Luther is characterized as 
resignation and self-knowledge, for Bonhoeffer it is no less than 
a selfless ethical act that points to the ultimate humility of 
Christ. Love to one's neighbor is humility's boundary for 
Luther; that is precisely where it begins for Bonhoeffer. 
Bonhoeffer gives an ethical-eschatological interpretation to 
humility with the notion of deputyship, allowing it to connote 
the selflessness Luther desired, yet surpassing his narrow 
ethical parameters.
As Bonhoeffer grappled with how an increasingly modern and 
autonomous age understands itself in increasingly godless terms 
in the Ethics. he offers up ethical motifs as they are defined 
in terms of the theoloqia crucis by which humanity may understand 
its increased power and independence. Human autonomy is 
characterized as free responsible action, deputyship and 
acceptance of guilt, all of which are the building blocks of 
Bonhoeffer's ethic of responsibility as well as Luther's cross­
centered theology. These concepts are not arbitrarily incorpo­
rated into Bonhoeffer's ethical thought, but gain their meaning 
from the terms of this theology of the cross which had developed 
°ver a period of years in his life and thought.79
78 Bonhoeffer, Ethics. pp. 131-32.
79 One scholar rightly points out the nature of the misunder­
standing which tends to surround some of Bonhoeffer's key motifs 
}n the Ethics: "We have become accustomed, perhaps especially
ln North America, to treat 'responsibility,' 'warrant,' and
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XI. Letters and Papers from Prison: Toward a Dialectical
Understanding of Human Power
In Letters and Papers from Prison we see how key terms Bon­
hoeffer used to characterize human autonomy appear again, this 
time in even more profound expression as his theoloqia crucis 
came to full fruition. Human autonomy is discussed there in 
terms of the new period in human history that has moved past a 
"religious" consciousness and toward a "world come of age" con­
sciousness. Bonhoeffer embraced this non-religious world, 
casting away "religion" as a mere garment of Christianity, not 
the thing itself.80
We look now to see how Bonhoeffer came to discuss human 
autonomy in terms of a "non-religious interpretation" and a 
"world come of age," and how these anthropological expressions 
gain their meaning in terms of his theology of the cross. More 
specifically, we shall show how Bonhoeffer understood and 
expressed human power paradigmatically in dialectical relation 
to God's weakness.
We begin by looking at Bonhoeffer's concept of religion and 
the nature of his critique. Gustavo Gutierrez, in his well-known 
book, The Power of the Poor in History, said, "It seems to me
'deputyship' as theological concepts that have applications to 
Political ethics. We cannot appreciate the originality and 
creativity of Bonhoeffer's Ethics until we see that he encoun­
tered these first as political ideas. He was able to give them 
a broader meaning and to provide normative guidance for the 
dilemmas of resistance precisely by relating them to theological 
concepts of vicarious action and accountability before God." 
Robin W. Lovin, 'The Biographical Context of Bonhoeffer's 
Ethics, / »New Studies in Bonhoeffer's Ethics. " p. 45. In full 
agreement with Lovin, the theoloqia crucis is just that theologi­
cal framework out of which Bonhoeffer gave meaning and breadth 
to his politically-motivated ethical concepts.
80 See Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison. Letter of
30 April 1944, p. 280.
that, for Bonhoeffer, the notion of religion is bound up with the 
idea of power: the human being's power over God (the idea Barth
had already rejected)— but God's power over the human being as 
well."81 Gutierrez's comments interestingly raise the issue of 
Bonhoeffer's understanding of this relationship between the 
"notion of religion" and the "idea of power."
Accordingly, this section will briefly examine, first, Karl 
Barth's critique of religion and its influence in Bonhoeffer's 
critique, and second, Rudolf Bultmann's anthropology and how he 
rejected the idea of "God's power over the human being" in a 
manner that partly resembled Bonhoeffer's.
Having explored what Bonhoeffer meant by religion and his 
non-religious interpretation, we then move to Bonhoeffer's second 
anthropological notion in The Letters and Papers from Prison, the 
"world come of age." Bonhoeffer was able to embrace this modern 
world which had become more godless and mature precisely because 
of the grounding that the theoloqia crucis allowed for such 
thinking. As Eberhard Bethge expressed:
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Now a liberating movement begins to spread in 
which the Christian listens to Feuerbach and Nietz­
sche— with a good conscience— and allows them their 
share in humanity's progress, in that they, for 
example, warn the Church against becoming a chemist's 
shop to minister to heavenly needs, leaving the world 
to its own devices. As against this, the theoloqia 
crucis of the Church may serve the inheritance of the 
Enlightenment as a protection against its own tendency 
towards the unrealistic. It corrects the unquenchable 
urge of mankind to glorify, deify or demonize its 
progress, and, today perhaps even more necessarily in 
the other direction, protects the rationalist from his 
unfortunate tendency to the sterile fragmentation of
81 Gustavo Gutierrez, The Power of the Poor in History. 
¿elected Writings. (London: SCM Press, 1983), p. 180.
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himself and his work into pessimistic resignation and 
sceptical agnosticism.82
To understand Bonhoeffer's embracing of this modern world by- 
means of the theoloqia crucis. we shall examine in turn, then, 
both Nietzsche and Feuerbach, and their atheistic critiques and 
how they are bound up in the concept of power. Then we shall 
consider how Bonhoeffer takes up their challenge in the same 
terms, responding with the theoloqia crucis. In this way we see 
clearly how the German pastor was able to affirm simultaneously, 
and without compromise or contradiction, that which the Enlight­
enment had bequeathed to the present generation as well as the 
cross of Jesus Christ. We conclude this section by summarizing 
how the terms of human autonomy and strength come to their full 
expression in terms of God's suffering and weakness in the world. 
In this way, we ultimately show how more of a non-religious 
language is present in Bonhoeffer's late theology in Letters and 
Papers from Prison, and how it takes shape in dialectical terms 
of power and weakness.
A. Toward a Non-Religious Interpretation: Bonhoeffer's
Concept of Religion
Bonhoeffer's concept of religion is expressed most vividly 
ln the prison letters. Three letters in particular outline his 
thoughts on the concept:
Man's religiosity makes him look in his distress 
to the power of God in the world: God is the deus ex
machina. The Bible directs man to God's powerlessness 
and suffering; only the suffering God can help. To
82 Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, p. 773.
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that extent we may say that the development towards 
the world's coming of age outlined above, which has 
done away with a false conception of God, opens up a 
way of seeing the God of the Bible, who wins power and 
space in the world by his weakness...83
And in his "Outline for a Book" he said,
Our relation to God is not a 'religious' rela­
tionship to the highest, most powerful, and best Being 
imaginable— that is not authentic transcendence— but 
our relation to God is a new life in 'existence for 
others', through participation in the being of Je­
sus.84
Finally, in a letter to Eberhard Bethge he said,
Religious people speak of God when human knowl­
edge (perhaps simply because they are too lazy to 
think) has come to an end, or when human resources 
fail— in fact it is always the deus ex machina that 
they bring on to the scene, either for the apparent 
solution of insoluble problems, or as strength in 
human failure— always, that is to say, exploiting 
human weakness or human boundaries.85
Bonhoeffer has in mind a functional understanding of 
religion, one that describes people's attitudes and concomitant 
actions under the presumption of a "stop-gap" God. As Clifford 
Green noted,
• . . Bonhoeffer's concept of religion is not institu­
tional but functional. 'Religion' is not used by 
Bonhoeffer to refer to such institutional elements as 
Church, sermon, sacrament, prayer, scripture, doctrine
83 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison. Letter of 16 
July 1944, p. 361.
84 Bonhoeffer, "Outline for a Book", Letters and Papers from £Ei§pn, p. 381.
85_ Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison. Letter of 30
APril 1944, p. 282.
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and so on, as if these were per se religious. 'Reli­
gion' is a particular way of behaving and thinking in 
an attempt to cope with human weakness and difficul­
ties, and in this behavioral sense it may appropriate­
ly be called functional.86
Green highlights the fact that "religion" presumes human 
weakness.87 In fact, Bonhoeffer defined the religious relation­
ship with God explicitly with reference to two poles: human
despair and weakness, and the "supreme Being," absolute in power 
and goodness.88 Once again, we see how these paradigmatic terms 
manifest themselves in a new way in Bonhoeffer's theology, this 
time with explicit reference to his concept of religion.
With his renunciation of "religiosity" and its attendant 
weak anthropology, Bonhoeffer went on to affirm a new age, a new 
period in modern human history characterized by human autonomy
86 Clifford Green, "Sociality and Church in Bonhoeffer," 
Scottish Journal of Theology, p. 432-33.
87 Although Green's identification of Bonhoeffer's concept 
of religion as functional is accurate, two additional comments 
should be made. His description of religion and the tendencies 
of the religious person house notions of divine deliverance which 
eclipse, or at least de-emphasize, the place and role of human 
responsibility. Because such a quietism is connoted within its 
structure, "functionalism" may not be the most apt characteriza­
tion for Bonhoeffer's concept of religion.
Secondly, Bonhoeffer's thoughts on religion must always be 
understood as contextual ones. Rather than offering a universal 
diagnosis of the "religious person," he addressed his critique 
to his contemporaries who faced new times, to the modern person 
standing on the side of history to whom progress had been good—  
the European descendants of the Enlightenment. This is important 
to recognize when Bonhoeffer says, "'Religion' is a particular 
way of behaving and thinking in an attempt to cope with human 
weakness and difficulties . . . ." The "weakness and difficul­
ties" referred to are those of certain modern persons, those who 
seek God's power, to rescue them from whatever existential or 
Psychological woe that plagues them "perhaps simply because they 
are too lazy to think." Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from 
££ison, Letter of 30 April 1944, p. 282.
88 For the clearest articulation of these "poles" see 
onhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison. Letter of 16 July 
944/ p. 360-61; "Outline for a Book," pp. 380-81; Letter of 23
August 1944, p. 3 9 2.
and strength. One of his letters from prison in particular 
describes at length what he saw in the dawning of this new age.89 
There he said:
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The movement that began about the thirteenth cen­
tury . . . towards the autonomy of man . . . has in
our time reached an undoubted completion. Man has 
learnt to deal with himself in all questions of 
importance without recourse to the 'working hypo­
thesis' called 'God'. In questions of science, art, 
and ethics this has become an understood thing at 
which one now hardly dares to tilt. But for the last 
hundred years or so it has also become increasingly 
true of religious questions; it is becoming evident 
that everything gets along without 'God'— and, in 
fact, just as well as before. As in the scientific 
field, so in human affairs generally, 'God' is being 
pushed more and more out of life, losing more and more 
ground . . .
The attack by Christian apologetic on the adult­
hood of the world I consider to be in the first place 
pointless, in the second place ignoble, and in the 
third place unchristian. Pointless, because it seems 
to me like an attempt to put a grown-up man back into 
adolescence, i.e. to make him dependent on things on 
which he is, in fact, no longer dependent, and thrust­
ing him into problems that are, in fact, no longer 
problems to him. Ignoble, because it amounts to an 
attempt to exploit man's weakness for purposes that 
are alien to him and to which he has not freely as­
sented. Unchristian, because it confuses Christ with 
one particular stage in man's religiousness, i.e. with 
a human law. . .
Bonhoeffer was convinced history was entering a new era in which 
the concept of God would go through far-reaching changes. Such 
a change would be due primarily to men and women exercising their 
freedom and autonomy in the world. This "world come of age" 
would be characterized by persons acting responsibly in the 
world, discarding the notion of a deus ex machina.
Having characterized religious depictions of God as 
anachronistic and immature, Bonhoeffer heralded a new period in
QQ Bonhoeffer, ibid.. Letter of 8 June 1944, pp. 325-29.
90 Bonhoeffer, ibid.. Letter of 8 June 1944, pp. 325-27.
human history characterized by increasing secularity and human 
autonomy, yielding a "world come of age." It is important to 
note that in conceiving of this new time in history, he concomi­
tantly spoke of the "non-religious interpretation of theological 
concepts." In the course of his letters from prison he varied 
the term he used and also called it "worldly interpretation," 
"worldly reinterpretation," or "the new non-religious language." 
In any case, the dynamic at work here was one in which Bonhoeffer 
attempted to express how we are to understand the world in 
relation to God. The "non-religious interpretation" is meant 
primarily to express the relation of God's revelation to the 
world come of age.91 The call is for a radically different 
understanding of the place of God in the world.
More than a program of interpretation, however, his "non­
religious interpretation" extends into an ethical category which 
includes specific concerns for the church.92 The questions of 
the "religious" person were no longer the questions of the modern 
person. A new day had dawned, one that brought with it positive, 
strong concepts of humanity's place in the world. And it all but 
seemed to leave God behind in its wake. We turn now to see how 
Bonhoeffer turned away from an outmoded way of thinking about God 
in the world to a new one whose very terms were determined on the 
basis of a new theology. This is done by examining the similari­
ties between Karl Barth and Rudolf Bultmann for Bonhoeffer's
91 Ronald Gregor Smith, ed. , World Come of Age: A Symposium
£0—Dietrich Ronhoeffer. (London: Collins, 1967), p. 100.
92 Although Bonhoeffer saw a transitionary period of 
comparative silence for the Church, there was a more profound 
rationale behind the call. He saw the emergence of the secular 
world not as a passing phenomenon, but as a new phase in history
hat had to develop its own pattern of spirituality. See Paul 
allard, "Worship in a Secular World: Bonhoeffer's Secret
lscipline," The Princeton Seminary Bulletin, Fall, 1968, p. 35.
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understanding of human power and then turning to Bonhoeffer's 
dialogue with Nietzsche and Feuerbach concerning their respective 
approaches to human autonomy and divine power.
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1. Karl Barth's Critique of Religion
The foundational theological influence in Bonhoeffer's 
critique of religion was certainly Karl Barth. In his prison 
letter of 8 June 1944 to Eberhard Bethge he praised Barth's 
clear-sighted critique of religion saying,
Barth was the first to realize the mistake that all 
these attempts . . . were making in leaving a clear
space for religion in the world or against the world. 
He brought in against religion the God of Jesus 
Christ, 'pneuma against sarx.' That remains his 
greatest service. . . .  93
Indeed, Barth's indictment against religion is rife in his 
second edition of Romans. There he speaks of religion as the 
last human possibility. He says,
• . . [w]e are able to see that the last and the most 
inevitable human possibility— the possibility of 
religion— even in its most courageous, most powerful, 
most clearly defined, most impossible 'variety', is 
after all no more than a human possibility, and as 
such a limited possibility: and, because limited,
peculiarly dangerous, since it bears witness to, and 
is embraced by, the promise of a new and higher order 
by which it is itself severely limited.94
93 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison. Letter of 8 
June 1944, p. 328.
94 Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans. ("Romans II") Sixth 
edition, trans. by Edwyn C. Hoskyns, (New York: Oxford Universi­
ty Press, 1968), p. 2 3 0 .
Religion, as a human possibility, is largely a functional concept 
describing human behavior. And it has been put to death by 
Christ's gracious death on the cross. Barth goes on to describe 
the functional connotation of religion,
Golgotha is the end of law and the frontier of 
religion. In the slain Christ-according-to-the-law, 
the last and noblest human possibility, the possibili­
ty of human piety and belief and enthusiasm and 
prayer, is fulfilled by being evacuated . . . With
this human body of Christ we also are dead to the law, 
for we have been removed from that life under the 
dominion of law, which is death. Looking outwards 
from the Cross, we observe religion, as a concrete 
thing of soul and sense, as a particular aspect of 
human behavior, to have been taken out of the way 
(Col. ii. 14).95
Religion is functionally denoted here as "human piety and belief 
and enthusiasm and prayer." The religious person "cling[s] to 
religion with a bourgeois tenacity, supposing it to be the final 
thing of soul and sense which is deathless and unshattered."96
Gutierrez's statement that Barth "had already rejected" the 
"human being's power over God" is clear.97 The final delusion 
is the religious one where a person's righteous or good acts are 
thought to be good enough to somehow circumvent the purview of 
God's law. Religion stands up in the face of God's law. Such 
a view presumes a pocket of power that the human being has over 
against God. The false picture remains that religion is the one 
arena left from which the person may exit victorious on one's own 
merits. Barth, of course, does all he can to illuminate this 
Picture of religion for what it is— a last vestige of human
95 Barth, ibid. . pp. 233-34. (Emphasis added).
% Barth, ibid.. p. 2 3 8.
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97 Gustavo Gutierrez, op. cit. . p. 180.
control and domain over against God, denying the fact that all 
power, all life, all "possibility" rests with God alone. The 
religious idea of God is just that— an idea, an intellectual 
fantasy. Barth brings into focus the living, dynamic reality of 
God, the one in whom all true power rests, in contrast with an 
idealistic concept of God which is not rooted in reality.98 
Undoubtedly, power is an important motif in Barth's commentary 
on Romans, and he shows time and time again with whom life and 
power rest.
Barth's keen perception and critique of what he felt was a 
misdirected 19th century liberalism, with its idealistic notion 
of God, left him free to explicate a God grounded in reality. 
By pointing out the contours of religion in direct opposition to 
Christian faith, Barth ingeniously demonstrated how anthropology 
had attempted to pass as theology. He succeeded in pointing out 
how the human being had falsely "overpowered" God with the notion 
of religion. The door was left open for piety, no matter how 
profound, to escape the inevitable judgment of God. The human 
creature had ultimately found a way to bypass or prevail against 
God.
Bonhoeffer built on Barth's acute analysis, extending it 
theologically in his own critique of religion. As Bonhoeffer 
noted,
Barth, who is the only one to have started along 
this line of thought, did not carry it to completion,
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98 • •As Jiingel put it, "revealed religion distinguishes itself 
as absolute religion from the preceding forms of religion in that 
it perceives the necessity of becoming in which the substance 
becomes self-consciousness . . . God is beheld sensuously and
immediately as a self, as a real individual human being. . ."
erhard Jiingel, God as the Mystery of the World, trans. by 
Darrell L. Guder, (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, Ltd., 1983), p. 85.
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but arrived at a positivism of revelation, which in 
the last analysis is essentially a restoration."
And again, in a subsequent letter,
It was not in ethics, as is often said, that he 
[Barth] subsequently failed . . .  it was that in the 
non-religious interpretation of theological concepts 
he gave no concrete guidance, either in dogmatics or 
in ethics. There lies his limitation, and because of 
it his theology of revelation has become positivist, 
a 'positivism of revelation', as I put it.100
Here we confront Bonhoeffer's accusation against Barth of
an Offenbarunospositivismus. or, positivism of revelation, which
has been the subject of much controversy over the years among
Barth and Bonhoeffer scholars. Supporting Barth's radical
critique of religion, Bonhoeffer wanted more, expected more from
his thorough-going enterprise. After such a debunking of
religion, what could be left but a religion-less Christianity?
The path of Barth's critique would lead naturally to specific,
concrete descriptions of what a non-religious interpretation of
theological concepts would look like, or so Bonhoeffer thought.
We saw in Act and Being the nature of his criticism against Barth
and how he came up short in his depiction of God's freedom in the
world. And now, over a decade later, their differing emphases
on the concreteness of God's revelation showed up again. The
younger theologian could only conclude that the promising path
of Barth's critique dead-ended into a formalistic understanding
of revelation, a positivism, ultimately restoring theological
99 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison. Letter of 30 
April 1944, p. 280.
100 Bonhoeffer, ibid.. Letter of 8 June 1944, p. 328.
concepts rather than paving the way to fresh, concrete theolog­
ical insights.101
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101 Simon Fisher, in his impressive book, Revelatory Positiv­
ism? , examines Bonhoeffer's charge against Barth of Offenbarunqs- 
positivismus ultimately deeming it enigmatic in nature and, thus, 
unsubstantiated. Fisher draws his conclusion by 1) pointing to 
differing interpretations of Bonhoeffer's accusation among 
scholars, 2) emphasizing such an accusation as directed more 
against a trend detected by Bonhoeffer in theology— i.e., the 
preaching and social witness of the Confessing Church, than 
against Barth in particular, 3) detecting a disparity between 
Bonhoeffer's similar accusation against Barth in Act and Being 
and as it occurred years later in the prison letters, and 4) 
concluding that such an accusation is related to novel themes 
which are inchoate and thus problematic. See Simon Fisher, 
Revelatory Positivism? Barth's Earliest Theology and the Marburg 
School. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 311-314.
We respond to Fisher's assessment by stating that his final 
evaluation of Bonhoeffer's accusation undercuts itself due to his 
apologetic agenda. Fisher articulates his response with those 
in mind who wish to "use the artillery of Bonhoeffer's Offenbar- 
unqspositivismus to storm the methodological foundations of the 
Barthian fortress." (p. 313) However, that is not the desire of 
this author, nor the intent with which we assess Bonhoeffer's 
words about his mentor. Seeking a descriptive account of the way 
Bonhoeffer and Barth differed in the way they discussed the 
concrete nature of revelation in light of such an accusation, and 
given the fact that Bonhoeffer chose to identify Barth in such 
terms constitutes the attitude with which we approach the charge. 
Although Fisher is right to point out the differing interpreta­
tions which have surrounded Bonhoeffer's charge over the years, 
the fact that such a charge is extended also against the Confess­
ing Church, and the fact that some of his later ideas were not 
fully developed, Fisher clouds the credibility of the charge by 
overemphasizing these factors, related though they are. 
Bonhoeffer did not think Barth went far enough in his critique 
against religion, that he started something which he did not 
finish. So, Bonhoeffer took up where Barth left off, trying to 
determine the concrete parameters of a non-religious Christiani­
ty* Bonhoeffer reiterated here his basic disquiet— that with 
Barth, God's revelation remains a distant, transcendent object 
°f thought, rather than a concrete revelation 'for' the world.
finitum capax infiniti remained the confessional issue to 
which Bonhoeffer remained loyal and which allowed him to draw out 
the concrete conclusions he felt were lacking in Barth's critique 
°f religion. The theologians' confessional differences once 
again separated them from one another. Bonhoeffer's language 
against Barth in the charge must be weighed with this basic, 
consistent fact in mind so that one does not end up dismissing 
he German theologian unduly in light of later related, but 
ultimately indeterminative factors, as Fisher does.
So, Bonhoeffer took up Barth's critique, asking the 
questions that he saw naturally issuing forth from such a 
critique:
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What do a church, a community, a sermon, a 
liturgy, a Christian life mean in a religionless 
world? How do we speak of God— without religion,
i.e., without the temporally conditioned presupposi­
tions of metaphysics, inwardness, and so on? How do 
we speak in a 'secular' way about 'God'? In what way 
are we the ek-klesia. those who are called forth, not 
regarding ourselves from a religious point of view as 
specially favored, but rather as belonging wholly to 
the world? In that case, Christ is no longer an 
object of religion, but something quite different, 
really the Lord of the world. But what does that 
mean? What is the place of worship and prayer in a 
religionless situation? Does the secret discipline .
. . take on a new importance here?102
Did Bonhoeffer answer these preliminary queries, or was this as 
far as he got? Not only did he begin to answer these questions, 
but he left more guidance on the issue than is often credited 
him. While he defined the religious relationship with God 
explicitly with reference to the two poles of human weakness and 
a sovereign, omnipotent God, he discussed the 'non-religious' 
Christianity with reference to the two poles of human strength 
and autonomy, and a weak, suffering God. He made this clear in 
his prison letters, saying the "God of the Bible, who wins power 
and space in the world by his weakness" would serve as the 
starting point for the secular interpretation.103 Whereas he 
juxtaposed the God of religion (an anachronistic, abstract 
concept characterized by the Sovereign God in control of human 
events) with the God of the Bible (the living, incarnate God
102 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, pp. 280, 281.
103 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, Letter of 16
nlY> 1944, p. 361; "Outline for a Book," p. 381.
characterized by powerlessness and suffering), he further 
juxtaposed humanity of previous generations (characterized by 
religious attitudes which formerly depended on an omnipotent God; 
i.e, the 'religious' person) with a new period in human history 
(characterized by increasing autonomy and strength, i.e., the 
'world come of age' person) . In this way, Bonhoeffer showed how 
a great reversal had been achieved with respect to a modern 
anthropological self-identity and how it came about it in terms 
of a fundamental theological revision. Such were the terms in 
which he cast his critique of religion and discussion of the non­
religious interpretation.
2. Rudolf Bultmann's Anthropological Notion of 
Autonomy and Weakness
In discussing Bonhoeffer's departure from Karl Barth we have 
only looked at one half of the equation. Bonhoeffer was just as 
uncomfortable with the notion of God's power over persons as 
well. While he joined Barth's fight against an idealistic God 
that human beings could exercise power over, it is equally clear 
that Bultmann's existential anthropology, and its attendant 
rejection of the "Vermund Gott." the "guardian God," had signifi­
cant impact on Bonhoeffer's own critique of religion.
We have just seen how Bonhoeffer defined the "religious 
relationship with God" explicitly with reference to two poles: 
human despair and weakness, and the "supreme Being, absolute in 
Power and goodness."104 Bultmann shared Bonhoeffer's negative
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104 "Man's religiosity makes him look in his distress to the 
Power of God in the world. . . . "  Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers 
££g£L_Prison r Letter of 16 July 1944, pp. 360-61; "Outline for a 
Book," pp. 380-381; Letter of 21 August 1944, p. 392.
view of an omnipotent God who exploits power over a weak 
humanity. For him, God as a Supreme Being was a false con­
cept,105 as well as the notion of a weak humanity at the mercy 
of a despotic God. To the contrary, both men assiduously 
affirmed an autonomous, "strong" view of humanity.106 Johnson 
observes that Bultmann's affirmation of the autonomy of human 
existence is primarily an existential (Heideggerian), ontological 
statement, rather than a theological one. He says,
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. . . this affirmation of human existence is set on
the Dasein-Welt axis of Heidegger's ontology: that
is, it is the autonomy of persons coram mundo that 
comes here to expression, the liberation of one from 
the falsification of his own being in the modality of 
an alien worldly being. It is not the autonomy of 
humanity coram Deo which, theologically, is hybris. 
sin, and which would require a quite different theo­
logical response.107
Bultmann and Bonhoeffer were like-minded revisionists, 
working fundamentally from the thematic presupposition of
105 Rudolf Bultmann, "Modernity and Faith in Conflict",
Rudolf Bultmann. Interpreting Faith for the Modern Era, e d . 
Roger Johnson, (London: Collins, 1987), p. 261.
106 Roger Johnson has cogently demonstrated points of
similarity between Bultmann's critique of mythology and Bon­
hoeffer's critique of religion. He identifies two themes basic 
to Bultmann's critique— the autonomy of the world and the
autonomy of human existence— and argues they reappear in somewhat 
modified form in Bonhoeffer's critique of religion. See Roger 
Johnson, "Religious Mythology and a Secular Faith: The Weakness
of Man and the Weakness of God," (unpublished paper on file at 
the Bonhoeffer Archives, Union Theological Seminary). Bultmann's 
view of persons' autonomous existence in the world is perhaps 
most clearly seen in his 1941 essay, "New Testament and Mytholo­
gy* " See Rudolf Bultmann, New Testament and Mythology and Other 
~^ig-Wmitinas, trans. by Schubert Ogden (Philadelphia: Fortress
Press, 1984) .
107 Johnson, op. cit. , p. 14.
worldly/human autonomy.108 Although Bultmann charted the begin­
ning of a new historical era with the Enlightenment and Bon- 
hoeffer dated it much earlier (in the thirteenth century), both 
agreed history has been moving toward autonomy.
While autonomy figures into both theologian's historico- 
anthropological visions, weakness, as a thematic, is equally 
ingredient to these purviews. The way each man deals with this 
"flip-side" to human autonomy markedly distinguishes them from 
one another.
Bultmann's existentialism is recognized as a landmark in 
early twentieth century German theology, its influence still 
reverberating throughout the Western theological enterprise.109 
His unique blend of Heideggerian existentialist philosophy with 
the older philosophical-theological tradition of Marburg neo- 
Kantianism110 eventually came to distinguish him from the "dia-
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108 Bonhoeffer emphasizes the same Enlightenment motifs as 
had Bultmann: the "sufficiency of reason" and "the discovery of
the laws by which the world lives and manages." See Bonhoeffer, 
Letters and Papers from Prison. Letter of 16 July 1944, pp. 359- 
61.
109 The Scottish theologian Ronald Gregor Smith did much to 
clarify the relationship between Bonhoeffer and Bultmann 
particularly because he was anxious to let Bonhoeffer "go his own 
way" and not be pressed into either the Barthian or Bultmannian 
camp. This notwithstanding, Smith placed Bonhoeffer closer to 
Bultmann, finally and regretfully suggesting Bonhoeffer's final 
position one of "regretful non-Barthianism". See Keith W. 
Clements, The Theology of Ronald Gregor Smith. (Leiden, Nether­
lands: E.J. Brill, 1986), p. 170. See esp. pp. 186-197.
110 Bultmann, along with Natorp and Cohen held to the neo- 
Kantian theory of knowledge which proposes that knowing involves 
objectifying in accordance with the principle of law. The neo- 
Kantians moved beyond Kant in understanding reason as both 
beginning and ending with itself. Whereas they rejected the 
notion of Obiekt. the initially given referent of thought, they 
accept it now as the product of thought. Cf. Johnson, The 
Origins of Demythologizinq. Philosophy and Historiography in the 
iiieology of Rudolf Bultmann. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974), pp. 47,
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lectical theologians"— Barth, Gogarten and Grisebach. Bultmann's 
existential interpretation of Scripture is still taught today as 
a viable hermeneutic paradigm.
It is important to understand exactly what he meant by 
existentialism.111 Bultmann believed anxiety, insecurity, or 
fear for one's future is the basic anthropological existential 
situation.112 For him, human weakness— one's insecurity and 
anxiety— provides the continuing point of contact between the 
Gospel and persons. The crucial issue for faith lies in 
clarifying the various resolutions to a person's situation of
111 For our purposes, the distinction between "existential 
event" and "existentialist conceptuality" is critical. Roger 
Johnson, in his highly instructive introduction to his anthology 
on Bultmann, denotes the distinction in the following manner, 
"Bultmann uses the word "existential" (in German, existentiell) 
to refer to an individual human being as responsible for his or 
her own future. What is existential is personal and expressed 
in an individuals's self-understanding. By self-understanding. 
Bultmann refers to the wavs in which each of us comes to terms 
with anxious concerns for his or her future. . . .  In contrast, 
existentialist (in German, existential) refers to a systematic 
body of philosophical concepts and a method of understanding 
human existence. Hence, existentialist is most often linked with 
"conceptuality." See Roger Johnson, Rudolf Bultmann. Interpret­
ing Faith for the Modern Era. (London: Collins Publishers,
1987), p. 22. (Emphasis added). The 1925 essay "The Problem of 
a Theological Exegesis of the New Testament" is illustrative of 
Bultmann's "existential" connotation, whereas his 1950 essay, 
"The Problem of Hermeneutics" is representative of his "existen­
tialist conceptuality." See Rudolf Bultmann, "The Problem of a 
Theological Exegesis of the New Testament" (1925) reprinted in 
James M. Robinson, ed. , The Beginnings of Dialectic Theology. 
(Richmond, VA: John Knox Press, 1968) ; Rudolf Bultmann, "The
Problem of Hermeneutics", (1950) reprinted in Johnson, op. cit. . 
Pp. 137-57. I will be dealing exclusively with the former of the 
two aspects of Bultmann's existentialism.
112 Bultmann expresses this anthropological concern within 
the context of mythology. For Bultmann, "mythology is rooted in, 
and an expression of, man's [sic] situation of weakness in the 
world. Indeed, he consistently defines mythology as expressing 
this particular self-understanding: man's [sic] situation of
insecurity in a cosmic reality which always exceeds the grasp of 
his knowledge and control. See Rudolf Bultmann, "Demythologizing: 
Controversial Slogan and Theological Focus," reprinted in 
Johnson, op. cit.. pp. 293, 296-298, 302-304; Rudolf Bultmann, 
^jth__and Understanding, (trans. Louise P. Smith) (Philadelphia: 
Portress Press, 1969), p. 46.
insecurity.113 Or, worded differently, for Bultmann, faith 
depends on which self-understanding one adopts at the point of 
existential insecurity.
Like Bultmann, Bonhoeffer took up the theme of weakness, but 
expressed it in much different terms. As shown above, Bultmann 
believed the basic anthropological existential situation one of 
insecurity and anxiety for the future— a position of weakness. 
Bonhoeffer did not accept this anthropological thesis. He did 
not simply question which resolution to the problem of weakness 
is the right one, but questioned the status and legitimacy of 
one's existential weakness as a guide to the truth of one's 
humanity.114
Johnson demonstrates how Bonhoeffer critiques Bultmann for 
his arbitrary use of weakness as a foundational element in his 
anthropological system. Bonhoeffer does this by describing the 
paradigmatic "religious" relationship with God: namely, one's
weakness— one's insecurity, anxiety, dependency, helplessness, 
guilt— and God's absolute power and goodness.115 These are 
prominent terms of "religion" for Bonhoeffer, hence, his rejec­
tion of Bultmann's anthropological self-understanding (the 
existentially weak self) as a construct of religion.
Johnson is right in assessing Bonhoeffer's disapproval of 
Bultmann's anthropological notion of weakness based on the terms 
of his religious critique. He said,
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in ,Johnson, "Religious Mythology and a Secular Faith," o p . 
Siti, p. 24.
114 See Johnson, ibid. . p. 25.
115 Johnson, ibid. . p. 24.
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The theme of the weakness of God becomes the lynchpin 
for the development of his non-religious interpreta­
tion of biblical conceptuality . . . [that] at this
point . . . Bonhoeffer discerns the connection between 
the autonomy of secular existence and the revelation 
of God in Christ. . . .116
Bonhoeffer strongly opposed nineteenth-century liberal theology's 
strategy of focusing on the limits of human autonomy. It could 
only lead to guilt and despair. Such a religious attack upon the 
adulthood of the world (muendigkeit) aims:
to put a grown-up man back into adolescence, i.e. to 
make him dependent on things on which he is, in fact, 
no longer dependent, and thrusting him into problems 
that are, in fact, no longer problems to him."7
Johnson is correct, further, in stating that the weakness of God 
displaces the focus from the weakness of self."8 However, he 
comes up short in his positive treatment of Bonhoeffer's thematic 
use of weakness precisely at this point.
Johnson suggests Bonhoeffer made a sharp turn away from the 
Bultmannian anthropological theme of human weakness as the point 
of departure for faith, replacing it with the theme of the 
weakness of God. Weakness, thus, became the cornerstone thematic 
for theology, eclipsing anthropology as its locus."9 Johnson
116 Johnson, "Religious Mythology and a Secular Faith", o p . 
Siti.» p. 26.
117 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison. Letter of 8 
June 1944, p. 3 2 7 .
118 Johnson, op. cit.. p. 28.
119 One might think it an overstatement to suggest Johnson's 
theological use of "weakness" eclipsing anthropology categorical­
ly* Indeed, he speaks of the "relationship of 'correspondence' 
between secular autonomy and Christian faith." Johnson, op. cit. . 
P* 28. However, he has held up the Bultmannian existential self- 
understanding of weakness, suggesting it be completely replaced
seemed to suggest that Bonhoeffer articulated the notion of God's 
weakness once he recognized and articulated the "world come of 
age" motif. According to him, only when Bonhoeffer spoke of the 
adulthood of the world did he then go on to make the connection 
or "correlation" between a strong view of humanity and a weak 
view of God.120 But Johnson's analysis overlooks the very 
important fact that Bonhoeffer's theology from his early to his 
late works increasingly came to incorporate the theme of weakness 
into its foundation. As Eberhard Bethge noted, the power of 
weakness was a basic insight Bonhoeffer held on to throughout his 
life.121
In fact, it is more accurate to see the "weak God" motif as 
the culmination of a lifelong theological thematic. I have 
already shown the chronological progression of Bonhoeffer's 
theologia crucis in chapter one, charting the ever expanding 
dialectical theme of power and weakness in his life and theology. 
Johnson has ended up presenting an incomplete picture of the way 
"weakness" as a theme took hold in Bonhoeffer as a theological 
motif. Having not acknowledged the relevance of this developing
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bY a theological notion of power, according to Bonhoeffer. He 
has failed to remind the reader that he is speaking of a 
rejection of anthropology as weakness in the existential, 
psychological sense only. As is well known, Bonhoeffer extolled 
the value of coming to view the events of world history "from 
below." Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison. "After Ten 
Years", p. 1 7 . Johnson unknowingly is underestimating the 
breadth of Bonhoeffer's use of "weakness" in his theology as well 
as his anthropology.
120 For example, Johnson says, "Indeed, Bonhoeffer's purpose 
ls to come upon a method of biblical interpretation that is 
appropriate to the full expression of the life of the Church in 
a religionless age . . ." Johnson, "Religious Mythology and a
Secular Faith", op. cit., p. 16.
121 •  •Eberhard Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Man of Vision, Man
Courage, (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1985) , p.374.
thematic in Bonhoeffer, he unintentionally exaggerated the 
'correlative' nature of the relationship between a secular 
autonomy and Christian faith, underestimating the weak God as the 
basis for an autonomous humanity.
By holding up the weakness of God as the basis (not 
correlation) for Bonhoeffer's statements on autonomy and the 
world come of age, we reverse the order which is normally 
suggested as to the factors which led him to the axiomatic 
Christological query— Who is Jesus Christ for us in a world come 
of age? Whereas many, like Johnson, discuss the weak God as a
response to the question, I believe it is the basis by which he
formulates the question. We should not forget Bonhoeffer's words 
on this,
Man's religiosity makes him look in his distress to
the power of God in the world: God is the deus ex
machina. The Bible directs man to God's powerlessness 
and suffering; only the suffering God can help. To 
that extent we may say that the development towards 
the world's coming of age outlined above, which has 
done away with a false conception of God, opens up a 
way of seeing the God of the Bible, who wins power and 
space in the world by his weakness. This probably 
will be the starting-point for our 'secular interpre­
tation .122
So, how might one characterize what Bonhoeffer has done with 
the theme of "weakness"? On the one hand, it has been removed 
as a psychological category (at least in the Bultmannian, 
existentialist sense of dependence, guilt, and anxiety) and 
replaced as a theological category, looking to the weakness of 
G°d as its new locus. This much Johnson brought us in his
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122 •Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, Letter of 18
ulY 1944, p. 361 (Emphasis added).
revision of Bultmann's mythology according to Bonhoeffer. But 
there is more to this theme of weakness.
One must not forget the "movement" of Bonhoeffer's theology 
of the cross. We have concurred with Johnson's analysis of the 
reversal of terms which occurred. Weakness became a category 
descriptive not of humanity, as religion would have it, but of 
God. Power and autonomy shifted from God to women and men in a 
world come of age. The terms of religion were effectively 
reversed, thus capturing the true relationship between God and 
persons. This represents the first step in Bonhoeffer's 
theoloqia crucis. Bonhoeffer did more than release persons from 
a "tyranny of weakness" however,123 he was reinstating another 
kind of weakness. In other words, Bonhoeffer went on to 
advocate weakness in a totally new and foreign way, the second 
level of a theologia crucis which involves a redefinition at its 
base. Johnson is only able to see Bonhoeffer's project as a 
release from a "tyranny of weakness" because of the vectorial 
nature of his analysis. For him, a strong, autonomous view of 
humanity which has shed any parasitic, sick self-image as well 
as any dominating, despotic image of God, co-exists with a God 
characterized by weakness. He fails to elaborate on this 
weakness of God once he has finally hit upon it, and how it 
informs the modern person, the world come of age.
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123 "Man's changed situation is such that he is increasingly 
able to cope technologically with the weakness of his situation 
in the world and psychologically with the weakness of his self- 
levelation as conscience. As a result, the old religious theme 
°f individual salvation has little appeal to him. He is far too 
occupied with the reorganization of his present society for a 
better distribution of human security and the freedom from the 
^Y£anoy of weakness to indulge in such an individualistic 
beligious preoccupation." Johnson, op. cit.. p. 20. (Emphasis added) .
The problem here is that divine weakness, as a motif, is 
discussed by Johnson only in relation to Bonhoeffer's thoughts 
on worldly autonomy in the Letters and Papers from Prison. He 
does not read back, for example, into the Ethics or The Cost of 
niscioleship. to get a more complete picture of what Bonhoeffer 
might have intended with this concept of a weak and powerless God 
who has been pushed to the edge of human awareness.
If one does not recognize and articulate the comprehensive 
nature of Bonhoeffer's theological notion of weakness, then other 
key statements are bypassed, which typically are not viewed in 
relation to his later thoughts on divine weakness. If one is 
aware of the developmental thematic of weakness, then notions, 
in this case, anthropological strength or autonomy, are much more 
fully informed.
Bonhoeffer, then, reverses the terms of Christian anthropol­
ogy, as is seen in his treatment of Bultmann's existential- 
anthropological understanding of weakness. But he does not 
simply release the terms of anthropology from the "tyranny of 
weakness." Once released, they regain their meaning according 
to the hidden, "renewed" theological meaning accorded to autonomy 
as is evidenced throughout Bonhoeffer's works, particularly his 
Ethics. it is not enough to say that the reversal of religious 
terms occurred. The weakness of God inscribes human autonomy 
more fully than a mere exchange will allow, thus, imbuing the 
anthropological reality with more power than one would think at 
first glance.
The way Bonhoeffer rejected Bultmann's anthropological 
starting point is a perfect example of his revisionism. Both men 
were forwarding ontological statements. For Bonhoeffer the 
ontological structure of the person is not rooted in self­
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relatedness, as it was in Bultmann, but in the self-other 
relationship.124 Thus, Bonhoeffer replaced the individualism of 
Bultmann's existentialism with the sociality of a pro me/pro 
nobis structured Christology.125
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B. Toward a World Come of Age: the Atheistic Critique and 
the Nature of Human Autonomy
1. Friedrich Nietzsche, the Will to Power, and a 
Transvaluation of Values
We turn now to examine two philosophical influences in 
Bonhoeffer's theology, with an eye toward the way in which power 
figures in as an important concept for both: Friedrich Nietzsche
124 Clifford Green, "Sociality and Church in Bonhoeffer's 
1933 Christology," The Scottish Journal of Theology. Vol. 21, No. 
4 (December 1968), p. 427. Green convincingly argues that the 
pro me nature of Christ's existence for humanity is the key 
toward recognizing and understanding the fundamentally social 
nature of human existence.
125 Bonhoeffer further affirmed the corporeality of human 
existence, a feature missing from Bultmann's existential 
anthropology. As Green said, "[With Bonhoeffer] man's nature as 
his corporeality is not denied or ignored but affirmed within his 
historical being. Contrast Bultmann, whose existential interpre­
tation of the Pauline 'soma' yields man as an historical existent 
but not 'essentially' embodied in nature; he notes that 'soma' 
also has this meaning in Paul, but it is filtered out by the 
hermeneutic. Green, "Sociality and Church in Bonhoeffer's 1933 
Christology," ibid. . p. 429; Clifford Green, Theology of the New 
Testament, T f (New York: Scribner, 1951), pp. 192ff.
A strong parallel between Bonhoeffer and Michel Foucault 
also exists on this topic of the corporeality of human existence. 
Foucault's 1976 work refers ". . . not so much to carnal
knowledge as to knowledge of— and therefore a power over--bodies 
• • . " The 'Will to Knowledge' as the original French title is 
called has to do with sexuality when one remembers the connection 
between the Garden of Eden and the Tree of Knowledge. See Michel 
Foucault, La Volonté de savoir retitled in English as The History 
Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction, trans. by Robert
Hurley, (New York: Pantheon, 1978); Alan Sheridan, Michel
¿SüÇault. The Will to Truth. (London: Tavistock Publications,
198°) , p. 165. With both men, the human body was taken seriously 
as a legitimate theological category (Bonhoeffer) and political 
category (Foucault and Bonhoeffer).
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and Wilhelm Feuerbach. There is no doubt that Bonhoeffer was 
well-versed in the anti-rationalistic "philosophy of life" in his 
early student days. He was thoroughly familiar with Nietzsche126 
and Feuerbach's critique of religion, critically dialoguing with 
each one in his Letters and Papers from Prison.127
Power is at the heart of Nietzsche's philosophical system, 
as well as his critique of Christian religion. The "will-to- 
power" is instantly recognizable as leitmotif. describing "the 
need for persons to assert power over their own life and to 
combat those powers which would rob them of their autonomy."128 
Nietzsche understood Christianity's moral ethics to be a noxious 
one, characterized by self-denial, piety and other self-defeating
126 "Bonhoeffer read all of Nietzsche very carefully, and 
Nietzsche's tremendous plea for the earth and for loyalty to its 
creatures never left his mind." Eberhard Bethge, "The Challenge 
of Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Life and Theology," in World Come of 
Age: A Symposium on Dietrich Bonhoeffer. (Ronald Gregor Smith,
ed.) (London: Collins, 1967), p. 27.
127 Geffrey B. Kelly's article, "Bonhoeffer's "Non-Religious" 
Christianity" discusses at length Nietzsche's and Feuerbach's 
influence on Bonhoeffer. See Geffrey Kelly, "Bonhoeffer's 'Non- 
Religious' Christianity: Antecedents and Critique," Biidragen 
37, (1976), pp. 118-148.
As Kelly has noted, "André Dumas observes correctly that, 
whereas Bonhoeffer replies formally to Nietzsche in the prison 
letters, his theology there is substantially an answer to 
Feuerbach. This is especially true when seen in the context of 
Bonhoeffer's attack on religion where he carried Barth's 
vitriolic criticism of religion a radical step further. Both 
Barth and Bonhoeffer were reacting against 'religion' in the 
Pejorative sense given it by Feuerbach, namely, that religion was 
a mere projection of man." Kelly, ibid. . p. 125; cf. André 
Dumas, Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Theologian of Reality. (London: SCM
Press Limited, 1971), p. 286. I would agree with Kelly and 
Dumas' analysis in terms of the Feuerbachian motif of religion 
as a human projection as an important, substantial influence on 
Bonhoeffer. However, Kelly is suggesting that Bonhoeffer's late 
theology in general follows suit. As my argument will show, from 
the perspective of power analysis, Bonhoeffer dialogues substan­
tially with both philosophers, not simply Feuerbach.
128 •  •  •  •  • Kelly, "Bonhoeffer's Non-Religious Christianity:
Antecedents and Critique," op. cit. , p. 119. Schopenhauer's
hotion of life as essentially "will" undergirds Nietzsche's
concept.
traits and behavior. He believed "resentment" was a concept 
which lay at the heart of ideas like justice, equality, democra­
cy, and religion. It is how the masses work against the ruling 
classes, how the weak exploit the power of the strong. By 
stressing such values as guilt, worthlessness, humility and self- 
denial, Nietzsche saw Christianity trying to co-opt the positive, 
strong values of an autonomous people with morally bankrupt, even 
corrupt, ones instead.
Partly in reaction to this negative code of morals and 
ethics, Nietzsche spoke of a "transvaluation of all values," or 
a replacing of all traditional, self-deprecatory values with 
positive, life-affirming ones. He did this specifically by 
rejecting the Christian concept of God with his atheistic notion 
of the Übermensch. or superior man. Nietzsche had come to 
believe that Christianity was a religion of slaves, belittling 
the human being in an effort to magnify the divine image of 
"God." He said,
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The Christian conception of God— God as god of 
the sick, God as a spider, God as spirit— is one of 
the most corrupt conceptions of the divine ever 
attained on earth. It may even represent the low- 
water mark in the descending development of divine 
types. God degenerated into the contradiction of 
life, instead of being its transfiguration and eternal 
Yes! God as the declaration of war against life, 
against nature, against the will to live! God— the 
formula for every slander against 'this world', for 
every lie about the 'beyond'!"129
129 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Antichrist reprinted in The 
£S£table Nietzsche, trans. by W. Kaufmann, (New York: Viking
Library, 1966), p. 585 quoted in Geffrey B. Kelly, "Bonhoeffer's 
Non-Religious Christianity: Antecedents and Critique", op. cit. .
P- 121.
We see this notion of a "weak" humanity and a powerful God come 
to a head in Nietzsche's concept of love. He believed the 
Christian concept of love to be identified with a sentimentalized 
love, or, the exploitation of the strong by the weak.130 
Bonhoeffer saw more to be praised in Nietzsche's atheistic 
critique, indeed, more to be in line with true Christian love, 
than otherwise. He said,
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Nietzsche, without knowing it, was speaking in 
the spirit of the New Testament when he attacked the 
legalistic and philistine misinterpretation of the 
commandment which bids us love our neighbour. He 
wrote: 'You are assiduous in your attentions to your
neighbour and you find beautiful words to describe 
your assiduity. But I tell you that your love for 
your neighbour is a worthless love for yourselves. 
You go to your neighbour to seek refuge from your­
selves and then you try to make a virtue of it; but I 
see through your 'unselfishness' . . . Do I advise you 
to love your neighbour? I advise you rather to shun 
your neighbour and to love whoever is furthest from
While Nietzsche rejected the "Christian" concept of love of one's 
neighbor as a disguised form of self-love, Bonhoeffer seized upon 
the philosopher's critique, offering a redefinition of neighbor 
in terms of its opposite. The enemy becomes the neighbor in true 
Christian love— there is no distinction so that the person may 
not get lost in determining "Who is my neighbor?" or "Who is my 
enemy?", and thus evade the Christian call to love. As Bon­
hoeffer put it in responding to Nietzsche's critique:
130 Cf. Kelly, op. cit. . p. 120.
131 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics, p. 259. For more on 
Nietzsche's concept of love of neighbor, see Friedrich Nietzsche,
Neighbor-Love" in Thus Spake Zarathustra, reprinted in The 
£0£table Nietzsche, trans. by W. Kaufmann, (New York: Viking
Library, 1966).
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Beyond the neighbour who is committed to us by the 
call of Jesus there stands also for Jesus the one who 
is furthest from us, namely, Jesus Christ Himself, God 
Himself. If beyond his neighbour a man does not know 
this one who is furthest from him, and if he does not 
know this one who is furthest from him as this neigh­
bour, then he does not serve his neighbour but him­
self; he takes refuge from the free open space of 
responsibility in the comforting confinement of the 
fulfilment of duty.132
For Nietzsche, Christianity had digressed to a point where 
humanity was reduced to a place of self-abnegation, powerlessness 
and no value so that it could be rescued by an omnipotent, strong 
God who stood over against it. The Übermensch and "trans­
valuation of all values" represent the atheist philosopher's 
attempt to affirm all that is strong, healthy, autonomous and 
full of life, in persons and on the earth, rather than to exploit 
it in the name of a corrupt religion which pulls itself up with 
a false image of divinity.
Certainly Bonhoeffer drew substantially from Nietzsche's 
critique of such "life-affirming" notions. Any casuistic 
morality or ethics was just as repugnant to the German pastor as 
it was to the philosopher. This influence is evident in several 
parts of the Letters and Papers from Prison as well as in his 
earlier theology.133 Even as a young doctoral student, Bon­
hoeffer articulated the need for the Christian and Christian
132 Bonhoeffer, Ethics. p. 259.
133 Reference here is being made to the earthbound nature of 
Bonhoeffer's ethics as early as 1929 as is seen in his lecture 
^Grundfragen einer christlichen Ethik." See Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 
Grundfragen einer christlichen Ethik," Dietrich Bonhoeffer. 
Sgsammelte Schriften, vol. III, ed. Eberhard Bethge (Munich: 
Christian Kaiser, 1960), pp. 48-58; see also Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 
-S-Bjjsty Swords: Letters. Lectures and Notes. 1928-1936. pp. 3 9-
ethics to remain earthbound. This is evident in his recounting 
of the tale of Antaeus, the giant.
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The profound old saga tells of the giant Antaeus, 
who was stronger than any man on earth; no one could 
overcome him until once in a fight someone lifted him 
from the ground; then the giant lost all the strength 
which had flowed into him through his contact with the 
earth. The man who would leave the earth, who would 
depart from the present distress, loses the power 
which still holds him by eternal, mysterious forc-
The literal notion of the ground underneath you as the force 
which gives you power and strength was one which was theologi­
cally present in Bonhoeffer's theology from beginning to end. 
The significance of the earthly, human community is expressed in 
terms of the Christian community as Christ's locus of power in 
the early theological period (Sanctorum Communio, Act and Being 
and Christoloqy  ̂.135 in his focused work on disciplined Christian 
community, Life Together as well as The Cost of Discipleship. and 
in the broader concept of human community in his later works 
Ethics and Letters and Papers from Prison.136
So, in both Nietzsche and Bonhoeffer we have an affirmation 
of life, the goodness of the earth and the autonomy of the
134 Bonhoeffer, No Rusty Swords, p. 47.
135 "Christ existing as community" is the specific motif 
expressing this socially-grounded concept.
136 Christ as "the man for others" is the specific concept 
expressing this broader, socially-structured reality, although 
1t should be noted that Bonhoeffer's concept of Christian action 
EU^einander and füreinander. articulated as early as 1927 in 
^ânçtorum Commum'o, is present throughout his theology, indicat- 
ln9 the broad social base from which his Christology developed. 
Busanne Dress, Bonhoeffer's younger sister, observed that the
ground" under one's feet was the Christian community. Cf. 
Shsanne Dress, "Remarks on the Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer," 
trans. by Reginald and U s e  Fuller, Union Seminary Quarterly 
Sêview, Vol. 25.2 (Winter 1970), pp. 134-35.
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person. Bonhoeffer agreed that human strength, earthly life and 
autonomy were not to be shunned or belittled, but affirmed. In 
this respect Bonhoeffer took up Nietzsche's challenge to affirm 
the concrete goodness of the earth, indeed, validating the earth 
as a source of strength or power for the person. This is the 
aspect of Nietzsche that Bonhoeffer learned from and utilized in 
setting out his thoughts on the world come of age and the non­
religious Christianity. But herein is where Bonhoeffer goes 
beyond Nietzsche in setting out the nature of concrete reality, 
and specifically, the nature of human power, strength, vitality, 
and autonomy.
The fact that Bonhoeffer came to speak more and more 
emphatically of God in terms of weakness and powerlessness would 
seem to contradict such a healthy image of humanity and the 
world. But Bonhoeffer's life-affirming, world-affirming thoughts 
are grounded, indeed, defined by his profound theological 
understanding of God's weakness in the world. For it is not 
that Bonhoeffer merely "absorbfedl Nietzsche's protest into his 
own Christian ethic"137 but he accepted Nietzsche's challenge, 
redefining the terms for divine and human power by making the 
cross his starting point for all language concerning God and 
humanity; hence, the non-religious understanding of Christianity 
and it's inherent image of autonomous persons.138
137 • • • •As James Woelfel has asserted, implying an uncritical 
posture toward Nietzsche. See James W. Woelfel, Bonhoeffer's 
ihjtqlocrv: Classical and Revolutionary. (Nashville: Abingdon,
1970), pp. 443-46.
138 • •Peter H. Van Ness, in his article "Bonhoeffer, Nietzsche, 
and Secular Spirituality" (Encounter. Autumn, 1991, pp. 327-341; 
esP* pp. 337, 338) concluded that Bonhoeffer's prison context did 
rauch to move him closer to Nietzsche than was true of Barth, 
resulting in a religionless or secular spirituality such as was 
championed by the philosopher. Whereas we agree that Bonhoeffer 
entered into a more profound discussion with Nietzsche than did
Whereas it would be very easy to see both Bonhoeffer and 
Nietzsche's love of the earth and affirmation of life and 
conclude that the former's thoughts on the subject are largely 
due to the influence of the latter, a closer inspection of the 
development of Bonhoeffer's theology, particularly the motif of 
the power of God's weakness indicates that a theological 
motivation lies at the heart of his positive statements on human 
autonomy, the goodness of the world, freedom, etc. For, in 
talking about the God before whom persons should live, Bonhoeffer 
replies firmly against a peripheral God, located at the outskirts 
of life, yet equally against the concept of a God who intrudes 
on persons' autonomy and rearranges the laws of nature.139 
Bonhoeffer said he has "come to be doubtful of talking about 
human boundaries. . . .  It always seems to me that we are trying 
anxiously in this way to reserve some space for God; I should 
like to speak of God not on the boundaries but at the centre, not 
in weakness but in strength; and therefore not in death and guilt 
but in man's life and goodness."140 Indeed, as early as 1931, 
in his essay, "Concerning the Christian Idea of God" Bonhoeffer 
wrote,
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Barth (with his critique of religion) as he tried to hammer out 
his thoughts on a religionless Christianity, Van Ness did not 
take into account our main point— that the cross of Jesus Christ 
was the starting point for Bonhoeffer's non-religious interpreta­
tion as well as for his image of a world come of age. In this 
WaY, Van Ness has drawn too close a connection between Nietzsche 
and Bonhoeffer.
13Q Cf. Geffrey B. Kelly, "Revelation in Christ. A Study of 
Bonhoeffer's Theology of Revelation," Ephemerides Theologicae 
i^^nienses, L, Fasc. 1 (May 1974), p. 60.
140 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison. Letter of 30
April 1944, p. 282.
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God entered history in Jesus, and so entirely 
that he can be recognized in his hiddenness only by 
faith. God gives an amazing proof of his sole author­
ity in the cross of Christ. God himself dies and 
reveals himself in the death of a man, who is con­
demned as a sinner. It is precisely this, which is 
the foolishness of the Christian idea of God, which 
has been witnessed to by all genuine Christian think­
ing from Paul, Augustine, Luther, to Kierkegaard and 
Barth . . . God remains in His hiddenness. In Christ 
all men are either condemned or restored and it is the 
work of God, the Holy Spirit, to apply this general 
condition in which all men are, to the single person 
. Here the paradoxical essence of God becomes 
visible to the faith of the Christian believer. 
Justification is pure self-revelation, pure way of God 
to man. No religion, no ethics, no metaphysical 
knowledge may serve man to approach God. These are 
all subject to the judgment of God, they are works of 
man. Only the acknowledgment that God's word alone 
helps and that every other attempt is and remains 
sinful, only by this acknowledgment God is received. 
And this acknowledgment must be given by God, as the 
Holy Spirit, as faith. That is the foolishness of the 
revelation of God and its paradoxical character— that 
just there, where the power of man has lapsed entire­
ly, where man knows his own weakness, sinfulness, and 
consequently the judgment of God upon him, that just 
there God is already working in grace, that just and 
exactly there and only there is forgiveness, justifi­
cation, restoration . . . The justification of the
sinner— this is the self-proof of the sole authority 
of God.141
Hence, as Kelly notes, "Luther's theologia crucis serves, like­
wise, as the basis for Bonheoffer's proposed reform of theologi­
cal discourse and for an explanation of how God chooses to affirm 
the world and exert his salvific power in that world."142
Of particular interest to us is the fact that through his 
¿hgoloqia crucis God's omnipotence is grounded in the cross, in
141 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, "Concerning the Christian Idea of 
God. 1931," Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Gesammelte Schriften. Dritter
Band, Hrsg. Eberhard Bethge, (München: Christian Kaiser Verlag,
1960) , pp. 108-09.
142 Geffrey B. Kelly, "Revelation in Christ. A Study of 
onhoeffer's Theology of Revelation," op. cit.. p. 64.
suffering, weakness and dying,143 while human strength and power 
is grounded in the Christological notion of "being there for the 
other," marked by selfless action and love.144 This is the
point at which we see Bonhoeffer meeting Nietzsche's challenge 
head on.
While history has progressed to a point where philosophers 
like Nietzsche do away with the false conception of God as the 
deus ex machina. Bonhoeffer praises such development because it 
forces Christians and non-Christians alike to face up to the fact 
that God's power is manifest in weakness— in the suffering death 
of Jesus on the cross. That is the concrete, earthly image of 
divine power which quashes any metaphysical fiction. As Bethge 
has put it,
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143 The fact that divine omnipotence is grounded in the 
cross, in weakness is clear from Bonhoeffer's "Outline for a 
Book" See Bonhoeffer, "Outline for a Book," Letters and Papers 
from Prison, p. 381. There he said, "Who is God? Not in the 
first place an abstract belief in God, in his omnipotence etc. 
That is not a genuine experience of God, but a partial extension 
of the world . . . [h]is [Christ's] 'being there for others' is 
the experience of transcendence. It is only this 'being there 
for others', maintained till death, that is the ground of his 
omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence."
144 The fact that Bonhoeffer grounds all anthropological 
statements, whether with reference to the Christian community or 
to non-believers as well, in the notion of God's weakness and 
powerlessness in the world is evident in his following words, 
noted earlier, from prison: "The God who lets us live in the
world without the working hypothesis of God is the God before 
whom we stand continually. Before God and with God we live 
without God. God lets himself be pushed out of the world on to 
the cross. He is weak and powerless in the world, and that is 
precisely the way, the only way, in which he is with us, and 
helps us . . . Man's religiosity makes him look in his distress
to the power of God in the world: god is the deus ex machina.
The Bible directs man to God's powerlessness and suffering; . .
• To that extent we may say that the development towards the 
world's coming of age outlined above, which has done away with 
a false conception of God, opens up a way of seeing the God of 
the Bible, who wins power and space in the world by his weakness. 
Siis— will probably be the starting point for our 'secular 
^¿grpretation." Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison. 
Letter of 16 July 1944, pp. 360-61. (Emphasis added).
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Bonhoeffer wants to re-check the doctrinal shape of 
the churches in order to prove that Christ is precise­
ly not all that religion says he is. He is the man 
for others against individualistic inwardness. He is 
lonely and forsaken without transcendent escape. He 
worships not in provinciality but in the midst of real 
life. He, though longing for him, does not experience 
the deus ex machina. Thus the time for religion must 
have gone, but not the time for Jesus, or if you like, 
for the theoloqia crucis.145
Bonhoeffer is not content to assign positive value to 
categories such as human autonomy, freedom and power in them­
selves as Nietzsche does, but he defines such terms only with 
reference to God's weakness. Paul Ricoeur has suggested that the 
paradoxical joining of the concept of a suffering God to the 
experience of life's fullness is an answer to Nietzsche.146 We 
would add that rather than a paradoxical wedding of concepts 
(weak God, powerful humanity), Bonhoeffer was redefining divine 
and human power according to his theoloqia crucis147 and the
145 Bethge, "The Challenge of Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Life and 
Theology," op. cit.. p. 81.
146 See Kelly, op. cit. . p. 56, footnote 56.
147 I fully concur with Kelly, that "Luther's theoloqia 
crucis serves . . .  as the basis for Bonhoeffer's proposed reform 
of theological discourse and for an explanation of how God 
chooses to affirm the world and exert his salvific power in that 
world." Kelly, without drawing explicit attention to it, also hit 
uPon the redefinition taking place in Bonhoeffer's cross-centered 
understanding of power when he said, "The divine quality which 
m°st fascinated Bonhoeffer as he grappled with the implications 
of worldliness for Christianity was, therefore, God's paradoxical 
'power in weakness'. This 'weakness' was a very human way of 
describing God's willingness to respect man's autonomy, to allow 
himself to be 'pushed out of the world' (not to dominate as an 
all-powerful ruler) onto the cross (but to be personally related 
as a loving and redeeming God), to assume man's sufferings as his 
°wh, and finally, to forgive and console. At the same time, this 
ig-iLjnode of God's power, since in this way life, in the fullness 
intended by God's creative-redemptive acts, is affirmed and man 
ls more effectively brought to a genuine self-transcendence." 
Kelly/ "Revelation in Christ. A Study of Bonhoeffer's Theology 
°f Revelation," o p . cit.. pp. 64-65.
power of weakness.148 Furthermore, the redefinition extends 
beyond a theological reordering of concepts. It is more radical 
than that, as we shall see.
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2. Ludwig Feuerbach's Concept of Reality and Anthro­
pological Weakness
Feuerbach represents another important influence on 
Bonhoeffer. As is well known, Feuerbach was convinced that 
theology is nothing more than a misguided anthropology, where 
persons project themselves as God, adorning God with all the 
attributes they lack.149 He saw the Christian religion as an 
exercise in debilitating persons of all that is healthy, mature 
and life-affirming, displacing these normal human traits with 
whimsical notions of a divine despot. Like Nietzsche, he saw 
Christianity as corrupting humanity, leaving it the victim of a 
vampire-like God-concept whose power is gained at the expense of 
its human victims, drained of strength, life, and power.
148 Geffrey Kelly speaks of God's paradoxical "power in 
weakness." I am suggesting, however, that Bonhoeffer speaks of 
the "power of weakness." Such a seemingly minor distinction is 
telling in that Kelly's choice of words stresses the paradox 
involved in the hiddenness of God's power. It seems to me, 
however, that Bonhoeffer, as part of his theology of the cross, 
is redefining divine and human power in terms of faith's 
hiddenness. Whereas one connotation stresses the polarity and 
tension between the two concepts (of power and weakness), the 
other focuses on the unity between the two terms. I am arguing 
that Bonhoeffer believed in the power of weakness and, by trying 
to articulate such a concept, he could quite easily discuss human 
autonomy and divine weakness at the same time. Both terms are 
to be reexamined in terms of their hidden character. All this 
points to his christological ontology and the hidden nature of 
reality as articulated in the Letters and Papers from Prison.
149 Cf. Henry Mottu, "Feuerbach and Bonhoeffer: Criticism of
Religion and the Last Period of Bonhoeffer's Thought," trans. by 
David Lewis, Union Seminary Quarterly Review. Vol. XXV, No. 1, 
(Fall 1969) , p. 5.
Bonhoeffer met Feuerbach's critique of religion by challeng­
ing the latter's concept of reality. The philosopher believed 
religion understood reality as duplex in nature, the heavenly and 
the earthly, in which the person is ". . . parcelled out between 
a heavenly and an earthly lord . . ."15° But Bonhoeffer, espe­
cially in his Ethics. did not speak in terms of a divine reality 
and a human one. Rather, he interpreted reality christological- 
ly, suggesting Christ alone as the "real One" (der Wirkliche), 
and reality as having a hidden character, a hidden name, Jesus 
Christ.151 The structure of reality, including secularity, is 
held together by Jesus Christ. Hence, his emphasis on Christ as 
Mediator (der Mittler) rather than transcendent Redeemer.152 
Bonhoeffer gets to the heart of Feuerbach's critique of religion 
by asserting an ontologically unified understanding of reality, 
thwarting Feuerbach's presumption of Christianity's view toward 
the nature of reality.
Bonhoeffer went on to invert the philosopher's critique at 
yet another point. Feuerbach believed that "[t]o enrich God, man
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150 Ludwig Feuerbach, Necessity for a Reform in Philosophy 
(1842) quoted in Mottu, "Feuerbach and Bonhoeffer" o p . cit.. p. 11.
151 "What Christ does is precisely to give effect to reality. 
He affirms reality. And indeed He is Himself the real man and 
consequently the foundation of all human reality." Bonhoeffer, 
Ithics, p. 85. Further, Bonhoeffer stated that, "[t]he point of 
departure for Christian ethics is not the reality of one's own 
self, or the reality of the world; nor is it the reality of 
standards and values. It is the reality of God as He reveals 
Himself in Jesus Christ." Bonhoeffer, Ethics, pp. 189-90.
152 "He [Bonhoeffer] was now able to say that Jesus Christ is 
for me, for us, present in word, sacrament, and community as one 
who is historical, manifesting himself through that presence as 
the center of existence, history, and nature, and as mediator, 
who stands in our place." Bonhoeffer speaks "of Christ as 
Mediator and center, the one in and through the other. In 
Mediating, Christ is the center; in being the center, Christ 
Mediates." Ernst Feil, The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer. 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), p. 76.
must become poor; that God may be all, man must be nothing."153 
And in this case, persons have a choice:
. . . either God exists, in which case man remains in 
an infantile state, a prey to religion, "drained" by
religion; or else God does not exist, in which case
man is free to develop. If God exists, man is not 
himself. In other words, it is either God or man— we 
must choose.154
Bonhoeffer reverses Feuerbach's scheme and consequently rejects 
the alternative to which it leads. He not only rejects the idea 
that God lives at persons' expense, holding that God dies so that 
persons might live life fully155, but he holds up an autonomous, 
strong humanity, with his notion of a mature humanity that has 
come of age. With Feuerbach, Bonhoeffer eschews an omnipotent 
understanding of God as well as a languid view of persons.
Bonhoeffer showed in his late work, particularly the letters 
from prison, that God does not exploit human weakness. God is
characterized by powerlessness and weakness, and the true
Christian is marked by strength. The reversal is clear in who 
is represented in terms of power and who is characterized in 
terms of weakness. In this way, Bonhoeffer accepts Feuerbach's 
critical attitude toward religion, going beyond it by switching 
the terms of who has the power and who does not. While human 
autonomy could only be gained by dispensing with God and sick 
God-concepts all together by Feuerbach, the same was gained by 
replacing exploitative god-concepts with the "living God of the
153 Ludwig Feuerbach, Necessity for a Reform in Philosophy 
(1842), quoted in Henry Mottu, "Feuerbach and Bonhoeffer", p. 11.
154 Mottu, "Feuerbach and Bonhoeffer," o p . cit. . p. 11.
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155 Mottu, ibid. , p. 11
Bible." This was exactly what a world come of age had paved the 
way for and what it was now ready to come to terms with.
C. A Different God at the Heart of Human Autonomy
Bonhoeffer rejected Feuerbach's and Nietzsche's alterna­
tives, holding up a weak, suffering God as the one true God with 
whom persons may enjoy a positive and healthy self-identity and 
relationship. As Bonhoeffer scholar Geffrey Kelly suggested, "He 
depicts the paradoxical weakness of God, God powerful in his 
helplessness on the cross."156 In pointing to God's weakness and 
powerlessness in the world it might seem that Bonhoeffer has 
merely changed names— this time it is the human being who has the 
power and God who does not. Why is suffering still a part of the 
equation at all if Bonhoeffer rejected exploitative notions of 
power in the first place? The answer is that his theology of the 
cross is at the root of his reversal of Feuerbach's terms of 
power. It is not merely an exchange in who holds the reins of 
power, it is a redefinition of what true power is in the first 
place, and the suffering God provides the content for such a 
change.
At several key points in the prison letters Bonhoeffer 
pointed to God's weakness in the world as the touchstone for a 
mature humanity to understand itself. As noted above, Geffrey 
Kelly highlights God's paradoxical "power in weakness" as the key 
to understanding the implications of worldliness for Christiani­
ty. Explaining what he means by this weakness he said:
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The divine quality which most fascinated Bon­
hoeffer as he grappled with the implications of 
worldliness for Christianity was, therefore, God's 
paradoxical "power in weakness". This "weakness" was 
a very human way of describing God's willingness to 
respect man's autonomy, to allow himself to be "pushed 
out of the world" (not to dominate as an all-powerful 
ruler) onto the cross (but to be personally related as 
a loving and redeeming God), to assume man's suffer­
ings as his own, and, finally, to forgive and console. 
At the same time, this is a mode of God's power, since 
in this way life, in the fullness intended by God's 
creative-redemptive acts, is affirmed and man is more 
effectively brought to a genuine self-transcendence. 
If God becomes "weak" in Christ, it is to enter into 
a more intimate personal relationship with man by 
moving man to a deeper awareness of what it means to 
exist only for others. Living before and with such a 
God involves adopting the attitude of Christ in which 
life is good and suffering redemptive. For Bon­
hoeffer, only the suffering Christ could disclose the 
true depths of God's kinship with man. This is the 
biblical picture of God in Christ which Bonhoeffer 
expresses in a new title, "the man for others".157
We come to the heart of the matter by looking at what 
Bonhoeffer means by God's weakness, God's suffering in the world, 
particularly as Kelly has described it. God's weakness is 
described in terms of paradox as a 1) description of God's 
willingness to respect human autonomy, allowing himself to be 
"pushed out of the world" and onto the cross, bearing sins and 
sufferings, and as 2) a mode of God's power. Kelly's analysis 
of Bonhoeffer's paradoxical understanding of God's "power in 
weakness" is faithful to Bonhoeffer's theological categories and 
the way he intended them. However, we would add a qualification 
to his portrayal of Bonhoeffer's intent with a slightly different 
emphasis and connotation.
Whereas Kelly describes the power of God's weakness in terms 
°f a "willingness" to respect human autonomy and as a "mode of
157 Geffrey B. Kelly, "Revelation in Christ. A Study of 
Bonhoeffer's Theology of Revelation," o p . cit.. pp. 64, 65.
God's power," Bonhoeffer seems to be making an even stronger, 
more fundamental claim about who God is and how God is present 
in the world. Bonhoeffer states at several different points in 
the prison letters the fact that God's "weakness" serves as a 
starting point for understanding God's true power in the world, 
and for this reason, we should go further than describing such 
divine weakness in terms of a "willingness" or a "mode" of God's 
power. Indeed, as we demonstrated in Chapter One, it is the 
axiomatic, fundamental way God's self-revelation is made known 
to the world. The power of God's weakness is the heart of 
Bonhoeffer's understanding of how God is present to a world come 
of age.
Again, as was shown in chapter one, God's power is essen­
tially hidden in form from human eyes, visible only to those who 
have the eyes of faith. To the unbeliever, Christ will appear 
as weak, helpless, and impotent in the world. But through the 
eyes of faith, one is then able to perceive the hidden form of 
God's power. Indeed, this is the very way Bonhoeffer describes 
God's presence in the modern world. Taking pains to discern 
faith's concrete contours in the world, Bonhoeffer does so, 
describing it as a metanoia. a joining in the Messianic suffer­
ings of God in the world, participating in life to the fullest, 
with all its joys and sufferings. Faith, then, becomes discern­
ible in a non-religious way.
Secondly, as he showed in his "Outline for a Book," God's 
omnipotence is grounded in his "being there for others." The 
ohristological vicarious principle is the leitmotif of Bon­
hoeffer's understanding of God. But, more than that, it is the 
in which God is power-ful in the world, and the way in which 
an autonomous age may understand its autonomy, power and
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responsibility. Thus, Bonhoeffer lays out in fresh terms the way 
a mature humanity may understand faith and God. Without faith, 
God remains pushed out as a meaningless concept on the fringes 
of modern life and reality. With faith, however, the forlorn 
crucified Christ demonstrates the fullness of God's power in the 
very act of suffering and giving himself on the cross in behalf 
of others. God's power is hidden from view because it is defined 
in terms of a relationship, not as a force or object which has 
been limited so that humanity may be autonomous. Further, it is 
hidden from view because God does not demonstrate who God is in 
the terms that we might expect. It is a hidden power, character­
ized at its base by Christ's self-giving of himself for others 
to the point of death. God's terms of power are not that of an 
autonomous age, and it is this image which hides within it the 
very definition of who God is in a world come of age for 
Bonhoeffer.
Given that this hidden "power of weakness" is the key to 
understanding God in a modern age, what does this have to do with 
human autonomy per se? Hopefully, this study has demonstrated 
that once key terms of Bonhoeffer's Ethics are examined in 
relation to the Letters and Papers from Prison, more profound 
understandings of what he means by human autonomy and a world 
come of age surface than have been acknowledged up to the 
present. The theologia crucis is the theological matrix out of 
which Bonhoeffer developed his most profound statements about 
human autonomy, but one must be careful here. Joining in with 
Nietzsche and Feuerbach, he demonstrated conclusively that a weak 
human self-understanding is not at all what the living God of the 
Bible desires or brings out in persons. At the same time, 
however, the true God is characterized by suffering, sacrificial
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action which ended in death on the cross. How, then, is a modern 
world with a strong self-image to understand the significance of 
divine suffering, sacrifice and rejection?
Bonhoeffer made it clear in his Ethics what values would 
characterize an autonomous age that had grown up. Responsibility 
stood as a central category throughout, and he defined what he 
meant by it: freely chosen action, deputyship (acting in others'
behalf) , and incurrence of guilt, leading even to death. The 
terms which defined his ethic of responsibility paralleled 
Luther's theology of the cross. In this way, Bonhoeffer 
introduced non-religious terms in his Ethics and elaborated on 
them more fully in the prison letters in relation to the weakness 
of God in the world.
Human autonomy, then, is defined in the same way and in 
accord with the way God is present and powerful in a world come 
of age— in terms of responsible, adult behavior: participating
fully in the joys and cares of the world, recognizing and 
fulfilling responsibility without relying on an omnipotent God 
to "rescue" one and others from humanly preventable injustices 
and wrongs. Further, this kind of autonomy freely takes on the 
guilt of others. This is the most profound aspect of Bon­
hoeffer's definition of human autonomy in the modern world, for 
it zeroes in on the thoroughly social, others'-minded attitude 
which operates at the base of such a definition.
Suffering, rejection and death, then, are not cowardly 
®°tifs suggestive of a sick modern self-image. They are part of 
the necessary components of responsible, mature behavior in the 
w°rld, demonstrating a "selfless self-assertion".158 By incorpo­
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rating rejection and incurrence of guilt into his concept of 
autonomous human behavior, Bonhoeffer takes a final step in 
integrating the terms of Luther's theology of the cross into his 
definition of human autonomy and power. God's presence in the 
world, hidden as it is in a seemingly weak, Crucified figure 
informs a modern human self-identity which is built upon the very 
same terms. In this way, Bonhoeffer's understanding of God and 
humanity demonstrates a profound unity at its base, suggesting 
the fundamental terms by which such a relationship may be 
discussed in an increasingly secular age with relevance, but more 
importantly, in truth.
Conclusions
By examining Bonhoeffer's last two major works, Ethics and 
Letters and Papers from Prison, we have seen how his terms of 
human autonomy gained their full meaning in relation to the way 
in which God is present in a world come of age. Just as we saw 
a reversal and redefinition in Bonhoeffer's concept of God in 
Chapter One, we have demonstrated the same "movement" with his 
notion of human autonomy. Exchanging omnipotent, titanic 
descriptions of God for those characterized by weakness, 
suffering and powerlessness, he exchanged languid, weak, craven 
descriptions of humanity for ones characterized by strength, 
autonomy, and maturity. We saw how Bonhoeffer did this by
examining his two late works in depth individually, and by 
examining the terms attached to his notion of human autonomy.
In Ethics Bonhoeffer discussed human autonomy at length, and 
this at a time when he was very active in his work with the 
conspirators in their plot against Hitler. He discussed human
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autonomy along two lines: with his ethic of conformation and his
ethic of command. In both cases, Christ is the one with whom we 
are in relation, to whom we conform and whose call we follow. 
Just as we saw in his radio address in 1933, Bonhoeffer again 
demonstrated his concern for the correct structuring of authority 
with his notion of God's commandment. We saw his penchant for 
ordering society according to superiority and inferiority, yet 
how this conservative category gained its meaning in terms of 
responsibility. From first to last, Bonhoeffer's theology was 
one of sociality and interpersonal relations, and with the Ethics 
we saw a change in his sense of authority. As one scholar aptly 
noted:
In the course of his short life, Bonhoeffer had 
many occasions to redefine this world— from an aris­
tocracy of training and position to an aristocracy of 
character and intelligence (e.g., his concept of 
Bildunq and his view of human rights). His sense of 
authority changed accordingly. His theology of inter­
personal relations made him ever more open to the 
reconstruction of human community by free and respon­
sible human interaction.159
Just as Bonhoeffer was able to speak of God's absolute rule in 
the Christian community in terms of sacrificial service and love 
in Sanctorum Communio, he likewise was able to speak of the God 
who commands in terms of responsibility— a concept marked by 
selfless self-assertion. In both cases, ruling was defined in 
terms of serving--a paradigm established by Jesus Christ, the man 
others and the vicarious principle of "being there for 
others". Bonhoeffer did not cease to structure authority based 
°n this christological principle, never losing cite of the
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selfless sociality which lay at the base of true authority and 
power. We see this expressed most highly in his prison letter 
of 23 January 1944160 in his thoughts about friendship and how 
this dimension of human existence is sui generis, of a different 
and higher order than the mandates.
Bonhoeffer developed his thoughts about human autonomy in 
the prison letters, utilizing interesting terms like a "world 
come of age" and the "non-religious interpretation of Biblical 
concepts," and this at a time when any ability to utilize his 
power for others was stripped from him. He was powerless, 
confined, silenced. Before we examined the material content and 
ramifications of these ideas, we paused to see how Bonhoeffer was 
influenced in his critique of religion and the extent to which 
power and weakness lay at the heart of his critique. We saw not 
only that power figures into his notion of religion and concomi­
tant critique of it, but how it does so in concert with four 
different critiques of religion as well. Two of his theological 
contemporaries— Barth and Bultmann, and two atheistic philoso­
phers of the nineteenth century— Nietzsche and Feuerbach, all 
spoke in terms of power and weakness when it came to religion. 
Barth showed how the religious person tries to occupy a place of 
power over against God by reducing God to a concept or idea which 
can be drawn upon conveniently in times of need, whereas Bultmann 
rejected the notion of God's power exploiting the human being's 
existential situation of weakness. Power exploited by humanity 
and by God— these were the terms of religion against which both 
®en declared war, and Bonhoeffer joined them in their battlecry.
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Both Nietzsche and Feuerbach saw religion as instilling and 
reinforcing a victimized, languid image of humanity and a 
despotic, vampire-like image of God, feeding off his impotent 
creature. For both, power rested with the divine, having been 
illegitimately wrested from humanity. Such a religion, with its 
attendant slavish morality was repugnant to them, and they fought 
to reinstate such virtues as human strength, health, power, and 
autonomy in their "philosophies of life." Bonhoeffer joined them 
on two fronts— in rejecting the polar images of a lifeless, 
powerless humanity and a tyrannical, autocratic God. He did this 
by reversing the terms which both philosophers attributed to 
humanity and the god-concept. Power, life, autonomy, health—  
these were no longer descriptive of an imaginary God which had 
been projected by an enervated humanity. These were the honest 
appraisals of a world-come-of-age, tired of childish images and 
values.
Against this worn out image of God, Bonhoeffer held up the 
living God, who is weak and powerless, forcing the terms of 
Christianity. While humanity is certainly autonomous in that it 
may freely reject this God who is revealed in this manner, 
Bonhoeffer holds that such weakness hides God's true power, and 
the fact that this rejected Christ stands at the center of human 
history and reality, holding it all together. In this way, it 
ls a Christonomy, just as Bonhoeffer suggested in the Ethics. 
There is no human autonomy which may exist without God, having 
rejected him. God remains at the center of the world, hidden 
beneath the cross, his power going unobserved, yet in the midst 
°f the world, for it, nonetheless. Bonhoeffer pushes the 
Christian claim to its limits, then, with his notion of human 
autonomy. For with it, he provides not only the terms by which
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a mature world may understand itself; he calls such an identity 
into view in the light of a God who rules the world by the 
ultimate sacrificial service of all which is continually offered 
to all— bearing the guilt of our sins in our place, pro nobis, 
and offering forgiveness— freedom.
Just as he forced the terms of Christianity in a world come 
of age with the suffering God who stands rejection, Bonhoeffer 
simultaneously pushed the claim of an increasingly secular, 
mature world, pointing out its hidden weakness. In the Ethics 
Bonhoeffer referred to a godlessness characterized by idolatry 
and self-deification, a godlessness which does not recognize sin 
and thus the need for forgiveness. Standing in the center of the 
world, this kind of godlessness doops itself into thinking it 
rules without God. Bonhoeffer depicted the problem this way in 
his Creation and Fall, showing Adam's attempt to co-opt God at 
the center of life.
There is a right godlessness, however, and Bonhoeffer draws 
out its self-identity in non-religious terms as a mature, 
responsible humanity that joins in God's messianic sufferings in 
the world. Fundamental to this kind of responsible "godlessness" 
is a taking on of other's guilt, recognizing the need for 
justification and the fact that Jesus Christ alone confers 
forgiveness and freedom. In this way, having demonstrated the 
power which is hidden in the weak figure of Jesus Christ on the 
cross, Bonhoeffer simultaneously identifies the weakness hidden 
at the center of a godless world. The German pastor elaborated 
°n this need for forgiveness, for justification, in a world come 
°f age with his provocative concept of the arcane discipline, and 
We shall look to that idea in chapter four in order to better 
aPprehend the ethical expression of human power and autonomy in
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this modern age, as well as the dialectical power of God's 
weakness. However, we must first pause to see how Bonhoeffer 
understood sin in the first place and the terms in which he cast 
it.
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This means that one thing is certain, that where 
love towards the other is destroyed man can only hate 
his limit. Then he only wants to possess or deny the 
other person without limit.




BONHOEFFER'S ETHICAL INTERPRETATION OF SIN:
"POWER" IN CREATION AND FALL
Introduction
In previous chapters we examined how power figures into 
Bonhoeffer's theology, a theology bearing the mark of the cross 
of Jesus Christ. Power and weakness surfaced in his most basic 
understanding of God and person. We find this is no less true 
in Bonhoeffer's statements on creation and sin. "Statements" 
rather than "doctrine" or "category" are more accurate because 
Bonhoeffer did not attempt systematization in this area.1 Howev­
er, even though he lacks an explicit synthesis of thought on 
creation or sin in general, he did have quite specific things to 
say about them during the winter 1932-33 term at the University 
of Berlin.
Creation and Fall is a small but significant work, written 
by the German theologian at a time when the issue of human 
origins and the "orders of creation" were receiving much emphasis 
among leading theologians. In this little work, we see 
Bonhoeffer intentionally refocusing the issue from a prelapsarian
1 One Bonhoeffer scholar described how Bonhoeffer's interest 
in systematic theology diminished and he turned "more and more 
bo the realm of practical theology and the theological exposition 
of the Bible." Rather than a diminished interest in theology, 
he had simply found another way of expressing this interest that 
Was necessary and relevant for that particular time. John 
Jodsey, The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer. (London: SCM Press
Limited, I960), p. 119.
question of origins to the postlapsarian issue of preservation. 
Eberhard Bethge said, "It was an ethical uneasiness which led him 
to devote himself to the subject of this lecture."2 With the 
nationalistic furor over the politicized notion of human origins, 
Bonhoeffer saw the need to construct a theological defense. 
Until now, Bonhoeffer scholarship has been more concerned with 
the methodological value of Creation and Fall than with its 
material benefit.3 This study seeks to remedy such an imbalance 
by providing an in-depth investigation into the content of 
Creation and Fall. By examining Bonhoeffer's theological
interpretation of the Genesis narrative and its consequences in 
the human relationship, we find an understanding of sin which 
challenges Luther's traditional interpretation. The ethical 
character of sin in Bonhoeffer's Creation and Fall demonstrates 
one way power recurs as a fundamental motif. It is to this 
ethically-nuanced understanding of sin that we now turn.
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2 Eberhard Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Man of Vision. Man 
of Courage, (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1985) , p. 
164.
3 Ernst Feil, in his thorough-going depiction of 
Bonhoeffer's theology, restricts his focus to locating Creation 
and Fall within Bonhoeffer's overall theological movement. For 
example, he says, "It is the course on creation and fall . . .
which shows how rapidly and consciously Bonhoeffer's theology 
became centered in christology. A decisive advance in his 
ehristological reflection took place in that course." Ernst Feil, 
ihg-_Theology Qf Dietrich Bonhoeffer. trans. Martin Rumscheidt, 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), p. 72-74). Feil then
proceeds to introduce new themes and developments in Creation and 
Edii which further Bonhoeffer's Christology. While Feil has 
decided to place his emphasis on theological classification, I 
Mi more interested in unpacking one of the thematics in the book, 
1,e;, Bonhoeffer's ethical interpretation of sin. Indeed, such 
an investigation seems warranted in that Bethge himself testifies 
that in Creation and Fall "[t]he content of what he said turned 
°ut to be more important than the demonstration of any 'theologi­
cal method' . . . there can be no ignoring the profundity of his 
utterances . . . "  Bethge, o p . cit., p. 163.
I. Luther's Systematic Definition of Sin
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Revisionism is not a novel occurence in the history of the 
church. Luther boldly took on fourteen hundred years of Catholic 
tradition with a theology which questioned the very basis of the 
reigning Church at the time. While Irenaeus in the second 
century formulated the distinction between image (imago) and 
likeness (similitudo), saying the imago Dei (human reason or 
rationality) had been retained in the Fall in a defected sense 
while the likeness to God had been lost, Luther believed such a 
distinction was false, and he used the terms interchangeably, 
believing any likeness or similarity to God lost irreparably in 
the Fall. He came with a new method, stepping out of a conven­
tional schema, interchanging terms, ignoring old customs and 
traditions.
With his exegetical method, Luther shifted the notion of the 
imago Dei from a reified concept, as it had been in the Catholic 
tradition, to a social, relational paradigm. Here, the image of 
God is understood best as the uninterrupted relationship between 
God and the person as a recipient of God's grace. In this sense, 
Luther broke with fourteen hundred years of tradition which had 
referred to human rationality as the imago Dei. Nothing, not 
even human reason, comes through the Fall unscathed— it is all 
corrupt and in need of God's divine grace.
Luther advances a postlapsarian anthropology which is 
systematic at its base. His doctrine of sin includes sin's 
"ro°t" (radix), "fruit" (fructus) and "issue" (eventus) . He 
described the root and source of sin as unbelief or unfaith 
(Unqlaube^. It is the absence of faith, as depicted in Romans 
14:23 ("But he who has doubts is condemned, if he eats, because
he does not act from faith; for whatever does not proceed from 
faith is sin.") He went on to describe sin's "fruit" as ontic 
egocentricity— the state of being turned in to the self 
(incurvatus in se) . Another phrase he used to depict this aspect 
of sin is through his imagery of the person turning from God 
toward the creature (aversio a Deo, conversio ad creaturam) . 
This is the opposite of the love that does not seek its own, as 
I Corinthians 13:5 demonstrates ("it [love] is not arrogant or 
rude. Love does not insist on its own way; it is not irritable 
or resentful"). The condition of being turned in upon oneself 
is described in more specific detail by Luther as pride, 
arrogance or going beyond appointed limits (as in the Latin 
superbia or the German Hoffart).
Finally, for Luther the concrete manifestation of sin in the 
world, sin's "issue," is an attitude of thanklessness 
(Undankbarkeit) or ingratitude. He refers to Romans 1:21 in his 
depiction of thanklessness: "for although they knew God they did 
not honor him as God or give thanks to him, but they became 
futile in their thinking and their senseless minds were dark­
ened." Luther labels ingratitude "the most shameful sin." Not 
only that, such an attitude is a "robbery of God in three ways." 
Ingratitude toward God signals a robbery of God, and therefore 
is a violation of faith; it is robbery of one's neighbor, which 
is a violation of love; and it is a robbery of one's self, a 
violation of hope. Not only is sin a systematic concept for 
Luther, there are intricate interrelationships within its own 
structural definition. For the father of Lutheranism, the 
Augustinian notion of sin as concupiscience was misguided. Sin 
ls a social concept at its heart, one in which the human creature 
ls in wrong relationship with the Creator.
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Bonhoeffer interpreted sin along the same basic lines, but 
differed from Luther when it came to the nature of sin's event 
in the world. Like his predecessor, Bonhoeffer thought the root 
of all sin is pride, superbia:
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The root of all sin is pride, superbia. I want 
to be my own law, I have a right to my self, my hatred 
and my desires, my life and my death. The mind and 
flesh of man are set on fire by pride; for it is 
precisely in his wickedness that man wants to be as 
God.4
Luther described sin's issue or event in the world in terms of 
an attitude— ingratitude. His interpretation of sin's eventus 
as thanklessness provides the theological junction where his 
twentieth century protégé brought new insight. Creation and Fall 
holds the key to his revision of the third part of Luther's 
triadic hamartiological impulse.
II. Bonhoeffer's Ethical Definition of Sin: Middle and Boundary
It is interesting that Bonhoeffer followed Luther's method 
of theological exegesis in interpreting Genesis 1-3. By 
examining groups of verses and commenting on them, Bonhoeffer 
followed a form of analysis re-instituted by Barth.5 Like Luther
4 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Life Together, trans. John W. 
Doberstein, (London: Harper and Row Publishers, 1954), pp. 113-
14/• see also Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Spiritual Care, trans. Jay C. 
Rochelle, (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988), p. 63.
5 Bonhoeffer's form of textual analysis does not preclude 
the methods of philological and historical research. C f . Bethge, 
Ei§trich_ Bonhoeffer. p. 162. Bonhoeffer preceded Barth himself 
as well as others in drawing material conclusions from his 
Jhristocentric treatment of the Old Testament.
before him, Bonhoeffer spoke of the imago Dei in social terms 
characterized by freedom, a freedom pro m e . pro nobis.6
Bonhoeffer made a decisive advance in his christology as his 
use of concepts demonstrated. Up until this time, he had been 
concerned with the question of boundary and limit, Christ 
representing extrinsicality .7 Now, in Creation and Fall he 
incorporated the notion of the center, the middle (mitte) with 
the notion of limit or boundary. This conceptuality manifested 
itself in at least three ways in Creation and Fall.
First, the eschatological thrust is obvious throughout the 
exegesis. In his introduction to the published version of the 
lectures, Bonhoeffer said,
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The Church of Holy Scripture— and there is no other 
"Church"— lives from the end. Therefore it reads all 
Holy Scripture as the book of the end, of the new, of 
Christ. What does Holy Scripture, upon which the
Church of Christ is grounded, have to say of the 
creation and the beginning except that only from
Christ can we know what the beginning is? 
[t]herefore the Scriptures need to be read and pro­
claimed wholly from the viewpoint of the end .
[w]e can read towards Christ only if we know that
Bethge mentions that Creation and Fall was the first book 
of Bonhoeffer's that Barth read. His reaction to it was mixed, 
although he thought Bonhoeffer's fidelity to the text went beyond 
that of other notable interpreters of the day. Cf. Bethge, 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer. p. 163.
6 "In man God creates his image on earth. This means that 
roan is like the Creator in that he is free. . . [ajnyone investigat­
ing man to discover freedom finds nothing of it. Why? because 
freedom is not a quality which can be revealed--it is not a 
possession, a presence, an object, nor is it a form of existence- 
~but a relationship and nothing else. In truth, freedom is a 
relationship between two persons. Being free means "being free
for the other," because the other has been bound to him. Only 
ln relation with the other am I free." Bonhoeffer, Creation and 
E§jd_. a Theological Interpretation of Genesis 1-3, (New York: 
Macmillan Publishing Company, 1959), p. 37.
' This is especially apparent in Act and Being.
Christ is the beginning, the new and the end of our
world.8
The Church lives according to the end, the limit, the boundary. 
The end of history directs the Church in the present, as history 
unfolds from the now, from the middle.9
Secondly, the eschatological hermeneutic for the Church 
comes from the more specific Barthian hermeneutic principle that 
Christ interprets the Old Testament. The Scripture is regarded 
as a unified whole in a way which simply had not existed before 
Barth's christological method of exegesis. Christ, the fulfill­
ment of the Scriptures, makes it possible to understand the 
creation story, the beginning. The end interprets the begin­
ning— indeed, there is no other way to correctly understand the 
Creation account, according to this exegetical method.
Thirdly, and most importantly for this study, Bonhoeffer's 
material interpretation of the Fall is consistent with his 
methodological hermeneutic. The 'middle-limit' language is not 
only potent imagery, but fully ingredient to the essence of his 
interpretation of sin. In his section on "The Middle of the 
Earth" (Genesis 2:8-17)10, Bonhoeffer focuses on the fact that 
the two trees— the Tree of Life and the Tree of the Knowledge of 
Good and Evil— occupy the middle of the garden. He discusses the 
significance of their location:
8 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, p. 12. The Barthian "Word 
of God" impress is clear.
9 This eschatological thematic of the end informing the 
Middle represents the earliest basis of Bonhoeffer's important 
eschatology-ethics theme which was so important in his late 
theology (particularly his notion of the penultimate and the 
ultimate). It is significant to note that as early as 1932 he 
Was already thinking in these terms.
10 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, pp. 48-57.
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First of all there is the tree of life. . . .
[i]t was in the middle— that is all that is said about 
it. The life that comes forth from God is in the 
middle. This means that God, who gives life, is in the 
middle . . . Adam's life comes from the middle which
is not Adam himself but God. . . . [i]t is character­
istic of man that his life is a constant circling 
around its middle, but that it never takes possession 
of it . . .
Like the tree of life, the tree of the knowledge 
of good and evil stands in the middle of the garden. 
But the reference to it contains a special Word of 
God: the prohibition to eat of it and the threat of
death as soon as man transgresses this commandment .
[t]wo things are contained in the prohibition. 
First, there is the reference to Adam's being as man, 
to his freedom . . . [sjecondly, this man . . .  is
shown his limit, that is to say, his creatureliness .
. . Tinian's limit is in the middle of his existence,
not on the edge. The limit which we look for on the 
edge is the limit of his condition, of his technology, 
of his possibilities. The limit in the middle is the 
limit of his reality, of his true existence.11
Bonhoeffer goes on to say that Adam knows his life is possible 
only by his limit, that he lives from this limit which is in the 
middle. The connection between the notions of boundary and 
middle is patently clear. It is remarkable how Bonhoeffer can 
explicate such typically opposing terms in such an inter­
penetrating and related way. God is the giver of life as 
represented by the two trees in the center of the Garden. Adam 
is told by God not to bother the tree of knowledge, reminding him 
of his creaturely boundary. The trees represent the center and 
source of life, Adam as a limited creature.
11 Ibid. . pp. 51, 52. (Emphasis original). This notion of 
the boundary being fundamentally connected to the middle comes 
to expression again in Bonhoeffer's late theology, in one of his 
Most famed quotes which depicts God on the edge or boundary, yet 
fully in the center of life: "Before God and with God we live
without God. God lets himself be pushed out of the world on to 
the cross. He is weak and powerless in the world, and that is 
Precisely the way, the only way, in which he is with us and helps 
Us>" Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, p. 360.
Bonhoeffer interprets the significance of the garden of Eden 
as well as that of the inhabitants who dwell therein. After 
describing the garden, Bonhoeffer examines Genesis 2:18-25 and 
entitles it "The Strength of the Other Person."12 The creation 
of Eve is the focus of the passage, and Bonhoeffer interprets it 
in a very provocative way. Eve is described as Adam's limit, a 
notion which ordinarily would carry negative, parasitic connota­
tions. This is not so with Bonhoeffer. Indeed, for him, the 
category of "limit" is a positive term in its prelapsarian usage. 
He says,
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Thus Adam knows that this creature, whom God has 
shaped with his assistance, out of his flesh, is 
unique, but he sees this action of his upon the other 
entirely as a gift of God. The fact that Eve derives 
from him is in Adam's eyes not a cause for glorifica­
tion but for special gratitude. He does not put 
forward any claim for himself: he knows that he is
connected in a completely new way to this Eve. . . .
[i]t is best to describe this unity by saying that now 
he belongs to her because she belongs to him.13
Bonhoeffer then goes on to make his most profound remarks about 
the way Eve is a "helper" to Adam:
In his unfathomable mercy the Creator knew that 
this creaturely, free life can only be born in limita­
tion if it is loved, and out of this mercy he created 
a companion for man who must be at once the embodiment 
of Adam's limit and the object of his love . . . [t]he 
other person is the limit placed upon me by God. I 
love this limit and I shall not transgress it because 
of my love . . . [i]n the creation of the other person 
freedom and creatureliness are bound together in love. 
That is why the other person is grace to the first .
• . [i]n this common bearing of the limit by the first 
two human beings in community, is tested the character 
of this community as the Church. This means that one
12 Ibid. . pp. 57-63.
13 Ibid . . p . 60 .
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thing is certain, that where love towards the other is 
destroyed man can only hate his limit. Then he only 
wants to possess or deny the other person without 
limit.14
Before the Fall, Eve is described as Adam's limit. But, 
this is the very nature of God's grace, according to Bonhoeffer's 
interpretation. Man can only live in freedom by living in accord 
with his limit. Bonhoeffer points out that "the other" is grace 
to the first, just as the prohibition to eat of the tree of 
knowledge was grace. It all turns on Bonhoeffer's notion of 
limit— limit as grace before sin has entered history. 'Limit,' 
which tends to carry a negative connotation, such as barrier, 
obstacle or hindrance is given a fresh, positive, graceful 
interpretation through Bonhoeffer's provocative exegesis. He 
has already alluded to what becomes explicit with the Fall— the 
double meaning attached to "limit." The prelapsarian understand­
ing of "the other" as limit connotes personal relationship 
typified by thankfulness, mutual service, and unity. The 
postlapsarian understanding alludes to objectification of the 
other typified by ingratitude, domination, and division.
We move on to the next passage in the narrative. Based on 
Bonhoeffer's exegesis of Eve's creation account, and after
14 Ibid. . p. 61. A similar emphasis is echoed in Life 
Sogether where Bonhoeffer discussed the difference between human 
love and spiritual love. There, he spoke of human love "not 
loving the other as a free person but as one whom it binds to 
itself. it wants to gain, to capture by every means; it uses 
force, it desires to be irresistible, to rule." Spiritual love, 
the other hand, loves the free person. The notion of Christ 
ln the middle (die Mitte) between persons is crucial here also, 
human love seeks direct access to the person whereas 
sPiritual love accepts the in cognito of the other, and the fact 
that access to the other can only occur through Jesus Christ. 
Lietrich Bonhoeffer, Life Together. pp. 34, 35; Dietrich
Bonhoeffer, Gemeinsames Leben. (Berlin: Evangelische Berlags-
anstalt, 1954), pp. 19-20.
comparing the original German text to the English translation, 
this section of theological interpretation warrants clarifica­
tion. The English translation translates the subtitle for the 
section on Genesis 2:18-25 as "The Strength of the Other 
Person."15 The German text subtitle is "Die Kraft des anderen." 
The word "Kraft" does mean "strength," but it can also mean 
power, force, and energy. Why did the translator choose 
"strength"? A bit of explanation brings to light the ambiguity 
involved in translating Bonhoeffer's German into English.
It is more appropriate to translate "Kraft" as "strength" 
when the reference is corporeal or moral; as "power" when the 
reference is spiritual or creative.16 John Fletcher, the 
translator of the 1959 English edition, chose "strength" to 
depict the meaning of "Kraft" in the subtitle, and there is good 
reason for this. Bonhoeffer defines Eve, the "other", as Adam's 
limit in a creaturely, bodily sense. She was created from his 
body; as a corporeal companion, she is his limit. It is a 
"physical" strength (as Kraft connotes in this context) in the 
same sense that it is a "corporeal" or bodily strength. It would 
be easy to think muscular strength or force is meant when using 
the word "physical strength," and indeed, it often does in 
general usage. But here, in Creation and Fall, according to 
Bonhoeffer's exegesis, the "strength" refers to the bodily 
existence of the other. Bonhoeffer's section on "The New" (Das 
H§ue) confirms this, describing the pivotal significance of 
corporeality for Bonhoeffer's notion of "the other." In this
15 Ibid. . p. 57.
16 "Force" and "Energy" have more specialized connotations 
ar>d do not hold the same level of ambiguity as that between 
"strength" and "power." Cf. Collins German-English, English-
Dictionary, p. 410.
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sense, then, Fletcher's translation is on the mark and faithfully 
reflects the spirit and intent of Bonhoeffer's exegesis.
However, there is an inconsistency in Fletcher's translation 
of the word Kraft which evidences a heretofore unacknowledged 
aspect of Bonhoeffer's overall theological interpretation of 
Genesis 1-3. In his section "The Strength of the Other," 
Bonhoeffer is exegeting Gen. 2:23, "This at last is bone of my 
bones and flesh of my flesh; she shall be called woman, because 
she was taken out of man."17 He extols the gratitude, thankful­
ness, and selfless character of Adam's recognition of the new 
creature:
2 2 2
Thus Adam knows that this creature, whom God has 
shaped with his assistance, out of his flesh, is 
unique, but he sees this action of his upon the other 
entirely as a gift of God. The fact that Eve derives 
from him is in Adam's eyes not a cause for glorifica­
tion but for special gratitude. He does not put 
forward any claim for himself . . .18
Then, extending "the limit" from applying only to Eve to include 
anyone other than oneself (i.e.. "the other") he goes on to say 
that out of God's mercy man's companion is simultaneously the 
embodiment of Adam's limit and the object of his love.19 The
17 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, p. 60.
18 Ibid. , p. 60.
19 Bonhoeffer makes the remark, "And in fact the love for 
woman was not to be the life of man in the truest sense." I 
think Bonhoeffer was on the right road with the categories of 
limit and life here, but he went awry in carrying out their 
meaning. I would take up his category and discussion, suggesting 
that while "the other" is one's limit, life consists in the 
Mutual relationship of service between the two, as Bonhoeffer 
alluded to earlier. Bonhoeffer does not follow the "pattern" or
logic" of his own categories here, so what ends up distracting 
hy unintentional sexist overtone can be resolved when one applies 
Bonhoeffer's own pattern of thinking to his thoughts here on 
Ihtiit and life.
other person is grace and gift, helping one to live before God 
in community.
But then we come to the decisive passage. Bonhoeffer 
concludes this subsection on what "the other" means as limit:
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The power of the other person, in which I live in 
the presence of God has now become the power of the 
other person by which I must die before God. The 
power of life becomes the power of destruction, power 
of community becomes power of isolation, power of love 
becomes power of hate.20
The controlling motif is "power" and how it has changed due to 
sin's irreparable damage. This passage is interesting when the 
English text is compared to the German:
Die Kraft des anderen, in der ich vor Gott lebe, 
ist mir nun die Kraft des Anderen, durch die ich vor 
Gott sterben muss. Kraft des Lebens wird Kraft der 
Vernichtung, Kraft der Gemeinschaft wird Kraft der 
Vereinsamung, Kraft der Liebe wird Kraft des Hasses.21
The title of this subsection certainly seems to take its cue from 
this concluding passage, given the parallel use of terms. In the 
German, the subsection title mirrors the phrase in the passage 
above, "Die Kraft des anderen." Why, then, does Fletcher 
translate it "The Strength of the Other" in the title and "The 
power of the other" in the passage from which the title origi­
nates? i have already suggested why Fletcher probably chose 
"strength" for the subtitle, but now the issue is raised--which 
is correct? The query is resolved quickly when one tries to
20 • •Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, p. 62.
21 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Schöpfung und Fall, printed in 
-Eêtrich Bonhoeffer Werke: Schöpfung und Fall, vol. 3 (Munich:
Christian Kaiser, 1989), p. 93.
insert "strength" where Fletcher used "power" in the passage 
cited above. Substituting "strength" in place of "power" is not 
appropriate for the context of Bonhoeffer's concluding remark. 
"Power" is the more accurate translation of "Kraft" so that the 
subtitle should read "The Power of the Other."
Not only does the translation inconsistency bear this out, 
but the thrust of the content points to the concept of power 
being the more contextually accurate one. Bonhoeffer has just 
drawn out the meaning of sin's effect or event in the world in 
terms of power. Before the fall, the "other" was described in 
thoroughly relational terms as grace to the other, as gift toward 
the other. Attitude and action between Adam and Eve were
characterized by gratitude, selflessness and mutual service 
toward one another. This was the power of the "other," Eve, 
before the Fall.
Then, with the advent of sin came a complete distortion of
that power. The "other" was still described in social terms, but
the terms themselves had changed. The other person was no longer 
grace, but wrath to the other, no longer a gift but a burden. 
The attitude and actions characterizing Adam and Eve were
characterized by ingratitude, selfishness, and opposition. But 
the vectorial nature of Bonhoeffer's description of power's 
changed status is perhaps the most fascinating component of his 
description of sin in terms of power. It is so subtle, yet so 
central to his interpretation that it must be acknowledged for 
a more accurate appreciation of his exegesis.
Before the Fall, power was described positively with Adam 
defining himself in terms of his limit, Eve. He did not occupy 
the center of the relationship, rather, it was a reflexive 
Motion, in which both Adam and Eve understood themselves
224
fundamentally from the vantage point of the other. After the 
Fall, however, power was described negatively with Adam defining 
himself in a self-reflexive manner, with no fundamental reference 
to Eve. Now he occupies the center of the relationship, Eve has 
been transgressed (and perhaps figuratively, pushed aside) having 
become a burden or obstacle, and power which was once service 
with and for the other has become power which is domination of 
one over and to the exclusion of the other. In this way, it 
becomes evident that Bonhoeffer is talking about sin's event or 
actual occurence in the world in ethical terms and in terms of 
power.
This brings us to what actually happened in the Fall, 
according to Bonhoeffer's exegesis. Limit and center provide 
the basis by which Bonhoeffer understands original sin. He 
describes it in two ways:
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In the first place the middle has been entered, 
the limit has been transgressed. Now man stands in 
the middle, now he is without limit. That he stands 
in the middle means that now he lives out of his own
resources and no longer from the middle. That he is
without a limit means that he is alone. To be in the 
middle and to be alone means to be like God. Man is
sicut deus. Now he lives out of himself, now he
creates his own life, he is his own creator . . .
[w]ith this his creatureliness is finished and de­
stroyed for him. Adam is no longer creature. He has 
torn himself away from his creatureliness . . . [t]og- 
ether with the limit Adam has lost his creature­
liness.22
Bonhoeffer follows solidly in Luther's steps, drawing out the 
egocentric "fruit" of sin as man's living "out of himself" 
(incurvatuc; in p;e) . But he does this using the language of 
Boundary and middle (Grenze and Mitte) . The symbolic value of
22 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, p. 72.
the tree of knowledge in the middle of the garden reaches its 
full impact. The center is man's limit, it is God's chosen 
place. By heeding the words of the tempter and eating the fruit 
Adam and Eve have chosen to "renounce the Word of God which 
constantly descends upon [them] out of the unenterable middle and 
limit of life . . . and usurp it for themselves."23
The limit God placed on man has been entered, and man now 
tries to occupy the place which is reserved for God alone. Adam 
has, literally and figuratively, overstepped his boundary, 
thereby changing forever the relationship between Creator and 
created. But by transgressing the limit, Adam's other intimate 
relationship has been irretrievably affected. Eve, who repre­
sents Bonhoeffer's limit, has been violated:
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It is clear, however, that for the Fall, if the 
limit were to be transgressed in opposition to the 
Creator this would have to coincide with the trans­
gression of the limit within the world of creation. 
Every transgression of the limit is bound to mean at 
the same time an attack upon the creatureliness of the 
other person. The violation of the tree of knowledge 
has to be at the same time a violation of the other 
person.24
Now we come to the part of Bonhoeffer's exegesis which deals with 
the "issue" (eventus) of sin, the third part of Luther's triadic
23 Ibid. . p. 73. I have translated the "reissen" as "usurp" 
rather than "snatches" in the quote. The German translation 
reads, "er verzichtet auf das Leben aus diesem Wort und reisst 
es an sich selbst." The Collins German dictionary indicates the 
verb "reissen," when used with the reflexive pronoun "sich" means 
'to seize. However, it also lists the slightly different word 
Usurp" when the reference is to power (Macht) . c f . Peter Terrell 
— sLLl, Collins German-English. English-German Dictionary. 
Glasgow: Collins, 1988), p. 542. The word preference reflects
the more specific context which I am arguing lies at the root of 
Bonhoeffer's exegesis of the creation and fall narrative.
24 Ibid. , p . 74.
definition. As mentioned above, Luther saw the concrete 
manifestation of sin in terms of an attitude of ingratitude 
(Undankbarkeit). When we look to the consequences of the Fall 
for Adam and Eve, Bonhoeffer takes the notion of ingratitude one 
step further.
When Adam and Eve recognized their nakedness and shame, as 
Genesis 3:7 recounts, Bonhoeffer interprets the passage in the 
following manner:
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Eve, the other person, had been to Adam the 
bodily form of the given limit whom he acknowledged in 
love, i.e. in the undivided unity of his devotion and 
whom he loved in her very nature as limit, i.e. 
because she was human and yet "another person." Now 
that he has transgressed the limit, he knows for the 
first time that he was limited . . . [n]ow he no
longer sees the limit of the other person as grace but 
as the wrath, the hatred, the envy of God. This means 
that he no longer sees the other person in love. He 
sees him over against himself, at variance with 
himself. Now the limit is no longer grace, holding 
man in the unity of his creaturely and free love; it 
is discord. Man and woman are divided. This means 
two things. First of all, man makes use of his share 
in the woman's body; more generally, one man makes use 
of his right to the other and puts forward his claim 
to the possession of the other, thereby denying and 
destroying the other person's creatureliness.25
Like Luther, Bonhoeffer believes with the advent of sin, 
ingratitude toward God and others occurs. He affirms this by 
saying the woman is no longer seen as a gift for which to be 
grateful, but as a burden. The grateful attitude disappears and 
is replaced with hatred. But it is more than that. Sin's 
"event" in the world has an ethical character. Bonhoeffer was 
influenced by Friedrech Christoph Oetinger, a seventeenth century
25 Ibid. . pp. 77, 78.
theologian, who emphasized the significance of the physical 
body.26 Bonhoeffer took such a consideration seriously, expli­
cating in detail the ethical/physical ramifications of sin's 
event in the world.
By overstepping his limit in the garden and trying to occupy 
God's place in the center, Adam's understanding of his fellow 
human being as "limit" has a new meaning. Before, Eve was 
Adam's "limit" in the sense that she was a fellow human being, 
a person, with whom Adam could share a relationship. She was a 
gift by God for Adam, and one whom he was given in a mutually 
serving relationship— they were as one. However, with sin's 
advent in the world, Eve was seen by Adam to be a burden. Gone 
was the love and gratitude which had defined Adam's feelings and 
actions toward Eve. Now, there was desire to possess, dominate 
and seize.27 The ethical force of Bonhoeffer's interpretation 
is explicit and provocative.
Bonhoeffer highlights the fact that Eve's creaturely 
existence, in bodily form, is the most basic aspect of God's gift 
to Adam. He was no longer alone— he was given another human 
companion. Community, or sociality, defines the very essence of 
the gift. After the Fall, Eve was a burden to overcome, an 
object to seize or possess. God's grace became God's wrath. The 
relationship of mutual care and serving one another became one 
°f domination and objectification. Gift became scorn, the 
sociality between Adam and Eve being rifted apart in its very
26 Oetinger said, "The end of the ways of God is bodiliness" 
see Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Schöpfung und Fall, op. cit., p. 114.
27 In Life Together Bonhoeffer spoke of sin in terms of human 
absorption" of the other (p. 33) and "domination and force" (p.
• The ethical expression of self-justification occured in 
these terms while the ethical expression of justification by 
grace manifested itself in terms of service.
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essence. By taking Luther's notion of sin as ingratitude one 
step further, he added a thoroughly ethical connotation to sin's 
event in the world.28
III. Conclusions Regarding "Power" in Creation and Fall
Thanks to Bonhoeffer's exegetical work on Genesis 1-3, 
creation and sin are understood from a new paradigm. Power 
surfaces as a category though which he interprets the creation 
and fall of Adam and Eve. Evidence for this hermeneutical key 
does not rest simply on the section whose title and thrust was 
questioned— "The Strength of the Other." Previous chapters have 
demonstrated how the concept "power" lies at the center of 
Bonhoeffer's concept of God and humanity. It is no less so for 
his understanding of sin.
The concepts Bonhoeffer employs in Creation and Fall are 
replete with reference to power. Adam is characterized as 
"invading" the center of the garden, trying to take God's place; 
he violates his limit, transgressing God. He does the same thing 
with his companion, trespassing and changing forever his 
relationship with his fellow human being. Bonhoeffer uses 
specific language to characterize the relationship between Adam 
and Eve before the Fall: gift, grace, love, service, community, 
unity, mutuality; and, after the Fall: wrath, burden, hatred, 
domination, division, self-centeredeness and egocentricity. It
28 This is not to say that Luther did not also have ethical 
qualities about his intepretation of sin as e v e n t u s . He spoke 
°f sin as a robbery of God (thus, a violation of faith), of the Meighbor (a violation of hope) and of one's self (love). However, Luther does not place the same concrete force in his 
definition as Bonhoeffer does. More than a robbery, it is closer 
an invasion or violation of a person. The meaning is much M°re socially and ethically nuanced.
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is interesting to see how he consistently discusses power in 
terms of sociality.29 An intimate relationship between persons, 
characterized by selfless giving of oneself to the other— this 
is Bonhoeffer's definition of community as God created it. 
However, once tainted by sin, the relationship deteriorates to 
one in which "the other" becomes de-humanized, objectivized and 
dominated (no longer seen as person but as thing to be manipulat­
ed) . Bonhoeffer has described the prelapsarian and postlapsarian 
condition in terms of power. But the fact that he has done this, 
consistently, in terms of power in Creation and Fall has gone by 
unacknowledged. How can this be so if it is so basic to his 
overall argument?
The problem has to do with definitions and how we understand 
terms. Bonhoeffer has offered an understanding of power in its 
sinful condition and in its ideal condition. I would argue that 
"power," as a concept, is understood most often in terms of its 
postlapsarian definition. In its more negative forms, power is 
understood as domination, despotism, aggression. In less 
dramatic terms it is also understood as control, possession. 
Most people tend to think of power as a negative concept when it 
involves more "obvious" abuse, such as tyranny or violent 
domination of others. However, there is another aspect to the 
sinful definition of power which is commonly accepted as 
normative and which, I would argue, more often than not, does not 
carry negative value.
When power is reified— that is, when it is understood as a 
thing to be obtained, possessed, seized or controlled, it is a 
OSIkLSocial concept at its base. Bonhoeffer, however, defined
29 Cf. Appendix I for Bethge's comments on the "relatedness" 
of power, pp. 307-08.
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power in thoroughly social terms. In its prelapsarian defini­
tion, "the other" is seen as a gift from God, someone who is in 
a self-giving relationship with another. In its postlapsarian 
definition, "the other" is seen as a burden from God, no longer 
some-one but some-thing to be dominated, possessed or controlled. 
Whereas the first definition connotes self-giving service for and 
with another, the second connotes self-centered objectification 
of the other. These are the terms of power, and Bonhoeffer holds 
up a social understanding of power in contrast to the reified 
definition.
Bonhoeffer's theological scheme suggests an asocial, reified 
notion of power prevails in the sinful world over the social 
understanding of power he envisions. We have seen that the 
nature of sin, according to his exegesis, is to objectivize 'the 
other' so that the person is, literally, de-personalized, de­
humanized and regarded as a burden or object to be manipulated. 
Sin attempts to objectivize the other and dominate him/her— this 
is its nature. The danger comes when an asocial, objectivizing 
notion of "power" is accepted as normative, and this kind of 
definition has occurred in the Western psyche, in both the Church 
and society at large.
If it is the case, that power is regarded as something to 
Be obtained (asocial definition) by society in the West, then how 
can such a "definition" be challenged?30 Several constructive 
options arise. First, the "normative" understanding of power 
must be challenged. Bonhoeffer does this by pitting his social 
definition against the more commonly accepted asocial notion, 
ff the German pastor's alternative interpretation is heard,
30 • • •I use the word "definition" loosely, in the sense that a 
ooncept is accepted as normative by society at large.
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acknowledged or even accepted, then the fact that a sinful 
definition of power has been in place must be confronted. The 
problem is that presently, Western society does not recognize 
that such a negative connotation tends to be operative within the 
structure of power's conventional meaning. Bonhoeffer confronts 
the contemporary world with the category of sin, you might say.
If the Church or non-religious society were to accept the 
new definition of power, where does that leave us? From the 
Christian perspective, we no longer exist in a prelapsarian 
society or community— indeed, far from it. This is where 
Bonhoeffer's eschatological interpretation of Genesis 1-3 is 
helpful. Adopting the Barthian method of exegesis, the creation 
and fall narrative can only be understood from a christological 
vantage point. Only Christ can interpret the story fully. 
Bonhoeffer resolves the human dilemma by referring back to the 
tree of life.31 He says,
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Indeed, it is now obvious that the whole story 
has really been about this tree . . . [t]he desperate 
feature of Adam's situation is just that he lives out 
of himself, he is imprisoned within himself, and thus 
he can only desire himself, he can only crave for 
himself, for he is his own God, he has become the 
creator of his own life. When he seeks God, when he 
seeks life, then he only seeks himself . . . Adam has 
eaten of the tree of knowledge, but the thirst for the 
tree of life, which this fruit has given him, remains 
unquenched. The limit that divides Adam's field from 
paradise shall from now on be here— where stands the 
tree of life.32
31 The reference is to Genesis 3:22-4:1. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 
Station and Fall . pp. 89-94.
32 Bonhoeffer, ibid. , pp. 89-91.
Then, he interprets Genesis 3 : 2433, making the decisive connec­
tion:
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The limit has not shifted, it is where it always 
was, in the unenterable middle of the tree of life. 
But now Adam stands in another place; this limit is no 
longer in the middle of his life, but it afflicts him 
from outside, he must continually run against it . .
. [t]he stem of the Cross becomes the staff of life, 
and in the midst of the world life is set up anew upon 
the cursed ground. In the middle of the world the 
spring of life wells up on the wood of the cross and 
those who thirst for life are called to this water, 
and those who have eaten of the wood of this life 
shall never hunger and thirst again . . . [w]hat a
strange tree of life, this tree on which God himself 
must suffer and die— but it is in fact the Kingdom of 
Life and of the Resurrection given again by God in 
grace; it is the opened door of imperishable hope, of 
waiting and of patience. The tree of life, the Cross 
of Christ, the middle of the fallen and preserved 
world of God, for us that is the end of the story of 
paradise.34
The tree of life achieves its full significance through 
Bonhoeffer's eschatalogical interpretation. Now, persons can 
reach for life and receive it from the tree on which Christ died, 
which stands at the center of life. The cross occupies the 
center of life, but it is still limit for women and men. Only 
Christ occupied the cross, dying on it so that persons might come 
to it to receive true life. The cross restores the hope, the 
life which sinful humanity tries to seize as its own.
But here again, with the cross both center and limit as the 
tree of life, power receives its redefinition. Before the Fall, 
God, Adam and Eve lived in intimate self-giving relationship with
33 "He drove out the man; and at the east of the garden of 
Eden he placed the cherubim, and a flaming sword which turned 
every way, to guard the way to the tree of life." Bonhoeffer, 
Srgation and Fall r p. 91.
34 Jbid. , pp. 91-94.
each other. God gave Adam life, creating communion between 
Creator and creature. God lovingly gave Adam new life with Eve 
so they might share life together. Self-giving for the other 
characterized every relationship between God, Adam and Eve. 
Then, with the Fall, Adam invaded God's and Eve's boundaries, and 
self-giving for the other became self-centered domination of the 
other. Now, Christ's selfless giving of himself on the cross for 
others makes possible again the same selfless service between the 
Christian community.
"Power" is restored to its former terms— all because of the 
power of the Cross. In this way, Bonhoeffer's theological 
interpretation of creation and fall is within the tradition of 
the theoloqia crucis. The cross stands in the center of life, 
transforming sin's distorted terms of power to their original 
connotation. But the power of the cross would not be understood 
in its fullness unless one identified the ethical interpretation 
of creation and sin as Bonhoeffer did in his interpretation of 
Genesis 1-3.
Unless one recognizes the nature of God's power as selfless 
giving to and for the other, as Christ did on the cross, and 
unless one sees the nature of sin's power as self-centered 
objectivization of the other, our present understanding of 
"power" in the world will go by unquestioned. The significance 
and meaning of the cross and of sin may be regained in a new, 
fresh and relevant way in contemporary Western culture by 
examining these theological categories by way of power analysis. 
Bonhoeffer showed how theological power analysis is possible in 
his theological interpretation of Genesis 1-3. Without his 
interpretation of the terms of power, we would remain blind to
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our sinful and inaccurate presumptions about human power and its 
ramifications in the world today.
The cross of Jesus Christ as the center and limit of life—  
this imagery provides the key to understanding God's power and 
human power in the world. Bonhoeffer never departed from such 
theological thinking. Indeed, his famous words from prison in 
July, 1944 echo the words and concepts written at the university 
in 1932/33. He said,
The God who lets us live in the world without the 
working hypothesis of God is the God before whom we 
stand continually. Before God and with God we live 
without God. God lets himself be pushed out of the 
world on to the cross. He is weak and powerless in 
the world, and that is precisely the way, the only 
way, in which he is with us and helps us. Matthew 
8:17 makes it quite clear that Christ helps us, not by 
virtue of his omnipotence, but by virtue of his 
omnipotence and suffering.35
These well-known words achieve their full significance in light 
of Bonhoeffer's theological concepts in Creation and Fall. The 
cross stands at the outer limit of life because the world has 
pushed it there. However, God remains in the center of life, 
allowing the cross to be rejected and edged out of human life. 
This is the theoloqia crucis at its height and then it comes down 
to the endThis is the theoloqia crucis at its height. The 
language of paradox— limit and center— applies perfectly to the 
cross here. Yet we know that it is not paradoxical— that is, 
left in unresolved contradiction— because we know Bonhoeffer 
understood "limit" and "middle" in terms of one another, 
further, this is the essence of the power of the cross. Despite
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35 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, pp. 360, 361.
(Emphasis added) .
modern humanity's rejection of the cross, God's power is ever 
present in his self-giving on the cross for others. His power 
is in giving himself away in loving relationship for others, not 
in marking off inviolable space in the center of life.36 Despite 
all human effort, the cross remains in the middle, even though 
it stands on the edge or limit of human life, barely visible and 
seemingly insignificant.
If one examines Bonhoeffer's interpretation of creation and 
fall in terms of power analysis, then a new definition of human 
and divine power becomes possible. Giving oneself to and for the 
other in love is the essence of God's power. Selfless, mutual 
relationship between people is the redeemed ethical definition 
of power made possible through the God's power pro nobis on the 
cross. Self-centered, dominating objectivization of others is
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36 This is exactly what Bonhoeffer is after when he says in 
his prison letter of July 1944, "The Bible directs man to God's 
powerlessness and suffering; only the suffering God can help. 
To that extent we may say that the development towards the 
world's coming of age outlined above, which has done away with 
a false conception of God, opens up a way of seeing the God of 
the Bible who wins power and space in the world by his weakness. 
Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, p. 361. (Emphasis 
added) .
Although Bonhoeffer does extol the intellectual development 
of philosophy and religion from the Middle Ages on and he heralds 
their contribution in making a path toward the world's "coming 
of age," he is making a theological statement of the order of the 
¿heplogja crucis and its significance has not been sufficientlyap p rec ia ted .
According to this theological letter Christ's cross occupies 
the center and limit of life. One must keep in mind what he said 
at the conclusion of this particular letter: "This [the God of
the Bible, who wins power and space in the world by his weakness] 
Wlll probably be the starting-point for our 'secular' interpre­
tation." Bonhoeffer's theoloqia crucis underlies all his 
statements about a world come of age and the progress of history. 
Tf one does not recognize this in its fulness in Bonhoeffer's 
letter of July 16, 1944, then the sinful character of modern
humanity is totally missed. Now, as then, the creature tries to 
Push the tree out of the center, out on the edge of life. But 
Bonhoeffer shows how God remains at the center while the tree of 
life, the cross, occupies the outer limit of life.
the sinful ethical definition of power. Even something so 
seemingly insignificant as an understanding of power as something 
to strive for, something one can obtain, holds within it sinful 
assumptions. The nature of power is duplex, given its social 
definition, according to Bonhoeffer. Thanks to his sapient and 
sensitive intepretation, we not only have a way toward a fresh 
understanding of divine and human power in the world, the cross 
takes on totally new significance and definition— all by way of 
a lonely, insignificant tree.
Conclusions
Bonhoeffer wanted to find a way to discuss theological 
concepts in a non-religious way. He was convinced the Church and 
theology needed to find a new language. Too much time has been 
spent grieving over, or being frustrated with, the incomplete 
nature of Bonhoeffer's provocative ideas, overlooking the new 
language which already lies inherently within the structure of 
his theology. Power analysis not only yields a new view into 
Bonhoeffer's thought, but a viable alternative for understanding 
and talking about divine and human power in the late twentieth 
century. Such a schema for theological thought, discussion, and 
action is timely if not mandated.
But what is fascinating is the reflexive quality of the 
concept of power for Bonhoeffer. Not only is power analysis 
aPpropriate to Bonhoeffer's theology as a whole, it arises from 
within the structure of his categories of thought. In this case 
ln Creation and Fall, creation and sin were revealed in a 
striking light, in socio-ethical terms. Sin is reintroduced into 
c°ntemporary religious and non-religious thought, discussion and
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action as a reality with which to contend. Whether or not the 
Church or society at large heeds the convicting challenge is one 
thing. But the fact that Bonhoeffer issues such a challenge to 
his succeeding generations cannot be disputed and should not be 
ignored.
As with any other scheme, Bonhoeffer leaves us with 
questions and problems which need to be resolved. For example, 
because Bonhoeffer's concept of power is social at its base, does 
this mean it is confined to anthropology to the exclusion of the 
environment? The answer to this is no. Although Bonhoeffer does 
not address ecological issues explicitly in his theology, and how 
the creature is related to the creation, the categories of his 
thought lend themselves fully to a "creation" theology. Given 
the nature of power which is defined in terms of the cross, 
persons are to live in thoughtful, giving, loving relation to the 
earth. Human attitude and actions are defined in reference to 
the creation God has given to humanity as a gift to be prized and 
preserved.
Secondly, Bonhoeffer's interpretation of sin as a misuse of 
power that manifests itself in terms of domination, objecti­
fication, and aggression appears to smack of sexism. At first 
glance this is the case. On the one hand, it is to Bonhoeffer's 
detriment that he did not perceive nor discuss sin as self- 
abnegation, as is a more accurate and relevant interpretation of 
sin for many people.37 This must be admitted to be lacking in
37 Gregory Jones in his paper, "The Cost of Forgiveness: Bonhoeffer on Grace, Christian Community, and the Politics of 
Worldly Discipleship" says that Bonhoeffer identifies pride as 
the root of all sin in his two works Spiritual Care and Life 
^Eggther. Jones does an excellent job showing how Bonhoeffer does not treat self-abnegation as sin. The Sixth International Bonhoeffer Conference "Bonhoeffer's Legacy for the Future: R e s p o n s ib i l i ty  in a New World," New York, Union Theological
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his theology. However, one must remember Bonhoeffer's duplex 
notion of power and the far-reaching ramifications of those 
meanings. To say the sinful definition of power is domination 
is to point the finger at the one who is guilty of this sin. In 
other words, sin manifests itself locally and personally. It 
would be wrong to universalize his definition of sinful power and 
apply it to those whose error lies elsewhere. The point with 
Bonhoeffer is that he was identifying the flagrant ethical misuse 
and abuse of power he was witnessing in his corner of the world 
and holding the relevant persons accountable according to this 
definition.38
One must avoid the temptation to universalize Bonhoeffer's 
description of the power of sin because sin can ethically 
manifest itself in many different ways. Further, the redeemed 
notion of power as selfless giving of oneself in relation
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38 In a section of her essay, "Bonhoeffer's Picture of 
Women", Renate Bethge points out that Bonhoeffer never "had or 
gave the feeling to a woman that he, as a man, was superior to 
her." In her essay, Bethge depicts the strong role women played 
at that time in Germany in the home and in Nazi society. While 
she admits Bonhoeffer wrote some things about women that 
surprises her, she affirms his basic respect for women. She 
says, " . . .  I get angry when I read dialogues in the many 
fiction and film manuscripts about Dietrich Bonhoeffer and his 
family where the men . . . talk down to the women in a teaching 
Manner and when the women are described as simple and frightened. 
As a matter of fact, the women were cunning and strong, never 
showing fear towards the Nazis, hardly even to each other, in 
order to keep up the spirit. They, as women were, even more 
outspoken and straightforward to the Nazis than the men. They 
had no jobs to lose and as women enjoyed a certain fool's license 
which they all used, . . . Renate Bethge, "Bonhoeffer's Picture
°f Women", Bonhoeffer's Ethics: Old Europe and New Frontiers.
(Kampen, Netherlands: Kok Pharos Publishing House, 1991), pp.
198. Bethge's helpful description of women at that time in 
Germany evidences key differences in self-identity between women 
at that time Germany and many women today in the United States. 
This helps us evaluate the charge that Bonhoeffer's definition 
°f sin does not apply to those who consider self-abnegation an 
accurate definition.
with/for another does not assume sheepish, self-deprecating, 
apologetic behavior. Service does not connote denial of oneself 
in a negative way. The need for a redefinition of service and 
selflessness may very well be warranted. One need only look at 
Jesus' life and teachings to see the perfect example of selfless 
giving of oneself for others. However, Jesus was bold, prophet­
ic, strong and incomparably courageous. These terms must be 
included in a graceful understanding of power as selfless 
service.
The circularity of sin's ethical power is inevitable unless 
a diacritical point is established by which persons may critique 
their personal assumptions, definitions, speech and actions. One 
could start to establish such a point with an inspection of the 
meanings surrounding "power" and "service" in society today. It 
would be better first to take a long look at the lonely, blood­
stained tree standing on the edge of the world. This is the 
theological legacy Bonhoeffer leaves the present generation. It 
is the ethical mandate society cannot ignore any longer and the 
power from which new definitions will emerge.
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The dialectical unity between prayer 
and earthiness was the fascinating secret of 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer's spirituality.
Jürgen Moltmann, The Church in the 
Power of the Spirit, pp. 283-84.
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CHAPTER FOUR
A REDEFINITION AND A MODEL OF POWER:
THE ARCANE DISCIPLINE
Introduction
Up to this point we have looked to Bonhoeffer's theoloqia 
crucis as the locus for Bonhoeffer's thoughts on divine and human 
power. We have seen how his understanding of God, humanity, and 
sin are all bound up with the dialectical concept of power as 
this power is defined according to Christ's passion on the cross. 
Now, with a better understanding of the specific nature of 
power's sociality, i.e., power as selfless, sacrificial giving 
of oneself in relationship with and for the other person, we move 
to examine the arcane discipline as a concrete model of power, 
a specific framework by which Bonhoeffer's redefinition may be 
weighed and measured.
As the previous chapters have demonstrated, a two-part
definition of divine and human power is present in Dietrich
Bonhoeffer's theological thought, characterized by the following 
"movement": first, a reversal of terms where Bonhoeffer
exchanges a powerful image of God for a weak, powerless one; he 
exchanges a weak humanity for a strong one. This is the first 
level of the definition, and it is an overt, clear exchange; 
second, a redefinition of terms where the hidden meaning 
associated with the new images of God and humanity is brought to 
Bear on the new terms. What Bonhoeffer means by a weak God, what 
Be means by a strong humanity is examined in light of the cross, 
which gives content to the new definitions.
This chapter seeks to determine the ful1 meaning of 
Bonhoeffer's understanding of God's presence and human autonomy 
in dialectical terms of power by looking to the 'arcane disci­
pline, ' demonstrating thereby that the same "movement" or 
material content occurs in Bonhoeffer's model of power as was 
true in his definition. We shall examine the ingenious way he 
linked eschatology with ethics so that we have a new paradigm, 
a new model for understanding the Church's power in a modern 
world. This "discipline" unfolds as an ethical model of power, 
and it eventually leads us back to reexamine the project as a 
whole, to see if Bonhoeffer's redefinition is substantiated, 
coherent and ethically viable in today's world.
I. The Relationship between the Non-Religious Interpretation 
and the Arcane Discipline
Bonhoeffer was concerned with the way the church would look 
and sound in a modern, "religionless" age. He pursued this line 
of inquiry in his first theological letter from prison:
. . . [i]f our final judgment must be that the
western form of Christianity, too, was only a prelimi­
nary stage to a complete absence of religion, what 
kind of situation emerges for us, for the church? . .
. The questions to be answered would surely be: What 
do a church, a community, a sermon, a liturgy, a 
Christian life mean in a religionless world? .
What is the place of worship and prayer in a religion­
less situation? Does the secret discipline, . . .
take on a new importance here?1
Tm grappling with the contours of the church in the forthcoming 
generations Bonhoeffer mentioned the notion of a secret or arcane
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1 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, pp. 280, 281.
discipline as a way to help the church maintain a right identity 
and relationship in and with the world. Although he was not able 
to explicate fully the potential significance of this "disci­
pline" due to his circumstances, he did describe what he meant 
by it in the baptismal address he wrote for his godson. He said:
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our being Christians today will be limited to two 
things: prayer and righteous action among men. All
Christian thinking, speaking, and organizing must be 
born anew out of this prayer and action . . .2
For Bonhoeffer, prayer and action in the service of others would 
constitute the parameters of Christianity for a new generation 
of Christians. But what exactly did he mean by this hidden 
discipline, this call to prayer and righteous action? Eberhard 
Bethge offered a very helpful explanation, considering the wider 
context of Bonhoeffer's theology as it had developed up to that 
time:
Everything presses now toward those passages in 
which Bonhoeffer speaks of the mystery of a 'partici­
pation in the suffering of God on this earth', . . .
Bonhoeffer describes this central mystery by the term 
'arcane discipline', referring to that part of the 
sharing . . . that is concerned with the 'worship of
God' . . . this is where we have statements about
silence and invisibility, about the way in which the 
just man prays and acts, and about the difference 
between the ultimate and the penultimate . . .  he 
means . . . that when the Gospel is preached the
relationship between God's Word and his world is not 
an obvious thing and cannot be established artificial­
2 Bonhoeffer, Ibid., p. 300; cf. pp. 281, 286. The only 
letters from prison where Bonhoeffer uses the phrase 'arcane 
discipline' are the ones of April 30, and May 5, 1944 and the 
Baptismal address for Dietrich Wilhelm Rudiger Bethge on May 18, 
1944 .
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ly or by a trick. The invention of new words achieves 
nothing."3
This entreaty to take the "secret discipline" more seriously 
involves taking a second look at two things, which for Bon­
hoeffer, formed a dialectic— prayer and "righteous" action in the 
world.4 How do we know these two factors comprise the discipline 
Bonhoeffer was pointing to? How do we know he was not referring 
primarily or exclusively to a new liturgy, or, in fact, to its 
dismissal? We know because:
It would be a total misunderstanding of Bon­
hoeffer to imagine that in the realization of his 
worldly interpretation there would no longer be any 
community gathered for worship, so that the Word, the 
Sacrament and the community could be simply replaced 
by caritas. The self-sacrifice of the Church in his 
non-religious interpretation, which Bonhoeffer was 
thinking of, both for it and for himself, is not, 
then, to be at all associated with the loss of identi­
ty. It is precisely this that is to be re-won.5
Clearly, Bonhoeffer was not trying to do away with traditional 
forms of Christianity. The church exists in relationship with 
a modern, secular world. Bethge clarified this relationship as 
he described its relation to the "non-religious interpretation" 
of Biblical concepts:
3 Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer. pp. 784-86.
4 It should be noted that Larry Rasmussen identifies the 
dialectic in Bonhoeffer between the hidden discipline (character­
ized by religionless worship in a secular age) and "doing justice 
among men." in Dietrich Bonhoeffer— His Significance Among North 
^ericans, p. 68.
5 Eberhard Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer. p. 785.
"The starting-point of his thinking f about the 
non-religious interpretation! is characteristically 
linked with his interest in an 'arcane discipline'. 
i.e. in the constant relationship between the inter­
preter and the Lord, whose power lies in his very 
powerlessness. This approach has not, on the whole, 
been accepted in theological discussion, but it raises 
immediately the problem of the identity of the Chris­
tian as soon as he begins to see the extent of his 
identification with the world. If, then, non-reli­
gious interpretation means identification, then arcane 
discipline is the guarantee of an identity."6
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With the identity of the Christian in the world at stake, 
Bonhoeffer set out to "guarantee" that identity by talking about 
a kind of discipline. Prayer and action, thus, constitute the 
secure parameters of Christianity by which a new generation of 
Christians might understand their relationship in and with the 
world.
We saw in chapter two how the Christian identity revolves 
around the notion of human autonomy or power. We found human 
autonomy in Ethics discussed in terms of freely chosen, responsi­
ble acts for others in an increasingly godless world. Thus, a 
social concept is at the heart of the non-religious interpreta­
tion, and it is characterized in terms of a relationship between 
"the interpreter and the Lord, whose power lies in his very 
powerlessness." God's weakness figured in as the cornerstone 
Motif in his description of the modern person's identity in the
world.
Bonhoeffer's expanded anthropological vision in Ethics made 
room for Christian and non-Christian alike. However, now that 
he had set some terms by which the modern identity might 
understand itself, he tried now in the prison letters to set out
6 Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer. op. cit., p. 783. (Emphasis
added) .
clear parameters by which the Christian, the Church, might 
maintain its identity aright. As Bethge said, he looked for the 
terms of a "guarantee" of sorts that would respect the identity 
of the autonomous person, but in the light of a God whose power 
"lies in his very powerlessness." We turn now to see how 
Bonhoeffer envisioned this identity to be preserved and guaran­
teed with the "arcane discipline" and the role eschatology played 
in such a scheme.
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II. The Relationship Between the Arcane Discipline and Ethics
Although some Bonhoeffer scholars negate the presence of a 
strong eschatalogical emphasis in Bonhoeffer,7 the German pastor 
indicated otherwise, particularly in the Letters and Papers from 
Prison8. In one of the prison letters he demonstrated such an 
interest:
The time between Easter and Ascension has always 
been particularly important to me. Our gaze is 
already directed to the last thing of all, but we 
still have our tasks, our joys and our sorrows on this 
earth and the power of living is granted to us by 
Easter. I . . . want to go this way with Maria, quite 
prepared for the last thing, for eternity, and yet 
wholly present for the task, the beauties and the
7 Such as Heinrich Ott, Reality and Faith, trans. A.A. 
Morrison (London: Lutterworth Press, 1971).
8 Cf. Clements, o p . cit., pp. 186-197 for a helpful discus­
sion of Bultmann's eschatological emphasis and how it relates to 
Bonhoeffer's christology. The 'secret discipline' figures in as 
a key eschatological component according to Ronald Gregor Smith.
L. Gregory Jones, argues persuasively for the clear presence 
°f this thematic in Bonhoeffer's theology, even in his early 
w°rk, in his recent seminar paper The Cost of Forgiveness: 
Ssnhoeffer nn Grace. Christian Community, and the Politics of 
^££ldly ni sr.i pleship, presented at the Sixth International Bonhoeffer Society Conference, Union Theological Seminary, New 
Tork City, August, 1992, esp. p. 23.
248
troubles of this earth. Only on this way can we be 
completely happy and completely at peace together.9
Indeed, the christological question which lay at the heart of his 
question "Who is Jesus Christ for us today?" is, in part, an 
eschatalogical one. In laying out Christ's claim on a world- 
come-of-age, Bonhoeffer expressed his hope in the eschatalogical 
fulfillment of the world, the 'restoration of all things, ' as the 
new creation which shall be achieved through the Holy Spirit.10 
We miss out on an aspect of his theology which is integral to his 
overall theological perspective if we do not pause and note the 
significance of his eschatalogical vision and what he meant by 
it.
Eberhard Bethge spoke of the "hidden discipline" in the 
following fashion:
. . . in the arcanum there takes place the life
events of faith, praise, thanksgiving and the fellow­
ship of the communion table, and these are not inter­
preted outwardly . . . Christ, the center of this
arcane discipline, continually sends out the 'ini­
tiated' into their participation in the life of the 
world, promising them that he encounters and questions 
them there.11
The interface between worship and action in the world is clear. 
But how is the Church to understand this partially hidden form 
°f spirituality? Bethge takes up this concern directly: "They
can make the sacrifice of being silent and incognito because they
9 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, p. 246. Also, 
<?L. p. 272 where he said, "How can people stand earthly tensions 
if they know nothing of the tension between heaven and earth?"
10 Ibid. . pp. 170, 171.
11 Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer. p. 788.
trust the Holy Spirit, who knows and brings on the time of 
proclamation."12 With the concept of the "secret discipline" 
Bonhoeffer set forth a provocative dimension to his escha- 
talogical drive. We turn now to see how two themes which 
surfaced in Ethics— the "ultimate and the penultimate" and 
"conformation" to Christ— bear on this provocative idea.
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A. The Ultimate and Penultimate
Geffrey Kelly, in his book Liberating Faith: Bonhoeffer's
Message for Today13, made a connection between the arcane 
discipline and the theme of the ultimate-penultimate in his 
Ethics:
The discipline of the secret in the first in­
stance, is alternated with the distinction Bonhoeffer 
made in his Ethics between penultimate and ultimate. 
These are terms employed by Bonhoeffer in place of the 
more familiar 'natural-supernatural' distinction of 
traditional church dogmatics. Because the Christian 
belongs wholly to this world, after the manner of 
Christ incarnate, the penultimate includes a whole­
hearted embracing of all human values. But this 
penultimate living is, in turn, conditioned by the 
ultimate. Bonhoeffer was careful that the concept of 
the ultimate should not be made to intrude imperiously 
on the penultimate situations in which the Christian 
can only wait and hope for insight into the full 
meaning of an event shrouded in historical ambiva­
lence. It is on such occasions that Bonhoeffer 
counseled and practiced a respectful silence that is 
akin to the 'discipline of the secret' mentioned in 
the letters.14
12 Ibid. In his discussion of what Bonhoeffer meant by the 
arcane discipline Bethge pointed to the pneumatological signifi­
cance therein. Cf. the guotation found on p. 202 of this study.
13 Geffrey Kelly, Liberating Faith: Bonhoeffer's Message for
£&day, (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Augsburg Publishing House,
l984), pp. 134-35.
14 Kelly, ibid. . p. 135.
Kelly joins Larry Rasmussen15 in pointing out the way Bonhoeffer 
combines eschatology and ethics in connection with the arcane 
discipline. This is an ingenious way of maintaining the 
difference between God and persons so that an ultimate identifi­
cation is not made and yet a false separation is not evoked 
either.
Bonhoeffer explained what he meant by his concept of 
ultimate and penultimate:
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What is the penultimate? It is everything that 
precedes the ultimate, everything that precedes the 
justification of the sinner by grace alone . . .  It is 
at the same time everything which follows the ultimate 
and yet again precedes it . . . the penultimate . . .
does not determine the ultimate; it is the ultimate 
which determines the penultimate . . . Concretely, two 
things are called penultimate in relation to the 
justification of the sinner by grace, namely being man 
and being good.16
He went on to say that while it is only on the basis of the 
ultimate (justification) that we can know what it is to be human 
(the penultimate), the relationship is such that personhood 
precedes justification. In this relationship, the penultimate 
does not rob the ultimate of its freedom; it is the freedom of 
the ultimate that validates the penultimate.17
15 Rasmussen discusses this in his chapter "An Ethic of the 
Cross," Rasmussen, op. cit.. pp. 144-173.
16 Bonhoeffer, Ethics. pp. 133-34.
17 Ibid. . p. 134. The definition of "ultimate-penultimate" 
above, as well as a few of the statements below on "the preparing 
°f the way" originated in my S.T.M. thesis on Bonhoeffer, 
"Towards a New Spirituality in North America: The Import of 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Dialectical Model of Spirituality", S.T.M. , 
Tale Divinity School, (1989) pp. 29-31.
L. Gregory Jones demonstrates in his paper, "The Cost of 
Forgiveness: . . ." three dimensions to Bonhoeffer's ultimate-
penultimate motif: first, the ordering of the term— the ultimate
ls Primary, the penultimate is to be understood in the light of
In this formula the emphasis on ethical behavior comes to 
the fore. Action which fosters more humane conditions in life 
prepares the way for God's grace to take hold in humanity.18 
But, with his emphasis on human realization of the penultimate, 
one might suspect that Bonhoeffer is suggesting a concept of 
grace in which human effort must precede God's message in order 
for it to take hold in the lives of men and women. This is not 
so. Bonhoeffer affirms that "[g]race must in the end prepare and 
make level its own way and grace alone must ever anew render 
possible the impossible." He went on to say, " . . .  all this 
does not release us from our obligation to prepare the way for 
the coming of grace, and to remove whatever obstructs it and 
makes it difficult."19 Rather than questioning the ultimacy of 
grace, Bonhoeffer asserted the necessity of responsible human 
action in the world as a preparation of the ultimate act of God's 
grace to occur.
There is a tendency for one to argue for the ultimacy of 
God's grace not so much to praise the finality of God's mercy
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the ultimate; second, the ultimate is the temporally final word 
of Christ's forgiveness that precedes the penultimate way that 
leads to repentance; and third, a more socio-political meaning—  
whereas we cannot compel the imparting of God's forgiving grace 
(the ultimate), we must still prepare the way (the penultimate) 
through concrete acts of repentance, cf. pp. 23-27.
18 Articulating what Bonhoeffer meant by 'grace' in his 
discussion on the Sermon on the Mount, Glen Stassen refers to the 
"shape of grace" as "that which delivers from mechanisms of 
bondage into a community of inclusive compassion. We are 
delivered into the light of God's presence, peace among nations, 
compassionate justice for the poor and hungry, knowledge of the 
Lord's forgiveness and redemption." Glen H. Stassen, "Grace and 
Deliverance in the Sermon on the Mount," Review and Expositor. 
v°l* 89, no. 2, Spring 1992, p. 237. Stassen makes a convincing 
argument for interpreting the Sermon on the Mount as "delivering 
grace", overcoming its past interpretation as an impossible ideal.
19 Bonhoeffer, Ethics. p. 136.
toward humanity, but to examine the possibility of human 
exemption from responsibility in allowing God's grace to become 
real for others. Bonhoeffer depicted this with a telling 
illustration:
For him who is cast into utter shame, desolation, 
poverty and helplessness, it is difficult to have 
faith in the justice and goodness of God . . .  To 
allow the hungry man to remain hungry would be to
blasphemy against God and one's neighbor, for what is
nearest to God is precisely the need of one's neigh­
bor .20
The preparation of the way for God's grace does not consist in 
esoteric, intellectual exercises. Bonhoeffer clearly suggested 
it consists in concrete actions done with and for those around 
us. With the profound notion of the ultimate and penultimate, 
he showed the way to understand God's forgiveness and human 
responsibility without hegemony, demonstrating thereby the place 
and meaning of both in a contemporary world. We shall see more
fully how this scheme relates to the "secret discipline" as a
concrete way modern Christians may prepare the way for God's 
graceful presence in the present age.
B. Conformation to Christ
In his section entitled "Ethics as Formation" Bonhoeffer 
spoke concretely of a way to understand how Christ is present and 
"takes shape" among us today. He said,
The word 'formation' arouses our suspicion. We 
are sick and tired of Christian programmes and of the
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20 Ibid. . pp. 136, 137.
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thoughtless and superficial slogan of what is called 
'practical' Christianity as distinct from 'dogmatic' 
Christianity . . . [t]he word 'formation', therefore, 
must be taken in quite a different sense from that to 
which we are accustomed. And in fact the Holy Scrip­
tures speak of formation in a sense which is at first 
entirely unfamiliar to us. Their primary concern is 
not with the forming of a world by means of plans and 
programmes. Whenever they speak of forming they are 
concerned only with the one form which has overcome 
the world, the form of Jesus Christ. Formation can 
only come from this form. But here again it is not a 
question of applying directly to the world the teach­
ing of Christ or what are referred to as Christian 
principles, so that the world might be formed in 
accordance with these. On the contrary, formation 
comes only by being drawn in into the form of Jesus 
Christ. It comes only as formation in His likeness, 
as conformation with the unique form of Him who was 
made man, was crucified and rose again. 21
Nowhere is Bonhoeffer more dynamic in his description of the way 
Christ is present in the world than in his description of the way 
he takes shape within persons, by formation. But he does not 
stop there. Lest the modern Christian think one can achieve such 
formation on his or her own he said,
This is not achieved by dint of efforts 'to 
become like Jesus', which is the way in which we 
usually interpret it. It is achieved only when the 
form of Jesus Christ itself works upon us in such a 
manner that it moulds our form in its own likeness 
(Gal. 4.19). Christ remains the only giver of forms. 
It is not Christian men who shape the world with their 
ideas, but it is Christ who shapes men in conformity 
with Himself.22
To make his point clear he forwarded the notion of "conforma­
tion." The present Christ seeks visibility, he does not remain 
hidden. And Bonhoeffer put concrete definition to the visible 
form of this christological presence in the world by elaborating
21 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, p. 80. (emphasis added) .
22 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, p. 80.
on the notion of conformation. This presence is beyond imita­
tion,23 and it is perhaps the most dynamic way he came to speak 
of how Christ is for us, pro nobis, in a world come of age.
At least four things stand out in this concept of conforma­
tion and how it relates to the arcane discipline. First, 
Bonhoeffer emphasized that conformation to Christ does not mean 
taking on an alien form, but persons are transformed into their 
own proper form.24 This is another provocative way Bonhoeffer 
was able to emphasize God's gracious initiative with humanity 
without eclipsing or taking away from human autonomy in any way. 
Formation to Christ involves persons being freed for their own 
true form. This highly personal and dynamic aspect of Bon­
hoeffer 's understanding of who Jesus Christ is for us reveals a 
basic intimacy between God and individuals through the Mediator 
of forms which respects human autonomy at its base.
Secondly, we see how Bonhoeffer is able to discuss the 
Lutheran notion of life coram Deo in a new way, in non-religious 
terms. God's gracious initiative in the life of the Christian 
is preserved because ultimately, human existence involves a 
passivity at its base. As Bonhoeffer said, ". . . formation
comes only by being drawn in into the form of Jesus Christ . .
• I|25 The form of Jesus Christ "molds our form," working itself 
upon us.26 This is none other than an existence which "under­
23 "The form of Jesus Christ takes form in man. Man does not 
take on an independent form of his own, but what gives him form 
and what maintains him in the new form is always solely the form 
°f Jesus Christ Himself. It is therefore not a vain imitation 
°r repetition of Christ's own form but Christ's form itself which 
takes form in man." Bonhoeffer, Ethics, p. 82.
24 cf. Ibid. , p. 82.
25 Ibid. , p . 8 0.
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26 Ibid.
goes" and a provocative way to understand how Christians in a 
modern world live in the presence of God, under divine guidance.
Thirdly, Bonhoeffer emphasized that conformation takes place 
within the Church, not in everyone. As we shall see later in 
more depth, it involves a "joining in the Messianic suffering of 
God in the world." Larry Rasmussen described the contemporary 
application of such a restriction:
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Arcane discipline means that worship in a world 
come of age is not for everyone. It is for small 
groups of committed Christians who comprise an intense 
community on the basis of their intense loyalty to 
Christ. Their expression of the meaning of that 
loyalty is communicated with one another in worship, 
but not to and with all. Worship as arcane discipline 
is not for the streets, the posters, or the mass 
media. It is certainly not Hollywood Bowl and drive- 
in Easter sunrise services, nor Sunday East Room 
exercises in American civil religion in the White 
House, nor Astrodome rallies of religiosity. It is 
not bumper-sticker and slick paper Christianity. If 
Bonhoeffer were to have his way, the church would 
begin by giving up its property for the sake of the 
needy, would be devout in its practice of disciplines, 
and demanding in its stipulations for participation. 
It would be a poor and apparently powerless church 
that would dispense costly grace, rather than a rich 
and privileged church that offers cheap grace.27
Bonhoeffer envisioned the arcane discipline to take shape in 
"small bands" of followers.28 This was yet another way he set 
forth a "guarantee" for Christians and their identity in a modern
world.
Lastly, by delineating conformation as he did, Bonhoeffer 
showed precisely how ethics as a discipline is grounded in the 
£§Eson of Jesus Christ. It is a thoroughly social point of
27 Rasmussen, op. cit. , pp. 68-69. Also quoted in GregoryJones, "The Cost of Forgiveness" o p . cit., p. 35.
28 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, p. 83.
departure, supplanting Christian ethics as a programmatic 
enterprise at its base. The Church as the body of Christ, then, 
takes on an even more profound connotation as the concrete, 
personal way Christ is present for others. He said:
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What matters in the Church is not religion but 
the form of Christ, and its taking form amidst a band 
of men. If we allow ourselves to lose sight of this, 
even for an instant, we inevitably relapse into that 
programme-planning for the ethical or religious 
shaping of the world, which was where we set out from 
. . . The point of departure for Christian ethics is
the body of Christ, the form of Christ in the form of 
the Church, and formation of the Church in conformity 
with the form of Christ . . . For indeed it is not
written that God became an idea, a principle, a 
programme, a universally valid proposition or a law, 
but that God became man.29
With his notions of the ultimate-penultimate and conforma­
tion, Bonhoeffer demonstrated a new way to understand the 
relationship between God and the Christian community in an 
increasingly secular world. These novel terms point to the new 
theological language he envisioned for a new generation of 
Christians, but more importantly, they laid the foundation for 
a concrete ethical formula by which the modern Christian identity 
and subsequent action might be measured and preserved— prayer and 
righteous action in the world.
29 Bonhoeffer, ibid. . pp. 84, 85.
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III. Prayer and Righteous Action as a Guarantee of the Christian
Identity in a 'World Come of Age'
A. Prayer as Limit
Bonhoeffer used the language of center and limit, middle and 
boundary at different points in his theology. At one point in 
a prison letter he said, "I've come to be doubtful of talking 
about any human boundaries (is even death, which people now 
hardly fear, and is sin, which they now hardly understand, still 
a genuine boundary today?)30 In this context, "human bound­
aries" represent the point at which human knowledge or strength 
fail and persons look to God out of weakness, ambiguity or simply 
laziness. "Boundary" is understood as weakness which is 
exploited.
Whereas the context for Bonhoeffer was one in which human 
limit represented intellectual sloth or physical weakness, the 
context for many Westerners today is the opposite— human 
limitations have been broken and crossed in so many ways that 
they have come to represent meaningless, transgressed signposts. 
Prayer is one of the limits which is commonly transgressed with 
no looking back. Bonhoeffer's attitude toward the concept of 
boundaries and limits in Creation and Fall is instructive here. 
F°r him, the "other" was discussed in social, relational terms 
as a graceful limit, a person to be served. His consequent 
thoughts and the legacy bequeathed to us in his notion of 
i£handisz ipii n , focused as they are on the place of prayer and 
righteous action in the world, lead us to new understandings of 
discipline, responsibility, and limits.
30 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, p. 282.
Bonhoeffer believed prayer was at the center of the Chris­
tian life, both in a world-come-of-age and in every age.31 When 
one reads his thoughts on the topic of prayer, whether in his 
earlier works or in the later works, one cannot help but notice 
his express intent to discuss it in a way which leads to bold 
action. He could not have been more clear about its significance 
in the letters from prison:
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. . . our being Christians today will be limited 
to two things: prayer and righteous action among men.
All Christian thinking, speaking, and organizing must 
be born anew out of this prayer and action . . .  32
For Bonhoeffer, prayer and action in the service of others will 
constitute the parameters of Christianity for a new generation 
of Christians. Until now, the political implications of prayer 
have gone largely unmentioned. Such an analysis has been sorely 
lacking, for Bonhoeffer envisioned prayer as a key to the 
Christian identity in the coming generations.
31 Jones argues that Bonhoeffer's reference to prayer in his 
Baptismal letter to Dietrich Wilhelm Rudiger Bethge should be 
understood in an "expansive rather than restrictive terms". In 
other words, the sacraments, proclamation and Bible study should 
somehow figure into his concept of "prayer." While we agree with 
Jones that Bonhoeffer did have more than prayer in mind in his 
thoughts on the arcane discipline and how the "mysteries" of the 
Christian faith could best be preserved amidst an increasingly 
secular culture by it, at the same time, he had much to say about 
this singular aspect of Christian practice and identity. We will
focus on this one aspect of his novel thought, given that it was 
such an essential, consistent theme throughout his life and 
theology.
32 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, p. 300.
B. The Political Implications of Prayer
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Bonhoeffer spoke of prayer throughout his writings. In The 
c.nst of Discipleship he discussed prayer in his exegesis of the 
sixth chapter of Matthew.33 By focusing first on the hiddenness 
of prayer, he went on to explicate the Lord's Prayer. Here we 
received some first clues as to the political implications of 
prayer.34 First, prayer puts into practice the real rela­
tionship we have with God. Prayer is a social event, between 
follower and God through Christ, the Mediator. Throughout his 
discussion Bonhoeffer spoke of prayer in relational terms only. 
Prayer exercises the relationship existing between the Creator 
and His creatures. It is the relationship of a child with his 
or her Father.35
Prayer reminds and reinforces individuals of their "place" 
in relationship with God. This relationship is nothing other 
than living in God's presence, before God, coram Deo, and prayer
33 Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Discipleship. pp. 180-187.
34 In our recent interview, Bethge stressed the political 
implication of prayer for Bonhoeffer at the time of his writing 
The Cost of Discipleship in Hitler's Germany: "When you say, I
pray to God, that means I pray to this God of the Bible and not 
the other gods. This dynamic was of course very much alive in 
Hitler's time . . . .  I think Dietrich was very much aware of 
that too— that Christ never could mean anything beside or in 
addition to the first commandment . . . .  Therefore, you have the 
rediscovery of the Psalms, for instance, because the Psalms are 
also fighting language. Every prayer means an Absage to other 
gods. Every prayer to Yahweh means a "no" to pagan gods, the 
stronger gods, the gods with whole armies on their side." In 
this way, the Barmen Declaration was an absolutely clear 
indication that Hitler was not God but Christ alone is God. It 
always gave a biblical sentence first, then a positive statement, 
then the negative, "we reject." Thus, "every positive prayer to 
God the Almighty is claiming that we know where "almightiness" 
is and we know where wrong "almightiness" is." Appendix I, pp. 
316-17.
Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Discipleship. pp. 180-183.
captures the intimacy of this relationship. It places one in a 
position of being open before God, where one is malleable, open 
to change.36 In his discussion on the hiddenness of prayer in 
The Cost of Discipleship. Bonhoeffer spoke of the essence of 
Christian prayer as petition. This was so for him because:
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How are we to be protected from ourselves, and 
our own premeditations? . . . The only way is by
mortifying our own wills which are always obtruding 
themselves. And the only way to do this is by letting 
Christ alone reign in our hearts, by surrendering our 
wills completely to him, by living in fellowship with 
Jesus and by following him. Then we can pray that his 
will may be done, the will of him who knows our needs 
before we ask. Only then is our prayer certain, 
strong and pure. And then prayer is really and truly 
petition. The child asks of the Father whom he knows. 
Thus the essence of Christian prayer is not general 
adoration, but definite, concrete petition.37
Basically, prayer before God inculcates the practice and belief 
that one can be vulnerable, open with God, because one exists 
fundamentally in relationship with God.
Secondly, Bonhoeffer stressed confession and forgiveness 
of sins in prayer. Citing the injunction, "Forgive us our debts, 
as we also forgive our debtors," he makes it all too clear that 
forgiveness without confession constitutes "cheap grace" (billige 
Gnade) . He says,
36 In his discussion on prayer as undemonstrative action, 
John Matthews points out that though prayer is a form of action 
for Bonhoeffer, it is primarily undemonstrative in that it 
"places the believer in the right posture before God, the 
neighbor, and self." Matthews, op. cit. p. 90. Cf. Bonhoeffer, 
Ihe_Cost of Discipleship, p. 181.
In his discussion of prayer that is informed by Scripture 
in Life Togpthpr, Bonhoeffer said, "Prayer means nothing else but 
the readiness and willingness to receive and appropriate the 
w?rd, and, what is more, to accept it in one's personal situa­
tion, particular tasks, decisions, sins, and temptations." 
Bonhoeffer, Life Together, pp. 84-85.
37 Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Discipleship. pp. 182-83.
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Cheap grace means grace as a doctrine, a princi­
ple, a system. It means forgiveness of sins pro­
claimed as a general truth, the love of God taught as 
the Christian "conception" of God. An intellectual 
assent to that idea is held to be of itself sufficient 
to secure remission of sins . . . [c]heap grace is the 
preaching of forgiveness without requiring repentance, 
baptism without church discipline, Communion without 
confession, absolution without discipleship, grace 
without the cross, grace without Jesus Christ, living 
and incarnate.38
The emphasis on confession and repentance allows persons to avoid 
self-deception. Therein, persons cannot escape the harsh reality 
that they are guilty of wrong and that their attitudes and 
behavior must be held up for examination. For Bonhoeffer, 
forgiveness without repentance is not only dangerous but an illu­
sion.39 He hung his heart on the fact that "the preaching of 
forgiveness must always go hand-in-hand with the preaching of 
repentance."40 Further, repentance and confession must be 
particular and concrete, lest one fall into a despair of genuine 
forgiveness or a smug assumption that "God forgives because that 
is God's business."41
As Bonhoeffer said, "Deceived and weakened, men felt that 
they were strong now that they were in possession of this cheap
38 Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Discipleship. pp. 45, 47.
39 We recall Bonhoeffer's concept of reality in Ethics with 
its christologically unified understanding of reality. There, 
he emphasized that unless the eye is "trained upon the true 
reality" in simplicity and wisdom, persons will constantly 
deceive themselves. He cited the confusion between what 
constitutes success and failure, death and life, idolization and 
contempt of others as some indications of how twisted values and 
ethics had become at that time in Nazi Germany under Hitler.
40 Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Discipleship. p. 324.
41 Bonhoeffer, Spiritual Care, p. 43. Cf. Gregory L. Jones, 
The Cost of Forgiveness...", p. 14.
grace— whereas they had in fact lost the power to live the life 
of discipleship and obedience."42 The deceived understanding of 
grace confuses the power of life (which he describes as disciple­
ship and following) with weakness (which he describes as a 
selfish, objectivized understanding of grace) .43 We have already 
suggested the objectivizing process involved in sin's ethical 
event in Chapter Three, and we see Bonhoeffer using the same 
paradigm, the same language here again in The Cost of Disciple­
ship. Confession and repentance, far from being a recommended 
practice for pious prayer, are ingredient to the nature of grace 
itself. If this human recognition, acknowledgement and confes­
sion of sin is not practiced, a prostituted understanding of 
grace and God's forgiveness occurs in the life and belief of the 
Christian and one is left in a position of self-centeredness 
rather than selflessness for others.
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42 Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Discipleship. p. 59. See also p. 
55 where he said, "Such a man knows that the call to discipleship 
is a gift of grace, and that the call is inseparable from the 
grace. But those who try to use this grace as a dispensation 
from following Christ are simply deceiving themselves."
43 In his 1931 essay "Concerning the Christian Idea of God", 
Bonhoeffer discusses God's paradoxical essence in justification. 
Even at this early date, the young theologian pointed out the way 
in which persons are deceived— God's revelation appears as 
"foolish" and persons confuse strength and weakness: "That is
the foolishness of the revelation of God and its paradoxical 
character— that just there, where the power of man has lapsed 
entirely, where man knows his own weakness, sinfulness, and 
consequently the judgment of God upon him, that just there God 
is already working in grace, that just and exactly there and only 
there is forgiveness, justification, restoration. There, where 
®an himself no longer sees, God sees, and Good alone works, in 
judgment and in grace. There, at the very limits of man, stands 
God, and when man can do nothing more, than God does all. The 
justification of the sinner— this is the self-proof of the sole 
authority of God." Dietrich Bonhoeffer, "Concerning the Christian 
Idea of God," Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Gesammelte Schriften vol. Ill, 
ed. Eberhard Bethge (Munich: Christian Kaiser Verlag, 1960), p.
I°9* Cf. Geffrey Kelly, "Revelation in Christ: A Study of
Bonhoeffer's Theology of Revelation," Ephemerides Theologicae 
ijgvanienses, L. 1 (1974), p. 61.
The sinful understanding of grace, according to Bonhoeffer, 
sees grace as a reified object to possess, whereas the true 
understanding of grace, "costly grace" (teure Gnade), is 
described socially in terms of following God or discipleship. 
The "objectivization" of grace is described no more eloquently 
nor incisively than in his well-known description of cheap grace:
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Cheap grace means grace sold on the market like 
cheapjacks' wares. The sacraments, the forgiveness of 
sin, and the consolations of religion are thrown away 
at cut prices. Grace is represented as the Church's 
inexhaustible treasury, from which she showers bless­
ings with generous hands, without asking questions or 
fixing limits. Grace without price; grace without 
cost! The essence of grace, we suppose, is that the 
account has been paid in advance; and, because it has 
been paid, everything can be had for nothing. Since 
the cost was infinite, the possibilities of using and 
spending it are infinite. What would grace be if it 
were not cheap?44
Grace is described materialistically as a reduced item for 
sale, as well as an infinite money reserve. The Christian who 
understands grace in a reified, static, asocial way is deceived. 
But once grace is understood as costly and accepted accordingly, 
the real, dynamic relationship between the individual and God is 
possible through discipleship. Once confession and repentance 
is left out, selfless intimate relationship is displaced by self- 
indulgent objectivization. Whereas sin objectifies and distorts, 
graces frees for relationship. We become free "for others" in 
the same way that Christ is pro nobis.
The key to note here is that confession of sin in prayer, 
while it continually restores the Christian to a right relation­
ship with God (as follower), it also restores the Christian to
44 Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Discipleship, p. 45.
a right relationship with others. God's "ultimate" forgiveness 
paves the way, or, leads one into "penultimate" service with and 
for others. A self-aggrandizing or despondent attitude toward 
grace is shattered and living, loving relationship with God and 
others is restored.
Unfortunately, acknowledgement and confession of sin often 
is sacrificed in day to day life. But Bonhoeffer shows how 
confession is mistakenly seen as an unimportant limit which 
should be practiced out of traditional obligation rather than an 
essential aspect of autonomous living. The political implication 
of prayer, and the confession which is a non-negotiable part of 
it, serve to release one from a posture and stance of selfish 
concern to one of others-centered action. Indeed, through 
confession and forgiveness we are liberated for service to and 
among the lowly and needy.45
Intercession is the prime example of how political prayer 
can be. Regarding it, Bonhoeffer said:
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I can no longer condemn or hate a brother for 
whom I pray, no matter how much trouble he causes me. 
His face, that hitherto may have been strange and 
intolerable to me, is transformed in intercession into 
the countenance of a brother for whom Christ died, the 
face of a forgiven sinner. This is a happy discovery 
for the Christian who begins to pray for others. 
There is no dislike, no personal tension, no estrange­
ment that cannot be overcome by intercession as far as 
our side of it is concerned. Intercessory prayer is 
the purifying bath into which the individual and the 
fellowship must enter every day. The struggle we 
undergo with our brother in intercession may be a hard
45 "Once a man has experienced the mercy of God in his life 
he will henceforth aspire only to serve. The proud throne of the 
judge no longer lures him; he wants to be down below with the 
lowly and the needy, because that is where God found him." 
Bonhoeffer. Life Together, p. 94; see Greg Jones, pp. cit., p. 18.
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one, but that struggle has the promise that it will 
gain its goal.46
The political ramifications are clear. The act of interceding 
for another de facto begins the process of breaking down barriers 
which separate one person or group from another. While prayer 
is all too often neglected as a valid topic for theological 
analysis, Bonhoeffer shows here and in his later work how prayer 
transforms human hate, enmity, tension and conflict into a 
completely different reality. It inevitably causes one to see 
oneself in relation to the other person, even when that person 
is one's enemy. It begins the process of melting down barriers 
so that persons can see each other more realistically and 
truthfully.
Bonhoeffer offers a clear description of what he means when 
he speaks of intercessory prayer47:
Intercession should be seen from two aspects: as
a human deed and as the divine will. In the first, 
the fact that the members of the church belong togeth­
er is made manifest. A third person is drawn into my 
solitary relation with God, or rather, I move in 
intercession into the other man's place, when my 
prayer remains my own, but nevertheless springs from 
his distress and his need; I really enter into the 
other man, into his guilt and distress; I am afflicted 
by his sins and his infirmity.48
46 Bonhoeffer, Life Together, p. 86.
47 The following discussion on intercessory prayer is derived 
from a very brief portion of an earlier dissertation by the 
author entitled, "Towards a New Spirituality in North America: 
The Import of Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Dialectical Model of 
Spirituality", Unpublished S.T.M. Thesis, Yale Divinity School, 
1989, pp. 1 4 , 1 5 , 16. On file in the Bonhoeffer Archives, Union 
Theological Seminary, New York, New York.
48 Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio. (London: Collins, 1963),
P- 133.
Intercessory prayer, then, is a way one Christian may seriously 
enter into prayer with the other individual fully in mind, so 
that, in essence, the one praying replaces oneself with the 
needs, sufferings and situations of the other who is in mind. 
For Bonhoeffer, this way of "being for others" is one of the 
greatest strengths of the Church:
If we now consider intercession from God's 
standpoint, it is seen to be the individual's organi­
zation of himself to realize God's will for the other 
man, so that he may serve the realization of God's 
rule in the church. Here is where the meaning and 
strength of the corporate prayer of the church re­
sides, as Luther speaks of it in the sermon on good 
works. In this corporate prayer God possesses his 
strongest means for organizing the whole church 
towards his purpose. The church recognizes itself in 
prayer as an instrument of his will and organizes 
itself accordingly in active obedience.49
Even as early as the late 1920's, Bonhoeffer was talking about 
prayer dialectically— as that which leads us into the world. And 
this was to become the "secret" of his spirituality, as Moltmann 
suggested. The relevance of such an understanding of prayer 
cannot be overestimated. Bonhoeffer's view on prayer leading one 
into the world stands in contradistinction from other "classical" 
spiritualities which suggest renunciation of the world and 
privatized forms of obedience to God. Bonhoeffer points out the 
relationship between our prayers and that which we do in external 
affairs, between God's ultimate act of justification and our 
penultimate actions of service with and for others. There is no 
dichotomy, and one is freed to view and practice prayer with an 
entirely new understanding. Thus, prayer is rejected as a pious 
exercise of egocentric request practiced in isolation from the
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49 Ibid. . p. 134.
world. Further, prayers become the direction, the motivation 
from which we discern the actions we are to be about in the 
world.
True prayer involves subjection of one's entire personal 
agenda to the more perfect wisdom of God through Jesus Christ. 
Thus, our prayers precede and accompany those types of work one 
does in the world before God, coram Deo. Not only is prayer 
itself a very real work which we perform through Jesus Christ, 
but it is the key force which leads us into informed action with 
those around us. Bonhoeffer extols prayer as the guardian of the 
church and the Christian's identity in a secular world for his 
coming generation.
By pausing to examine the meaning and ramifications 
associated with prayer for Bonhoeffer we have been able to see 
how he carried Luther's theology of the cross to new heights.
Indeed, Luther made it clear that at the cross, all thoughts and
understanding of God are done away, and new, paradoxical
understandings come forth--God's wisdom appearing as foolishness 
in the world, God's strength appearing as weakness. By articu­
lating prayer as part of a hidden or "secret" discipline,
Bonhoeffer gave new, ethical terms to God's transcendent 
hiddenness. We remember that he struggled throughout his life 
with Barth's transcendent understanding of God, concluding that 
it was a noetic transcendentalism which emphasized God's detached 
freedom from the world. Bonhoeffer believed God is free for 
others, pro aliis. to such an extent that his presence could be 
understood as an ethical transcendence. The arcane discipline 
represents the ethical expression of that presence, God manifest- 
ing God's self in his justification of others on the cross, his 
forgiveness serving as the "ultimate" act which ushers in
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"penultimate" action for others and with others. Prayer is the 
moment in which God's final authority or power is manifest in 
terms of a seemingly insignificant, hidden practice. It is a 
costly forgiveness, a costly grace as Bonhoeffer emphasized in 
The Cost of Discipleship. marked by confession and repentance. 
We turn now to see how this hidden form of God's power in the 
world manifests itself in ethical terms, in terms of "righteous 
action," in terms of service for others.
C. "Righteous Action" in the World: Getting Terms Straight
The call to action today typically receives more attention 
than the call to prayer. This is understandable, for persons 
interested in Bonhoeffer's model of Christianity commonly seek 
to understand what kind of action constitutes "righteous" or 
"responsible" action in a given context. However, the hidden, 
"non-demonstrative" part of the dialectic— prayer— is skipped 
over, and the first tragic mistake is made. Bonhoeffer empha­
sized that prayer leads one into responsible action. We have 
seen thus far how, as the Christian's graceful limit, it prevents 
self-deception and provides insight into the true nature of 
grace. Indeed, God's hidden, powerful presence in the world was 
expressed by Bonhoeffer in terms of forgiveness, of justifica­
tion. This is God's "ultimate" way of "being there for others," 
and as such it makes responsible action in the world possible. 
The ethical ramifications of prayer manifest themselves in 
"righteous action" for others. We turn now to see what Bon­
hoeffer meant by such action and how it differs from responsible, 
autonomous action by a world come of age.
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In sketching out the parameters for a book50 while he was 
in prison, Bonhoeffer made provocative statements about christo- 
logical and ecclesiological power. We heard them earlier, and 
they have been foundational in our investigation of his thought. 
First, we know that Bonhoeffer believed christological power is 
grounded in Jesus' "being there for others."51 Ecclesiological 
"power" is based on this Christological principle— "[t]he church 
is the church only when it exists for others . . .  it is not 
abstract argument, but example, that gives its word emphasis and 
power."52 "Being there for others" constitutes the social 
reality underlying power's meaning.
Further, Bonhoeffer was pressed throughout his life to 
understand the way God was and is present in the world. His 
lifelong query, "Who is Jesus Christ for us today?" aphoristical­
ly represented this concern. The cradle and the cross— the most 
human, mundane images— depict Christ's presence most clearly. 
And yet, this Incarnate presence is partially hidden and remains 
a mystery to human knowledge.53 Given the incarnate, hidden 
presence of Christ in the world, Bonhoeffer made it clear in the 
letters from prison that God is in the center of life54
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50 "Outline for a Book," Letters and Papers from Prison, pp. 
380-383.
51 "His 'being there for others' . . .  is the ground of his 
omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence." Bonhoeffer, Letters 
¿nd Papers from Prison, p. 381.
52 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, p. 382-83.
53 See Bonhoeffer's Christmas letter of 1939 to the ordinands 
to see his Lutheran emphasis on the mystery of the incarnation. 
Bonhoeffer, True Patriotism, pp. 28-33.
54 As one Bonhoeffer scholar said, "Bonhoeffer's interest in 
the arcani disciplina was the result of an intense passion to 
know God in the 'center of life,' not only at the boundaries." 
John Matthews, op. cit.. p. 27.
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It always seems to me that we are trying anxious­
ly . .  . to reserve some space for God; I should like 
to speak of God not on the boundaries but at the 
center, not in weaknesses but in strength; and there­
fore not in death and guilt but in man's life and 
goodness.55
And again, one month later in a letter from prison he says,
Here again, God is no stop-gap; he must be 
recognized at the centre of life, not when we are at 
the end of our resources; it is his will to be recog­
nized in life,and not only when death comes; in health 
and vigour, and not only in suffering; in our activi­
ties, and not only in sin. The ground for this lies 
in the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. He is the 
centre of life, and he certainly didn't 'come' to 
answer our unsolved problems. From the centre of life 
certain questions, and their answers, are seen to be 
wholly irrelevant . . .  56
Bonhoeffer had a long-term interest in determining this partially 
hidden presence of Christ in the world, pursuing this quest with 
vigor in classical Lutheran form. These two rudimentary 
theological factors, Bonhoeffer's social understanding of divine 
presence and human autonomy or power as "being there for others," 
and the concern to articulate the hidden-yet-present God in the 
center of life— were at the crux of his interest in the arcane 
discipline. We turn now to examine them in more detail as well 
as to clarify the terms and meaning associated with what 
concretely constitutes "righteous action" in a world marked by 
autonomy.
55 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, p. 282.
56 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, p. 312.
1. The Principle of Vicarious Action
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Throughout his life, Bonhoeffer spoke of this christological 
principle.57 Interestingly, as early as 1927 in Sanctorum 
Communio he articulated the parameters for the arcane discipline 
in strict conjunction with the principle of vicarious action:
Our being for one another now has to be actual­
ized through the act of love. Three great possibili­
ties for acting positively for one another are dis­
closed in the communion of saints: renunciatory,
active work for our neighbor, prayers of intercession, 
and lastly the mutual granting of forgiveness of sins 
in God's name. With all of them it is a question of 
abandoning oneself 'for' one's neighbor, for his good, 
but with the readiness to do and bear everything in 
his stead, indeed if need be to sacrifice oneself for 
him, to act vicariously for him.58
Rather than suggest vicarious action as a single type of action 
performed for others, Bonhoeffer explained the breadth of such 
a principle by showing the varied ways in which selfless living 
may occur. More than ten years later, in the Ethics. he wrote 
about it during his third phase in the section on the structure 
of responsible living.59 In non-religious terms he explained 
what he meant by it:
The fact that responsibility is fundamentally a 
matter of deputyship is demonstrated most clearly in 
those circumstances in which a man is directly obliged 
to act in the place of other men, for example as a
57 "Jesus Christ is for his brethren by standing in their 
Place. Christ stands for his new humanity before God. But if 
that is the case, he is the new humanity. He stands vicariously 
where mankind should stand, by virtue of his pro me structure. 
Bonhoeffer, Christology. p. 48.
58 Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio, p. 130.
59 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, pp. 224-27.
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father, as a statesman or as a teacher. The father 
acts for the children, working for them, caring for 
them, interceding, fighting and suffering for them. 
Thus in a real sense he is their deputy. He is not an 
isolated individual, but he combines in himself the 
selves of a number of human beings. Any attempt to 
live as though he were alone is a denial of the actual 
fact of his responsibility . . .  No man can altogether 
escape responsibility, and this means that no man can 
avoid deputyship . . . Deputyship, and therefore also 
responsibility, lies only in the complete surrender of 
one's own life to the other man. Only the selfless 
man lives responsibly, and this means that only the 
selfless man lives.60
The christological principle of "being there for others," which 
came to be so significant in his late theology, was most clearly 
expressed in ethical terms as "deputyship."61 Here, again, 
Bonhoeffer was talking about a selfless way of living which is 
focused on others.
In sketching a second chapter in his "Outline for a Book"62 
while in prison, Bonhoeffer made provocative statements about 
christological and ecclesiological power. He believed christo­
logical power is grounded in Jesus' "being there for others":
60 Bonhoeffer, Ethics. pp. 224-25.
61 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, pp. 224-227. In his book The Theology 
of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ernst Feil points out that ". . . Bon­
hoeffer took up again the ideas of deputyship which had appeared 
in the concept of pro nobis from the christology course to 
Ethics. Yet he made a significant change: here he used the 
phrase 'for others,' substituting 'pro aliis' for 'pro nobis.'
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), p. 93. Feil refers to the 
proposed second chapter outline of Bonhoeffer's "Outline for a 
Book" and the phrases "Jesus is there only for others" and 
"existence for others" as a case in point (Letters and Papers 
from Priannr p. 381. However, as we have seen above, Bonhoeffer 
discussed this "being there for others" as early as Sanctorum 
Communi o r both with his explicit words on "being for one another" 
and with his concepts of vicarious action "with another" (mitein- 
änder) and "for another" (füreinander). My disagreement with 
Beil over this alleged "change" is more a semantic one than a 
substantive one, for the main point in the similar terminologies 
is that the Lutheran notion of Christ's action for us, pro nobis, 
is at the heart of Bonhoeffer's concern.
62 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, pp. 380-83.
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Who is God? Not in the first place an abstract 
belief in God, in his omnipotence etc. That is not a 
genuine experience of God, but a partial extension of 
the world. . . . His 'being there for others' . . .  is 
the ground of his omnipotence, omniscience, and 
omnipresence.63
Likewise, the power of the Church is based on this Christological 
principle, " [t]he church is the church only when it exists for 
others . . .  it is not abstract argument, but example, that gives 
its word and emphasis and power."64 "Being there for others" 
constitutes the social reality underlying power's meaning. 
Bonhoeffer's ethical notion of the transcendent replaces 
metaphysical notions here:
Our relation to God is not a 'religious' rela­
tionship to the highest, most powerful, and best Being 
imaginable--that is not authentic transcendence— but 
our relation to God is a new life in 'existence for 
others', through participation in the being of Jesus. 
The transcendental is not infinite and unattainable 
tasks, but the neighbour who is within reach in any 
given situation.65
And again, Bonhoeffer draws out some of the specific, concrete 
manifestations such power takes in the Church:
The church is the church only when it exists for 
others. To make a start, it should give away all its 
property to those in need. The clergy must live 
solely on the free-will offerings of their congrega­
tions, or possibly engage in some secular calling. 
The church must share in the secular problems of 
ordinary human life, not dominating, but helping and
63 Letters and Papers from Prison, p . 3 81.
64 Ibid. . pp. 382-83.
65 Ibid. . p. 381.
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serving. It must tell men of every calling what it 
means to live in Christ, to exist for others.66
Bonhoeffer articulated the concrete, ethical parameters by which 
God's freedom for others may be known in an increasingly autono­
mous world, and he cast its' ethical identity socially in terms 
of power. "Being there for others" captured in definitive form 
the concrete, christological expression of such power. And he 
suggested some radical ideas for how this social power might look 
in the world. Giving away property and suggesting unsalaried 
clergy positions suggest the seriousness with which Bonhoeffer 
took this vicarious principle of "existing for others."
2. New Expressions of "Middle" and "Boundary"
Bonhoeffer discussed the nature of God's power not only in 
social terms as "being there for others" but in terms of place. 
He was pressed throughout his life to understand the way God was 
and is present in the world. His lifelong query, "Who is Jesus 
Christ for us today?" aphoristically represented this concern, 
and for him, as for Luther, the mundane image of the cross 
depicted Christ's presence most clearly. And yet, this Incarnate 
presence is partially hidden and remains a mystery to human 
knowledge.67 Given the incarnate, hidden presence of Christ in 
the world, Bonhoeffer made it clear in the letters from prison 
that God is in the center of life, not on its boundaries:
66 Ibid. . pp. 382, 383.
67 c f . Bonhoeffer's Christmas letter of 1939 to the ordinands 
to see his Lutheran emphasis on the mystery of the incarnation. 
Bonhoeffer, True Patriotism, pp. 28-33.
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It always seems to me that we are trying anx­
iously . . .  to reserve some space for God; I should 
like to speak of God not on the boundaries but at the 
center, not in weaknesses but in strength; and there­
fore not in death and guilt but in man's life and 
goodness.68
And again, one month later in a letter from prison he said:
Here again, God is no stop-gap; he must be 
recognized at the centre of life, not when we are at 
the end of our resources; it is his will to be recog­
nized in life, and not only when death comes; in 
health and vigour, and not only in suffering; in our 
activities, and not only in sin. The ground for this 
lies in the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. He is 
the centre of life, and he certainly didn't 'come' to 
answer our unsolved problems. From the centre of life 
certain questions, and their answers, are seen to be 
wholly irrelevant . . ,69
Whereas he spoke of God at the center spatially in Creation 
and Fall with the tree of life, he broadened his notion of the 
"middle" (die Mitte) as we saw in Ethics. where Christ is at the 
very heart of reality in an ontological sense— all of reality 
being held together in Him. Bonhoeffer became increasingly 
skeptical of describing God's place in the world in spatial 
terms.70 An autonomous, responsible humanity had pushed the God
68 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, p. 282.
69 Ibid. . p. 312.
70 Note that Bonhoeffer spoke in terms of power and weakness 
in his description of God's place in the world: "Religious 
People speak of God when human knowledge (perhaps simply because 
they are too lazy to think) has come to an end, or when human 
resources fail— in fact it is always the deus ex machina that 
they bring on the scene, either for the apparent solution of 
insoluble problems, or as strength in human failure— always, that 
is to say, exploiting human weakness or human boundaries. Of 
necessity, that can go on only till people can by their own 
strength push these boundaries somewhat further out, so that God 
becomes superfluous as a deus ex machina. I've come to be 
doubtful of talking about any human boundaries (is even death, 
which people now hardly fear, and is sin, which they now hardly
concept to the limits or boundaries of human existence, taking 
up residence in the middle of life. Bonhoeffer expanded his 
middle-boundary thematic onto a more profoundly social plane with 
his elaboration of what responsible action looks like in a world 
come of age.
For Bonhoeffer, true identity as a person and as a Christian 
is gained as one embraces the mundane world and sees God's place 
in it:
By this-worldliness I mean living unreservedly in 
life's duties, problems, successes and failures, 
experiences and perplexities. In so doing we throw 
ourselves completely into the arms of God in the 
world— watching with Christ in Gethsemane. That I 
think, is faith; that is metanoia; and that is how one 
becomes a man and a Christian.71
"Righteous" or "responsible" action in the world, half of 
the arcane discipline's dialectic, is determined by a radical 
acceptance of this world in all its goodness and chaos without 
offering any excuses. Christian actions, then, become congruent 
with the realities of this world. There is no attempt to
reinterpret the world from a religious schema, nor is there an
external distinction between Christian and secular action, per
§e, as much as we may look for it.
At this point one can see clearly how Bonhoeffer's non­
religious interpretation of Biblical concepts is more of an
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understand, still a genuine boundary today?). It always seems 
¿2—me that we are trying anxiously in this wav to reserve some 
§M c e  for God; I should like to speak of God not on the bound­
aries but at the centre, not in weaknesses but in strength; and
¿bgrefore. not- in death and quilt but in man's life and croodness. "
Letter of 30 April 1944, pp. 281-82 (Emphasis added).
71 Ibid. . Letter of 21 July, 1944, p. 370.
ethical category than a hermeneutical one.72 He described 
"righteous action" as a category that applies to Christian and 
non-Christian alike. In Ethics, responsibility as deputyship 
expressed the kind of action that an autonomous humanity is 
about, and in Letters and Papers from Prison he expressed the 
exact same idea in the christological terms he utilized through­
out his theological corpus— the vicarious principle of "being 
there for others." In this way, he set out specific parameters 
which determine the identity of the modern person and the 
Christian simultaneously. But how does the arcane discipline, 
and specifically, "righteous action" guarantee the Christian's 
identity in the world?
3. "Sharing in God's Sufferings in the World"
Bonhoeffer discussed the parameters by which the Christian 
simultaneously identifies with a world come of age yet maintains 
some kind of distinction from it. He expressed this most 
eloquently in his poem "Christians and Pagans":
1
Men go to God when they are sore bestead,
Pray to him for succor, for his peace, for bread,
For mercy for them sick, sinning, or dead;
All men do so, Christian and unbelieving.
2
Men go to God when he is sore bestead,
Find him poor and scorned, without shelter or bread,
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72 Recall Bethge's clarification of the non-religious 
interpretation: " . . .  non-religious interpretation is more an
ethical than a hermeneutical category and also a direct call to 
Penitence directed at the Church and its present form— for the 
sake off if one likes, the kerygma, the language." Bethge, 
Bjetrich Bonhoeffer, p. 783.
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Whelmed under weight of the wicked, the weak, the dead; 
Christians stand by God in his hour of grieving.
3
God goes to every man when sore bestead,
Feeds body and spirit with his bread;
For Christians, pagans alike he hangs dead,
And both alike forgiving.73
In his letter of 18 July 1944, Bonhoeffer elaborated on his poem 
and how Christians maintain their identity.74 Christians must 
"really live in the godless world," accepting the "secular" way 
of life. They must not try to be religious, but to be the person 
"that Christ creates in us."75 Then, he spells it out once 
again, what separates Christians from their non-Christian 
neighbors:
It is not the religious act that makes the 
Christian, but participation in the sufferings of God 
in the secular life. That is metanoia: not in the
first place thinking about one's own needs, problems, 
sins, and fears, but allowing oneself to be caught up 
into the way of Jesus Christ, into the messianic 
event, . . .  76
Sharing in this suffering of God is the distinguishing factor. 
This is the kind of action which typifies the responsible action
73 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, pp. 348-49.
74 "The poem about Christians and pagans contains an idea 
that you [Bethge] will recognize: 'Christians stand by God in his 
hour of grieving'; that is what distinguishes Christians from 
Pagans. Jesus asked in Gethsemane, "Could you not watch with me 
one hour?" That is a reversal of what the religious man expects 
from God. Man is summoned to share in God's sufferings at the 
hands of a godless world." Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from 
Edison, p. 361.
75 Such a motif clearly echoes Bonhoeffer's theme of
conformation in Ethics.
76 Ibid. . pp. 361, 362 .
of God's people in a way which definitively sets them apart.77 
It is the "righteous action" Bonhoeffer was after in the arcane 
discipline, an integral aspect of that which guarantees the 
Christian followers' identity in a mature world. But Bonhoeffer 
asked the specific question which must inevitably be addressed 
to such an ethically-oriented form of identification: "what does
this life look like, this participation in the powerlessness of 
God in the world?"
We recall his thoughts about suffering from chapter one of 
this study, where he was hesitant to discuss such suffering 
openly for fear of it being glorified and overestimated as a 
general theme in the Christian life. However, he wrote freely, 
now, about another kind of suffering, another kind of action 
altogether— the sufferings of God in the world. Bonhoeffer 
pointed to a suffering which is freely chosen, yet is guided and 
defined by God. This is the specific action which guarantees the 
Christian identity in the world, the kind of action he envisions 
in the arcane discipline. This difference between Christian 
action and that of a non-believer has to do with whether the 
particular action is committed to God's guidance or not.
Eberhard Bethge, in a recent interview, however, pointed out 
that even when a person commits their actions to God's guidance 
and fully believes it to be in accord with God's will, an 
idolatry of the cross can still occur. In his discussion of the
77 Bonhoeffer's youngest sister, Susanne Dress, pointed out 
that it was this decision to stand by God in His hour of grieving 
that brought Dietrich himself to the gallows. Yet, he shunned 
dramatizing his own suffering in prison (as we have seen) , 
Measuring it against the suffering of Jesus Christ. It was "his 
willingness and ability to suffer which emerged from the very 
fullness of his life's opportunities, and which he enjoyed 
consciously and gratefully." Susanne Dress, "Remarks on the 
Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer," Union Seminary Quarterly 
S§Yiew, Vol. XXV, No. 2, (Winter, 1970), p. 148.
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poem "Christians and Pagans," he emphasized the movement of the 
poem.78 In the first stanza unbelievers ask God for mercy in the 
midst of need and suffering. This is what you would expect from 
the "religious" person as well as the Christian. But then there 
is a great reversal in the second stanza, and the religious 
person is surprised by the description of God and Christians 
found there. The terms are switched, and God is characterized 
as the weak One and Christians stand by God. But this is exactly 
where the misunderstanding can occur. The Christians might 
overestimate their suffering with God, misunderstanding the 
nature of His weakness and the nature of their power. Thus, an 
"idolatry of the cross" occurs.
Thus, we have the third stanza, and herein lay the secret 
of the power of God's weakness: the granting of forgiveness to
Christian and sinner alike through his ultimate sacrifice for all 
persons. This "secret" was at the center of Bonhoeffer and his 
theology, particularly in his notion of the arcane discipline. 
In this way, one's identity and action is ultimately decided by 
God who alone confers forgiveness, and the one who shares in the 
"messianic" suffering recognizes God's hidden power at the root 
of any human action, no matter how noble or selfless. This 
recognition of God's hidden power in the world, in terms of 
justification, demonstrates most fully not only how Bonhoeffer 
surpassed Luther's understanding of God's hiddenness in the world 
in ethical terms of atonement, but the extent to which the 
fheolocrja crucis informs the church's identity, as well as the 
nature of human autonomy in a world come of age. His theology
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78 •See Appendix I.
of the cross went far in determining a new ethical paradigm by 
which modernity might understand itself anew.
4. Taking a Second Look at Who God is for Us Today
If we were to leave Bonhoeffer's description of the arcane 
discipline there, it would not do justice to the theological 
motivation underlying his new theological formulae. He laid out 
the terms of an increasingly autonomous human period in history 
for Christian and non-Christian alike, providing a framework by 
which an identity might be gained for both. He also articulated 
the specific nature of that which protects or guarantees the 
identity of the Christian in the world so that a complete identi­
fication would not be inferred or misunderstood from his 
theological formulae of a "non-religious age" or a "worldly 
interpretation."
He elaborated further on the nature of Christian action and 
its* autonomy in christological terms of being free for others. 
Bonhoeffer not only demonstrated the positive values underlying 
his anthropology, which included Christians and non-Christians 
alike, he did so specifically in terms of the theologia crucis. 
From this framework we understand most accurately how Bonhoeffer 
brought together his ideas on the autonomous nature of mature 
human action and God's hidden presence in the world. Whereas his 
statements about a world come of age tend to be viewed in light 
°f the weak Christ who has been pushed out of the world, 
Bonhoeffer's theology of the cross went deeper, ultimately 
Pointing to the hidden power of God in the world as the corner­
stone upon which a strong humanity may rightly understand and 
judge its actions.
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Once again, one must ask how it is that Bonhoeffer points 
to God's power at the heart of a world come of age in the Letters 
and Papers from Prison when so many statements explicitly point 
to the opposite— a suffering, powerless God, especially as we try 
to understand even more concretely the nature of Christian action 
in a secular world. Whereas we answered this in Chapter One, a 
more pronounced look at his theology of the cross is in order, 
for this is the heart of his understanding of the Church's proper 
identity and action in a modern world.
In Ethics he wrote:
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The cross of the atonement is the setting free 
for life before God in the midst of the godless world; 
it is the setting free for life in genuine worldli­
ness. The proclamation of the cross of the atonement 
is a setting free because it leaves behind it the vain 
attempts to deify the world and because it has over­
come the disunions, tensions and conflicts between the 
'Christian' element and the 'secular' element and 
calls for simple life and action in the belief that 
the reconciliation of the world with God has been 
accomplished. A life in genuine worldliness is 
possible only through the proclamation of Christ 
crucified.79
The cross is the reality in the midst of the world. It is the 
reconciliation of the world to God. Bonhoeffer's emphasis on the 
cross setting persons free in a godless world is important. This 
is so because it is not an understanding of human freedom as an 
abstract concept; it is a social understanding of freedom, one 
which sets free for others. The cross is not a spiritualized 
reality, but is, rather, the power of God in the midst of a 
godless world. In his statements on the significance of the
79 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, p. 297.
cross for the world, Bonhoeffer pointed out the ramifications of 
a world which does not understand itself in terms of the cross:
Without or against the proclamation of the cross 
of Christ there can be no recognition of the godless­
ness and godforsakenness of the world, but the worldly 
element will rather seek always to satisfy its insa­
tiable longing for its own deification.80
While Bonhoeffer was happy to see the rejection of the "God 
of the gaps" concept, he enthusiastically hailed the fact that 
modernity had paved a way for the real living God of the Bible 
to gain expression. Rather than God's strength, Bonhoeffer 
pointed to God's "suffering"81, "weakness"82 and "powerl­
essness"83 in the world as the only way he is with us. He showed 
us what he meant in concrete terms by God's weakness and 
suffering. Such weakness is characterized by the passion event—  
the selfless, sacrificial taking on of others' guilt, offering 
gracious forgiveness to the point of death on the cross. This 
is the shape and form of the Son of God in the world, and His 
power is characterized in social terms of "being there for 
others." It was the ultimate sacrifice for humanity, yet it 
remains the ultimate power of God in the world,84 partially 
hidden by its very social expression.
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80 Ibid.
81 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison. Letters of 18 
JUly, 1944, and 28 July, 1944, pp. 361-62, 374-75.
82 Ibid. . Letter of 16 July, 1944, pp. 360-61.
83 Ibid.
84 "The justification of the sinner— this is the self-proof 
°f the sole authority of God." Bonhoeffer, Gesammelte Schriften. 
v°l. Ill, p. 109.
Bonhoeffer said this God "wins power and space in the world 
by his weakness."85 It is the same God whose omnipotence is 
grounded in his "being there for others." He was pointing to 
another kind of divine power altogether which lay at the heart 
of his notion of who God is in a modern world, and it gathered 
its meaning in ethical terms of atonement. In this way, like 
Luther before him, Bonhoeffer took the notion of God's omnipo­
tence and did away with its metaphysically-oriented definition, 
joining in with a world come of age which had recognized the 
falsity involved in a deus ex machina.
In his theological letter of 16 July 1944, Bonhoeffer 
referred to Mark 15.34, which is Jesus' "cry of dereliction", "My 
God, my God, why have you forsaken me?" as Biblical evidence of 
the fact that the real God is one who forsakes, not one who 
rescues men and women in omnipotent splendor. In this way, 
Bonhoeffer forces the reader to come to grips with a harsh 
picture of who and where God is. God as invincible victor does 
not exist in the world— that is only a false wish. But God is 
present in the cross of Jesus Christ. Bonhoeffer forces a 
reconsideration of the terms of Christ's presence, terms which 
contradict traditional beliefs about God.
For the German pastor, God's presence in the world is 
expressed concretely in the two ways which were just discussed 
above: in terms of who God is— in socio-ethical terms as "the
Man for others," and in terms of where God is— in hidden-yet- 
Present terms of "center" and "boundary." The terms of God's 
presence go so sharply against any projected images of power and 
llory that a radical reconsideration of God is called for.
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85 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, p. 361.
Although the world has certainly entered into a period of 
unprecedented autonomy and independence in comparison to past 
generations, many Christians still hold strongly to the notion 
of God as omnipotent in a way that takes God's costly action in 
behalf of others for granted. God ends up being a crutch on 
which to rely during the difficult times, during times when human 
knowledge reaches its limits. For these, Bonhoeffer's non­
religious depiction of God as powerless and weak in the world is 
a herald which needs desperately to be heard. Not only is an 
outdated theological understanding at stake with such a prehen­
sion, but human definitions and practices of power based on such 
an understanding end up yielding asocial, dominating connota­
tions .
At the same time, because God's presence is hidden in 
nature, to many, God is truly absent from the world. This is the 
danger facing an autonomous age that has done away with the deus 
ex machina. but that might now perceive a permanent divine 
absence. This is why it was so important for Bonhoeffer to 
outline the nature of God's presence in terms of weakness and to 
explain what that means in a world come of age. That he laid out 
the terms of God's presence according to the theologia crucis is 
fully evident in the way he discusses the hidden nature of God's 
true power in the world. In this way, Bonhoeffer forces a world 
come of age to come to terms with God's ultimate act of costly 
forgiveness on the cross in socio-ethical terms. Unless these 
terms are taken seriously, humanity risks the self-deification 
and deception which result from a skewed understanding of its own 
autonomy.
Not only is a socio-ethical understanding of God's power in 
the world dictated by the terms of the cross, in terms of his
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"being there for others," a theological understanding of that 
same power is gained in the ultimate justification Jesus Christ 
affords persons through His selfless action. By pointing 
exclusively to weakness as the starting point for understanding 
God's hidden presence, old abstract definitions are buried, and 
new concrete ones are restored to vision, yielding God's true 
power in the world. This power is characterized by sociality, 
not domination and tyranny; it is defined explicitly as a "being 
there for others," not treating persons as unthinking, weak 
subjects; it is defined concretely in Christ's ethical action on 
the cross, not abstractly in anthropologically metaphysical 
definitions; it is gained in terms of justification: incurring
the guilt of others,86 bearing their sins and forgiving them, not 
in terms of getting one's way over others; it is hidden in 
weakness, according to the terms of the cross, not directly 
manifest to all in conventional or arbitrary terms.
This is Bonhoeffer's theologia crucis at its highest, for 
not only did he point to God's weakness in the world as the 
defining point for modern humanity, both Christian and non- 
Christian to understand itself aright; he suggested new terms for 
God's power, and thus, the Church's power in the world. But we 
miss this profound "movement" in his theology of the cross, 
seeing only the weakness of God in the world and not perceiving 
the profound nature of His power and how it informs Christian 
power, if we do not recognize how Bonhoeffer uses his new 
theological formulae.
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86 Bethge brings this point home in his interview where he 
discusses Bonhoeffer's view on being responsible and incurring 
guilt in the plot against Hitler. See Appendix I, p. 318.
By using paradoxical language, the inevitable reordering of 
values is evident, specifically with reference to the concept of 
power. Bonhoeffer identified the human tendency of past 
generations to look for God's power in the world according to its 
sinful understanding of what should constitute such a reality. 
Although hailing the progress of human autonomy with the modern 
generation, he did not leave the world come of age exempt from 
its sinful tendency— to deify itself with the false belief that 
its' power is sufficient unto itself and that no place for God 
remains in such a world. Against both distorted notions of God's 
presence and absence, respectively, Bonhoeffer held up the cross 
as the sole locus for determining God's place and presence in the 
world. Both past generations and the present generation may not 
be able to accept such an understanding of God because of the 
terms in which God makes Himself known. Not only is it a hidden 
presence, it is best understood in social terms. We prefer 
definitions that offer direct access and divine tutelage for 
ourselves or absence and asocial autonomy from God. Instead, 
Bonhoeffer points only to the "Man for others."
If Bonhoeffer is offering up a new definition of God's power 
in socio-ethical terms and in theological terms which parallel 
one another, then how are we to understand Christian action in 
the world? What is its power? As Bonhoeffer continued his 
thoughts in the prison letters on an autonomous humanity and 
God's suffering in the world, and as he pointed to new theologi­
cal formulae like the "arcane discipline," a "world come of age," 
and a "non-religious interpretation of theological concepts," he 
carried through with his ethically-grounded hermeneutic, offering 
UP a new way God's presence might be understood aright in a world
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that had grown tired of a childish god-concept, guaranteeing the 
Church of its identity in the same ethical terms.
Just as the terms of human responsibility in Ethics achieved 
their meaning from concepts like freedom, acceptance of guilt, 
and deputyship, so Bonhoeffer's christological principle of 
"being there for others," involving the same ideas, is at the 
heart of God's powerful presence in the world. In other words, 
human power, or autonomy, and divine power both gained expression 
in terms of the christological event of the atonement. But 
Bonhoeffer had a special word for the Church, for those who are 
"caught up into the way of Jesus Christ, . . . into the messianic 
suffering of God."87 Bonhoeffer, following Luther, believed true 
theology speaks of the disciple's cross as much as it does 
Christ's. And he spoke of this discipleship in terms of God's 
ultimate word of grace and human penultimate action which 
prepares its way. We turn now to see how Bonhoeffer expressed 
in ethical terms the way God's grace may lead contemporary 
society toward its work of preparation.
IV. Preparing the Way for a New Model of Power
As Bonhoeffer struggled to articulate the contours of the 
Christian's participation in God's powerlessness in the world, 
he made a clear connection between Christ's cross and that of the 
Christian. First, about God and the nature of His power:
Who is God? Not in the first place an abstract 
belief in God, in his omnipotence etc. That is not a 
genuine experience of God, but a partial extension of 
the world. Encounter with Jesus Christ. The experi­
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87 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, pp. 361-62.
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ence that a transformation of all human life is given 
in the fact that 'Jesus is there only for others' . 
His 'being there for others' is the experience of 
transcendence. It is only this 'being there for 
others', maintained till death, that is the ground of 
[God's] omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence .
And then, about the Church and the nature of its power:
[t]he church is the church only when it exists 
for others . . . [i]t must not under-estimate the
importance of human example (which has its origin in 
the humanity of Jesus and is so important to Paul) ; it 
is not abstract argument, but example, that gives its 
word emphasis and power.88
The similarity is vastly apparent. In opposition to any abstract 
concept having to do with God, the Church and the form of their 
presence in the world, Bonhoeffer offered a thoroughly socio- 
ethical and theological definition of both. "Being there for 
others," the christological principle which shaped his entire 
theology, turned out to be the partially hidden form of God's 
true power in the world. And the arcane discipline, with its 
ethical notion of prayer and righteous action, is the hidden form 
of the Church's presence and power in the world.89 Therein lies 
the redefinition of divine and ecclesiological presence according 
to the cross in terms of hiddenness and power.90
88 Bonhoeffer, "Outline for a Book," pp. 381-383 .
89 Recall that Bonhoeffer described the "arcane discipline" 
in terms of mystery, silence, and invisibility." Cf. Bethge, 
Bletrich Bonhoeffer. pp. 784-86.
90 In pointing out the uncanny similarities between the 
theologies of Ronald Gregor Smith and Bonhoeffer, Clements 
highlights one very interesting similarity. He said, "Gregor 
Smith was still deeply under Kierkegaard's influence in these war 
years, and of course the theme of the suffering and humiliation 
°f Christ was central to Kierkegaard, especially for example in 
his book Training in Christianity. But whereas Kierkegaard
With the concept of the arcane discipline, Bonhoeffer 
articulated in non-religious terms God's ethical transcendence 
in the world. As we remember, Bethge affirmed the non-religious 
interpretation as "more an ethical than a hermeneutical category 
and also a direct call to penitence directed at the Church and 
its present form— for the sake of . the kerygma, the
language."91 The arcane discipline is a prime example of this 
interpretation. And we hold that this is the way Bonhoeffer 
depicted God's transcendent presence in ethical terms, overcoming 
the weakness of Barth's unfinished religious critique. And the 
fact that he did so in dialectical terms of power and weakness, 
ultimately in conjunction with the terms of a theology of the 
cross, augurs well the paradigm which runs throughout his life 
and thought.
For Bonhoeffer, God's power was redefined in christological 
terms of "being there for others," taking on human sin and guilt, 
and offering forgiveness to sinner and Christian alike. Indeed, 
God's authority is self-evidenced in the justification of the 
sinner. This is the locus by which God's power in the world may 
be understood. His poem "Christians and Pagans" reflects this 
most fully. The church's power was redefined in the same way, 
as an "existing for others" which involves taking on the sin and
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stresses the offence of Jesus' suffering humanity, the absurd 
paradox of the crucified God-man, Gregor Smith simply points to 
the 'fact' of the humanity of Jesus as the sign and explanation 
of his divinity. Gregor Smith is not asking for acceptance of 
an absurdity, but for a reversal of the assumptions which make 
for absurdity— and by so doing was coming close to the very 
Lutheran christology which the imprisoned Bonhoeffer was shortly 
to re-emphasize . . . Clements, What Freedom?. p. 162. It is
this "reversal of the assumptions which make for absurdity" that 
are after in depicting the transformation of values and 
Redefinitions which surface in Bonhoeffer's theology.
91 Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, p. 78 3.
guilt of others, standing in their place vicariously and 
performing sacrificial acts in their behalf. This is the more 
specific meaning assigned to the "Messianic sufferings of God in 
the world" which Christian followers join in. Thus, the 
ambiguity surrounding some of these "problematic" ideas92 is 
clarified at a basic level, and they surface as more fully 
informed and instructive motifs than is often credited them.93
Bonhoeffer, then, was able to realize, at least partly, who 
Jesus Christ was for him, or more particularly, would be for the 
coming generation, with this new theological formulae of the 
arcane discipline. Prayer which leads Christians into the 
Messianic sufferings of God in the world is the concrete, ethical 
expression of God's ultimate grace leading followers into paths 
of righteousness for his sake. Beyond imitation, it is a 
"preparing of the way" which is created in us, in free obedience 
to the one who is the "Man for others," Jesus Christ. But this 
way is a hidden way, not one that all will discern or follow.
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92 See Simon Fisher, Revelatory Positivism, p. 313.
93 Humility is at the root of Bonhoeffer's vision for the way 
the Christian community may prepare the way for a new model of 
power. And it is a humility borne out of "selfless self- 
assertion" as Bonhoeffer described it, not an arrogant acting in 
one's own behalf or a concern primarily with self-preservation. 
As John Godsey pointed out, "Far too often in the history of the 
church Christians have acted as if they were better than others. 
They have forgotten that their call is not to privilege but to 
service. To the extent that they have elevated themselves over 
others they have lowered themselves in the eyes of God. 
Christian missionaries have lorded it over natives and have 
demeaned their culture. Christian armies have carried on 
crusades against the heathen . . . Where there is no humility,
there is no understanding of Christian freedom or Christian 
love." John D. Godsey, "Toward A Theology of Maturity," Unpub­
lished paper presented at the Sixth International Bonhoeffer 
Society Conference in New York City at Union Theological 
Seminary, August, 1992, pp. 8, 9. That humility is assigned to 
power is made all to clear by Bonhoeffer pointing out it in his 
"Outline for a Book" that Christ's selfless "being there for 
others" is the defining point of His power in the world.
It is a way marked by power, but a power characterized by 
selfless service for others incurring guilt and granting forgive­
ness to others. Moreover, the Church's power is protected from 
falling into self-idolatry because God's ultimate forgiveness for 
the Church of its sins leads it humbly toward the way that it is 
to prepare for others.
Bonhoeffer asked us to let those who suffer inform our 
actions in the world, a notion in full keeping with the theologia 
crucis' emphasis on the suffering humanity of Christ. Indeed, 
God's ultimate forgiveness leads us to desire nothing other than 
to serve. He said, "We must learn to regard people less in the 
light of what they do or omit to do, and more in the light of 
what they suffer."94 Allowing those who suffer to inform our 
actions in terms of service reflects a large part of the essence 
of God's grace which transforms us and turns us away from our own 
self-interests. The arcane discipline holds within its structure 
the theological and socio-ethical understanding of God's powerful 
presence in the world, and how it leads the Church to paths of 
action which conform to His selfless action of "being there for 
others." And it is the hiddenness of the secret discipline which 
not only protects it from profanation, but which reveals the true 
nature of its power.
Because many persons perceive God's presence in terms of a 
Sovereign potentate who is in control of human affairs, and 
because many perceive God's permanent absence in the world as 
well, it becomes imperative to understand the nature of God's 
hiddenness, and Bonhoeffer does so in a way that brings comfort 
and hope. The hiddenness of God's presence in terms of weakness
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94 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, p. 10.
is God's very strength. And this hiddenness is understood in 
more than one sense. Hidden behind our sinful understanding of 
what constitutes not only divine power, but human power as well, 
is the true power of the cross which reverses these distorted 
images. The person becomes not an object to be dominated or 
overcome, but a gift of God to be served. God's true power 
restores one's vision of the other as person, not object, and the 
nature of power as service, not domination. Only the cross with 
its "costly forgiveness" reverses these wrong definitions of God, 
wrong definitions of persons, wrong definitions of power. It is 
the hermeneutical guide toward such definitions which makes 
transformative definitions ethically possible in this-worldly 
living.
The hiddenness involved in Bonhoeffer's understanding of 
Christ and the Christian's power resides in the hiddenness of the 
arcane discipline. Bonhoeffer's description of the Church's 
power as "existing for others," specifically through prayer and 
righteous action, presumes a transformation which occurs in the 
do-er of the action. Such grace-filled change as a result of 
God's gracious forgiveness manifests itself in persons' atti­
tudes, lifestyles, relationships, and actions. The hidden change 
formed in the person becomes visible in specific, concrete ways, 
terms which Bonhoeffer began putting expression to with the 
notion of the arcane discipline. Such a model excludes patroniz­
ing action "for the other" because it fundamentally involves 
Persons in relation with one another. Action for the other might 
be defined in terms of the do-er's new attitude toward personal 
money management, food consumption, worship, prayer, tithing, 
education, etc. Bonhoeffer articulated the beginning of his 
vision for the way the Church could exert its power "existing for
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others" in terms of relinquishing property, bi-vocational clergy, 
unsalaried positions, etc. Thus, it is never blind, ill-informed 
action "for the other" but action in active, well-educated 
relationship "with and for the other."
Conclusions
Bonhoeffer was beginning to articulate new parameters for 
the church, new parameters by which Christ's presence may be 
understood. He expressed this in the Ethics with the notions of 
the ultimate-penultimate, and conformation, and again in the 
Letters and Papers from Prison with the arcane discipline. This 
is but a part of the new language he struggled with to express 
what Christianity in a non-religious age would look like. Its 
hiddenness is partly understood in eschatalogical terms, terms 
which promise hope and new direction for the Church in a world 
come of age.95 Bonhoeffer provides a model of power which 
gains its meaning in terms of his theoloqia crucis. With the 
arcane discipline he proposed a period of temporary silence in 
the Church so that its identity might be renewed and recast in 
connection with a world which had grown up and cast away old 
images and definitions. As a result of this investigation we see 
a new definition and model of God's power in the world has been 
borne from within the structures of Bonhoeffer's theology itself.
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95 Such hope is seen no more clearly than in former Eastern 
European churches where Bonhoeffer's non-religious interpretation 
of Biblical concepts helped Christians living under the pressure 
of atheism break through communist and atheistic isolation and 
Proclaim the gospel in non-religious terms for their own 
countries. See Jan Ligus, "Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Democracy," 
unpublished paper presented at the Sixth International Bonhoeffer 
Society Conference, Union Theological Seminary, August 1992, p.
Indeed, the time for silence has passed, and the Church stands 
faced with positive new terms and practices assigned to power and 
how they are manifest in the world. It is a language of promise 
and hope bequeathed to the present generation, its very potency 
evidenced by its hiddenness.
The contemporary Western Church will demonstrate whether or 
not its action is turned in upon itself or is fundamentally 
turned outward toward the other.96 It will demonstrate whether 
its identity and action is gained from conformation to God's 
gracious self-giving for others, or whether it evidences a 
corrupted practice of power, fixated on itself. A new ethical 
model of power, such as the arcane discipline, will only take 
hold in a world come of age by allowing Christ's hidden presence 
to take shape. Unless such conformation takes place within the 
Christian community, we will forever be in pursuit of images, 
symbols and metaphors, trying to gain for humanity what cannot 
be achieved by human effort, no matter how noble or clear­
sighted. Bonhoeffer's model of power for the Church— prayer and 
'righteous' action in the world— brings a fresh understanding of 
what constitutes true power and what does not. Such a language 
assigns authority to service, sociality to power, grace to 
limits, and a hiddenness to reality. The question is, are the 
Church and the world ready to hear this new word?
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96 In his recent book What Freedom? Keith Clements helpfully 
Points to the notion of the Church as "deputy", drawing from 
Bonhoeffer's Ethics (Bristol: Bristol Baptist College, 1990, pp.
97f 98) . With such a notion, a dominion of the church over 
society and the world is rejected and "being there for others", 
the christological principle of vicarious action is authoritative 
instead. Further, we would point out our earlier point— that 
God's dominion or rule in the world manifests itself in terms of 
deputyship. This is the nature of divine rule and the church's 
power in the world.
CONCLUSIONS
Bonhoeffer's perennial query is well known— Who is Jesus 
Christ? And who is he for us today? Our research yielded an 
interesting partial answer to the German pastor's relentless 
question. By taking a long hard look at the way God is concrete­
ly present in the modern world, we came to discover a new 
paradigm in Bonhoeffer's theology. We saw a new language 
therein, providing critical content to the concepts of human and 
divine power in terms of the cross. We turn now to take stock 
of Bonhoeffer's paradigm of power and to clarify whether it does 
provide a coherent and promising path for theology today. We 
begin by summarizing the individual findings of the four 
chapters, concluding with final comments on the study as a whole.
In chapter one we saw how Bonhoeffer came to describe God 
increasingly in terms of weakness and less in terms of power. 
In so doing, a paradigm surfaced, one out of which he articulated 
his understanding of God. We demonstrated this by going through 
his theological corpus, showing a steady progression of such 
terminology from his early work until his last theological 
letters in prison. This progression revealed how God came to be 
described more explicitly and thoroughly in terms of power­
lessness. Hence, Bonhoeffer's theology of the cross, which we 
identified clearly in The Cost of Discipleship and fully in 
Letters and Papers from Prison, demonstrates that his understand­
ing of God as hidden was expressed consistently and specifically 
in terms of God's weakness hiding God's power. Rather than 
Permanently eschewing the notion of God as powerful and advocat­
ing one in diametrically opposite terms— a weak God— Bonhoeffer 
held up God's weakness on the cross, in the world, as the way to
understand God's real power. The cross provided that critical 
content.
We came away from our examination of the progression with 
a definition of sorts, involving a two-part "movement" in 
Bonhoeffer's understanding of God. It could be stated in the 
following way: first, there is a reversal of terms. Bonhoeffer
discussed God less and less explicitly in terms of power, 
relinquishing any lingering titanic images and incorporating the 
"weak" God more and more. Although he eventually came to say 
that God is not as we imagine,1 he did not leave traditional 
notions of God in critique. He offered a constructive proposal, 
a redefinition of terms.
The redefinition constituted the second part of the two part 
"movement" in Bonhoeffer's definition of power. By this we mean 
that the meaning attached to the "weak God" was increasingly 
gathered in terms of the theologia crucis. Thus, Bonhoeffer not 
only pointed to a theological method (a reversal of terms), but 
a theological content (a redefinition based on a re-evaluation 
of values) which is fully in line with that of Luther's theology 
of the cross. Method and content reflect and inform one another. 
The re-evaluation of values that occurs as a result, specifical­
ly, is that God's power is. his self-giving of himself on the 
cross.
At the heart of the redefinition is Bonhoeffer's notion of 
"the power of weakness," one of the most profound theological 
concepts he was to hold to throughout his life.2 The passion
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1 Letter of 21 August, 1944, Letters and Papers from Prison. 
P. 391.
2 According to Bethge in his biography, Dietrich Bonhoeffer. 
Se^citi., p. 374.
event is the authoritative demonstration of divine power in the 
world, and Bonhoeffer describes it in thoroughly social terms, 
emphasizing the ethical nature of God's atonement in the process. 
Such power remains hidden to the world, however, because of 
misdirected preconceptions of what God's power in the world looks 
like.
Bonhoeffer's theology of the cross has been underestimated 
in the past for two reasons: first, because of a lack of
identification and recognition of the dialectical terms, the 
language— weakness and power— in which it came to expression; 
secondly and, simultaneously, the way in which these terms 
increasingly took on their meaning, dialectically, according to 
Luther's theologia crucis throughout his theology. Bonhoeffer's 
theology of the cross is typically assigned to The Cost of 
Discipleship and Letters and Papers from Prison and left there. 
Although certain themes of his theologia crucis have been 
identified in Bonhoeffer's early work among scholars, the failure 
to identify this dialectical motif has contributed toward this 
unintentional underestimation.
In chapter one we saw how Bonhoeffer provides us with a new 
definition, a new language by which God may be understood in 
terms of power. In chapter two, we moved on to see what such a 
definition meant for human power as against conventional 
understandings by looking particularly to his Ethics and Letters 
and Papers from Prison. In this chapter we saw the reversal of 
terms and redefinition of power in explicit detail, along with 
the "re-evaluation of values" that occurs with a theology of the 
cross. Looking at the way Bonhoeffer discussed divine weakness 
in relation to human strength provided the sharpened focus.
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Bonhoeffer rejected the twin notions of persons exercising 
power over God as well as the idea that God lords power over 
human beings. With Barth, Bonhoeffer did away with the 'reli­
gious' idea of God.3 With Bultmann, he assigned anthropological 
"weakness" a credible status in the theological enterprise, 
particularly by rejecting the notion of a deus ex machina. 
However, Bonhoeffer departed from the status Bultmann assigned 
to weakness as the paradigmatic anthropological category. We 
showed how Bonhoeffer rejected any kind of "tyranny of weak­
ness,"4 yet how he reinstated another kind of weakness altogether 
which yielded power's true definition.
We then saw how Bonhoeffer, with Nietzsche and Feuerbach, 
rejected the notion of a powerful God who preys on weak human 
beings. Supplanting the strong God/weak humanity paradigm, their 
source of disagreement centered on their constructive proposals 
and how to deal with the death of this God concept. While the 
atheist philosophers replaced the God concept with a strong 
humanity, (i.e., becoming the superman fUber-mensch) . Bonhoeffer 
agreed with the death of the God concept. replacing it with the 
living God of the Bible. In this way, Bonhoeffer pushes human 
reason to its limits, affirming full autonomy and health to
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3 As Paul Lehmann said so well, "Barth and Bonhoeffer are 
being asked by the oncoming theologians of our time to make sense 
of Jesus Christ in the midst of the culture and experience of a 
"world come of age"; whereas Barth and Bonhoeffer, in their turn, 
are asking the oncoming theologians in our time to make sense of 
the culture and experience of a "world come of age" with due 
regard to the concrete presence and pressure of Jesus Christ in 
our midst . . . Paul Lehmann, "The Concreteness of Theology:
Reflections on the Conversation Between Barth and Bonhoeffer," 
from Martin Rumscheidt, ed., Footnotes to a Theology: The Karl
Barth Colloguium of 1972, (n.p.: The Corp. for the Publication
of Academic Studies in Religion in Canada, n.d.), p. 62.
4 As Roger Johnson referred to it in his essay, "Religious 
Mythology and a Secular Faith: The Weakness of Man and the 
Weakness of God."
anthropology, while coming to terms (literally) with a very 
different God— a weak God whose power is manifest in a specific 
way in relationship with a strong, automous humanity.
Research has confirmed in the past the theology of the cross 
as the foundation of Bonhoeffer's "non-religious interpretation," 
but not in such a way as to see the profound extent to which it 
informs Bonhoeffer's hermeneutical idea. For example, Bonhoeffer 
proves that he is not vulnerable to the traditional charge 
against Luther, that his theology harbors a basic irrationalism. 
Joining in the philosophical challenge, Bonhoeffer pushed 
theology to make a more radical claim while affirming a healthy 
concept of humanity at the same time. His dialectical under­
standing of power reveals this healthy tension.
A second ramification of the connection between his 
theologia crucis and the non-religious interpretation has to do 
with his strong concept of humanity with the world-come-of-age. 
The question inevitably arises, if the two-part methodological 
movement of Bonhoeffer's notion of human power follows the same 
pattern as his notion of divine power, does the concept of an 
autonomous humanity hide within it a kind of weakness that is not 
self-evident and has not been named yet? If God's power is 
hidden in terms of weakness in the cross, does human power need 
to come to terms with its own weakness to be honest with itself? 
Bonhoeffer's understanding of the hidden nature of reality, along 
with his contextual remarks about the dangers inherent within 
modern society would suggest that such an investigation is 
warranted.
Eberhard Bethge said Bonhoeffer's new non-religious 
interpretation was to be understood as an ethical category moreso 
than a linguistic one. Chapters three and four focused on the
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ethical terms bound up in Bonhoeffer's theological understanding 
of divine and human power. In chapter three we delved into one 
of his works, Creation and Fall, to examine his ethical treatment 
of sin in terms of power. While Luther did have a systematized, 
triadic understanding of sin (root— unfaith; fruit— ontic 
egocentricity; event— ingratitude), Bonhoeffer did not articulate 
his understanding in the same way. Certainly, he was limited by 
circumstance, as well as the fact that this was not an intention­
al part of his theological agenda in the same way as it was with 
Luther. However, he did have a very specific understanding of 
sin's event or concrete expression, and it came in terms of 
power.
While for Luther, the event of sin issues forth as ingrati­
tude (Undankbarkeit), for Bonhoeffer it was understood as the 
human abuse or misuse of power. In his exegesis of Genesis 1-3, 
Bonhoeffer depicted sin as Adam's domination of Eve, treating her 
as an obstacle to be pushed aside. The other person became 
something to be overpowered. Sin took expression, then, in terms 
of a material objectification of the other, thus, a full 
sociality underlying his ethical depiction of sin's event.
It was interesting to see how Bonhoeffer described the 
relationship between Adam and Eve as it would be when restored 
by grace. The other (Eve) is seen by Adam as a person to be 
served and given thanks for. The relationship between the two 
is marked by selfless serving; understanding the other person as 
a gift by God. Sin wrenching this intimacy apart, creates a 
wedge between Adam and Eve so that domination of the other and 
self-centered thinking mark one's actions and attitudes.
It was also interesting to see how he described power from 
two different perspectives. He discussed it either as the power
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of the other5 in graceful, "outward-looking" terms as selfless, 
gracious service to and with another; or, power turned in on 
itself, in sinful, self-centered terms as objectifying domination 
of the other. In one case, he described human power socially, 
in terms of a person to be served thankfully; in the other case, 
the "other" person was described as an object to be pushed aside. 
Bonhoeffer's lectures on the Biblical creation account represent 
his most concrete expression of power where he characterized sin 
in terms of material objectification and domination of the other.
Such a paradigm for understanding sin's ethical, concrete 
event raises important issues and questions. First, we articu­
lated the belief that a materialistic objectification of power 
is a very common one in contemporary Western society. Power as 
an object to be seized or possessed— such a notion indicates a 
negative understanding at its base. It remains something to be 
grabbed from the hands of others, something to be renunciated, 
or, in its most positive light, a thing to be shared equitably 
among persons. Bonhoeffer showed us that he speaks of power in 
terms of sociality, not objectivization. Further, it is not only 
a social concept, it gains its meaning from Christ's selfless 
giving of himself for others as the authoritative demonstration 
of divine power.
Two questions arise as a result of Bonhoeffer's social 
understanding of sin in terms of power. First, he described the 
"other" in terms of a "limit" in his lectures on creation and 
sin. The notion of persons described as "limits" or "boundaries" 
extended across Bonhoeffer's theology. He made reference to it 
here, but whether or not it is a concept that fits into his
5 Or "strength" (Kraft) of the other as it occurs in the 
English translation of Creation and Fall.
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overall social paradigm is worth being questioned. Adam's 
domination of Eve was regarded as a fundamental trespassing of 
the other, for she was his "limit." In this way, the notion of 
limit is consistent with Bonhoeffer's understanding of sin as an 
objectification of the other. But how do you emphasize the other 
as "limit" in power's graceful interpretation? How does one 
serve a limit? Articulating sin in social terms, as Bonhoeffer 
does, the use of this concept seems to indicate an inconsistency 
in his use of concepts, if not a limit to his overall depiction 
of sin's sociality.
A second question which must be raised has to do with 
Bonhoeffer's understanding of sin as domination of the other 
person. Agreeing with Luther, that the root of all sin is pride 
(superbia), he went on to define sin's ethical event issuing 
forth in terms of domination, objectification and aggression. 
But such terms do not accurately describe sin's event for many. 
Self-abnegation describes the ethical expression of sin for many, 
and Bonhoeffer's paradigm does not address this opposite 
expression of sin's event. This is a limit of Bonhoeffer's 
theology in that his normative depiction of sin as a material 
objectification of the other presumes pride at its base and 
domination as its expression. Hence, it would be wrong to assign 
Bonhoeffer's conception of sin universal status.
As a result of our investigation into chapters one, two and 
three, we came away with a definition of divine and human power 
in Bonhoeffer's theology as the selfless giving of oneself in 
delation with and for another. Christ's passion at the cross 
dictates this meaning, providing a critical measure against which 
conventional definitions may be measured. However, the notion 
°f power defined in terms of service might not find acceptance
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as a definition easily because of negative connotations easily 
associated with concepts like "selflessness" and "sacrifice." 
Is Bonhoeffer suggesting a "worm mentality"— suggesting we think 
of ourselves in reduced terms? Everything we have seen about his 
understanding of power does not suggest this in the least. In 
chapter two, his redefinition of humility clearly supplanted any 
quandry in this direction, not to mention his agreement with 
Nietzsche and Feuerbach's philosophical critique against a weak 
anthropology. It is a different kind of selfless service 
Bonhoeffer points us toward, and it was to this that we looked 
in chapter four.
Having identified the two-part movement of Bonhoeffer's 
definition of human and divine power in the previous chapters, 
in chapter four we sought to determine the full meaning of 
Bonhoeffer's dialectical concept of power and weakness. We did 
this by looking to his notion of the arcane discipline as a 
viable model for power. By looking at the political implications 
of prayer, the boldness involved in acting vicariously in behalf 
of others and the dialectic that exists between the two, we were 
able to show how the same "movement" occured in his model of 
power as was true for his definition based on the event of the 
cross.
We saw how Bonhoeffer ingeniously linked eschatology with 
ethics— both in his notion of the arcane discipline and with his 
concept of conformation to Christ— and how such a linkage yields 
a new paradigm for understanding and exercising human power. We 
come away from his provocative thoughts, seeing "service" as a 
concept connoting a humble authority, rather than a cowering 
servitude. In this final chapter we saw most clearly how 
Bonhoeffer redefined power in terms of service, providing content
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to both in dialectical fashion according to the hidden power of 
the crucified and risen Lord.
As a result of this study, we have seen the perennial 
question, "Who is Jesus Christ? Who is He for us today?" 
partially answered by Bonhoeffer in terms of a hidden presence: 
the weak, crucified Christ whose power is hidden in the the 
cross. That is where the meaning is determined. Throughout his 
life, Bonhoeffer was constantly striving to determine that 
concrete revelation of Christ's presence in the world. In every 
chapter we saw the ethical expression of this in terms of power.
By offering us this new understanding of who Jesus Christ 
is in terms of power, we understand the new language in terms of 
a christological ethic. The soteriological-ethical content of 
the act of Christ's atonement is the foundation for the new 
language. In this way, we see, finally, that Bonhoeffer did not 
make fragmentary and ambiguous stabs at a non-religious language. 
He gave a solid start and consistent expression to a new language 
from within his work as a whole. In this way, he went beyond 
Barth's critique of religion, offering concrete ethical expres­
sion to a new ethical language for the coming generation. With 
his dialectical concept of power he showed how power can be 
released from a meaning characterized by a materialistic 
objectivization to become a social, relational concept at it s 
base. He demonstrates how power gains its fundamental meaning 
from the cross in terms of service, as opposed to conventional 
notions of power which commonly connote zero sum thinking.
With this new language and the specific meaning attached to 
it, we see Bonhoeffer reinstating "service" as well as "power" 
as theological concepts. He points to a new authority in 
service, just as he points to a new selflessness in power— all
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as a social category, informed by Christ's act of atonement on 
the cross. "Power" is no longer bound by negative connotations 
and practices that presume domination, aggression, exploitation 
and reification of others, just as "service" is no longer bound 
by negative connotations and practices that presume subordination 
and self-abnegating behavior.
Finally, as a result of our investigation into Bonhoeffer's 
dialectical understanding of power, we see the legitimacy and 
need for power analysis in theology today. With him, we have a 
paradigm that holds within its contours critique and promise, a 
sure diacritical point by which theological definitions and 
assumptions can be weighed as well as new paths which will lead 




Interview of Eberhard Bethge 
by Leslie Alford
(reprinted with permission)
(On 20 November 1993, the author met with Eberhard Bethge in 
Wachtberg, Germany to discuss the ways in which the motifs of 
power and weakness manifest themselves in Bonhoeffer's life and 
theology. The following discussion is a summary of our inter­
view, condensed for the sake of clarity and coherency.)
Alford: Toward the end of Creation and Fall Bonhoeffer described
the Fall in terms of overpowering the other person and 
transgressing the limit of the other. God's grace after 
the Fall is discussed as restoring the human relationship, 
in terms of relating to the other as "gift", someone to be 
served. It seems that Bonhoeffer is speaking in those 
terms, with sin as an overpowering or a dominating of the 
other person, whereas with God's grace the person informs 
your very action. What is your understanding?
Bethge: The whole notion of Macht and ohne Macht which is in
your thesis, is in fact an experience in the overriding 
theme of the human being as a related entity. Power is one 
way of relating to others. But you will be disappointed if
you use it, because it just destroys the relatedness. On 
the other hand, you cannot put it away, because it's always 
a play going on from one to another or from the other back. 
This was so with Bonhoeffer.
For example, Dietrich taught Sunday School in Berlin 
in Grünewald. There he experienced his own power in how 
the children wanted to be his friend and that made him 
nervous. He experienced his own power in how he attracted 
all kinds of children. This experience was with him so 
much so that one day he wrote a letter, which unfortunately 
is lost, to an older student in Tübingen, telling him about 
this experience in Sunday School, and how it could be 
dangerous. That letter unfortunately is lost but I think 
it is very characteristic.
Then there was the later period when he was a teacher 
of his students at Finkenwalde. He again experienced this 
power he had over others. In theology, in games, in all 
kinds of activities as the director there, he experienced 
this power.
You probably have heard that Bonhoeffer tried to 
revive oral confession at Finkenwalde. One day I was 
chosen by Bonhoeffer to listen to his confession. I was 
totally inexperienced in this. Bonhoeffer said he had days 
of deep depression sometimes, and that began when he was so 
successful. When he observed that people made themselves 
absolutely dependent on him to come to their own conclu­
sions, then he started to lose all meaning of faith, 
because of this experience of success.
Again, that was his life experience, that he always 
controlled— physically, mentally, theologically— in every
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matter. At the same time, he had the feeling that one 
could misuse that great power all the time. With that 
experience he came to points of deep depression.
I remember you've mentioned that in your biography at 
different points, that he would enter these depressions.
Which again makes clear that power is a means, and the 
priority is relatedness, positively and negatively.
I am reminded of the Ethics because there he brings up the 
theme of success. Exactly what you just said, in the 
context of Ethics. has to do with what Bonhoeffer said 
about deception when people assign so much authority, so 
much power, to a very charismatic figure. My understanding 
is that he is referring to Hitler at that time, and peo­
ple's tendency at the time to buy into slogans and catch- 
phrases, not thinking for themselves, and assigning their 
authority totally over to someone else. He begins to speak 
of that as deception, and how the terms of success are 
confused at that point.
One thing I am curious about, and particularly as I 
have seen the Life in Pictures— it seems that Bonhoeffer is 
a very "romantic" figure in the sense that it is very easy 
put him on a pedestal and not think of him as a person. 
That happens quite often in America, I think. But when I 
read what he was like, I would imagine that had I met him 
I would have been intimidated. You can sometimes get the 
impression that Bonhoeffer loved everyone, but he was 
demanding.
B: He was demanding. But of course he had a sense of humor
and liked to tease. He didn't like to lose in games, he 
wanted to win, and was able to win.
A: I remember your recounting his days as a school child when
he stood up and said "I will be a theologian!" Not many 
children that age would take things so seriously, and the 
experience says a lot about him, it seems to me.
B: Yes. I think that his whole life was a struggle to come to
terms with his own power over others. And in the end he 
accepted it as a gift. As soon as you use your own power 
for others, then the tristitia or the accedia stopped. In 
a way, his returning from America in 1939 solved, or was a 
great contribution to solving, that problem. In America he 
would have continued and continued his own power. He would 
have become a great theological teacher, a great friend of 
all of them there. But it would have been a continuation 
of his own growing power. So, his whole biography is from 
promising, highest claims and highest possibilities. He 
wrote his dissertation earlier than anyone else, he was 
always open to becoming a professor, full professor in 
Berlin— the main place of theology in Germany in those 
days. Everything was open to him. Then his biography is 
one of reducing and reducing, going back, into nothing. He 
became nothing, not a bishop, not a professor. He became 
nothing, nothing.
He would have become a professor, of course, as soon 
as possible, in 1939 in America if he would have stayed. 
But that would have aggravated his problem of power. So he
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came back. He decided to go back into that place where 
there was no prospect of a great career. But he gave his 
power in the service of others. In the form of his contri­
bution to becoming a member of the conspiracy. Something 
which was, from his earlier point of view, absolutely 
impossible. The pacifist became a putschist.
That is the background out of which he could say after 
coming back here, in a letter he wrote to me, "No repeti­
tions of tristitia." From that point on, not only in his 
theology, but in his life, he had made a step of no return 
in the service of others, with others.
A: In your biography you referred to his movement from talking
about the weak Christian community as the locus where God's 
freedom limits itself in Act and Being, to The Cost of 
Discipleship, where he talked more about the weak Word that 
is despised and rejected and the weak Christ. You said one 
of the most profound aspects of Bonhoeffer is to be found 
in this "power of weakness." I wonder if you could say a 
little more about this "power of weakness" in a theological 
sense.
B: Well, look at the poem "Pagans and Believers."1 That's
1 [For an aid to the reader, "Christians and Pagans" is
reprinted:
1. Men go to God when they are sore bestead,
Pray to him for sucour, for his peace, for bread,
For mercy for them sick, sinning, or dead;
All men do so, Christian and unbelieving.
2. Men go to God when he is sore bestead,
Find him poor and scorned, without shelter or bread, 
Whelmed under weight of the wicked, the weak, the dead; 
Christians stand by God in his hour of grieving.
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very much in the center of him and of his theology. We 
have the pagans— they ask God for mercy. Then there is 
that complete opposite change in verse two. But that total 
change in verse two could itself become again something of 
the wrong power. Therefore, there is the third verse, in 
which Dietrich did not let that second verse become an 
ideal.
In his Christology he always looked under this kind of 
experience or dynamic: that step from the first verse to
the second verse or from the second to the third. He knows 
exactly what religion is in verse one. That's very human, 
very understandable. Then he discovers that secret— even 
the cross can become idolatry, therefore, verse three.
A: When you say the word "idolatry" I think of the connections
being made between Bonhoeffer and liberation theology, 
i.e., the emphasis on the theme of suffering. I found very 
helpful the element in Bonhoeffer that prevents an idolatry 
of suffering, and in that sense, an idolatry of the cross. 
But the deputizing element, as you pointed out in your 
biography, is what prevents it from slipping into an 
exaltation of mysticism or a self-pity of the suffering.
I don't know of another theologian who could speak so 
concretely about suffering in terms of responsibility. 
That is, being in such close relation with others, one's
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3. God goes to every man when sore bestead,
Feeds body and spirit with his bread;
For Christians, pagans alike he hangs dead,
And both alike forgiving.
Dietrich Bonhoeffer: "Christians and Pagans," Letters and Papers 
from Prison. (New York: Collier Books, 1972) p. 348.]
actions may involve suffering or sacrifice, but one is not 
thinking in terms of one's own suffering. That is what was 
so impressive about Bonhoeffer in the Letters where he 
said, "I don't consider what I'm doing suffering."
B: No, and not a martyr. The very early Christians— they
understood apparently when they set the terms for what 
makes a martyr a martyr. Excluding that self-offering as 
a martyr which destroys martyrdom. First of all, martyrdom 
is to be acknowledged by the churches connected with the 
apostles, prophets, and the martyrs. Martyrs must do their 
acts out of free choice. But secondly, it must never be 
self-offering, because then you would exclude yourself 
totally off the list of being counted as a martyr.
Dietrich understood that. That's one of the secrets 
that in the Bonhoeffer family, in the most difficult years,
you had to enjoy music and plays and such.
You know, we had our fiftieth wedding anniversary 
recently, Renate and me. On the 5th of April in 1943, 
Bonhoeffer was imprisoned. In the middle of May was our 
wedding and for that we had a great celebration in the 
family. If you look at these letters written by Dietrich, 
in those days he said, "You must enjoy your wedding. Don't 
cut it short and don't think that I suffer because I am not
with you because I am in prison. You must enjoy it." So
there never was self-pity, or an element of self-pity in 
him and in his suffering. That makes these letters and 
papers from prison so influential. That there is something 
of a freeing element in it. Even when there is death next 
to you, you enjoy life.
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During the conspiracy, sometimes, some of the conspir­
ators came together in that house, in that private house in 
Berlin. But first we played a concerto. Ernst von Harnack 
played the first flute, I played the second flute, Emmi 
Bonhoeffer and Renate's father played the violin, and Klaus 
Bonhoeffer played the cello. We did that with Dietrich. 
And when Dietrich was in prison, we continued to do that. 
That's such an important element of using your powers or 
gifts, the musical gift can be a power too.
I think in a way that that was a result of Dietrich's 
whole theology and life. That he understood, too, then how 
to deal with his power. His power over other people. His 
great gifts with which he was, and became, so influential, 
and even with his intellect. But at the end, difficult 
theological problems do not remain; but the most simple 
thing in life is at the same time the most difficult. So 
I've started now with your theme from another view. Power 
or non-power, weakness— that is all describing actually 
relatedness, positively and negatively. Dietrich looks at 
Christ and at the Church, what they are in that scheme.
I've wondered what you think of Bonhoeffer's theology of 
the cross. Much has been written on his notion of "joining 
in the messianic sufferings."
But the secret of Christ's sufferings is that in its 
uniqueness there is nothing unique. Exactly why it was the 
most human is what makes it so unique.
A: I wonder about a certain characteristic of God's hidden­
ness: how easily one can miss the nature of God's being in 
terms of atonement, and as a Bonhoeffer spoke of it, in 
selfless giving to others. Bonhoeffer's life not only 
reflects this but also certain concepts like "being there 
for others" and "deputyship." It seems to me that these 
concepts are examples of the theology of the cross in 
Bonhoeffer.
B: He always says two things. He says, one thing is at the
same time another. It's always a dialectic.
A: How would you say a theology of the cross is present in his
theology?
B: It takes on new dimensions of experiences that have to do
with his own criticism to the cost of deception. That he 
suddenly realized, I am at the same direction of trying to 
find out how to realize or even to formulate it. But I 
have something monopolized or something that has come now 
on the point to become an ideologue. The theology of the 
cross as well as The Cost of Discipleship risked degenerat­
ing into an ideology.
A: Another question has to do with The Cost of Discipleship.
the christology therein, and the way his theology of the 
cross was developing explicitly at that time.
B: We should look to the Barmen Declaration, the solus. It
was an absolutely clear indication— Hitler is not God— but
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Christ is the God. This involves one in a polemic situa­
tion. When I hear pastors preach, they have no idea that 
the book of Psalms and the Biblical language are so polemi­
cal most of the time. When you say, I pray to God, that 
means I pray to this God of the Bible and not the other 
gods.
This dynamic was of course very much alive in Hitler's 
time. When you pray a psalm to God it is always a fight 
against other gods. I think Dietrich was very much aware 
of that too— that Christ never could mean anything beside 
or in addition to the first commandment.
In this way, I can see how Bonhoeffer was able to speak 
simultaneously about the "weak Word" and the commanding 
Christ without contradiction in The Cost of Discipleship.
Yes. Of course, you cannot think of Dietrich by talking 
about the weakness, weakness of the Word, weakness of 
Christ. Weakness is never letting everything go. Weakness 
is never weakness understood in the sense of giving in. It 
is the highest form of fighting, which makes aggressive 
persons over against me helpless in a way. Therefore, each 
prayer is an aggressive Kampfanzug. I'm not submitting to 
you, or if I submit to you, it's not at all submission. I 
submit to you and with that I have the stronger weapon in 
my hands.
Therefore, you have the rediscovery of the Psalms, for 
instance, because the Psalms are also fighting language. 
Every prayer means an Absage to other gods. Every prayer
to Yahweh means a "no" to pagan gods, the stronger gods, 
the gods with whole armies on their side.
A: That's why I'm convinced too that one has to be very
careful about suggesting what Bonhoeffer means by weakness 
because he constantly revolted against weakness, particu­
larly in the Letters and Papers. I remember he considered 
it a greater sin than folly. That is why I think he is 
reinterpreting what power and weakness mean.
B: Yes, the Barmen Declaration always gives first a biblical
sentence. Then comes a positive statement. And then 
always comes the negative, "we reject." And so, every 
positive prayer to God the Almighty is claiming that we 
know where "almightiness" is and we know where wrong 
"almightiness" is. With all their weapons they can make 
bloodshed. But they are powerless. It is this kind of 
triumphal prayer and knowing weakness that is the most 
powerful at work. Of course, that is not covering up your 
responsibility for Auschwitz.
A: What do you mean by that?
B: Auschwitz means putting aside the perpetrators, they have
to be hindered, they have to be . . . even killed. That is 
different from making war. Or making war has very differ­
ent motives or objectives.
Have you ever read Dietrich's decision to come back 
from the United States? It started during the nights of 
November 1938 when the synagogues were burned during
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Kristalnacht. Dietrich was reading Psalm 74, "they are 
burning all the houses of God" and where "we have no 
prophets anymore." He made up his mind in those weeks. He 
started to think now, is confessing the Barmen Declaration 
enough? You have to stop that man. You have to take over 
the guilt by actions which are sinful in a normal time.
Then, one evening in 1940 or 1941 we sat together in 
the house of the Dohnanyi's and Hans Dohnanyi asked Diet- 
rich, "Now there is that saying in the New Testament, 'he 
who takes the sword, shall be killed by the sword.' What 
about this? What about us?" Dietrich said, "Yes, that is 
true, and we'll be guilty. But these very people who are 
accepting that, they are now needed." This is the history 
behind it, which shows he doesn't say "No, you are justi­
fied by not taking any kind of weapon against these men." 
That is the progression to the Cost of Discipleship. He 
thinks about what the responsible action is and accepting 
the fact that there are several levels of guilt.
In America, once we were asked at Smith College "How 
could that theologian take action with the goal to kill 
Hitler?" Renate answered, "He does not have to justify 
that. The others who did not take action to kill Hitler, 
they have to be asked, 'How could they.'" You are not to 
ask, "How could he act that way." You have to ask, "How 
could he not act that way."
I have another question having to do with Nietzsche and 
Feuerbach, the influence they had on Bonhoeffer. My 
understanding is that he read Nietzsche early on.
B: Yes, he did.
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A: And I think that Bonhoeffer scholarship has shown quite
clearly that in these healthy, strong, vigorous images of 
humanity Bonhoeffer agrees with Nietzsche and Feuerbach
that it's not right to have these weak images of humanity.
Bonhoeffer scholars have pointed to the theology of the 
cross underlying that and as the impulse behind this very 
positive notion of contemporary Western men and women. I 
think people who want to argue for the philosophical 
influences in Bonhoeffer give too much credit, even though 
credit is due to them.
B: Too much, to Nietzsche and Feuerbach?
A: Yes, for these positive statements that he makes about
humanity particularly in the late theology.
B: Now there is the Hegel Seminar of 1933. That will answer
your question. But there was another reason why he liked 
to read Nietzsche here and there because of his fight with 
Wagner. We always wanted to come to terms with Wagner
music. And we turned more and more to hate Wagner and not 
to love him. Now just these great messages about why 
Nietzsche became an enemy of Wagner. And how he formulates 
that and at the end Nietzsche says, "Wagner makes people 
believe that he's very great." But that's a side element.
Of course this has to do with Dietrich's attempt of 
being put away from the center of life. The emphasis in 
Nietzsche for life, of course, excited him very much
because that he wanted to discover this. And just through 
the theology of the cross. We have never mentioned now, 
Luther.
In fact, that's in a very basic way I'm wanting to argue 
for the "Lutheran-ness" of Bonhoeffer to be taking a little 
more seriously.
His criticism for Karl Holl, his teacher in Berlin, that's 
important there.
Perhaps it's nothing more than giving the credit where the 
credit is due and then not trying to overextend the point 
of where those influences are. I think those are the last 
questions, actually I'm sure I have a hundred more, but 
those were the main ones I have to ask.
Appendix II
Clifford Green's Sequence for Bonhoeffer's Ethics 
Presented at Fifth International Bonhoeffer Conference1
First Work Period: 18 March-13 November 1940
"Christus, die Wirklichkeit und das Gute," August 1940?
(Christ, Reality and Good)
E 200-17, 225-26




Zettel 1, 38, et al.
"Ethik als Gestaltung" (2)
(Ethics as Formation)
E 77-94




Zettel 16, 61, 50, 62, 82, 63-69
on "Das Gute" (Good) for an unwritten chapter




(Guilt, Justification and Renewal)
E 117-27
Insert for "Christus, die Wirklichkeit Oct.-Nov. 1940
und das Gute"
(Christ, Reality, and Good
1 Clifford Green, "Textual Research for the New Edition of 
Bonhoeffer's Ethics" Panel Discussion, in Bonhoeffer's Ethics: 
Old Europe and New Frontiers. Guy Carter, René van Eyden, Hans- 
Dirk van Hoogstraten, Jurjen Wiersma, eds. (Kampen, Netherlands: 
Kok Pharos Publishing House, 1991).
Sept. 1940
9 Oct. 1940
Second Work Period: 17 November 1940-22 February 1941
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"Die Letzen und die Vorletzten Dinge" up to 10 Dec. 1940
(The Last Things and The Things Before the Last)
E 128-52
"Das natürliche Leben" up to 22 Feb. 1940
(Natural Life)
E 152-198
Third Work Period: 25 March-25 October 1941
"Die Geschichte und das Gute" (1. Fassung)
(History and Good)
GS III, 455-77
"Die Geschichte und das Gute" (2. Fassung) 1941
(History and Good)
E 227-78
Fourth Work Period: End of 1941-Autumn 1942
["'Personal'— und 'Sach'--Ethos"]
("Personal" and "Real" Ethos)
E 341-52
"Die Liebe Gottes und der Zerfall der Welt"
(The Love of God and the Decay of the World)
E 19-58
"Kirche und Welt I" 1942
(The Church and the World)
E 59-67
"Über die Möglichkeit des Wortes der Kirche an die Welt"
(On the Possibility of the Word of the Church to the World) 
E 376-84
["Die Lehre vom primus usus legis nach den lutherischen 
Bekenntnisschriften und ihre Kritik"]
(The Doctrine of the Primus Usus Legis According to 
the Lutheran Symbolic Writings and its Critique)
E 323-40
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"Das 'Ethische' und das 'Christliche' als Thema" 1942-43
(The "Ethical" and the "Christian" as a Theme)
E 279-302
"Das konkrete gebot und die göttlichen Mandate"
(The Concrete Commandment and the Divine Mandates)
E 303-19
APPENDIX III
Prison Letter of 23 January 19441
I very much agree with what you say in this connection about 
friendship which, in contrast to marriage and kinship, has no 
generally recognized rights, and therefore depends entirely on 
its own inherent quality. It is by no means easy to classify 
friendship sociologically. Perhaps it is to be regarded as a 
sub-heading of culture and education, brotherhood being a sub­
heading of church, and comradeship a sub-heading of work and 
politics. Marriage, work, state, and church all have their 
definite, divine mandate; but what about culture and education? 
I don't think they can just be classified under work, however 
tempting that might be in many ways.
They belong, not to the spheres of obedience, but to the 
broad area of freedom, which surrounds all three spheres of the 
divine mandates. The man who is ignorant of this area of freedom 
may be a good father, citizen, and worker, indeed even a 
Christian; but I doubt whether he is a complete man and therefore 
a Christian in the widest sense of the term. Our 'Protestant' 
(not Lutheran) Prussian world has been so dominated by the four 
mandates that the sphere of freedom has receded into the 
background. I wonder whether it is possible (it almost seems so 
today) to regain the idea of the church as providing an under­
standing of the area of freedom (art, education, friendship,
1 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, pp.
192-93.
play), so that Kierkegaard's 'aesthetic existence' would not be 
banished from the church's sphere, but would be re-established 
within it? I really think that is so, and it would mean that we 
should recover a link with the Middle Ages. Who is there, for 
instance, in our times, who can devote himself with an easy mind 
to music, friendship, games, or happiness? Surely not the 
'ethical' man, but only the Christian. Just because friendship 
belongs to this sphere of freedom ('of the Christian man'?!), it 
must be confidently defended against all the disapproving frowns 
of 'ethical' existences, though without claiming for it the 
necessitas of a divine decree, but only the necessitas of 
freedom. I believe that within the sphere of this freedom 
friendship is by far the rarest and most priceless treasure, for 
where else does it survive in this world of ours, dominated as 
it is by the three other mandates? It cannot be compared with 
the treasures of the mandates, for in relation to them it is sui 





Not from the heavy soil, 
where blood and sex and oath 
rule in their hallowed might, 
where earth itself,
guarding the primal consecrated order,
avenges wantonness and madness —
not from the heavy soil of earth,
but from the spirit's choice and free desire,
needing no oath or legal bond,
is friend bestowed on friend.
Beside the cornfield that sustains us, 
tilled and cared for reverently by men 
sweating as they labour at their task, 
and, if need be, giving their life's blood —  
beside the field that gives their daily bread 
men also let the lovely cornflower thrive.
No one has planted, no one watered it; 
it grows, defenceless and in freedom, 
and in glad confidence of life untroubled 
under the open sky.
Beside the staff of life,
taken and fashioned from the heavy earth, 
beside our marriage, work, and war,
the free man, too, will live and grow towards the sun.
2 Bonhoeffer, ibid.. pp. 388-91.
Not the ripe fruit alone —  
blossom is lovely, too.
Does blossom only serve the fruit, 
or does fruit only serve the blossom —  
who knows?
For both are given to us.
Finest and rarest blossom, 
at a happy moment springing
from the freedom of a lightsome, daring, trusting spirit, 
is a friend to a friend.
Playmates at first
on the spirit's long journeys
to distant and wonderful realms
that, veiled by the morning sunlight,
glitter like gold;
when, in the midday heat
the gossamer clouds in the deep blue sky
drift slowly towards them —
realms that, when night stirs the senses,
lit by the lamps in the darkness,
like treasures prudently hidden
beckon the seeker.
When the spirit touches 
man's heart and brow
with thoughts that are lofty, bold, serene, 
so that with clear eyes he will face the world 
us a free man may;
when then the spirit gives birth to action
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by which alone we stand or fall;
when from the sane and resolute action
rises the work that gives a man's life
content and meaning —
then would that man,
lonely and actively working,
know of the spirit that grasps and befriends him,
like waters clear and refreshing
where the spirit is cleansed from the dust
and cooled from the heat that oppressed him,
steeling himself in the hour of fatigue —
like a fortress to which, from confusion and danger,
the spirit returns,
wherein he finds refuge and comfort and strengthening, 
is a friend to a friend.
And the spirit will trust, 
trust without limit.
Sickened by vermin
that feed, in the shade of the good,
on envy, greed, and suspicion,
by the snake-like hissing
of venomous tongues
that fear and hate and revile
the mystery of free thought
and upright heart,
the spirit would cast aside all deceit, 
open his heart to the spirit he trusts, 
and united with him freely as one.
Ungrudging, he will support,
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will thank and acknowledge him,
and from him draw happiness and strength.
But always to rigorous 
judgment and censure 
freely assenting, 
man seeks, in his manhood,
not orders, not laws and peremptory dogmas, 
but counsel from one who is earnest in goodness 
and faithful in friendship, 
making man free.
Distant or near, 
in joy or in sorrow, 
each in the other 
sees his true helper 
to brotherly freedom.
At midnight came the air-raid siren's song;
I thought of you in silence and for long —  
how you are faring, how our lives once were, 
and how I wish you home this coming year.
We wait till half past one, and hear at last 
the signal that the danger now is past; 
so danger —  if the omen does not lie —  
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